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Abstract
The founding of the World Trade Organization in 1995, was hailed as a new era in 
resolving global trade disputes, with many academicians espousing a 
constitutionalised vision of world trade law. The constitutional evolution of WTO 
law is founded, not only on the text of the WTO Covered Agreements, but is also 
buttressed exceedingly by precedence and norms that are generated through 
adjudication by the panels and the standing WTO Appellate Body. Today, as is with 
most mature legal systems, international lawyers and academics avidly critique WTO 
jurisprudence and the interpretive methodology of its adjudicators. However, there is 
a dearth of scholarship on the implications of WTO law interpretation on developing 
nations. This thesis fills this void in research by constructing a framework for 
analysing the jurisprudence of the WTO from the perspective of developing nations. 
Subsequently, it proceeds to evaluate three agreements which are important for 
developing nations, i.e., the DSU and due process rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and 
the Antidumping Agreement. To this end, the framework for analysis is termed “the 
development approach” to fair adjudication, which is grounded on established legal 
concepts of legitimacy, justice and ultimately fairness.
The thesis demonstrates that a fair trading regime entails more than seemingly 
balanced treaty texts, but rather that adjudication of the treaties must include an 
approach, which recognises and accounts for the effects of interpretation on 
development. To this end, the adjudicators have to go beyond merely finding the 
literal meaning of the treaty text, but embrace an approach, which is guided by the 
context and purpose of WTO provisions. The analysis reveals that the adjudicators 
of the WTO have failed to recognise the nexus between interpretation and
development and as such, have created a body of case law that harms the 
development ambitions of third world countries.
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Introduction
The new World Trade Organization (WTO) regime for resolving trade disputes has been 
hailed as one of the greatest advances in the realm of public international law.1 Yet, 
developing nations have been at the forefront of the criticisms lobbied against the 
functioning of the dispute settlement regime of the WTO. Unlike the original 1947 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade2 (GATT), the 1994 Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization covers a much wider range of trade issues. It extends beyond 
goods and embraces, inter alia, services, intellectual property, investments and 
agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc 
agreements and understandings. Rather, all trade obligations are subsumed under the 
auspices of the WTO. Under rules established at the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (UR), Members must ratify and accept the obligations contained in all 
the WTO-covered agreements as a “single package.” 3
The WTO Agreement also ushers in a new era in decision-making by the parties and in 
the resolution of disputes. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),4a 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) consisting of panels and an Appellate Body (AB) 
adjudicates trade disputes between parties. A WTO member may invoke the compulsory
1 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter DSU, Apr. 15, 
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
hereinafter WTO Agreement, Apr. 15,1994, in World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947, TIAS No. 1700,55 UNTS 194.
3 There are plurilateral agreements in the field of civil aircrafts, government procurement, and dairy 
products, which are only binding on parties that have accepted the terms of these agreements.
Supra at note 1.
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jurisdiction of a panel to settle a dispute,5 in addition to the automatic right to appeal 
panel decisions. Cases, which go to the Appellate Body, involve questions of law arising 
from the WTO agreements, with important implications in relation to international legal 
and normative issues.6
As international relations have become increasingly dominated by economic factors, the 
WTO system was created to move away from the GATT power-oriented diplomatic 
approach to trade relations and embrace a more legal-oriented approach to dispute 
settlement.7 In struggling to address the need for fairness in international economic 
relations, dispute settlement panels and the AB provide a forum for the airing of 
grievances regardless of a party’s economic power. Theoretically, developing countries 
are given an opportunity to challenge the trade measures of economically strong states 
that normally dominate international negotiations and multilateral institutions. One of the 
objectives in installing a rule-based dispute resolution mechanism within the trade regime 
is to entrench the legitimacy of the regime itself and provide for better incentives to 
comply with international trade obligations.8 The global acceptance of a compulsory 
dispute settlement system lends credibility to developments in international trade law and 
elevates the importance of public international law in general. One of the key elements 
of this thesis is the creation of a framework for fairness so as to evaluate the case law of
5 DSU Article 6.
6 DSU Article 17.
7 Petersmann, E.U., The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International 
Organizations, and Dispute Settlement, 1997, (Kluwer Law); Jackson, J.H. Restructuring the GATT System 
(1990), pp. 56-78; Weiler, J.H.H., The Rule o f Lawyers and the Ethos ofDiplomats: Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy o f WTO Dispute Settlement, (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9100) at 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/links/index.html.
8 See e.g., Jackson, J.H., The World Trading System: Law and Policy o f International Economic Relations, 
(2000); McGinnis, J.O., Movesian, M.L., The World Trade Constitution, (2000), 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511; 
Petersmann, E.U., supra at note 7.
the WTO in relation to the agreements most consequential to the economic development 
of developing Members. This framework is termed the “development approach to fair 
adjudicatioa”
The acceptance of the WTO system is inextricable from the Members’ conception of 
fairness and justice. Fair adjudication is a natural and obvious expectation in any legal 
regime founded on the rule of law. According to Thomas Franck, fairness entails a 
certain level of legal legitimacy in addition to a proper allocation of justice.9 With regard 
to developing nations, which have a large stake in the judicialisation of the WTO, 
legitimacy, justice, and consequently, fairness are crucial.10 This is due to the fact that 
international trade norms have become more concrete and constitutional in nature.11 It 
would be much more difficult to overcome the impediments to export-oriented economic 
growth of developing nations in a system that is legal in nature, yet lacks the requisite 
threshold of fairness from their perspective.
The advent of the WTO dispute resolution system and its judicialisation still affords a 
significant role for diplomacy and non-legal argument in the system Indeed, one can 
detect a sense of resentment amongst non-lawyers who participate in the dispute 
settlement against lawyers, who are introducing legal concepts that are unfamiliar to
9 Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Clarendon Press, 1995) pp. 26-32.
10 It is, however, conceivable to have a legitimate adjudication or law; yet, it is not deemed to be fair under 
the Franckian theory of fairness. This occurs if the proper allocation of justice is not achieved, thereby 
rendering the law unfair since justice was not properly taken into account.
11 Cass, D.Z., The Constitution o f International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine o f  
Constitutional Development in International Trade, 2001,12 EJIL 39-78; Jackson, J.H., The WTO: 
Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1998, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House); 
McGinnis, J.O., & Movesian, M.L., supra at note 8.
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technocrats.12 However, as John Jackson and others have claimed, the juridical or rule- 
oriented approach preceded the establishment of the WTO, but has been extended greatly 
under the new institution.13
The DSU furthers the role of legal adjudication in international economic relations by 
instituting a permanent appellate tribunal. This reflects the need to create neutral arbiters 
of trade disputes, who base their decisions primarily on interpretations of the WTO law 
and regulations. As such, fair decisions under the “development approach” to 
interpretation would facilitate and assist in formulation of solutions that are mutually 
acceptable to the parties, while remaining consistent with the norms and principles of the 
WTO and public international law. Disputes under the GATT 1947 necessitated that 
panels choose one party’s interpretation over others, contingent upon the acceptance of 
the ruling by the losing party, because consensus was the requirement for the adoption of 
a dec is io a  This led to a large number of decisions that were never adopted. Hence, 
panels were likely to be influenced by the objective to reach a mutually accepted 
solution, constantly searching for the lowest common denominator.14 The new WTO 
system was designed to liberate the adjudicators from this bind by mandating negative 
consensus whereby all parties, including the “winner,” must vote to reject the ruling of 
the DSB. By providing automatic adoption of reports, it is believed that the parties have 
“substituted legal legitimacy for political legitimacy” in the dispute settlement
12 Cameron, J., & Gray, K., Principles o f International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 2001,50 
I.C.L.Q. 248 p. 249.
13 Jackson, J.H., The World Trading System 1989, MIT Press p. 85. Also see, Hudec, R.E., Enforcing 
International Trade Law: The Evolution o f the Modem GATT Legal System, 1993, (Butterworth).
14 Jackson, J.H., The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture: Reflections on Constitutional Changes to 
the Global Trading System, 1996,72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 511.
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mechanism.15 Yet, to determine whether developing nations view its legitimacy in the 
same light, and how that affects the fairness of the system from their perspective, will be 
a major objective of this thesis.
Over 315 cases have been initiated in the dispute settlement body by late 2004.16 This is 
in marked contrast with the number of disputes heard under the GATT 1947 over a 
period of some 40 years.17 The creation of the AB, with its standing body of 7 
distinguished international judges and legal professionals, increases the sophistication of 
international trade as it provides a certain level of legal and judicial credibility. As the 
panel and AB develop a recognisable body of case law, the fairness of the system 
becomes ever more crucial for developing nations. The fairness of the system lies in both 
its legitimacy and the manner in which justice is distributed. These two notions together 
must be commensurate with a notion of law that also takes into account certain socio­
political principles related to trade and development. In fact, with respect to developing 
countries and development as a process, the WTO has indicated that trade and 
development issues are at the core of the Institution’s objectives.18 The theoretical 
background to the proposed “development approach” does admit of teleological 
elements. However, this is justified because it is argued that at a certain point in the 
deliberation process of the judges, where they must select a particular argument or 
interpretation in lieu of others, the teleology and conception that the adjudicators hold are
15 Chua, A., The Precedential Effect o f WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports, 1998,11 L. J. I. L. 45 pp. 
46-47.
16 Statistics found on www.wto.org and www.worldtradelaw.net by 10/11/2004, although there is a slight 
difference in the calculation between the two sources accounting for panels established but never operated 
or other consultation-phase settlements which the DSB has not been informed of by the parties.
17 Statistics found on www.wto.org.
18 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, ratified 1995, Preamble.
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greatly influential in the ultimate decision. Thus, even the most textually inclined judges 
will be making decisions grounded on their teleology of international trade law.
0.1 Origin of the Project
The establishment of the WTO dispute settlement regime had been one of the most 
important and crucial developments in international trade law and economic relations. 
The GATT had been deemed obsolete by the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, and the 
negotiators at the UR were struggling with achieving a consensus on the procedures and 
principles of a new dispute settlement regime.19 The outcome was lauded as a major 
accomplishment since, for the first time, the WTO procedures created mandatory 
jurisdiction for Members with a much stronger binding effect. The overarching 
theoretical justification was that the new regime would create better predictability, 
effectiveness, and implementation of trade rules globally, which firms in the 
industrialised nations desire in the long nrn.20 For developing nations, which had great 
problems in gaining positive outcomes during the GATT years of dispute settlement due 
to their power-oriented and consensus-based approach, the new WTO would allow them 
to bring forward cases and, if victorious, afforded them the opportunity to obtain 
remedies from Members, such as the US, the EC, and Japan. The legalised and binding 
nature of the new WTO dispute settlement would inoculate developing countries from the 
power politics that was rife under the GATT, and in lieu, would herald a new trade
19 Hudec, R.E. The Crumbling Edifice o f GATT, 1992,14 Geo. Wash. J. Int’lL. 23 pp. 27-30.
20 Hudec, R.E., The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview o f the First Three Years, 1999, 
8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, pp. 4-9.
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regime based on law. Raw power was to be curtailed for the sake of establishing a global 
framework for the rule of law in the international trade realm.
Seven years after the founding of the WTO, I arranged to interview representatives of 21 
developing country Members in order to better appreciate developing countries' 
perspective on the new dispute resolution regime.21 One of the key findings was that 
many developing nations’ WTO delegations were concerned about the jurisprudential 
direction of the DSB. The following statements are some examples of responses given 
by the interviewees from those delegations to the question of: “What is your major 
criticism or concern in relation to the new dispute settlement regime and its adjudication 
process or methods?”
‘I t  is too legalised and formalistic to the point of being viewed by us as unfair.”
“We are worried about the way in which the adjudicators reason their cases.”
“The dispute settlement system hasn’t been good to our interests.”
“The adjudicators in general have little idea about the problems faced by developing 
countries.”
211 interviewed the following representatives of developing nations to the WTO: Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, South Africa, 
Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and, South Korea. The interviews 
were held at the Missions or Offices of the national representatives in Geneva, Switzerland from 5/2/2002 
to 15/3/2002. The interviews were between 75-105 minutes in duration and a set of core questions were 
asked from each delegation with discretion to ask other follow-up questions as deemed appropriate. The 
interviewees were either the Ambassadors of the respective countries to the WTO or International 
Organizations based in Geneva, legal attaches responsible for representing their countries at the WTO, or 
carried the title of Representative to the WTO. Some interviews were held in the presence of another 
official of the respective Mission, though most were done on a one-on-one basis. Due to the confidential 
nature of the WTO dispute settlement process, none of the interviewees were willing to go on record as to 
the particular content of the remarks.
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“The TRIPS [Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] and 
Antidumping and Subsidies issues are not handled fairly.”
“The TRIPS should have never been part of the WTO and now that it is, it is more 
problematic than we thought”
“They {the panellists and appellate body} are not sure themselves about how to settle 
disputes especially for antidumping cases in developing countries.”
“Legalisation is good but America and Europe still rule the roost.”
Another 9 interviewees gave similar or “qualitatively” similar responses bringing the 
total to 18 of 21 Members exhibiting dissatisfaction with the interpretive methodology 
and jurisprudence of the dispute resolution regime. The underlying perception of these 
officials was that somehow the new legalised system has not met their expectations and 
that it is not functioning to protect their countries’ trade interests to the same extent as it 
protects industrialised Members.22
The interviews led me to research the doctrinal issues and interpretive methodology at the 
heart of WTO jurisprudence. What had moulded this negative perception of the 
adjudicative regime by the highest legal and diplomatic trade officials in light of the
22 In response to the question, “Do you think that the DSB recognises and protects your and other 
developing nations’ trade interest equivalent to US and EC trade interests?,” 10 out of 21 interviewees 
explicitly mentioned that their trade and institutional interests are not being addressed vis-a-vis 
industrialised Members, such as the US, EC, Canada, and to a lesser extent, Japan. Another 5 interviewees 
gave less explicit responses, but in follow-up questions agreed with the opinion of the others that trade 
interests of die powerful Members are protected more so than the developing nations. For instance, one 
interviewee stated: “A representative from {Name of a developing Member} has said in diplomatic circles 
that ‘America and the Europeans get much more out of the dispute settlements system because they are 
America and Europe, but we have to fight for every decision that helps us out” The interviewee continued, 
“We have no reason to counter that claim or disagree.” Of the other 6 ,4  believed that their interests are 
treated evenly. The other 2 respondents declined to answer that question.
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initial optimism expressed after the founding of the WTO in 1995 by all parties? This 
negativity went beyond the accepted grievance that developing countries received an 
imbalanced deal at the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Their grievance had taken for 
granted the asymmetry in the balance of trade interests in the WTO Covered Agreements. 
Rather, they claimed that when the adjudicators could “do something to help {developing 
countries} within acceptable legal norms” they still failed to provide maximum benefit to 
developing countries’ trade interests whilst they addressed developed nations’ interests.
Aside from the interviews, one can find developing country dissatisfaction in three other 
avenues of research, i.e., WTO institutional declarations, academic works, and reports of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which contain the reasoning of the adjudicators and 
the claims and arguments of the disputants. Several declarations at the WTO institutional 
level have asserted that approaches to interpretation taken by the AB and panels have 
operated against the development objectives of third world Members.23 These concerns 
began to permeate in the officialdom of the WTO in 2002 and have since been the topic 
of discussion and negotiation at the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.24
23 See, amongst others, (TN/DS/W/15, Sept 25,2002) by Kenya on behalf o f the African Group that stated: 
“In their interpretation and application of the provisions, the panels and the Appellate Body have in several 
instances exceeded their mandate and fundamentally prejudiced the interests and rights of developing- 
country members as enshrined in the WTO Agreement’; (TN/DS/W/18, Oct. 7,2002) India on behalf of 
Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; (TN/DS/W/17, Oct. 9,2002). 
Zambia on behalf of the LDC Group stated: “A careful reading of the accumulated jurisprudence of the DS 
system thus far reveals that the interests and perceptions of developing countries have not been adequately 
taken into account.” Also in Qureshi, Interpreting World Trade Organization Agreements for the 
Development Objective, 2003, 37 J.W.T. 5 pp. 847-882.
24 For instance, see (WT/MIN (01)/Dec/W/2, Nov. 14,2001) concerning the TRIPS Agreement. It holds 
that the role of the “object and purpose,” as opposed to the strictly textual approach admittedly being taken 
by the adjudicators, must be given a central role. This statement signalled the dissatisfaction of developing 
Members due to the excessively textual approach used by the adjudicators, which effectively created 
circumstances that would reduce access to cheaper medicine. Also in Qureshi at note 23 above.
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For the first time, developing Members directly criticised the evolving jurisprudence of 
the WTO as being devoid of “development-friendly” norms and objectives.25
In relation to academic works, Robert Hudec published an article that attempted to show 
that the much higher rate of cases brought forth by Members in the new WTO in contrast 
to the GATT system is not necessarily a signal that the new regime is better or more 
successful.26 Hudec maintained that one way of testing the success of the new system 
would be to see whether the weaker Members of the WTO have brought more cases 
against industrialised Members, as this would be an indication that power relations have 
been curtailed.27 After comparing the relevant statistics on claims and cases, he argued 
that the great surge in cases could be explained by the extended coverage of the WTO- 
covered agreements as opposed to the sole GATT agreement on trade in goods.28 
Hudec’s statistical analysis has been extended by other academics using more 
sophisticated and complex models so as to gauge the success of the regime and to see 
whether there is a bias against certain Members or sectors 29
Yet, Hudec and other scholars researching this area admit that statistical analysis alone is 
not sufficient to prove the success or failure of the dispute resolution system; rather, a 
more legal-doctrinal approach where the cases are analysed in more depth is the most
25 See declaration by Zambia at note 23, stating: “The panels and the Appellate Body have displayed an 
excessively sanitized concern with legalisms, often to the detriment o f the evolution of a development- 
friendly jurisprudence.” Also, in Qureshi at note 23.
26 Hudec, R.E., The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview o f the First Three Years, 1999,
8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1.
27 Ibid. pp. 2-6
^Ibid. pp. 10-18.
29 Holmes, P., Rollo, J., Young, A.R., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the GATT?, 
2003, World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 3133.
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accurate way to decipher the success of the new system.30 The success or failure of the 
system is related to whether the legalised system creates a more fair or equitable regime 
vis-a-vis the old power-based GATT system Other commentators who have analysed 
and evaluated the process of interpretation have reaffirmed Hudec’s claim that the quality 
of the decisions and interpretations is the best indicator.31 However, Hudec and other 
scholars did not address the issue that success for one type of Member may be perceived 
as a failure for other Members, or the type of framework for evaluation that should be 
used when taking a doctrinal approach.
The methods of interpretation have been the subject of consideration for many panel and 
AB rulings in accordance with rules set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) Articles 31 and 32. The VCLT suggests that the adjudicators must 
focus on the ordinary meaning of the words, the context of the law, and the object and 
purpose of the provisioa However, developing countries have often criticised the 
methods used by the adjudicators in interpreting and applying WTO provisions.32
30 Hudec, R., supra at note 26, pp. 2-4.
31 See e.g., Footer, M., Developing Country Practice in the Matter o f WTO Dispute Settlement, 2001 35 
JWT 1, pp. 55-98; Slotboom, M.M., Do the Different Treaty Purposes Matter fo r Treaty Interpretation? 
The Elimination o f Discriminatory Internal Taxes in the EC and the WTO Law, 2001, J.I.E.L. 557-579; 
Raustiala, K., Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 2000,1 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 401; Jackson, J.H., The 
Jurisprudence o f GATT and WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, 2000, (Georgetown 
Univ. Press); Qureshi, A., supra at note 23; Steinberg, R., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 2004,98 Am. J. Int’l. L. 247.
32 The following cases were frequently cited by delegates of developing countries in the interviews of 2002 
(see footnote 21). Each of the cases were cited by at least four interviewees to the question: “Do you have 
any examples of cases where you feel the panellists or the AB judges interpreted WTO provisions in a 
manner that is not, in your opinion, standard practice in relation to the Vienna Convention or past WTO 
practice?” (the full name and citation of cases added author): European Communities-Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Imports o f Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (WT/DS141/R, adopted Oct. 2000); US-Import 
Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (WT/DS58 & 61/AB/R); Indonesia-Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry(WT/DS54/R, adopted July 1998); Argentina-Footwear Safeguards 
(WT/DS21/AB/R, adopted January 2000); Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry 
(WT/DS139/R adopted Feb. 11,2000); Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export o f Bovine Hides 
(WT/DS155/R, adopted, Dec. 2000); Brazil-Export Financing Programs for Aircraft (WT/DS46/AB/R
11
This dissertation will attempt to take a developing nations’ perspective in its evaluation 
of the WTO dispute settlement regime by first establishing a framework for the 
evaluation of the case law of the WTO, termed the “development approach to fairness.” 
It then focuses on the case law relating to the two most troublesome and important 
agreements in the WTO in relation to development, i.e., TRIPS and the Antidumping 
Agreement (ADA).33
0.2 Aims and Scope of Thesis
The underlying theme that arises from the research is that the role of adjudication and 
interpretation as facilitators of development has not been properly addressed by the DSB 
as reaffirmed by the ongoing debate at the WTO institutional level. As mentioned above, 
there exists a substantial amount of scholarship that uses either a statistical model or a 
trade interest-based approach for evaluating the dispute settlement regime from the 
perspective of developing countries. However, there has been no research of substance 
that takes a jurisprudential approach to evaluating the WTO system This thesis does 
take a jurisprudential approach and grounds its evaluation on legal theories of fairness, 
justice, and legitimacy.
adopted Sept. 1999); India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports o f Agricultural, Textiles and Industrial 
Products (WT/DS90/R, adopted April 1999); India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, 
(WT/DS146/R, adopted Dec. 2001).
33 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh 
Agreement Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights {hereinafter 
TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement}; Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994; Agreement 
on Antidumping {hereinafter Antidumping Agreement, Agreement on Antidumping, or ADA}.
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To this end, it will be argued that in order for the system to be fair towards developing 
nations, the adjudicators are obliged to rule in a manner that will further the development 
objectives of these countries. The concept of fairness demonstrated under the 
development approach will assist the adjudicators in their decision-making process so 
that developing nations are able to achieve their development goals within the framework 
of WTO law and regulations. These objectives may be categorised as institutional 
capacity-building at the domestic level and market access to industrialised nations for 
their exports. In relation to the former, developing countries face major impediments to 
their economic development due to their lack of institutional and legal capacity. 
Moreover, WTO obligations encroach heavily on their domestic decision-making 
capabilities because developing countries’ policies must conform to a certain set of 
international rules and norms, e.g., they cannot provide export subsidies or minimum 
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights. With regard to access to 
wealthy markets, the Uruguay Round creates asymmetric market access obligations that 
impede the export interests of developing countries to the industrialised markets, a 
situation that is exacerbated by excessive industrialised Members’ usage of trade 
contingency measures such as antidumping.34
The TRIPS Agreement creates implementation problems for developing countries that 
are caused by their lack of institutional capacity and by their problems in accessing 
knowledge. The keenness to protect domestic industries from the reduced tariff bindings
34 Arguably, the concessions given to developing countries in their sectors with comparative advantage, i.e., 
agriculture and textiles, by industrialised countries pale in comparison to the concessions given by 
developing countries in sectors in which the industrialised countries have an advantage, i.e., services and 
intellectual property. Moreover, industrialised countries have negotiated the ADA in a manner that allows 
for purely strategic levying of duties on imports from developing nations.
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negotiated in Uruguay has made antidumping measures the strategic weapon of choice in 
blocking access to the markets of the industrialised Members. Therefore, as the two most 
problematic agreements for the economic development of developing Members, the 
TRIPS and the ADA will be the foci of jurisprudential evaluation under the development 
approach to fairness.
0.3 Organisation of Thesis
The thesis is divided into five chapters in addition to a conclusioa Chapter 1 will begin 
with a background to the dispute settlement regime and then will proceed to explain the 
developing countries’ participation and interplay in global trade dispute settlement 
regimes. Furthermore, it will present a theoretical framework and the justifications for 
that framework, which borrow from the ideas of Thomas Franck, John Rawls, and Ronald 
Dworkin. This framework will be used throughout the thesis as a tool for evaluating the 
jurisprudence of the WTO as pertaining to the TRIPS and ADA. Chapter 2 will discuss 
the procedural rights issues decided by the AB and their effect on developing countries’ 
litigious interests. In deciding the contours of procedural rights, such as burden of proof, 
third-party submissions, judicial economy, and others, the adjudicators have not properly 
addressed developing countries’ lack of legal resources since the adjudicators rule in a 
manner that is not legitimate under the development approach.
Chapter 3 will shift the focus on intellectual property disputes pursuant to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Under the TRIPS Agreement, the main issues of concern for developing
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countries are: (1) the implementation of the costly positive obligations of the Agreement 
and (2) access to knowledge. Thus far, the built-in flexibility of the TRIPS text that 
grants Members leeway in the methods they may employ for implementing the 
obligations of the Agreement has not been given full authority in the rulings of the DSB. 
This flexibility diminishes the costs associated with the implementation of the TRIPS and 
allows for the promulgation of policies that assist developing nations in accessing 
knowledge. Due to a dearth of adjudicated cases pertaining to TRIPS provisions, the 
thesis will present hypothetical cases in order to demonstrate the application of the 
development approach to TRIPS cases.
Chapter 4 will discuss the economics of antidumping, the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement, its theoretical underpinnings, and its strategic use as a protectionist weapoa 
The argument presented attempts to demonstrate that the rise in antidumping measures 
has little relationship to liberal economic fundaments, as they are used as a strategic 
instrument for protecting non-competitive domestic industry from the tariff reductions 
agreed to in Uruguay. In Chapter 5, the case law of the WTO in relation to antidumping 
will be analysed using the development approach to fairness. To this end, it is argued 
that the adjudicators have ruled in a manner that does little to curtail the protectionist 
impulses of domestic authorities in industrialised countries within the confines of the text 
of the Antidumping Agreement. In essence, the rulings of the adjudicators in 
antidumping cases only perpetuate the use of antidumping measures as the optimal 
instrument for preventing market access in industrialised nations to developing country 
exports. In the Conclusion, a brief summary of the arguments made throughout the
15
thesis will be revisited, with the ultimate aim of showing that the new legalised WTO 
dispute settlement system does not take into account the legitimate trade and 
development interests of developing countries as a jurisprudential matter leading to 
unfairness.
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Chapter 1
Constructing a Framework for Fairness
A fair system of dispute settlement is the fundamental task and objective of any 
legal regime founded on the rule of law. One of the underlying goals in the 
establishment of the new WTO system was the extension of the rule of law into the 
international trade realm, in contrast to the more diplomatic nature of the old 
GATT regime. In order for the system to be fair towards developing countries in 
the context of WTO dispute resolution, the adjudicators are obliged to rule in a 
manner that will further the development objectives of these countries. The notion 
of fairness demonstrated in this chapter will assist these nations in achieving their 
development objectives within the framework of the WTO. These objectives may 
be categorised as institutional capacity building at the domestic level and market 
access to industrialised nations. As to the former, developing countries do not 
have the institutional infrastructures that allow them to play the trade game equally 
vis-a-vis powerful Members and the WTO obligations encroach heavily on 
domestic capabilities of Members. With respect to the latter, the Uruguay Round 
created asymmetric market access obligations that impede the export interests of 
developing countries to the industrialised markets. In fact, these impediments to 
trade and development are embodied in two major Agreements within the WTO 
covered Agreements, i.e., TRIPS and ADA. TRIPS creates implementation 
problems due to a lack of institutional capacity, whilst the ADA creates obstacles 
to market access for developing countries’ exports to the industrialised nations.
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In order to engage in a debate on the fairness of the WTO system, some 
background description of the current legal, political, and development policies of 
Members, and a framework for analysis are required. Therefore, this chapter will 
address the following issues: In the first section, background issues such as
indications of development, the identity of developing countries in the WTO, and 
reasons for their participation in global dispute settlement will be discussed. The 
discussion will then focus on explaining some of the key elements of the WTO 
dispute settlement regime and then proceed to justify the use of the TRIPS and 
ADA as the most problematic of agreements under the WTO. Finally, the chapter 
will lay forth the theoretical underpinnings and justifications for the use of a 
development approach to fair adjudication. To this end, the last section will justify 
the inclusion of the justice elements into the interpretive process and show that the 
adjudicators inevitably make decisions, which have a strong grounding in teleology 
and judicial politics. Subsequently, in formulating the development approach to 
fair adjudication, the work of Thomas Franck on fairness will be utilised, with 
certain elements being supplemented by Rawls’ theory of justice and Dworkin’s 
principled approach to the law.
Global trade negotiations after the Second World War were conducted by and large 
by industrialised nations for industrialised nations. Developing countries gradually 
became bigger players in the global trade negotiations due to the confluence of a 
variety of political and economic realities. They included, amongst others, the 
demand for ever more export markets by multinational corporations based in the 
rich world, the intellectual and policy-making traction and inertia created by 
proponents of free trade, and the subsequent failure of import substitution
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industrialisation (ISI) models in the third world. As a result, developing nations, 
willingly or not, increased their participation. After decades of negotiations and 
trade dispute settlement under the auspices of the GATT and its subsequent 
obsolescence, a new and transformed WTO was founded with a dispute resolution 
mechanism that had greater binding effect. All parties were to benefit from this 
new system, and developing countries were expected to benefit the most as a more 
legalised system would inoculate them from the power politics associated with past 
dispute settlement under the GATT. This new system warrants evaluation from the 
perspective of developing Members.
1.1 Identifying Developing Countries
The classification of some states as economically developed does not suggest a 
static standard that once attained remains constant. The notion of economic 
development is progressive: It provides comparative economic indicators that at 
any given time may be used to evaluate the level of performance of states. Hence, 
standards of technology or degrees of affluence that once were high, if maintained 
during times of technological advancement, may well be considered as indicative 
of stagnation.1 Many developing countries have witnessed stagnation in their 
infrastructure and the services they provide, if not outright regression, in an age of 
technological advancement.
In the context of the WTO, however, there are four groupings of Members: 1) 
Industrialised nations, which include the US, EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, New
1 Bondzi-Simpson, P.E., Dilemmas o f Development Through Law, 1992, in Bondzi-Simpson, P.E., 
The Law and Economic Development in the Third World,pp. 1-21, p. 3.
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Zealand, Switzerland, and Norway; 2) Economies in Transition, which are mainly 
former Eastern Bloc nations with previously command economies 3) Lesser- 
Developed Nations, which number 32 in total and have been designated as such by 
the UN. These nations have a per capita GDP under $1,000 USD. 4) Developing 
nations, which are all the countries that do not fall within these three categories 
mentioned and have officially designated themselves as such. This group has the 
highest membership and includes countries such as India, Brazil, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, South Africa, and China. The focus of this thesis is the fourth group of 
Members and their participation in the dispute settlement process.
1.2 Indications of Development
The basic indicators used in evaluating the degree of economic development of 
states, as prescribed by the World Bank, are, inter alia, per capita GDP, annual 
growth rate of GDP, annual rate of inflation, and life expectancy.2 However, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses the GDP 
Criterion to distinguish different types of developing nations.3 Other economic 
indicators used by international agencies to compare and categorise states include 
the degree of industrialisation of a nation and the availability and affordability of 
social services such as education and health. A brief overview of some of these
2 The World Bank in its annual reports called World Debt Tables: External Debt o f  Developing 
Countries (Washington D.C. IBRD) uses these indicators in its evaluation of developing countries; 
Handelmann, H. The Challenge o f  Third World Development, 2002, (Prentice Hall) pp. 163-165
3 See, for example, OECD report: External Debt Statistics: The Debt and Other External Liabilities 
o f  Developing, CMEA and Certain Other Countries and Territories. (1989). Paris p. 5.
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indicators that are utilised by relevant international organisations and institutions is 
as follows:4
1. Growth of production: average rate of growth of GDP
2. Structure of production: GDP and the sectoral distribution of GDP
3. Commercial energy: production, consumption, and imports as a percentage of 
merchandise exports
4. Structure of manufacturing: value added in manufacturing and the distribution 
of manufacturing value added to agriculture, textiles, equipment chemical 
produce, and technology
5. Growth of consumption and investment
6. Structure of demand: distribution of GDP on general government
consumption, and on private consumption domestic investment
7. Structure of consumption: total share of household consumption on food, rent, 
fuel, health, education, transport, and communication
8. Growth of merchandise trade: volume of merchandise trade (imports and 
exports, average annual growth rate of trade)
9. Structure of merchandise imports
10. Structure of merchandise exports
11. Balance of payments and reserves
12. Total external debt: long-term public and private guaranteed debt
13. Health and nutrition
14. Education: level of unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled labour
15. Urbanization: urban population in relation to total population
4 For further research, see Wilber, C., & Jameson, K., The Political Economy o f  Development and 
Underdevelopment, 1995, (McGraw-Hill); Meisarri-Polsi, T., UNCTAD and Sustainable 
Development-A Case Study o f  Difficulties in Large International Organizations. 1988 in 
Perspectives on Sustainable Development by Stockholm Group of Studies on Natural Resource 
Management 1989.
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The list of indicators mentioned above can lead one to realise where the main 
differences between the level of development amongst the industrialised and 
developing countries lie. Industrialised nations are better endowed not only in 
GDP per capita but also in the other 14 indicators of development. This imbalance 
is better known as the development gap that the WTO adjudicators must consider 
at every level of decision-making. These indicators mentioned, can be classified 
into two main categories of the development process: The first is the general lack 
of resources and institutional capacity; and the second category of problems within 
the context and capabilities of the WTO is market access to industrialised nations. 
The indicators, such as GDP growth, structures of imports and exports, balance of 
payments, and others, are directly or indirectly related to the access that these 
nations have for their goods to the developed countries. These two categories of 
concern for development will be the overarching consideration that the WTO 
adjudicators must address in their reports and decisions.
Neoclassical economists following Adam Smith advocate a laissez faire and free 
trade system of economics. The promotion of their ideas is the raison d'etre of the 
WTO. However, aside from the most marginal of beliefs, it is understood that 
development comprises more than strictly materialistic, economic, or quantitative 
considerations.5 It is more than the simple accumulation of capital. The pursuit 
of development by states implies more than a mere quest for improvement in the 
material conditions of the nation. Developing the appropriate environment that 
ensures the availability of goods and services and the wherewithal to obtain them is
5 See Ray, D., Development Economics, 1998, (Princeton Univ. Press) pp. 173-178; Handelmann, H. 
supra at note 4, pp. 3-13
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only one aspect of development. Economic development must be consistent with 
the quest for maintaining the integrity and identity of the states that pursue it and 
the well-being of their citizens. However, the WTO is a focused institution; and 
even though it considers these non-materialistic objectives of development, it 
nevertheless concentrates its efforts on economic development through trade. The 
social dimensions of development are left to the states themselves. At times, these 
objectives come into conflict with each other, and compromises must be made. 
The balancing of these different objectives is difficult and is this grey area where 
the WTO and its adjudicative system often operate.
The inadequacy of resources in developing countries relative to industrialised 
nations is one that is obvious at first glance. The richer developed world has the 
money and technological resources to play the trade game at a higher tier vis-a-vis 
the developing countries. Furthermore, these indicators illustrate that the 
developing countries lack the infrastructure and institutional sophistication in order 
to be able to adequately progress in the development of their countries. The 
indicators, which allude to structural foundations of an economy such as structures 
of consumption, demand, and manufacturing, all signify a need for infrastructures 
and institutions for economic development, including those pertaining to trade 
matters. Also, these institutions could be legal and regulatory in nature as well, 
which are important especially when issues of implementation of multilateral 
obligations are concerned. For example the TRIPS Agreement demands a certain 
level of institutional capacity in order to properly dispense a Member’s obligations.
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Thus, two major needs of developing countries in the context of the WTO and its 
different agencies are the building of trade and economic institutions with a certain 
degree of sophistication, as well as, market access to developed countries. The 
WTO has a responsibility, and developing nations demand, that it address these 
two major issues in relation to the adjudication of trade disputes. The next issue 
that may arise is: Why would weaker countries, which are not on an equal footing 
with industrialised countries, participate in multilateral trade negotiations and 
dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena?
1.3 Developing Countries’ Participation in Global Dispute Settlement 
Regimes
If reaping the benefits associated with free trade is the objective of developing 
nations, active participation in international institutions that govern trade must be 
prioritised by their policy-makers.6 The WTO and the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations provided a forum for such participation with other trading partners. 
There are a variety of viewpoints for and against multilateral trade negotiations and 
their benefits for developing countries.7
Arguments against developing country participation in multilateral trade 
negotiations include, amongst others; developing countries are not as yet true 
players in global trade flows; the need for government intervention in economic
6 Page, S., Developing Country Participation in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Developing 
Country Perspectives and Negotiating Framework, 2002 in Qureshi, A., Perspectives on 
International Economic Law, pp. 111-127, p. I l l  (KluwerLaw).
7 Page, S., supra at note 6 pp. 111-112. The pros and cons of global dispute settlement participation 
by developing nations is extensively presented by Page and will be discussed in this section (1.3). 
Also see, Coyle, D., Governing the World Economy, 2000, (Cambridge University Press)
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activity domestically is greater due to their less than optimum level of 
development; there are greater fixed costs for developing countries as opposed to 
developed countries in regulating certain sectors of the economy, i.e., 
implementation of intellectual property rights, sanitary standards; developing 
countries have less bargaining power vis-a-vis industrialised nations in accepting 
agreements; the balance of cost and benefit for certain sectors of society is 
different for developing countries as opposed to developed nations (e.g., 
intellectual property protection is much greater in industrialised nations as opposed 
to developing one due to the sophistication of the economy in the latter).8
In contrast, arguments in favour of developing country participation in global trade 
negotiations include: international regulations restrain larger countries or larger 
firms from pursuing activity that may be detrimental to developing countries; it is 
more efficient both politically and financially to appeal to international 
organisations for the settlement of disputes; it is more efficient to mimic 
international regulations than to create a two-tiered economic policy, one at the 
national level and the other at the international one.9
In many respects, developing countries’ importance, especially as a block, to other 
nations or to the international regime as a whole is sufficiently great to the extent 
that many industrialised nations feel that it is necessary for them to negotiate.10 
The developing countries are left with little option but to participate, as other 
political realities will weigh heavily against them if they do not. For example, the
8 ibid. Also, see for critical assessment o f the WTO, Anderson, S., Views from the South: The 
Effects o f  Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries, 2000
9 Page, S., supra at note 6 p. 112.
10 Ibid.
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markets of these nations are necessary for developed nations' multinational 
corporations so as to increase their growth and profit rates. Therefore, 
international organisations are obliged to include developing nations in the 
negotiations and to adapt to the reality that weaker and less economically stable 
Members will participate.11
Now that the participation of the developing nations is deemed inevitable, the next
issue that needs to be addressed is the nature of their participation in the dispute
resolution system of the WTO. With the backdrop that these poorer countries
engage in the international order simply due to economic and political realities that
impose certain regulations on them, one can see that the creation of such bodies
adds another layer of rigidity to the regulation of domestic and international policy
10from the perspective of developing countries.
The new WTO dispute settlement procedures is supposed to act as a leveller of the 
playing field by allowing economically weaker states the chance to win cases 
against powerful industrialised nations. The conception is that WTO disputes will 
be resolved based on the rule of law rather than power orientations. However, this 
optimistic picture will be shown to have been less than successful as this thesis 
progresses. The legalisation of the trade regime may be deemed to have solidified 
industrialised countries’ already existing system of economic governance at the 
global level. The rules that have been devised are based on developed countries’ 
experiences, and they oblige less-developed nations to mimic. Such a system does
11 Ibid.
12 Somarajah, M .,A Developing Country Perspective o f  International Economic Law in the Context 
o f  Dispute Settlement, 2002, in Qureshi, A., Perspectives on International Economic Law, 2002, pp. 
83-110, pp. 85-86.
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not take into account the history of development in the 19th and 20th centuries of 
the industrialised nations, a time when many of these nations were avid 
practitioners of protectionism and mercantilism.13 In fact, one can point to 
Japan’s post-World War II development as an example that protectionist measures 
can play a big role in development. However, the merits of protectionism and free 
trade will not be discussed, except to point out that developing nations at times 
deem certain protectionist policies to be crucial to their development.
The dispute settlement mechanism has not delivered some of the benefits expected 
from the perspective of developing nations as this thesis will demonstrate. The 
blame may lie with a variety of actors and factors such as the negotiated treaty 
provisions and external power- oriented realities, but this thesis will focus on the 
shortcomings of the adjudicators and the jurisprudential structure that is being 
moulded by them in the interpretive process. In this regard, the manner in which 
disputes are settled and the interpretive methodologies which are utilised become a 
major safety valve for the protection of developing country interests, if disputes are 
adjudicated under the development approach. Otherwise, the system may be 
regarded as another weapon in the arsenal of industrialised nations in imposing 
standards that are only beneficial to their interests at the expense of weaker 
developing nations.
13 For more insight, see Khor, M. Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices, 
2001, Zed Books pp. 16-38.
1.4 The Uruguay Round and Problems for Developing Countries
The Uruguay Round with all the fanfare that was created after its coming into force 
in 1995, has nonetheless, created major problems for developing countries. The 
problem is twofold: first, the burden of implementing the obligations is heavy for 
nations that lack a strong and stable economy. Second, the commitments 
themselves cause market access problems, which are detrimental to the developing 
nations. The market access commitments in the WTO Agreements are problematic 
in that benefits are asymmetrical, i.e., the higher barriers to products most exported 
by developing nations in relation to the barriers erected for products originating in 
the industrialised nations.14 The espousal of free trade and neo-liberal economic 
theory by the developing countries entails a shift to export-oriented economies and 
as such, market access to other WTO Members’ territory, especially the wealthy 
markets, becomes crucial. The market access commitments in the WTO 
Agreement as negotiated during the UR are more advantageous to the industries of 
the developed world than they are to the industries of the developing nations. The 
export interests of the industrialised nations are better served, whilst the export 
interests of the developing nations face many more barriers. For instance, textiles, 
clothing, and agriculture are subject to high tariffs in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the TRIPS Agreement and the ADA stand out 
as the most harmful of WTO covered agreements towards the interests of the 
developing Members.
14 See, amongst others, Lai Das, B., The WTO Agreement, Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required 
Changes, 1998, Zed Books; Watal, J., Developing Countries Interests in a ‘Development Round", 
2000 in Schott, J., The WTO After Seattle, 2000, Institute for International Economics, pp. 71-84.
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1.4.1 The TRIPS Agreement
For the first time in GATT/WTO history, the Uruguay Round introduced 
negotiations on trade-related IP rights. Under fierce pressure from the US and the 
EU, an agreement on the availability and enforcement of such rights became part 
of the WTO Covered Agreements.15 The Agreement is by its coverage the most 
comprehensive international instrument to protect IP rights. The Agreement 
establishes minimum standards on copyrights, trademarks, patents, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, integrated circuits, and trade secrets. The 
implementation of this Agreement poses great challenges for the trade and 
economic infrastructure of developing countries.16
The level of protection negotiated touches upon both the availability of rights as 
well as enforcement mechanisms for those rights. This means that Members 
cannot confer a lower level of protection than provided for under the TRIPS, whilst 
not being obliged to confer a higher level of protection.17 The provisions on the 
enforcement of rights are unique, as they oblige Members to abide by certain 
criteria in their administrative and judicial procedures. These criteria include, 
amongst others, provisions on presentation of evidence, injunctions, counterfeiting, 
and penalties in case of infringement.18
15 Correa, C. M., Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, 2000 Zed Books pp. 1-5.
16 Finger J.M., The Uruguay Round North-South Bargain: Will the WTO Get Over Itself, 2001, in 
Hudec, R., The Political Economy o f  International Trade Law, University o f Minn. Press
17 Article 1.1 o f TRIPS.
18 Correa, C.M., supra at note 15.
29
The TRIPS Agreement, counter to the expectations of the developing countries, is 
not a mere instrument to combat counterfeiting and piracy.19 Rather, the 
Agreement was a concerted effort by developed countries to instil a global policy 
of “technological protectionism.” This policy seeks to protect the innovators and 
generators of technology, who are most often from industrialised nations, whilst 
relegating the developing countries to consumers of protected technology.20 This 
new framework, universalises standards of IP protection that are most suitable to 
industrialised countries at their particular level of economic progression. In fact, 
these standards have evolved in the course of many years at the domestic level in 
the US, EU, and Canada. The abrupt injection of these standards within a few 
years in countries with weaker economic capabilities is one of many reasons that 
burden the capacity of developing nations.21
The cost associated with implementing the Agreement is great. For instance, in 
Argentina the TRIPS is estimated to cost over $425 million a year in the 
pharmaceutical sector alone.22 A report by the University of Colorado indicates 
that the biggest winner of the TRIPS is the US with a net profit of $6 billion a year 
from foreigners; and of the 29 countries in the study, only six are theoretically 
made better off by the TRIPS mandated patent reforms.23
19 See, amongst others, de Koning, M., Why the Coercion-Based GATT Approach Is Not the Only 
Answer to International Piracy in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1997, EIPR, No. 2.
20 Correa at note 15 pp. 5.
21 Correa, C.M., The TRIPS Agreement and Information Technologies: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 1996,5 Information and Communications Technology Law 2 pp. 228-230; Bass, N.A., 
Implications o f  the TRIPS Agreementfor Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in 
Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 2002,34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 191, pp. 216-217.
22 Primo Braga, C.A., Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement 
and Its Economic Implications, 1995, Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on “ The 
Uruguay Round and Developing Economies” Washington D.C., found on www.worldbank.org.
23 Maskus, K., The International Regulation o f  Intellectual Property, 1997, IESG Conference on 
“Regulation o f International Trade and Investment,” University o f Nottingham, found on 
www.notac.uk.
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Article 67 of TRIPS recognises the need for assistance to developing countries in 
order to implement the Agreement. However, the Article does not bind Members 
to provide assistance simply because of the hortatory nature of the provision. The 
developing countries accepted bound commitments to implement, but received 
unbound promises of assistance to do so. Nonetheless, Article 67 does indicate a 
principle that developing countries need assistance in the building of institutional 
and trade capacity. The role of the AB in the balancing of the rights of producers 
and consumers of technology on the one hand, and developing nations’ 
predicament in implementing the agreement in light of their lack of institutional 
capacity on the other hand, is one of the areas that the “development approach” 
will try to address.
1.4.2 The ADA
Very broadly, “dumping” is defined as selling a product abroad at a lower price 
than at the home market, or alternatively selling a product abroad at below 
production costs. In response, an importing country may levy anti-dumping 
measures, almost exclusively in the form of an extra tariff. For the developing 
countries, the idea of a strengthened global trading system included changes to the 
law governing the dumping of goods. The grounds for this view were that a 
stronger global regime would be to their advantage. Being poorer and less 
powerful participants in the multilateral trading system, the developing countries
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were inclined to support the creation of a system in which the power and influence 
of the Members are subject to agreed substantive and procedural laws.24
The main users of anti-dumping laws have been and are the US, the EC, Australia, 
and Canada 25 However, a growing trend is observed in that many of the larger 
developing countries such as India, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico are also 
engaging in the levying of anti-dumping duties.26 For developing countries, two 
correlating issues are at the core of their problems with the ADA. First, anti­
dumping laws are a sophisticated and complex set of trade instruments. Indeed, 
they have been termed the “tool of protection of the elite.”27 The framework for 
anti-dumping regulations in the WTO has become more and more technical and 
imposes a variety of obligations on Members. Unwarranted levying of anti­
dumping duties leads to immediate recourse to dispute settlement procedures, 
especially where such levying targets powerful companies’ markets abroad.28
Secondly, anti-dumping investigations and duties may have a negative effect on 
competition, as they divert trade and create uncertainty for exporters. Overall, anti­
dumping measures restrict market access to importing nations. For developing 
countries that export to developed markets, market access is crucial to their 
economic health. The situation for developing countries is detrimental to their 
interests as anti-dumping measures are most often used by the industrialised
24 Whalley, J., Developing Countries and System Strengthening in die Uruguay Round, in Martin,
W. & Winters, L.A. (eds.) The Uruguay Round and Developing Economies, 1995, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 307 p. 309.
25 See Harvard Center for International Development Paper found on www.cid.harvard.edu: and 
Euro Commerce Position Paper 5 July 2001, found on www.wto.org.
26 Vermulst, E Adopting and Implementing Anti-Dumping Laws: Some Suggestions for Developing 
Countries, 1997,31 J. o f World Trade 5 pp. 5-7.
27 Ibid.
28 Vermulst, E., & Komuro, N., Anti-Dumping Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Navigating Dire Straits, 
1997,31 J o f World Trade 1 pp. 8-20.
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countries. Market access concessions are the core of the multilateral trade 
negotiating system, as liberal trade theory rests on the proposition that markets will 
eventually be opened to everyone. Yet, the Antidumping Agreement leaves many 
issues unresolved, in that it allows for the major trading nations to block imports, a 
practice that could harm their own domestic industries. For most Members, this is 
due to lobbying by the so-called “losing” industries from the open competition.29 
Chapter 4 will argue that the ADA is being used as a strategic protectionist tool so 
as to compensate for some of the tariff concessions granted by industrialised 
nations to developing countries.
Thus, the problems of developing countries exist at two levels: first is the lack of 
expertise and resources to fight the anti-dumping war fairly, and second is that 
their market access to developed nations is hindered. It is possible for the 
adjudicators to address these problems, within the existing framework of the WTO, 
by either restricting the domestic investigative powers of Members or by 
recognising the lack of sophistication on the part of developing countries in their 
pursuit of imposing anti-dumping duties. The former would probably be more in 
line with free trade ideology and thought, whilst the latter would allow for more 
trade-related social issues to be taken into account by domestic policy-makers. 
The ideal would be to balance these two competing interests, and this thesis will 
present a balancing mechanism under the umbrella of the development approach to 
fair adjudication. It will attempt to better allow for developing nations to gain
29 Handley B., & Masserlin P., Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized Protection in die WTO 
and What to Do About it ,1996 (AEI Publishing) pp. 6-23; Prusa, T.J., The Economic and Strategic 
Motives fo r Antidumping Filings, 2001 (US National Bureau of Economic Research) found on 
www.nber.org.
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rightful access to industrialised markets, whilst allowing policy-makers to pursue 
their developmental objectives.
It must be noted that the balancing act is limited to the existing WTO regulations 
and solely narrowed to the objectives and goals of the developing countries in the 
context of the dispute settlement regime. The discussion does not pretend to 
rebalance the WTO negotiations in one fell swoop. Rather, suggestions will be 
made only to the extent that the panel and AB have the authority and capability to 
generate the legal norms as they have in the past.
1.5 Dispute Settlement Procedures
The GATT process was very much a diplomatic endeavour. The consensus rule 
for the adoption of panel reports was seen as a major obstacle in resolving disputes, 
as the losing party had the right to block the panel’s ruling. Under the WTO, the 
consensus requirement is reversed: Consensus is required to reject the panel’s 
ruling, including the winning party’s vote. The Members acting collectively as the 
DSB officially have the last word; however, in practice, the final say on a matter is 
the domain of the panel and the AB. The DSU envisages a three- or four-phased 
process of settlement of disputes. The first phase is the consultations phase, 
followed by the establishment of a panel, if necessary; an appeal to the AB; and 
finally, the implementation phase. The following is a brief overview of the 
process.
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1.5.1 Consultations
Dispute settlement begins with a formal request for consultations, though informal 
negotiations have probably already taken place. Requests for consultations must 
be in writing and should be copied to the DSB and the relevant committees and 
councils.30 These committees and councils deal with different substantive and 
sectoral issues of trade, such as the Council for TRIPS, Trade in Goods or the 
Committee on Anti-Dumping, and Technical Barriers to Trade.
Members receiving a request for consultations are required to respond to the 
request for consultations within ten days and must agree to consult within 30 days 
after the receipt of the request or as otherwise agreed upon by the parties.31 
Therefore, this phase allows the parties to negotiate “out of court” and also to 
better understand the legal arguments of the opposition before commencement of 
the proceedings. It also functions as a discovery phase for the parties, as they may 
learn of the evidence presented against them.
1.5.2 Establishment o f a Panel
If after the consultations phase no agreement has been reached by the parties, the 
complainant can request the establishment of a panel. At the request of the 
complainant, a meeting of the DSB shall be convened within 15 days.32 A panel 
will be established no later than the second meeting after the request for a panel 
first appears on the DSB’s agenda, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
30DSU Art 4.1-4.3
31 DSU At 4.4-4.8
32DSU Art 4&5.
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establish a panel.33 A requesting party might agree not to establish a panel at a 
particular meeting of a DSB if it feels more consultations may be fruitful.
1.5.3 Composition o f Panels
Panels normally are composed of three individuals, with one serving as chair. The 
parties may agree to have five-Member panels provided they do so within 10 days 
of the establishment of the panel by the DSB.34 Panellists are present Members or 
former Members of non-party delegations to the WTO, or trade law academics. 
They serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of governments or 
other organizations. Members are required to allow their officials to serve as 
panellists without giving them instructions or seeking influence from them.35 
When a developing country is involved, one of the panellists must be from a 
developing country if that Member so requests.36
Panellists are nominated by the Secretariat from the Member delegations and from 
a roster of governmental and non-governmental individuals who are deemed 
qualified by virtue of their experiences. Members are directed not to oppose 
nominees of the Secretariat “except for compelling reasons.”37 If the parties do not 
agree on panellists within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, either party 
may request the Director-General of the WTO, in consultation with the Chairman 
of the DSB and Chairman of the relevant Council or committee, to name the 
panellists.38 Thus, the establishment of the panel and the composition of the
33 DSU Art 6.
34DSUArL8.5.
35 DSU Art 8.9.
36 DSU Art 8.10.
37 DSU Art 8.6.
38 DSU Art 8.7.
36
panellists are done by mutual agreement between the parties. However, some 
doubts remain as to the quality of panellists in these types of situations, as they 
may not have detailed expertise in some of the areas of trade that they are to 
adjudicate.
1.5.4 The Appellate Process
The WTO Appellate Body consists of seven Members, three of whom serve on any 
particular case.39 Its jurisdiction is limited to issues of law covered in a panel 
report and to legal interpretations devised by the panel.40 The AB may uphold, 
modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.41 However, if it 
modifies or reverses the findings of the panel, it may not remand the matter to the 
panel for further review.42
Only parties to the dispute, and not third parties, may appeal a panel report. In the 
event of an appeal, third parties who have notified the DSB of a substantial interest 
in the matter, pursuant to DSU Article 10.2, may have the right to be heard.
The DSU requires that the AB prepare working procedures in consultation with the 
Chairman of the DSB and the Director -General.43 These were issued in 1996 and 
constitute the rules by which the appellate process is conducted. Part I of the rules
39DSU An. 17.1.
40 DSU Art 17.6.
41 DSU Art. 17.3.
42 Palmeter, D., & Mavroidis, P.C., Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Practice and Procedure, 1999 
Kluwer Law pp. 147-152.
43 DSU Art. 17.9.
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deals with internal organization of the AB, whilst part II deals with procedural 
rules.
In its rule, the AB has used the term “division” for the group of three judges who 
hear each case. The Members constituting a division are selected at random so as 
to ensure opportunity for all Members to serve regardless of their nationality. 
Decisions relating to an appeal are taken only by Members of the division hearing 
an appeal. If a division cannot reach consensus, the decision will be made by 
majority vote.44 The DSU specifies that opinions of the AB shall be anonymous, 
and it does not discuss the possibility of a dissenting opinion. To further 
collegiality, all Members of the AB receive all documents filed in all appeals, 
including those Members not serving on the division deciding the case. All 
Members also exchange views on each appeal before the division finalizes the 
appellate report; yet, the division is supposed to retain “full authority and 
freedom” to adjudicate.45
1.6 Teleology and the Development Approach to Fair Adjudication
The arguments for the adjudicators ascribing to a development approach to dispute 
resolution are grounded on teleological factors. The question that arises is whether 
an approach founded on teleology is necessary or even justified in an international 
legal system. Asif Qureshi, in seminal article on the relationship between 
interpretation and development, has proposed using a teleological approach to 
adjudication using a “development dimension.” He proposes that adjudicators,
44 AB rule III (2).
45 AB Rule IV (4).
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whether cognisant or not, have brought to the process their own teleology.46 He 
grounds his arguments on the works of Ian Brownlie and Ian Sinclair, amongst 
others, who believe that in the interpretive process the judges are ultimately 
making policy choices, particularly, in relation to the VCLT Articles 31 and 32, 
which are recognised as customary rules of interpretation in international law.
The “development approach” in this thesis assimilates some of the institutional and 
legal justifications for espousing a teleological method. Qureshi’s arguments are 
based on established interpretive norms, language of the WTO Agreements 
themselves, and a refutation of the possibility of truly textual interpretations. The 
approach suggested by the thesis builds upon those arguments as well as basing the 
teleology in legal theory and philosophy. The “development approach” arises out 
of the legal philosophies of Franck, Rawls, and Dworkin to construct the teleology, 
and then matches them with identifiable trade interests of the developing countries, 
i.e., institutional and trade infrastructure capacity building, and market access to 
the industrialised nations.
The “development approach,” in line with Professor Qureshi, suggests that the 
object and purpose of the WTO treaties are as important as the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty words. The WTO case law is fraught with references to the ordinary 
meaning of the words of provisions, constantly seeking help from the dictionary as 
a signal of its emphasis on literal interpretations.47 This emphasis on literal
46 Qureshi, A., Interpreting World Trade Organization Agreements for the Development Objective, 
2003,37(5) J.W.T. 847.
47 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former AB judge, is quoted in his own writing as admitting to a 
hierarchical approach. After quoting Article 31.1 of the VCLT, he states “...Among these three 
criteria, the Appellate Body has certainly attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e., ‘the ordinary 
meaning o f the terms of treaty.’ This is easily illustrated by the frequent references in the Appellate
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interpretation, which highlights the ordinary meaning of the words, has been 
claimed to be standard WTO practice by many observers and WTO lawyers. The 
sequencing or prioritising of the rules of interpretation pursuant to Articles 31 and 
32 of VCLT are not justified.48 The hierarchy between the ordinary meaning of the 
text, the context, and lastly, the object and purpose is an artificial one. In this 
regard, Ian Brownlie holds that deciphering what constitutes a literal meaning of 
the law is at some point a policy choice 49 There is no hierarchy. Rather, Article 31 
of VCLT arguably encourages a “holistic” approach to interpretation, and any 
prioritisation of the three elements is simply a choice made by the interpreter to 
give more weight to one criterion over the other.50
Furthermore, other issues with respect to literal interpretation come to the fore. 
First, simply citing the dictionary does not mean that the ordinary meaning has 
been found. A large majority of words in the dictionary have more than one 
meaning; many of the words have several. Moreover, if the adjudicators were to 
analyse the context also, one may logically conclude that their selection of the 
words has been somewhat arbitrary. Why did they choose one definition over the 
other? How could they truly grasp the context of the words without any reference 
to the object and purpose of the provisions or the treaty? At some point, the
Body reports to dictionaries... The second criterion, i.e., ‘context’ has less weight than the first, but 
is certainly more often used and relied upon than the third, i.e., ‘object and purpose... .The 
Appellate Body clearly privileges “literal” inteipretation.” See, EhLermann, C.D., Six Years on the 
Bench o f  the World Trade Court: Some Personal Experiences as Member o f  the Appellate Body o f  
the World Trade Organization, 2002,4 J.W.T. 4, p. 615. Also see Qureshi at note 46, p. 867
48 Qureshi, supra at note 46 pp. 867-868.
49 Brownlie, I., Principles o f  Public International Law, 1998, (5th ed. Oxford University Press) pp. 
632-636.
50 See Qureshi supra at note 46, pp. 853-854; Dixon, M., & McCorquodale, R., Cases and Materials 
on International Law, 2003, (Oxford University Press) pp. 85-88; Shankar, D., The Vienna 
Convention on the Law o f Treaties, The Dispute Settlement System o f  the WTO and the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, 2002,36 JWT 4 721-772 pp. 724-727.
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objective of the provision at issue has a strong bearing on the context of the 
provision or the agreement that it embodies.
Second, the literal approach tends to protect and preserve the interests of the 
immediate winners of the treaty negotiations. The immediate winners of the WTO 
Covered Agreements have been for the most part the industrialised nations of the 
EU, the US, Canada, and other developed nations. Although Article 3.2 of the 
DSU states that the dispute settlement body must not add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations of Members, it cannot be disputed that the context and purpose of 
that provision are to simply create limits on the power of the adjudicators and 
prevent them from “rogue” decisions.51 Third, some observers claim that the WTO 
is contractual in nature, and as such, a more textual approach is prudent. However, 
the WTO and its Covered Agreements are characterised as constitutional in nature, 
having contractual, legislative, and judicial elements similar to other constitutional 
or institutionalised legal frameworks such as the EU, the UN, and other deeply 
rooted legal organisations.52 As the law must be responsive to the ever-changing 
nature of trade relations and global interactions, a dynamic understanding of the 
law suggests that it takes on a life of its own after promulgation.53
Therefore, the position that literal or textual interpretation is a viable and neutral 
way of interpretation is open to question, as policy choices are inevitable. The
51 See Behboodi, R. Legal Reasoning and the International Law o f  Trade: The First Steps o f  the 
Appellate Body o f  the WTO, 1998 J.W.T. 32(4) 55-99 pp. 58-64; Franck, T., Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions, (1995) Clarendon Press; Qureshi supra at note 46.
52 See amongst others, Jackson, J.H., The WTO: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1998, (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House); Jackson, J.H., The World Trading System: Law 
and Policy o f  International Economic Relations,2000; Cass, D.Z., The Constitution o f  International 
Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine o f  Constitutional Development in 
International Trade (2001), 12 EJIL 3-38; Steinberg, R.H., McGinnis,J.O., & Movesian, M.L., The 
World Trade Constitution,{2000) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511.
53 Qureshi, at note 46, p. 869.
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context, object, and purpose of provisions must also be part and parcel of the 
interpretation process without hierarchy. Since the literal approach in the final 
analysis relies on the internal teleology and disposition of judges, it is prudent to 
identify and recognise the object and purpose of the Agreement in the 
interpretation process, as it constrains and limits the judges from imposing their 
own teleology.54 There is a long-standing and continuous debate, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon common law tradition, about the nature and scope of judicial 
competency, i.e., the literal or textualists versus the judicial activists.55 This 
dichotomy of thought belies a truth, which is that both sides are making policy 
decisions.
The judicial activist approach, which is sometimes associated with the more liberal 
or “left” schools of political and social thinking, believes that the gaps in the law 
must be filled by judges and that they should be there to illustrate the dynamism of 
the law and be responsive to the changing nature of society. The textualists 
dismiss as much as possible insights into the context, object and purpose, or justice 
of the law and judicial activists’ rulings. Judges are simply there to interpret the 
law as literally as possible. The policy decision made by these judges is to 
preserve the status quo. Again, a “lack” of law or rule and its supposed deference 
to a legislative body belies the adjudicators' teleology that the law is static. The 
law tends to benefit the players or entities that had more participation in the law­
54 It is not being argued that the development approach leaves no room for the judges’ internal 
dispositions. What it does, however, is that it forces them to acknowledge and work within the 
certain framework for adjudication that promotes and assists in the development process.
55 See Powers, S.P., & Rothman, S., The Least Dangerous Branch?: Consequences o f  Judicial 
Activism, 2002, Praeger Publishing; Sunstein, C.R., Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing 
Courts are wrong for America, 2005, Basic Books Pub.; Barak, A., & Bashi, S., Purposive 
Interpretation o f  Law, 2005, Princeton University Press.
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making process.56 Or at a minimum, the interests of the non-represented or non­
participant entities in the law-making process may not have been properly spelled 
out in the law, and therefore, their interests must wait until the legislative process 
corrects it. The judge is left with little scope for justice concerns.
An interesting historical analogy can be made in the English legal system, where 
the literal approach to the law was so unworkable that equity courts had to be 
established so as to address justice concerns.57 EU law is also known to be 
“purposive” (looking into the object and purpose of the law) in its application, due 
to the civil law systems of most EU Member States.58 The purposive nature of EU 
law was accepted and given primacy by the English courts in Pickstone v. 
Freemans pic (1988), although UK courts have a history of being reluctant to go 
beyond literal interpretations.59 In sum, it may be argued that the debate between 
these two schools of thought is a relative one. Both schools, in modem legal 
discourse, appreciate that an excessive pull in either direction of the spectrum will 
marginalise their thought in the mainstream of the legal community. This thesis 
proposes that no matter where on this legal spectrum of thought a judge falls, his or 
her teleology should seek to alleviate the two main problems that face the
56 Thomas Franck claims, in relation to legitimacy and justice which have indirect relevance to 
teleology, that the static nature o f legitimacy tends to emulate the needs and demands o f nations 
that created the international system, whilst justice is dynamic and promotes reform and changes 
that may result in benefit to the interests o f weaker entities; supra at note 51 pp. 140-158; Qureshi 
also claims that static understanding o f the law only perpetuates the interests o f entities that 
formulated the law without mention of this statement’s indirect relationship with Franckian notions 
of legitimacy and justice. See Qureshi supra at note 46, pp. 869-871.
57 Slapper, G., & Kelly, D., The English Legal System, 2001,5* ed. (Cavendish Publishing) p. 3.
58 Ibid pp. 167-168.
59 Pickstone v. Freemans pic (1988) AC 66. There, the House o f Lords held that it was necessary for 
the court to read words into inadequate domestic legislation in order to give effect to EC law 
pertaining to equal pay for equal work value. Ibid. p. 168. Also, see Lister v. Forth Dry Dock 
(1989) 2 WLR 634 and Three Rivers District Council v. Bank o f  England (no. 2) (1996) 2 All ER 
363.
43
developing countries with the new WTO regulations and international trade in 
general.
The WTO Covered Agreements and the negotiation history of the UR present a 
picture that has development through trade as an objective and goal of the 
institution. Therefore, this thesis seeks to present what a development approach to 
adjudication should look like and as such has sought to premise this teleology not 
just from a trade interest perspective but also from a legitimacy, justice, and 
ultimately, a fairness standpoint. The following sections will justify the use of 
justice requirements in a rule-based system, and explicate and elaborate more on 
the theoretical underpinnings of the development approach to fairness.
1.7 The Need for Justice in Adjudication of Disputes
The increase in scope of GATT/WTO law from pre-Uruguay Rounds to the 
present, with its growing sophistication and legalization, encroaches heavily onto 
other areas of social and developmental issues. International economic law and 
WTO law, in particular, affect fundamental decisions about the allocation of social 
benefits among states and their citizens, including benefits such as economic 
advantages, preferences, opportunities for obtaining wealth and property, 
information, and many other social goods. The WTO dispute settlement 
procedures exist in order to identify and correct improper gains or circumvention 
of obligations, which are directly related to the social distribution of goods.60
60 Garcia, F., in Trade and Justice: Linking die Trade Linkage Debates, 1998,19 U. Pa. J. Int’l. 
Ecoa L. 394. pp. 404-405.
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Naturally, the role of adjudicators becomes more and more significant for 
Members of the WTO. The AB’s role becomes even more crucial as it is the final 
arbiter of legal questions. Furthermore, as the WTO General Assembly’s 
legislative role becomes stagnant, the norms created by the panels and AB gain 
more prominence. This is due to the voting mechanism of the WTO, whereby 
consensus is needed to amend any treaty provisions.61 Thus, where the law falls 
short, the adjudicators must fill the gaps. In order to properly discharge their 
duties so as to resolve disputes in a timely and effective manner, the adjudicators 
have been obliged to become an “activist court” that creates legal norms through 
its reasoning and decisions.62
The norms generated by the adjudicators are grounded in their responsibilities as 
legal interpreters of treaty texts. In instances in which the law is not clear-cut, the 
adjudicators step in to distinguish the obligations and commitments of the 
Members. Since, as mentioned, WTO law encroaches on matters of social 
concern, which are not strictly trade related, the panels and AB should heed calls 
for justice and fairness rather than simply focus on the black letter of the law. 
Each decision carries with it norms, which will become part of global trade 
regulations. For developing countries, negotiation of treaties is still a power- 
oriented game. In addition to the legalization of the process, which brings forth 
more solidity of rules, the need for justice becomes vital. As these nations 
progress on building their economic and social infrastructures, realization and
61 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. X.
62 Cass does not specifically term the AB as an activist court, but her claim o f judicial norm- 
generation could, arguably, be considered as judicial activism. See supra at note 52.
3 Behboodi, R., supra at note 51, pp. 70-78.
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understanding of the problems associated with the disparities of wealth and 
infrastructure between developing and developed societies gain more importance.
Thus, four interrelated matters should oblige the WTO adjudicators to include 
notions of justice into its decision-making. First, the negotiation of treaties by 
nature tends to benefit the strong states as opposed to weaker states. Second, the 
more legalised character of the WTO could solidify these at times “unfair” treaty 
provisions, thereby creating a system that serves the powerful. Third, the vast 
amounts of treaty law pertaining to many different areas of trade encroach on 
matters of important social and developmental policymaking. Fourth, the 
practically unfeasible amending process of the WTO provisions grants the 
adjudicators vast authority to promulgate trade norms and influence the 
constitution of world trade law.
How the two interconnected concepts of justice and fairness should be 
implemented will be an important element in the development approach to 
adjudications, as will be discussed later in this chapter. However, it must be noted 
that the reason for injecting justice into a rule-based system is one that is based on 
“acceptable social outcomes.” This notion, first introduced by Klaus Scherer, 
claims that justice is understood as social outcomes justified by recourse to 
principles accepted by the community and is indispensable for any kind of social 
association.64 A strictly rule-based system may be held to be adhering to a 
positivist legal approach whereby moral or justice concerns are separate from the 
formal quality of the law. However, even H.L. A. Hart, who is regarded as one of
64 Scherer, K., Issues in the Study o f  Justice, in Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 1992, pp. 3 - 
14. Also, see the works o f Garcia, F. supra at 60, pp. 408-411.
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the key founders of the positivist theory, claims that though morality is separate 
from the law, nevertheless, justice concerns function as an evaluator of the law.65 
Moreover, references to justice could be simply deemed as a prudent approach by 
the decision makers or lawmakers of any legal order because it indicates a certain 
amount of social acceptability.
Thus, the argument that a strictly rule-based system leaves no room for justice does 
not pass muster. It could be argued that decisions of the adjudicators should be 
evaluated through the prism of justice, or that justice is necessary for the 
adjudicators’ decisions to be acceptable according to Scherer, or simply, that they 
must be just as a matter of prudence. The community must accept the 
adjudicators’ rulings; otherwise, the WTO system could crumble due to a lack of 
social acceptability or legitimacy. Yet, acceptability in the international order is 
more than simply just rulings; rather, these rulings can only be acceptable if 
Members comply. Rulings that provoke frequent non-compliance may be deemed 
unjust if the rulings by their nature repel compliance. Therefore, we reach a point 
where the AB must not only rule in a just manner, but also must make sure that the 
reasoning behind its ruling is acceptable to a point of encouraging compliance even 
when the short-term interest of a State may be best served by derogating from 
compliance. However, it is assumed that very infrequent non-compliance may 
occur in an international setting, but the overall jurisprudence has a strong element 
of compliance. Therefore, the question becomes how to consolidate the at times 
conflicting notions of law, justice, and acceptability or legitimacy in the 
international setting. Thomas Franck has presented a theory that attempts to
65 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept o f  Law, 1961, pp. 200-207.
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bundle these ideas in order to devise a concept of fairness. However, Franck’s 
theory has gaps that will be filled by the injection of Dworkin’s principled 
approach to the law. The details of these concepts will be analysed in the 
forthcoming section.
The mentioned concepts of adjudication are underpinned by the interplay and 
dynamics of political actors in the WTO and the process of judicial lawmaking by 
the adjudicators. Therefore, a closer look at the judicial politics of the adjudicators 
is pertinent.
1.8 Judicial Politics of the WTO
Since the establishment of the WTO, the wisdom of replacing the GATT system 
with the legalised WTO model has been debated extensively.66 Most recently, the 
debate has been extended to allegations of judicial activism by the adjudicators and 
the way that this activism affects the different types of Members in the WTO.67 
“Activism” is a term subject to alternative definitions and normative assessments, 
but the debate usually concerns WTO adjudicators’ holdings that domestic 
regulations contravene WTO law, or the adjudicators’ fidelity to a certain posited, 
deduced, or constructed intent of the negotiators of the UR.
66 Goldstein, J., & Martin, L.L., Legalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 2000,54 
Int’L. Org. 603,603-632; Hudec, R., The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview 
o f the First Three Years, 1999,8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, arguing against the new effectiveness of 
the new legalized WTO system. For proponents o f the legalised system, see, amongst others, 
Jackson, J.H., Restructuring the GATT System 1990, pp. 56-80; Weiler, J.H.H., The Rule o f  
Lawyers and the Ethos o f  Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy o f  the 
WTO Dispute Settlement, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9-00 found on 
www.ieanmonnetprogram.org; Keohane, R.O., Moravcsik, A., & Slaughter, A., Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 2000 54 Int’L. Org. 457 pp. 458-480.
67 Ragosta, J., Joneja, N., & Zeldovich, M., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and 
Must Be Fixed, 2003, 37 Int’L. Law 687, pp. 748-751; Steinberg, R., Judicial Lawmaking at the 
WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 2004,98 AJIL 247, p.248.
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In general, commentators use the term “activism” in order to describe the 
expansiveness of judicial lawmaking in the WTO. Cass has explained and 
analysed the activism of the WTO adjudicators in the context of the 
constitutionalisation of international trade law.68 She has explained that the 
holdings of the adjudicators have contributed and are the “engine” in the 
constitutionalisation process.69 Qureshi, however, has suggested how the judicial 
lawmaking process needs to respond to developing country needs.70 Jackson has 
explained and described the generative nature of the adjudicators with ambivalence 
as to how that has affected the Membership and trade constitution.71 The three 
ideas mentioned do not purport to be an analysis of the judicial politics of the DSB, 
but rather provide an analysis of judicial lawmaking and the way that plays out at 
the institutional and legal level. Richard Steinberg has laid out one of the more 
interesting explanations of judicial lawmaking and the politics underlying that 
process in the WTO. He describes the judicial politics of the AB as indirectly 
beholden to the international political discourse, i.e., the adjudicators are cognisant 
of the political restraints inherent in their duties as judges. They cannot fill legal 
gaps and clarify ambiguities without considering the reaction of powerful 
Members of the WTO.72 This constraint should alleviate the US and EU angst in 
relation to activist judges. He argues that the expansive nature of judicial 
lawmaking is, as Jackson believes, necessary for a proper functioning institution, 
but that the holdings can never really infringe on American supremacy o f trade
68 Cass, D.Z, supra at note 52.
69 Cass, D.Z., supra at note 52, pp. 5-12.
70 Qureshi, supra at note 46.
71 Jackson, J.H., supra at note 52 and Cass, D.Z. at note 52 on her belief about the ambivalence of 
Jackson in relation to the manner in which the WTO generates norms.
72 Steinberg, R.H., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints, 2004, 98 Am. J. Int’l. L. 247, pp. 251-252 and 267.
relations.73 Steinberg does acknowledge that the international legal discourse and 
the WTO constitution play a role in the “interpretative space”74 or discretion that is 
afforded to the adjudicators; but he suggests that until today, those elements are 
constrained and shaped by political realities 75
US and EC interests are protected despite the constitutional rules that give the 
adjudicators significant leeway to make law. The interpretations of the 
adjudicators are discursive and employ an “interpretive stance that is intrinsically
Hfkelastic, permitting politically functional or dysfunctional judicial lawmaking.” 
The UR negotiators did not intend the expansiveness of WTO judicial lawmaking 
in its current form; however, the Quad and other powerful Members have nothing 
to fear.77 Moreover, AB judges are selected through a process in which powerful 
Members vet the candidates in a mini version of the US judicial nomination 
process, whereby ideological positions of the candidate and his or her past court 
rulings are inspected and scrutinized.78 Furthermore, studies of legalised 
international organs have shown that there is a higher tendency for full-time 
judicial bodies, backed by the power to issue legal remedies and a relatively large 
discretion to affect legal norms and constitutions, to engage in strategic political 
decision-making than an ad hoc group of panellists 79
73 Steinberg. R., ibid.
74 Steinberg uses the term “interpretative space.” This thesis uses this term interchangeably with 
“interpretive latitude” or “possible range of interpretations,” supra at note 72, pp. 250-258.
75 Steinberg, R., supra at note 72, pp. 249-250.
76 Steinberg, R. ibid.
77 Steinberg, R., supra at note 72, pp. 247-248 & 271.
78 Steinberg, R., supra at note 72, p. 264.
79 Keohane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, supra at note 66. It is noteworthy that during the authors’ 
interviews with WTO delegations of developing countries, 15 out o f 21 respondents to the question 
of whether they prefer the old GATT system or the new WTO legalised adjudication regime, at 
some point in their responses mentioned that they prefer the WTO system but that the panelists’ 
holdings were more “fair” or “preferable” than the AB decisions. On follow up of why they have 
such perception, 12 of the 15 delegates believed that the legal interpretations o f the panel are more
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The AB acts in the shadow of threats to rewrite DSU rules by the powerful 
Members that would weaken it, and of possible defiance by powerful Members of 
its rulings. It is a well-known fact that the power of the US and EC was the 
insurmountable leverage that forced the developing nations to sign and ratify the 
WTO as a single package of Covered Agreements, including the TRIPS, during the 
UR. That same power can be wielded to change DSU rules in their current form 
and dilute or strengthen the adjudicators’ roles as necessary.80 Furthermore, the 
AB has established means of gathering information on the preferences of powerful 
Members, or their use of “avoidance techniques” so as to avoid major political 
controversy, though the mechanism is not foolproof. Hudec first coined the term 
“avoidance techniques” for what he called “wrong cases” in GATT dispute 
settlement.81 In the WTO context due to its legalised nature, doctrinal tools such 
as judicial economy, in dubio mitius, and non liquet are utilised to avoid politically 
sensitive questions. Also, in order to avoid political controversy, the AB seeks the 
input of the EC and the US through their political statements and their participation 
in disputes as third parties.82 An interesting point is that Steinberg in an interview 
with the WTO Deputy Director-General in 2002 was able to find that senior 
secretariat officials have met with and advised Members of the AB to show
in line with their view of the nature of WTO law and that the AB engages in extremely formal legal 
rulings that are causing much concern for developing countries.
S0Aside from economic power in the institutional context, one o f the major elements of the power o f 
the Quad, and especially the US and EC, is their ability to set the agenda and formulate texts of 
agreements in the working groups during multilateral trade negotiations; see Blackhurst, R., 
Reforming WTO Decision-Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle in Deutsch, K.G., &
Spever, B. (eds.), The World Trade Organization: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century, 2001, 
p. 295.
81 Hudec, R., GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 1980,13 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 145, pp. 189-190; and Steinberg, supra at note 72 pp. 269-27.
82 There are no cases in die entire body of over 310 disputes resolved to date that neither the US nor 
the EC was a third-party participant
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restraint when those officials perceived that AB reports might not be politically 
acceptable.83
The developing countries’ worst-case scenario in the context of WTO dispute 
settlement may arguably have occurred. Not only are the negotiated substantive 
rules of the WTO skewed against them, but so, too, are its jurisprudence and 
dispute settlement regime. There is, moreover, the added burden of having the 
norm-generating, constitutionalised trade regime that is beholden to power politics 
legitimised on the altar of international law. The legalised dispute settlement 
regime of the WTO was supposed to advantage the developing countries, as 
theoretically a legal system in contrast to a diplomatic regime would empower 
them to secure remedies against larger, more powerful nations. However, the 
unintended consequence has been that they do not obtain the legal remedies they 
expected because the adjudication process does not give them the normative and 
precedential “victories.” The adjudicators are politicking counter to developing 
countries’ interests.
The developing countries and both the US and EC have complained about the 
perceived activism or expansive lawmaking powers of the DSB.84 There is a 
qualitative and contextual difference between the two. The US and EC are 
concerned first and foremost with the legal obligations and so-called sovereignty
83 Steinberg, supra at note 72, p. 266.
84 Davey, W.J., Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority? (2001) 4 J. 
Int’l. Econ. L. 79; Howse, R., Mainstreaming die Right to Development into International Trade 
Law and Policy at the WTO, 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17, found on UN website
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rights issues, which are underpinned by their objective to protect their interests.85 
However, the developing nations are mostly concerned with their trade interests, 
which are an important aspect in their overall economic development. The 
developing nations are mostly concerned about first-order economic development 
for a poorer population, whilst the US and EU are basing their arguments on the 
protection of their established legal system for commerce. As Steinberg notes, the 
US and EC should not be so concerned about judicial activism as political forces 
inhibit expansive lawmaking that is detrimental to powerful Members. But the 
expansive lawmaking of the DSB is working against the interests of the developing 
nations in the context of fairness, as this point will be proven throughout the thesis. 
At the minimum, it can be stated that in their judicial politics, the adjudicators of 
the WTO do not seek the same political acceptability from developing nations. A 
much louder uproar must take place by the developing Members in order for the 
adjudicators to take note. The development approach to fairness expounded in this 
thesis will restrain the DSB from engaging in expansive judicial lawmaking unless 
developing countries’ interests are considered too. If there is a zero-sum game in 
the interpretative process that clearly delineates the winners and losers, then the 
adjudicators must either side with the disadvantaged or make sure that gap-filling 
actions do not create norms that harm developing nations in the jurisprudential 
context.
Another layer of inequity that was discussed in the previous section is evidenced 
by the aforementioned statement of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former AB judge, 
that the ordinary meaning of the text is the prime tool for WTO treaty
85 Steinberg, R., supra at 72 and Howse, R., ibid.
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interpretation so as to immunize the AB from charges of activism. This 
immunisation is a function of solidifying the political power structure that exists 
from any potential remedial actions by adjudicators of the WTO. The implicit 
suggestion in the statement by Ehlermann to the WTO membership is that the AB 
will restrain the interpretative discretion to a point at which the interests of the 
powerful Members will remain and their expected benefits from the WTO 
Agreements will endure intact. Nothing in this statement would imply that the 
same immunisation is in place for the weaker developing countries, because the 
policy choice on interpretation serves to implement and internalise institutionally 
the inequities and imbalances of the WTO covered Agreement negotiated in 
Uruguay.
1.9 Theoretical Concepts of the Development Approach to Fair Adjudication
As mentioned, fairness under the Franckian theory suggests a two-pronged 
approach. The two criteria for fairness are legitimacy and justice. The 
development approach uses this general framework for fairness with some 
variations on the requirements of achieving legitimacy and justice. The variations 
are based on the works of both John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.
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1.9.1 Franck
As Franck explains, one major appeal in crafting legally legitimate rulings is its 
“compliance pull”.86 Legitimate rulings are more likely to lead to compliance by 
sovereign nations in the international arena. Parallel to legitimacy, justice 
concerns must also be dealt with, as a ruling that is unjust, yet legitimate, remains 
unfair. Thus, according to Frank, in order to achieve fairness, both legitimacy and 
justice must be present. This conception of fairness bodes well for developing 
nations in the WTO, as economic power asymmetries pose many obstacles for then- 
trade interests. The fairness discourse offered by Franck allows for just rulings 
that have in theory a high likelihood of compliance, which is important where a 
developing country has won a claim against an industrialised Member. It is 
evident that a just ruling, which is not likely to be implemented, is of no practical 
use for smaller or economically weaker Members.
1.9.1.1 Community
Franck believes that any discourse concerning fairness, justice, or legitimacy must 
be done within the framework of a certain community, which holds certain ideas 
and values as true and real. One of the reasons for applying the concept of 
community is to constrain the possible range of interpretations and understandings 
of the law so as to eliminate very marginal and excessively obscure ideas. The 
value system of the actors involved recognises certain underlying facts and 
realities. Nevertheless, a substantial level of indeterminacy exists within any
86 Franck, T., Legitimacy in the International System, (1988) 82 Am. J. o f Int. L. 736.
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community. H.L. A. Hart explains that true determinacy is unattainable and in fact, 
undesirable because humans are “handicapped by relative ignorance” and 
“linguistic indeterminacy”.87 The drafters and negotiators of the WTO Agreement 
were conscious of this, and one could only conclude that some of the treaty 
language was left purposely vague because of the nature of multilateral treaty 
negotiations. Furthermore, the negotiators deliberately confer some discretion on 
rule interpreters, such as panellists and AB judges, to determine the borderline and 
difficult cases.88
Judicial discretion, ignorance, limitations of language, and conflict of interests 
amongst Members of the WTO are some of the issues that give rise to problems of 
interpretation and application of rules.89 Yet, these elements also allow for a 
certain degree of “interpretational latitude”. However, this latitude is not 
boundless. The constraints of this latitude are imposed by what many theorists, 
including Franck, call the “interpretive community”. The function of a legitimate 
adjudicative system can only be served if there are certain assumptions and beliefs 
that are so established as to be understood as fact.90 It is within this “interpretive 
community” that the adjudicators of the WTO must form their opinions.
The WTO Members’ delegates, trade bureaucracies, trade and international 
lawyers, and judges are some of the participants in this community, a fact that 
limits the possible choices available to the adjudicators. At least in a normative
87 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept o f  Law, (2nd Edition 1992) pp. 127-128.
88 For more insight on certain aspects o f judicial discretion, see: Hines, V.G. Judicial Discretion in 
Sentencing by Judges and Magistrates (1982); Golub, J., Rethinking the Role o f  National Courts in 
European Integration: A Political Study o f  British Judicial Discretion, (1994) (European University 
Institute Working Paper); Llewellyn, K., The Case Law System o f  America, 1989.
89 Twining, Jurisprudence, (Butterworths 1998) pp. 179-180.
90 Behboodi, R., supra at note 51.
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sense, one can evaluate the DSB cases in light of these mentioned constraining 
factors.91 One must attempt to make the community as inclusive as possible. In 
order to do so, there needs to be a tiered notion of community. The first order 
would include the lawyers, judges, and technocrats mentioned who scrutinize the 
judges at every level of reasoning in reaching their decisions. The second tier of 
the community could be thought of as any individual who is affected and has 
knowledge of the multilateral trading system. However, their may be a lack of 
cohesiveness in the values that they adhere to, i.e., some may be against 
globalisation, others prefer a different set of norms and rules for international 
trade. This second tier is most interested in the results of the cases, which is 
mainly a distributive justice concern. Also, the interplay between this second-tier 
community and adjudicators is most salient in the context of the judicial politics of 
the DSB and the WTO.
1.9.2 Legitimacy Criteria
Franck proposes four elements required in order to achieve legitimate outcomes: 
determinacy (predictability), adherence to normative hierarchy (security), 
coherence (consistency), and symbolic validation. However, the development 
approach within the WTO context uses only the first three criteria, as symbolic 
validation is not necessary due to the nature of the WTO.
Symbolic validation refers to a general acceptance or credibility of certain
institutions by a large proportion of individuals and global actors. The UN and the
91 For instance, when describing the latitude granted to American judges in state appeals courts,
Karl Llewellyn identifies fourteen “major steadying factors” that tend to reduce doubts and limit the 
range of choice in practice, see Llewellyn, K., supra at note 88, p. 102.
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are two very well-recognized 
symbolic institutions that can provide legitimacy to actions taken by international 
entities. These organizations have a pedigree and history that make them reputable 
within the context of their responsibilities.
The reasons for discharging this requirement are on two levels: Firstly, the
arguments that are being presented will assume that the WTO’s legal system is 
self-contained. Its existence is justified through its political legitimacy and its 
acceptance by an overwhelming majority of nations. It is in effect self-validating, 
since the WTO is held to be the main forum in which global economic relations, 
especially trade relations, are regulated and managed. No other international 
institution dealing with economic relations exists that has the same gravitas as the 
WTO. It is steeped in history, practically on par with the founding of the UN. 
The developing nations, though sceptical about its results, were participants in the 
Uruguay Round. The authority of the WTO has been consensually agreed upon. 
Therefore, it is superfluous to engage in the analysis of symbolic validation in this 
setting.
Alternatively, notions of symbolic validation, which seek to rely on 
anthropological, historical rituals, and, pedigree, are deemed suspect by many 
developing nations. This is due to the fact that many of these Members were 
colonies of the industrialised nations. Moreover, some nations have been founded 
and recognised relatively recently. As such, these nations believe that they were 
not influential in the establishment of these rituals and pedigree, thereby making 
them at a minimum irrelevant and at a maximum another instrument of
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subjugation.92 However, for the purposes of this section, the assumption will be 
that the system is self-validating.
1.9.2.1 Predictability
Determinacy as proposed by Franck equates with the notion of predictability, as 
both are a function of the clarity of regulations and laws.93 In the context of this 
discussion, determinacy is relevant to the interpretation and application of the 
WTO and its covered agreements by the adjudicating body. There needs to be both 
ex ante and ex post predictability in order to reach the necessary standard.94 Ex 
ante predictability refers to understanding the law before taking action, while ex 
post refers to understanding whether certain behaviour was legal after the act has 
taken place.
1.9.2.2 Security
According to Franck, the concept of security and adherence (to a normative 
hierarchy) is the next level of analysis, as merely reaching determinant ends does 
not afford legitimacy by itself.95 The means by which adjudicators reach those 
ends is vital to the system. The nature of the law is context-specific, and thus, 
every legal statement conveys a certain normative meaning with respect to
92 See Ghosh, P.J., New International Economic Order: A Third World Perspective, 1984, chs. 1-4; 
Nanda, V.P., Development as an Emerging Right Under International Law, 1985,13 Denv. J. Int’l. 
L & Pol’y 161.
93 For the purposes o f this discussion, they will be used interchangeably.
94 Franck does not delineate between what Baxter calls “primary” and “secondary” predictability 
(see Baxter, W., Choice o f  Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1 pp. 3-5 1963). However, 
it is implicit in his explanation of the concept of determinacy. Supra at 86.
95 Franck, T., supra at note 51.
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Members’ obligations.96 Therefore, at every phase of analysis, adjudicators must 
struggle to convince the “community” that it has grasped the true meaning of the 
law. This conviction has to take place, taking into account not only legal 
considerations, but also policy-making ones.97
Franck further stipulates that the reasoning of the adjudicators must be interwoven 
with basic principles of international law. These are principles of reasoning, which 
have been devised over the years in the international sphere. A clear example of 
this adherence is the WTO’s incorporation of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties when instructing the adjudicators about the standards of interpretation 
to be employed. However, explicit mandates should not be the sole promoter of 
adherence. The panellists and Appellate judges must also implicitly adhere to 
these normative hierarchies, which transcend the WTO. This means that the 
adjudicators must justify their decisions in line with the prevailing interpretative 
attitudes, whilst structuring their arguments such that the integrity of the WTO 
remains intact.
1.9.2.3 Consistency
Predictability and security are interrelated with the concept of coherence 
(consistency).98 Coherence is grounded on the notion that similar cases will result 
in similar outcomes. Dworkin explains that coherence is the main element in
^Behboodi, R., supra at note 51, p. 64.
97 Franck, supra at 51 pp. 42-43.
^Franck, supra at note 86, p. 750.
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compelling states to abide by certain rules." However, these rules must be directly 
related to certain principles and standards set by the entire system. According to 
Dworkin, consistency requires that a rule be applied uniformly in every instance, 
which creates “similar*’ questions of law. Failure to do so is termed “checker 
boarding”.100
However, there are justified and valid forms of checker boarding. Franck mentions 
the GATT 1947 General System of Preferences (GSP) as an example of justified 
checker boarding.101 Claiming that although the GSP deviates from the MFN 
principles of the GATT, it flirthers the underlying objective of global trade 
promotion. The same may be said of the new WTO Agreement, which defines 
certain extra benefits for developing and lesser-developed countries.102 Thus, rules 
become coherent and consistent when applied in such a fashion as to avoid 
arbitrary checker boarding.
1.10 Legitimate Outcomes with Respect to Developing Nations
Franck has suggested that legitimate outcomes are one major criterion for 
achieving fairness. Furthermore, he claims that legitimacy provides for procedural 
justice. However, achieving procedurally just ends does not by itself result in 
fairness. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the AB has failed to reach legitimate 
outcomes in certain due process matters. This has led to detrimental effects for
99 Dworkin uses the term “integrity” when describing coherence. Found in Dworkin, R., Law’s 
Empire, (1986) and pp. 198-218.
100 Ibid.
101 Franck article, supra at 86 p. 747.
102 There are many examples o f these benefits, though some might be deemed hortatoiy. The DSU, 
TRIPS, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), ADA, Agriculture, and other covered 
agreements have rules exceptions for developing and less-developed countries.
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developing nations litigating matters before the WTO. For instance, with respect 
to the burden of proof, it has failed, inter alia, to provide secure and consistent 
rulings. This failure has the potential to harm the trade interests of developing 
countries. The developing nations, already at a disadvantage due to a lack of legal 
and economic institutional capacity, are confronting even more obstacles when 
acting as parties to a dispute.
Accordingly, the insufficiency of legitimacy tends to be more detrimental to 
Members with less economic power and legal resources, as costs are greater in an 
unpredictable, inconsistent, or insecure legal regime. The outcomes of the cases 
are also more important to developing nations as an adverse ruling in a key sector 
could create substantial welfare losses for that Member. The industrialised 
economies are better able to absorb adverse rulings, which, relative to developing 
nations, equate to smaller welfare losses. Thus, when legitimacy is compromised 
by the AB’s decisions, it may have negative effects on the chances of developing 
countries to win cases. As a result, their trade and economic interests are harmed. 
This could imply a less than optimal allocation of justice. The sub-optimal 
distribution of justice puts the fairness of the system in question. Furthermore, as 
the constitutional edifice of the WTO is being continuously moulded with every 
case, the early protection of developing countries’ interests is imperative.
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1.11 Description of Justice and Its Relationship to the Normative Concept of 
Law in the WTO
In order to validly assess whether the system has achieved fairness towards 
developing nations, one must also establish some form of definitional framework 
for justice and the conception of law. Franck argues that there is constant tension 
between legitimacy and justice, and the two must be “managed”. However, no 
guide as to how these two concepts, at times competing ideas, should be managed 
is offered. From the perspective of developing countries, the ideal situation would 
be one in which distributive justice and legitimacy are both present. Yet, there are 
times when some compromises must be made in a particular case. In these 
circumstances, the developing nations would prefer to have distributive justice 
supplant legitimacy.103 The reason for this preference becomes clearer when the 
WTO adjudicators apply a Rawlsian version of distributive justice, coupled with a 
principled conception of the law. The two concepts, Rawls and justice on the one 
hand and Dworkin and law on the other could work in parallel with each other. 
The main argument here is that in order to better achieve the just outcomes 
outlined by Rawls, one must look through the legal prism espoused by Dworkin, 
which holds that the law must be based on real socio-political values of the
104community.
103 Franck, T., supra at note 51 argues that since legitimacy tends to preserve the status quo, and justice 
tends to promote change and is dynamic, countries that have not been previously participated in the 
international legal process are likely to benefit more from justice related matters, pp. 147-160.
104 Dworkin, R., supra at 99 pp. 31-44.
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1.11.1 Rawls
This section proposes to use John Rawls’ work in A Theory o f Justice}05 Briefly, 
Rawls suggests that one of the pillars of justice is to advantage the disadvantaged. 
Naturally, there may be objections to the idea of using A Theory o f Justice in the 
international setting, as Rawls himself has claimed it to be suitable for domestic 
legal regimes. Nonetheless, as many legal commentators admit, this exemption is 
somewhat suspect.106 In order to circumscribe some of the ambiguities associated 
with the definitional contours of distributive justice, this section focuses on Rawls’ 
suggestion that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. In the context of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, the least advantaged refers to developing and lesser-developed 
disputants.
1.11.2 Dworkin and Principled Law in Relation to Developing Nations
In order for the Rawlsian approach to be applied in a more desirable manner, the 
adjudicators should also adhere to a “principled” conception of the law. One of 
Ronald Dworkin’s main ideas is the notion that: “principled” law supersedes
105 Rawls, J .,A Theory o f  Justice (1971).
106 Many legal commentators have applied Rawls’ A Theory o f  Justice to the international setting. 
They begin their analysis by stipulating that all transnational relations involving inequalities and, 
indeed, all aspects o f transnational relations require justification in terms o f domestic political 
thought. Thus, they focus on domestic political theory for the normative justification of distributive 
patterns in which the richer and the poorer are individuals considered together as states, and not 
individuals within a particular state. For more insightful works, see: Mandle, J., Globalization and 
Justice, 570 annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., 126 (2000); Pogge, T., Realizing Rawls (1989); 
Richards, D. A.J., International Distributive Justice in Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the 
Law p. 275 (Pennock, J.R., & Chapman, J.W., eds.).
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•  107positive rule-making in so far as it exemplifies the political and societal values. 
As far as developing nations in the dispute settlement of the WTO are concerned, 
the principle most beneficial is the right to development and certain subsidiary 
effects of this right. There is a plethora of literature on this principle with many 
divergent views on the specific aspects of the right to development; however, the 
assumed limits of that right will be the protection of market access for developing 
nations in OECD markets and legal capacity-building via, inter alia, the domestic 
implementation of policy.108
It can be argued that this right to development may be provided through customary 
international law and/or by its acknowledgment in many different provisions of the 
WTO Agreement, including the historical aspects of the GATT’s special and 
preferential regime. In its current form under the WTO, the focus is on the least- 
developed Members, but there are provisions that grant developing countries 
special timetables for the implementation of certain obligations. Furthermore, the 
WTO’s many communiques and programmes, such as Trade Facilitation, 
cooperation schemes with the World Bank, the founding of the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law, and the labelling of the new round of negotiations as the “Development 
Round,” all signify a certain institutional and political value that seeks to assist in 
levelling the playing field for economically weaker Members.109 The debate on
107 Dworkin, R., The Model o f  Rules, 35 U Chicago Law Rev. 14 (1967) reprinted in Taking Rights 
Seriously.
108 Obviously, this is in addition to health and national security concerns, which have been given 
“exception” status to all Members if the need for derogation of obligations arises.
109 For a comprehensive look at the international right to development, please refer to Bedjaoui, M., 
Unorthodox Reflection on the Right to Development, in Snyder, F., & Slinn, P. (eds.) International 
Law o f  Development: Comparative Perspectives, (1987); Abi-Saab, G., The Legal Formulation o f  
the Right to Development (subjects and contents) in The Right to Development at the International 
Level (Workshop held under die auspices o f the Hague Academy of International Law and the UN  
University) (R.J. Dupuy eds. 1980) p. 159; Howse, R., Mainstreaming the Right to Development 
into International Trade Law and Policy at the WTO, 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17, found
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whether the right to development is customary international law or merely opinio 
juris is not to be explored here, but this right does indicate a socio-political value. 
As Dworkin proposes, the value in question does not vanish if it is not applied in a 
particular case; it is, rather, that it is the instrument to incline judges towards a 
particular value-based choice.110
The Rawlsian approach to justice may be taken individually, but the addition of a 
principled approach to law improves and provides an insurance that the 
adjudicators will reach just and desirable outcomes in relation to developing 
nations. If taken individually, the Rawlsian idea of justice would incline the panel 
or AB to rule in a manner that benefits the legal and economic interest of the 
developing Member in a dispute as opposed to the industrialised Member within 
the limits of WTO law. The preferred scheme of law and justice, proffered here, 
would use Rawls and Dworkin together. If one were to combine the two concepts, 
the result would be that the Rawlsian notion would be more like a rule when 
addressing the justice of an outcome, whilst Dworkin’s approach would be viewed 
as a “standard of legal adjudication”. The combination of the approaches allows a 
judge to rule in favour of a developing country based on just grounds, whilst 
obliging a judge to make sure that a ruling against a developing country is clearly 
justified in light of the community’s values and not merely on a strict literal 
interpretation of the rules. Without the principled approach, it would be
on UN website, Donnelly, J., In Search o f  the Unicom: The Jurisprudence and Politics o f  the Right 
to Development, 15 Calif. W. Int’l. L. J. 473 (1985); Schachter, O., The Evolving Law o f  
International Development, 15 Colum. J. Trans. L. 1 (1976); Ghosh, P.J., New International 
Economic Order, A Third World Perspective (1984) Chs. 1-4; Nanda, V.P., Development as an 
Emerging Right Under International Law, 13 Denv. J. Int’l. L & Pol’y 161 (1985); Dorsey, J.F., 
Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International Economic Relations, 18 Har. Int’l. L. J.
109 (1977).
110 Dworkin, R., supra at note 99, pp. 22-24.
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theoretically possible that a judge applies a Rawlsian approach, yet adheres to a 
strict interpretation of the rules. The addition of the principle of the right to 
development imposes a more broad-based outlook on the adjudicators.
This approach could be very useful, as sometimes the lines between rules and 
standards are not clear and do not remain consistent through adjudication over a 
period of time. With the development approach, the distinctions become clearer. 
In any setting in which courts refer to stare decisis, as does the WTO, the tribunal 
may suggest a standard in a particular case, and then formulate that standard in 
later cases until it has the authority of a rule for application.111 If these standards 
were to attain the functionality of rules, then developing nations would be able to 
achieve what they have not been able to do through negotiations at the Uruguay 
Round: that is to make the WTO treaties themselves impose obligations on 
Members to the benefit of their trade and development objectives. Under this 
scenario, the adjudicators would generate a strict application of a norm, which was 
not included, though crucial for developing nations, in the Uruguay Round dispute 
settlement negotiations.112
Furthermore, as a strategic matter, the developing nations’ bargaining power is 
increased during the consultation phase. These justice entitlements allow the 
weaker side to bargain from a better position. It could also have consequences 
during later negotiating rounds as an important bargaining chip. Any proposal by 
industrialized nations that may be counter to the adjudicative concepts mentioned
111 Trachtman, J.P., International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: 
Discrimination, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Negotiations, 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 726 (2000) p. 737.
112 See Cass, D.Z. supra at note 52 section on judicial norm generation by the AB.
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will have less chances of success. Also, developing countries could propose that 
they are willing to legislatively curb their justice entitlements in exchange for other 
concessions from industrialised Members.
Examples to better illustrate that the development approach using Rawls and 
Dworkin in tandem could function adequately are usually seen in disputes in which 
a Member challenges another Member’s use of safeguard measures.113 A 
safeguard case will inevitably entail some form of economic and allocational cost- 
benefit analysis. There are different forms of cost-benefit analyses, and judges are 
advised to use them individually or in combination.114 The focus will be on the 
proportionality of domestic safeguards regulations115 whereby the judge is 
supposed to decide whether the means selected are proportional to the ends 
desired. There are two forms of proportionality testing: static and comparative. 
The static approach, which only concentrates on the regulation at issue, does not 
seek to analyse the costs and benefits associated with an alternative set of 
regulations. If a developing nation was disputing an industrialized nation’s 
domestic regulations, then an adjudicator could decide to reason based on a static 
proportionality test and use a Rawlsian view. This approach would still not be able 
to advantage the developing Member at an optimal level. For instance, the judge 
could read the terms of reference or the standard of review in that particular case in 
such a narrow fashion as to justify a simple static approach. The judge’s scrutiny is 
benefiting the developing nations, yet only in relation to the one narrowly defined
113 Trachtman, supra at note 111 pp. 731-732.
114 Trachtman supra at 111, pp. 730-732.
115 These cases are usually based on claims made in relation to Art HI o f GATT and the non­
discrimination provisions, with respect to Art XX of GATT, which allow derogations from GATT 
for certain domestic objectives, or in other less-frequent circumstances as they relate to the 
safeguards agreement or the TBT agreement.
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set of safeguard regulations. The judge is, in essence compelled to act as if the 
safeguard imposing party has no other options available to it. In contrast, if a 
jurisprudential standard existed that guided the judges towards applying the right to 
development, then that judge could be persuaded to analyse alternate policy 
choices that the industrialised country had at its disposal. This latter approach 
might not affect the developmental objectives of the weaker nation. The 
adjudicators could, for instance, interpret the terms of reference and standard of 
review more broadly and would, therefore, be more open to arguments based on 
alternative options available to the safeguard imposer put forth by the claimant.
A similar situation could occur during an Article 21.5 implementation dispute in 
which a “winner” challenges the validity of the implementation by the “losing” 
party of the recommendations of the adjudicators. A previously victorious 
industrialised Member would bring forth a claim that the opposing developing 
nation has not abided by the recommendation of the DSB in implementing their 
decision. A pure Rawlsian approach could be simply applied by looking at 
whether the recommendation of the DSB has been strictly adhered to, whilst 
providing certain advantages during the litigation of the dispute to the developing 
Member. This could for example, include the understanding by the judges that 
developing Members are not as capable in providing comprehensive evidence and 
economic statistics as opposed to the developed litigant. Therefore, the outcome 
could still be less than optimal for the developing nation. However, if the 
adjudicators adhered to the principle of the right to development, then other policy 
alternatives and implementation strategies could be explored so that the 
implementation of the DSB recommendations may be less burdensome.
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Moreover, the developing Members gain a bargaining chip during negotiations for 
the implementation of DSB recommendations. They would have more alternatives 
at their disposal when negotiating with an industrialised Member.
The theoretical underpinning of the development approach needs to be applied by 
the adjudicators to individual cases. Therefore, the application of the development 
approach to WTO cases is prudent.
1.12 Applying the Development Approach to Fair Adjudication
The analysis now turns to some of the more important procedural issues. The 
objective of the thesis is to show that the AB has either not promoted legal 
legitimacy and/or has not reached the correct threshold of distributive justice under 
the development approach in its holdings. These rulings have functioned to the 
detriment of developing countries in relation to a range of issues pertaining to due 
process rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and the ADA. As a result, the rulings have 
not reached the threshold of fair rulings under the development approach criteria.
The proposed Development Approach, taking account of the theoretical 
instruments (explained in previous sections), could be summarized as offering a 
five-pronged guideline that if utilized consistently can produce fair outcomes from 
the perspective of developing nations. The guidelines suggest that the adjudicators 
deciding the fates of developing countries should do the following: 1) When 
deciding disputes involving developing nations, the adjudicators use predictability, 
adherence, and coherence as the first level of analysis and a window to “fair”
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rulings. 2) Once the legitimacy and its subsequent effects have been recognised, 
they should seek to make sure that they also meet the justice requirements by 
advantaging the disadvantaged. 3) Subsequently, in order to achieve the optimum 
level of justice, the adjudicators should apply the principle of the right to 
development and its defined subsidiary effects in their perception of the law and, 
as such, their reasonings. 4) If compromises have to be made with respect to 
legitimacy and justice, then the adjudicators should give priority to the justness of 
their decision. 5) All holdings must be within the confines of the WTO community 
described.
1.13 Conclusion
For any particular application, interpretation, or adjudication of a rule of the 
international trading regime, there is often a choice among equally plausible but 
different options. In selecting one plausible option, another equally plausible 
option is excluded. In essence, neutrality of adjudicators is merely a fa?ade that is 
not a bias towards a certain Member but rather a bias towards certain policies. 
Furthermore, the adjudicators of the WTO, with the AB at the forefront, have since 
1995 developed a set of norms and practices as a result of settling disputes between 
Members. The manner in which these norms and practices are being promulgated 
by the DSB is of great importance to the weaker developing countries. These 
Members expect a fair system of adjudication and norm generation. After the 
completion of the Uruguay Round, many developing countries were optimistic 
about the new legal approach to dispute settlement. However, an unintended 
consequence of the Institution has been that legal gaps have been filled by the
71
DSB, instead of by the General Council as the WTO Agreement mandates. This 
consequence has arguably been necessary for the stability of the WTO and its 
dispute settlement system as the vote of three-fourths of the WTO membership is 
required in order to clarify interpretations of the provisions in the WTO.
This chapter has attempted to create a set of guidelines based on notions of fairness 
espoused by Franck whilst complementing his theory with certain aspects of Rawls 
and Dworkin. The purpose of this exercise has been to illustrate that both the 
interpretation of provisions and the filling of some legal gaps must be done in a 
manner that is protective of the interests of developing countries in the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the WTO. In order to assess and evaluate the legal 
decisions of the DSB, a framework for fairness is proposed that would be both just 
and legitimate, whilst being responsive to all Members of the WTO, especially the 
developing countries.
After identifying developing nations, their developmental needs in the context of 
international trade, and the reasons why these countries would partake in global 
trade settlement systems, the discussion set out the different aspects of fairness. 
The framework consists of using Franck’s two-pronged approach towards fairness, 
which holds that fairness is derived from both legitimacy and justice. Legitimate 
rulings are those that are predictable, adhere to a normative hierarchy (secure 
reasoning), are symbolically validated, and are consistent. As the WTO is a 
Member-driven organization with its own legal system, and at present acts as a 
recognised institution for the regulation of international trade, the use of symbolic
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validation in the fairness framework is somewhat obsolete and irrelevant. 
Therefore, the other three elements of legitimacy will be the benchmark.
Franck holds that justice is the other prong of fairness. The development approach 
would use only one of Rawls’ elements of distributive justice, i.e., to advantage the 
disadvantaged. In order to enhance the legal options available to adjudicators, a 
principled Dworkinian approach to the law is also necessary. Identifying the 
principles at stake for developing countries could be done by looking at the 
wording and language of certain provisions in the WTO Covered Agreements. 
Although some are hortatory, they nevertheless indicate that for developing 
countries, the objective and goal of membership is the accrual of economic and 
developmental benefits through international trade. To achieve this objective, the 
institutional capacity of developing nations and market access for their products in 
the developed world must be improved and promoted.
In applying the development approach to fairness, the adjudicators must fulfil five 
criteria that are borne out of the legal theories prescribed by Franck, Rawls, and 
Dworkin in addition to the wording contained in the different WTO-covered 
agreements. The legal and jurisprudential concepts offered here are a set of 
judicial norms that remain committed to the letter and spirit of WTO law. The 
legal provisions under dispute in a case will be contested by each disputant, and 
developed and developing countries will have their own separate views as to how 
the rules must be applied. However, the adjudicators have a duty to protect the 
developing countries and make sure that their development needs are met. The 
development approach to fairness provides the normative tools for WTO judges to
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make decisions that would better assist developing countries achieve the benefits 
expected from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
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Chapter 2
Adjudication and Interpretation of Due Process Rights Provisions
The fair administration of due process rights is a vital component in any legal regime. 
As described in chapter 1, Franckian fairness entails legitimacy and justice. The 
legitimacy of the system is directly attributable to ensuring due process rights of the 
parties. In the context of the development approach to fair adjudication and due 
process matters, justice relates mostly to the litigious interests of the developing 
countries in the WTO. Under the WTO regime, the substantive trade interests of the 
developing nations could be negatively affected if “illegitimate” rulings create 
obstacles to winning a case. Nevertheless, when evaluating due process issues, it is 
inevitable that the legitimacy of the rulings plays a bigger role: and as such, the justice 
of the rulings should be viewed in light of the subsequent effects of those holdings. 
Accordingly, this chapter will focus on whether the AB has achieved the level of 
fairness as required by the development approach in due process matters.
When evaluating the case law of the DSB pertaining to due process matters under the 
development approach, justice could be deemed as inadequate if the rulings lack the 
requisite threshold of legitimacy. This happens for two reasons: first, a system that 
harms the interests of the weak more so than the strong is not just according to the 
development approach. Second, the potential losses of cases that may be incurred by 
developing countries due to harm done to their litigation strategy and capacity have 
subsidiary effects on their overall trade interests. For example, the rulings by the AB
75
with regard to burden of proof matters under the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures(SPS), Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), and GATT 
Article XX have been insecure and inconsistent (see section 2.3). This could lead to 
developing countries losing more cases under the SPS and ATC, which will have great 
effects on developing country industries with high export potential, i.e., agricultural 
goods and textiles, and clothing industries.1
The analysis now turns to some of the more important procedural issues. The objective 
of the chapter is to show that in its holdings, the AB has not promoted legal legitimacy 
and/or has not reached the correct threshold of distributive justice concerns. These 
rulings have functioned to the detriment of developing countries in relation to a range 
of procedural issues, including: the terms of reference as prescribed by Article 6.2 of 
the DSU, burden of proof and general rule exceptions, appeals under DSU Article 11, 
judicial economy, and third party amicus brief submissions. The result is that the 
rulings have not reached the threshold of fairness under the development approach 
criteria.
1 This may not always be the case. For example, the US-Tax Treatment o f “Foreign Sales 
Corporations ”, WT/DS108/AB/R, (Adopted 20 March 2000) (hereinafter, US-FSC or FSC) case 
involved over four billion USD of trade. In contrast, the Bananas (European Communities-Regime for  
the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Adopted 25 Sept. 1997) 
{hereinafter Bananas}) case involved approximately 190 million USD worth of trade. The latter case 
would not amount to an economically harmful amount of trade for the US or the EC but could be a 
burdensome amount for developing nations and their industries. This amount of potential harm to the 
producers of Bananas in either the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries, as well as, banana producers 
in Latin America is very significant.
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2.1 Terms of Reference and the “Standard of Clarity” of Article 6.2 of the DSU
Under Article 6.2 of the DSU, all disputes must be initiated through the submission of 
a “request for the establishment of a panel”(REP). The relevant part of Article 6.2 of 
the DSU states the following: “ The request for the establishment of a panel shall be 
made in writing. It shall... identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief 
summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem 
clearly....” The text of this Article raises certain questions for Members, in particular, 
the developing nations. For instance, how comprehensive must the request for the 
establishment of a panel be, in order to “present the problem clearly?” The standard of 
clarity is the precision with which this question is addressed in a claimant’s REP. The 
importance of the fair application of this issue is directly related to developing nations’ 
ability to devise prudent litigation strategies.
In the Desiccated Coconuts2 case, the Appellate Body sought to elucidate the 
importance of the terms of reference and their need for the fulfilment of certain due 
process objectives. It held: “A panel’s terms of reference are important for two 
reasons. First, terms of reference fulfil an important due process objective, they give 
the parties and third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the 
dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the complainant’s case. 
Second, they establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at
2 Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconuts, WT/DS22/AB/R (Adopted 20 March 
1997){hereinafter, Coconuts or Brazil-Coconuts}.
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issue in the dispute.”3 Furthermore, in Bananas4 the AB added that Article 6.2 is 
important because “it often forms the basis of the terms of reference of the panel 
pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU.”
The panel request and its function in formulating the terms of reference are vital to the 
proper dispensation of adjudicative obligations under the WTO system Not satisfying 
the requirements of Article 6.2 in particular the identification of the measures at issue 
and a brief summary of the legal foundation of the claim deviates from the object and 
purpose of this provision. These objectives must be fulfilled at the outset of a dispute 
because by nature they cannot be modified during the course of the proceedings.5
Since the understanding of claims at issue goes to the core of any just legal system, the 
same applies to the WTO legal regime. The delineation of the appropriate terms of 
reference for each case is more important for weaker Members as it is a fundamental 
due process matter, and wealthier Members are better able to overcome due process 
shortcomings.6 First, it is vital for the weaker party to have a firm grasp of the legal 
issues at stake. If the terms of reference are not clearly stated in the complainant’s 
request for the establishment of a panel, then the defendant is less able to put forth a 
more comprehensive defence strategy. Second, as the AB stated in Bananas, third
3 Ibid., at section VI.
4 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R (Adopted 25 Sept 1997) {hereinafter Bananas}.
5 Ibid., para. 143.
6 Sypnowich, C., Some Disquiet about Difference, Hart, J., & Bauman, R., (eds.) in Explorations in 
Difference, Law, Culture, and Politics (1996) pp. 117-134; Lind, A.E., Procedural Justice, Disputing, 
and Reactions to Legal Authority, in Sarat, A., Constable, M., Engel, D., Haus, V., & Lawrence, S.
(eds.) Every Day Practices and Trouble Cases (1998); Fitzpatrick, P., Relational Power and the Limits 
of the Law, in Tuori, K., Bankowski, Z., & Uusitalo, J., (eds.) Law and Power: Critical and Socio- 
Legal Essays (1997).
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party rights are also at stake. Third party participation is usually the first step that a 
Member of the WTO takes in order to familiarise itself with the legal environment of 
the WTO dispute resolution process. Third party participation is crucial because it 
provides practical experience for lawyers and diplomats of developing countries that 
have not yet been parties to a formal dispute.7
In Bananas, the AB approved and endorsed the panel’s decision that in this case the 
complainants had conformed to the standards set in Article 6.2 by “listing the 
provisions of the specific agreements alleged to have been violated without setting out 
detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the measures at issue relate to 
which specific provisions of those agreements.”8 This “mere listing” standard does 
not bode very well for developing country interests. If this standard prevails, 
developing countries would be disadvantaged as they would not be able to defend 
themselves properly in every case. It encourages the disputants to be as evasive as 
possible in drafting their REPs. For instance, they could list superfluous claims 
amongst valid ones, thereby forcing the opposition to waste time by inspecting for the 
truly relevant claims. The clarification would have to be done during the consultations 
phase, yet strict time limits might still prevent a defendant from deciphering between 
claims that will be germane to the case and claims that may not have an impact. 
Furthermore, this standard is conducive to the proliferation of creative and digressive 
litigation techniques, which in effect, tends to benefit Members with well-endowed
7 Footer, M., Developing Country Practice in the Matter o f  WTO Dispute Settlement, 2001 35 JWT 1, 
pp. 55-98 p.70.
Bananas case, supra at note 4, para. 141.
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legal resources.9 The development of litigation techniques in procedural rules is 
something that has been shunned by the AB.10
Giving advantages to parties which lack the resources to overcome due process 
shortcomings vis-a-vis another party which is more capable, paving access for 
previously non-participating developing countries in the dispute settlement process, 
preventing the stronger Members from creative litigation techniques against weaker 
parties are all elements of justice allocation. The AB has ruled against the interests of 
developing nations with regard to the dismissal of claims that do not satisfy the 
provisions of Article 6.2. In fact, with regard to rulings that may stymie third party 
rights, those rulings would be deemed to be derogating from the development 
approach, as the institutional capacity building of developing nations would be harmed 
in that they would have a harder time in their familiarisation of the dispute settlement 
process.
Subsequently, in the Korea-Dairy11 case, the AB attempted to make some 
clarifications on the subject. It held that a) the “mere listing” standard espoused by 
Bananas is not always sufficient12; b) the “standard of clarity” must be examined on a 
case-by-case basis13; c) when an Article establishes not “one single, distinct 
obligation, but rather multiple obligations. In such a situation, the listing of articles of
9 Weissbrodt, D., & Wolfrum, R., (eds.) The Right to a Fair Trial, 1998, pp. 33-37; 697-698.
10 US-Foreign Sales Corporations case, supra at note 1, para 166.
11 Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports o f  Certain Dairy Products WT/DS98/AB/R 
(Adopted 12 Jan. 2000).
12 Ibid., at para 128.
13 Ibid., at para 127.
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an agreement, in and of itself, may fall short of the standard of Article 6.2”.14 and d) 
that in order for the panel to dismiss claims as outside its scope of reference, the 
defendant must show that it has suffered prejudice for the lack of clarity.15 This case 
seems to have shed some light on the matter; yet, a closer inspection will illustrate that 
in effect, it does nothing of real value in lifting the opaqueness of Article 6.2.
First, it can be argued that this case grants more powers to the panellists in decision­
making without providing any road maps as to how this authority should be exercised. 
The fact that it must be done on a case-by-case basis means that panellists will have 
more authority to decide whether or not to even scrutinize a counter claim of Article 
6.2 by the defendant. Second, declaring that mere listing may or may not be adequate 
does nothing to make the provision more predictable and coherent. According to the 
standards of legitimacy outlined, the adjudication on the standard of clarity does 
nothing to make the rule any more determinate and predictable as the disputants do not 
know in advance whether their claims made in the REP will be addressed by the panel 
during the dispute resolution process. Consistency is compromised, as a case-by-case 
approach judged by a disparate group of panellists will undoubtedly produce 
inconsistent results even though the circumstances of the case may have been similar.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
81
2.1.1 Prejudice
The AB has injected another uncertainty to Article 6.2 by suggesting that in claims 
based on provisions which carry more than one obligation, mere listing may not be 
enough. The AB in this particular case acts in a questionable manner in terms of 
making a secure decisioa It held that the panel should have examined the Korean 
claim of failure by the EC to abide by Article 6.2, and that Korea is correct in claiming 
that in this case, mere listing does not suffice. However, the AB decided that the 
claims should not be dismissed unless the defendant is able to show prejudice.
This extra criterion for the dismissal of claims is excessively onerous. This 
requirement shifts the objectives of Article 6.2 to that of whether a respondent’s rights 
of due process have been infringed over the course of the proceeding as a result of any 
shortcomings in the REP. Developing nations already in a resource bind must not 
only prove that the opposing party has not clarified its claims, it must also prove 
prejudice. Proving prejudice is a very difficult task in any type of jurisdiction. It 
entails proving something that is not clearly defined and must necessarily involve the 
inspection and scrutiny of the parties’ litigation strategy. Furthermore, the defendant 
could be placed in the unenviable position of having to continue its defence of a claim 
which it perceives to be dismissible, while simultaneously, having to argue that it was 
prejudiced by not having clear understanding of the claims brought against it. Of
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course, this is largely due to the feet that panels have thus far shied away from issuing 
preliminary rulings on procedural matters before the continuation of the proceedings.
Prejudice suffered by a defendant during the resolution process is irrelevant in light of 
the object and purpose of Article 6.2, as the function of this provision must be 
determined at the outset of the proceeding. The standard promoted by the AB in no 
way produces predictability. What is the definition of prejudice? How can one prove 
prejudice suffered at the outset of a dispute, whilst continuing to defend itself against 
the claims of the plaintiff? At a minimum, the AB could have proposed some 
guidelines as to what, in feet, it means by “prejudice.” With the threshold for dismissal 
so high, nothing prevents a complainant from merely listing its claims complemented 
by at most, a very vague indication of the legal grounds with little explanatory notes, 
thereby causing more legal confusion and expenditure for the defendant as the 
probability of the claim being dismissed is very slim
2.1.2 Obligations o f an Article Directly Related or Incorporated into Another Article
Another problem that has occurred regards claims of articles which incorporate 
another article in it.16 The question is whether the plaintiff must include the related 
articles in its REP. In Argentina Footwear,11 the issue at stake was whether the 
determination of serious injury under article 4.2 of the Safeguards agreement was done
16 There are many examples within the covered agreements of the WTO (i.e., Article 3 into Article 4.2 
of the Safeguards Agreement or different schedules attached in annexes; or more obviously, articles 
which have many paragraphs and each affords a different set of rights and obligations).
17 Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (Adopted 12 Jan. 2000).
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properly. The complainant (EC) had claimed violation of this provision in its request 
for the establishment of a panel. However, in its submissions it introduced Article 3 of 
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM) in order to show that 
the investigation requirement pursuant to Article 4.2 was not conducted objectively. 
The panel made its decision taking full account of Article 3. When Argentina 
appealed under Article 6.2 of DSU, the AB explained that the panel was not only 
correct in analysing Article 3; in fact, it was obliged to do so.18
The same sort of reasoning prevailed in Korea-Frozen Beef. 19 There, the AB stated 
that since the Annex and Commitment Schedule (LX) were incorporated into 
complainants’ claims under Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
reference to the Annex and Commitment Schedule in the request for the establishment 
of a panel is not necessary. These two cases, in effect, overturn the Korea-Dairy 
decision in situations where more than one obligation or right exists within an article; 
as in that case the AB had ruled that in instances where more than one obligation is 
addressed, mere listing is not sufficient. Thus, the Members are again left in a state of 
uncertainty as to in which situations mere listing suffices and in which situations more 
legal indication is necessary, failing to make the provision predictable both in advance 
and after submitting their REP. If a Member were to draft an REP with a claim which 
has more than one obligation within a certain Article of a WTO-covered agreement, it 
will not know in advance whether it meets the requirements of Article 6.2. Once the 
proceedings have commenced and a defendant makes a counter claim seeking to
18 Ibid., para. 75.
19 Korea-Measures Affecting Imports o f  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef WT/DS161&169/AB/R 
{hereinafter, Korea-Beef or Korea-Frozen Beef}.
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dismiss a claim based on Article 6.2, the disputants would be uncertain how much 
weight and attention they should give to a claim during the submission of their 
arguments. The parties do not know whether the claims at issue will be dismissed or 
not, as ex ante predictability associated with “easy cases” is greatly diminished.20 This 
is a situation where both developing and developed nations would be harmed from the 
unpredictability of the matter, but developing nations would be more harmed as the 
expenditure of costs associated with illegitimacy of rulings is heavier on the 
economically weaker party. Thus, these rulings could be deemed unjust, as the 
advantage has not been afforded to the weaker party.
In its request for the establishment of a panel in the India-TRIPS case, the United 
States made claims against India’s intellectual property regime, and asserted that it 
was inconsistent with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement “including but not 
necessarily limited to Articles 27, 65, and 70. ”21 During the proceedings the US felt 
obliged to include in its written and oral submissions India’s lack of “mailbox” 
notification system in violation of Article 63. Arguably, the new claims could be 
related to certain provisions of Article 65, and as such the US stated that since it has 
used the term “necessary but not limited,” and that Article 63 is incorporated into 
Article 65, then it should be able to have the claims under Article 63 addressed. India 
claimed violation of Article 6.2 of DSU because the term “including but not
20 Easy cases as opposed to hard cases are those that parties to a dispute are fairly sure of what the 
judgment of the adjudicators is likely to be. Easy cases tend to facilitate mutually agreed settlements 
before or soon after the commencement of hearings. For developing countries distinguishing between 
hard cases and easy cases is important in that they can save costs associated with litigation in the WTO. 
See Butler, M., & Hauser, H., The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an 
Economic Perspective, 2000,16(2) Journal of law, Economics and Organizations, pp.503-533.
21 Request for the Establishment of a Panel. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/4, (Dated 7 Nov. 1996).
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necessarily limited” was vague and ambiguous. The panel disagreed, but the AB 
reversed the panel’s holding insofar as the phrase used by the US in its REP was 
indeed ambiguous and counter to Article 6.2. Yet, the US claims of Article 63 were 
still addressed by the AB based on a lack of demonstrated prejudice, but the issue of 
prejudice was not explicitly addressed by the AB in its report, leaving the reasoning 
insecure. The question remains whether the US claims would have been inconsistent 
with Article 6.2 had they simply not used the term “including but not necessarily 
limited.” The result would have been a mere listing of alleged violations and would 
have had some relation to an explicitly mentioned claim.
The inconsistency and insecurity of the AB in interpreting Article 6.2 of the DSU and 
its “standard of clarity” are detrimental to the interests of the developing countries. 
Furthermore, in instances where future litigation interests of developing countries are 
concerned, such as third party rights and their educational effect for currently non­
participating Members, the AB has ruled counter to the jurisprudential standard for 
justice under the development approach. As the developing countries’ learning 
process continues in the dispute settlement realm, the adjudicators must in the same 
breath devise more legitimate and just rulings for their terms of reference.
Furthermore, the costs associated with compelling claimants to identify and explain 
the legal basis of their allegations more clearly and precisely are negligible to the costs 
incurred by developing nations in defending against unclear claims. The 
“incorporated obligation” standard put forth in Argentina-Footwear and Korea-Beef
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needs to be reformulated so that at a minimum, the Korea-Dairy standard for going 
beyond mere listing when more than one obligation is presented, prevails again. The 
standard promoted there was that when more than one obligation is presented within 
an Article, mere listing is not enough; precise indication of the measures alleged to 
have been in violation plus its relevant legal foundation must be included in the REP.
In sum, the treatment by the AB in relation to the requirements of the REP has been 
lacking legitimacy and justice. On the issue of what needs to be included in the REP 
according to Article 6.2, the AB has made rulings which do not afford determinacy or 
coherence as it is held to be done on a case-by-case basis. On subsidiary matters such 
as prejudice, which is a requirement in dismissing the claim even when it is held to be 
lacking the clarity required by Article 6.2, the rulings have been illegitimate since they 
provide no predictability in the definition of prejudice. Furthermore, the higher cost of 
litigation caused by these decisions, coupled with the knowledge that developing 
countries lack the institutional and legal capacity, renders these holdings unjust. This 
is also true with regard to incorporated Articles. If one were to stipulate that the AB 
has been consistently ruling that a case-by-case approach is sufficient, then future 
cases would suffer from ex ante unpredictability with implications for developing 
countries. With regard to sub-topic issues such as incorporation of obligations, the AB 
has continued to make inconsistent rulings, as the differences in the holdings between 
Argentina-Footwear and Korea-Beef as opposed to Korea-Dairy indicate. Thus, the 
AB has been unfair towards developing nations in its adjudication of Article 6.2 of the
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DSU, since the rulings analysed either lack elements of legitimacy and/or justice, as 
has been established at the outset.
2.2 Appeals under Article 11 of DSU
Article 11 of the DSU requires that panels make an “objective assessment of the 
facts.” It would be logical to assume that under appeal the AB may examine whether 
the panel has complied with this obligatioa Yet, the AB has taken a very restricted 
stance in this regard. If one is to assume that the developing nations lack the legal 
resources to investigate and inspect the evidence presented by an OECD Member, then 
the AB, with its mandate to function as a legal safety mechanism, would be an 
appropriate agency to compensate for some of this deficiency by scrutinizing the 
application of the law by the panel to the evidence presented. Furthermore, it should 
be able to examine whether the panel during its analysis of the case has correctly 
distinguished between issues of fact and issues of law. As the AB is the standing body 
of judges with considerable legal expertise, whilst the panels are headed by a variety 
of experts who are not necessarily lawyers, the panels possibly show less sensitivity to
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legal issues.22 The AB was established as a form of compromise to accepting the 
binding force of the dispute settlement process during the Uruguay Round.23
The AB should allow itself some leeway as to when and how it must scrutinise the 
panel process in particular, the distinctions between issues of fact and law. Since 
these terms are not very clear and in many cases they overlap, the AB must afford 
itself some powers in examining whether the panels made an objective assessment and 
whether this assessment was flawed. However, an inspection of the cases clearly 
illustrates that the AB has thus far shied away from investigating the panel’s 
assessment of facts and even the panel’s assessment of issues that are dual in nature.24 
The view of many legal scholars that international tribunals are ill-equipped to 
examine evidence properly, coupled with the fact that developing nations have 
difficulties investigating the evidence of the industrialised opposition, provides for an
• 25undesirable situation for developing countries.
22 The relevant part of Articles 8.1 and 8.4 of the DSU shed some light on the compositions of panels: 
Art. 8.1: “Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental 
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as 
representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council 
of Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or 
published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.”; 
Art. 8.4: “To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of 
governmental and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, 
from which panelists may be drawn as appropriate.”
23 Petersmann, E.U., The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International, International 
Organizations and Dispute Settlement (1997) pp. 186-189
24 The dual nature arises mainly in cases where a determination of “directly competitive or 
substitutable” and “like” products are necessary or in anti-dumping and countervailing duties cases 
where much deference is granted to domestic authorities. Basically, these are cases where the 
distinction between matters of fact and law are not clear-cut. For more analysis look at McNelis, N., 
Fact and Law in Pleadings before the WTO Appellate Body, in Bronckers, M.C.E.J., A Cross-Section of 
WTO Law (2000) pp. 241-255 Cameron May Publishing,
25 McRae, D.M., The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier? (2000) 3 
J.I.E.L. 27 pp. 32-33. Also see Thomas, C., Litigation Process under the GATT Dispute Settlement 
System: Lessons fo r the World Trade Organization? (1996) 30 J World T 53, pp. 69-71.
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Assuming that developing nations are not as capable in generating the required 
evidence whilst the developed Members have stronger capabilities in doing so, then 
during disputes, the panels are faced with a preponderance of evidence emanating 
from one party. This shifts the developing nations’ litigation strategy into one of 
constant defence and rebuttal of evidence. At a minimum, the AB should be able to 
limit the panels’ excessive reliance on particular evidence when it sees fit and be able 
to inspect the assessment process of the panel. Otherwise, the proceedings in and of 
themselves become unjust. It may be argued that the lack of capability of international 
tribunals in assessing evidence should discourage allowing more claims to be brought 
to the AB. However, the AB is a second chance for disputants to find legal grounds 
that would reverse the incorrect application of the law to the facts or an incorrect 
distinction between fact and law.
For instance, in subsidies disputes, a common question facing the panels is whether 
two products are “like.” Hypothetically, a developed Member asserts and provides 
evidence supporting its claim that the product in question is “like.” The panel agrees 
with that assertion though the developing Member disputant disagrees. Later, the 
panel using the fact that the products are “like” proceeds to analyse another claim In 
such circumstances the AB should be able to examine whether in light of the evidence 
provided, the panel was correct in assuming that the products are “like” based on the 
meaning of “like” under the SCM Agreement.26 Of course, this does not mean that the
26 In the SCM Agreement in footnote 46 the definition of “like product” is as follows: “Throughout this 
Agreement the term ‘like product’ shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in 
all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product
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AB should overstep its obligations and duties as prescribed by the DSU by analysing 
the validity of the evidence presented, but rather that they have the power to examine 
whether the evidence provided by the industrialised party was given adequate weight 
in a finding of “likeness,” or whether the finding of “likeness” is commensurate with 
precedent.
The examination of this sort of claim in the appellate stage becomes prudent especially 
with regard to the comparison of two products which are not identical and yet may or 
may not be considered “like” in the context of the SCM Agreement.27 The AB could 
ask itself whether the panel truly understood the characteristics of the product in 
question, whether the comparison of the two products is correct, or whether another 
similar product should have been the basis of comparisoa The developing country 
disputant would have less chance of winning an appeal based on the SCM Agreement, 
as the term “like product” is a footnoted, stipulated definition and not an actual 
provision of the Agreement itself. There are no concrete guidelines in the Agreement 
to assist in the panel’s decision. Thus, it should be the responsibility of the AB to 
inspect the panel’s application of the defined term in the Agreement to the evidence 
presented under Article 11 of DSU.
In the Australia-Salmon28 case, the AB provided an interesting elaboration of its 
stance concerning Article 11. There, it explained that in past cases such as
which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product 
under consideration.”
27 Refer to the last sentence of SCM Agreement footnote 46.
28 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation o f Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Adopted 20 Oct. 1998).
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Hormones29 and EC-PouItry30 it had followed the line that determining the 
“credibility” to be afforded to certain facts is the mandate of the panel, and it is not the 
duty of the AB to “second guess” the panel’s findings.31 It said that it could only 
reverse the panel’s findings if the panel’s assessment of facts was so flawed as to 
render an objective assessment impossible.32 It also held that the panel could only 
violate Article 11 in the most extreme cases where it committed a truly “egregious 
error, so serious that it would call into question the panel’s good faith.” It utilised 
language such as “wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence.”33 In 
essence, the AB has set the threshold for establishing failure to abide by Article 11 of 
DSU so high that it is next to impossible to prove such occurrence.
The “wilful error” standard is one that is extreme. Though it can harm any Member’s 
interests, it is more detrimental to the weaker developing nations. It requires the 
appellants to allege that the panellists were, in essence, lacking the necessary aptitude. 
In the diplomatic and international setting, this is an allegation that is rarely 
appropriate, especially since the panellists are in many instances diplomats 
themselves, in constant contact with the parties of the dispute on issues other than 
trade.34 These allegations, if made by a party, would be counter to diplomatic comity 
and may have spillover effects. Thus, the parties to a dispute under this standard set 
by the AB are for all intents and purposes unable to claim Article 11 violations. It
29 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R para. 122-125.
30 EC-Measures Affecting the Importation o f Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R (Adopted 23 
July 1998).
31 Supra at note 28, para. 265-267.
32 Ibid. at para.267.
33 Ibid. at para. 266.
34 Based on interviews with the Thai, Philippines and Costa Rican delegations on February 14* 16th and 
22nd’ 2002 in Geneva, Switzerland.
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might be further argued that this diminishes the rights of Members negotiated under 
the multilateral agreements in contravention of Article 3.2 of the DSU, as it prevents a 
Member from invoking rights that have been guaranteed under the WTO Agreement.
The AB would be fulfilling its duties insufficiently by affirming an error of fact where 
that error was crucial in the resolution of the dispute. These types of panel judgments 
should be open to evaluation by the AB, and they should be corrected under Article 
11. To allow clear errors stand undermines the legitimacy of the system It gives way 
to the possibility that similar cases will not result in similar outcomes because the 
latitude granted to the panels to assess the facts, application of law to the facts, and, 
matters of dual nature is excessively broad. The panellist selection process of the 
WTO exacerbates this possibility due to its lack of a standing body. Furthermore, if 
coherence is compromised, it can easily lead to an insecurity in ruling because the 
manner in which the facts are assessed might not have adhered to a normative 
principle of international law under the development approach.
Arguably, the AB has been correct in allowing such latitude to the panels. They cite 
Article 17.6 of the DSU, which states, “An appeal shall be limited to issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” This 
argument seems sound, though not valid in this context. First, it can be argued that the 
AB has decided on questions of facts in many instances, and this is due to its arguable 
lack of remand authority.35 Examples of such decisions are the US-Reformulated
35 Palmeter, D., and Mavroidis, P.C., Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and 
Procedure (1999) Kluwer Law Publishing, pp. 84-95.
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Gasoline, EC-Poultry, Canada-Periodicals, and India-Patent Protection o f 
Pharmaceuticals cases,36 where the AB either “completed the analysis” or reversed 
and modified the panels’ decisions, and made de novo findings.37 Second, in cases 
which involve the application of the law to the facts (they may also be dual-natured 
issues of law and fact)38 the AB under Article 17.6 is obliged to scrutinise the 
examination process of the panel. Therefore, such a high standard for reversing the 
panel’s holding under the “objective assessment of facts” provision is unnecessary as a 
matter of law and detrimental as an institutional matter for developing Members.
As raising the threshold of valid claims under DSU Article 11 is more harmful to 
weaker developing nations, the AB should be more lenient in its interpretation of the 
Article as a matter of justice. The legitimacy of the cases involving claims of Article 
11 has thus far met the required criteria, and as such they have not been focused upon 
in this section. However, the weaker Members have not been advantaged by the AB’s 
interpretatioa Thus, from the perspective of developing nations the matter of appeals 
under Article 11 of DSU has been handled in an unjust and thus, unfair manner. This 
is an issue whereby it is prudent to adjust Franck’s “management” of legitimacy and 
justice, with the fourth criterion of the Development Approach, i.e., that where 
compromises have to be made with regard to justice and legitimacy, justice should be 
prioritised. Many aspects of WTO law involve the application of legal standards to a
36 US-Standards for Reformulated Conventional and Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Adopted 20 May 
1996); Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (Adopted 30 July 1997); 
India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R 
(Adopted 16 Jan. 1998).
37 For a more complete discussion on the AB lack of remand authority and its inspections of factual 
issues, see Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra at note 35, pp. 147-152.
38 Examples are given in footnote 36.
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particular set of facts. Proper assessment of determinations of injury, causality, “like” 
products and a plethora of similar issues is vital to developing countries’ interests in 
the dispute settlement regime. A less restrictive view of this issue will insure that the 
application of law to the facts will be done more prudently, as failure to do so will 
only exclude an important portion of WTO law from the AB’s review.
2.3 Burden of Proof
As the WTO dispute settlement regime grows more complex and juridical, the 
question of burden of proof has become increasingly contentious. In feet, nearly a 
third of all cases either directly or indirectly deal with placing the burden of proof on 
the appropriate party as explained in the DSB reports. The WTO, as with many other 
international tribunals, adheres to the principle of actori incumbit probatio, that the 
party asserting a fact is responsible for providing the proof of the fact.39 The AB in 
US-Wool Shirts explicitly reaffirmed the WTO’s adherence to this principle.40
However, some confusion still exists with matters that are known as “General Rule 
Exception” (GRE) and affirmative defence. A GRE is an exception to a WTO 
principle included in the provisions of WTO Covered Agreements, most often in the 
form of a safeguard measure. One example is rules which allow derogation from 
Most-Favoured-Nation principle (MFN) or national treatment principles due to
39 See, amongst others, Martha, R.S.J., Presumptions and Burden of Proof in World Trade Law, 14 
Journal of International Arbitration 1, at 67-68, and Kazazi, M., Burden o f Proof and Related Issues: A 
Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals (1996), pp. 175-180, Kluwer Law Publishing.
40 United States-Measures Affecting Imports o f  Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India 
WT/DS33/AB/R (Adopted 23 May 1997). p. 16 {hereinafter, US-Wool Shirts or India-B louses}.
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environmental or health and safety reasons. When a defendant claims that its 
measures, although contrary to WTO principles, are nonetheless allowed under a 
certain provision, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Member taking 
the safeguard measure. An affirmative defence, which is not an established 
international legal norm, merely accepts the claim of exception by the defendant but 
does not shift the burden of proof to it; rather the claimant must prove that the measure 
is not consistent with the WTO provision. An analysis of the case law will illustrate 
that the AB’s interpretation of GREs and affirmative defence has been predictable and 
coherent but lacks security and an adherence to international legal norms. 
Furthermore, the rulings on burden of proof have led to a situation whereby claims 
against protectionist measures levied on developing country exports are raised to a 
point that grants excessive deference to industrialised Members’ domestic authorities 
to levy non-tariff barriers. As due process is thought to function as a leveller of power 
and stature in the eyes of the law, developing countries have a strong litigious interest 
in the clarification of the burden of proof.41 This section will show that the 
adjudicators’ reasoning lacks adherence to international legal norms or security under 
the development approach. This lack of security lies in the misconstruction of the term 
“burden of proof,” as the AB has failed to distinguish it from the notion of “burden of 
evidence.” This failure will be assessed after an examination of the cases and the 
demonstration of the AB’s view towards the burden of proof. A second-best 
approach will also be developed that will suggest that even if the AB believes that 
Articles 3.3 of SPS, 6 of ATC, and Article 27.4 of the SCM are not GREs, but rather
41 Gaskins, R.H., Burden of Proof in Modem Discourse (1993 Yale Univ. Press) p. 83 -86
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that they are affirmative defences, they could have allowed the shifting of the burden 
of evidence whilst retaining the burden of proof on the claimant.
The EC-Beef Hormones42 case can be characterized as the benchmark decision with 
regard to the burden of proof and GRE. There, the AB held that “merely 
characterizing a treaty provision as an “exception” does not by itself justify a “stricter” 
or “narrower” interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination 
of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in the context and in the 
light of the treaty’s object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal 
rules of treaty interpretation.”43 It basically took a very literal approach in interpreting 
the exceptions, and limited Members to only a few GREs, i.e., Articles XX and XI 
(2)(c) of GATT.
In that case, the panel had ruled that Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is a GRE, and 
thus, is incumbent on the party invoking this exception to defend its actions.44 The 
AB reversed the panel’s ruling, claiming that the panel made an interpretational error 
and should not have classified this provision as a GRE. SPS Article 3.3 allows 
Members, on the basis of scientific justification or appropriate risk assessment, to 
impose a higher level of sanitary and phytosanitary measures than international norms 
in accordance with, inter alia, SPS Article 5. The panel’s decision would have been 
advantageous to developing countries, as their agricultural exports would have been 
harder to block by developed nations. Industrialised countries often impose higher
42 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS48/AB/R (Adopted 13 Feb. 1998).
43 Ibid., at para. 104.
44 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, part of the WTO Covered Agreements.
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standards than the international norm for environmental and health considerations.45 
The impact on developing countries is negative, as developing country exports usually 
bear the brunt of those higher standards. The risk assessment requirements mandated 
by Article 5 of the SPS are easier to satisfy for industrialised nations, as the scientific 
studies and evidence needed to impose higher levels of SPS are better conducted by 
richer nations. Under the current situation, once a Member raises the SPS standards in 
supposed conformity with its obligations, it forces the other party to prove that its risk 
assessment studies were not reliable or valid. This is a great hurdle for developing 
nations to overcome, in a sector that is crucial to their export interests. It seems that 
only Members such as the US or EU can fight these battles equitably. This is 
particularly true since developing countries tend not to raise their sanitary standards 
more than required, for example to comply with international standards, as the cost to 
their domestic food and agricultural industry would be dear.
The actori incumbit probatio principle has been well established and functions quite 
predictably and consistently. The only point of contention seems to be issues relating 
to GRE and what the AB has coined as “affirmative defence.” Until now, the 
adjudicators have held that Article XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) of GATT are limited 
exceptions from general principles of the WTO, and thus, the respondent party 
invoking them has the burden of proving their conformity with their obligations.46
45 Wilson, S. & Otsuki, T., Global Trade and Food Safety, Winners and Losers in a Fragmented 
System, 2001, World Bank Policy Paper no. 2698
46 India-Blouses, Supra at 40, para. 14.
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Yet, the AB has taken a stricter approach in categorising other exceptions similar to 
GATT Article XX and XI:(2)(c)(i). Aside from SPS Article 3.3, Article 6 of the ATC 
allowing the imposition of quantitative restrictions under certain circumstances, and 
Article 27.4 of the SCM allowing for certain export subsidies by developing countries 
are other examples of GREs. In US-Wool Shirts, Argentina-Footwear, and US-Cotton 
Underwear^the AB affirmed that Article 6 of the ATC is not a General Rule 
Exception; rather it illustrates a delicately balanced agreement, which was negotiated 
by the Members during the Uruguay Round. It further held that tinkering with this 
fine balance would alter the landscape of all the agreements covered by the WTO.48
Although the AB has provided a consistent and predictable approach on this matter, 
nevertheless, it has caused some consternation from the developing nations. As 
textiles and clothing are two of the major exports of developing countries, the ATC is 
of great importance. Article 6 is a large obstacle for these nations, as importing 
countries can apply quantitative restrictions. If this Article were held to be a GRE, it 
would make it much more difficult for developed nations, as evidenced by the 
mentioned cases, to block exports from the third world.49
As major exporters of textiles and agriculture, developing countries are at a 
disadvantage, as they are not able to effectively challenge the domestic authorities of
47 United States-Restrictions on Imports o f Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwearfrom Costa Rica, 
WT/DS24/AB/R (Adopted 25 Feb. 1997).
48 India-Blouses supra at note AO, Argentina-Footwear supra at note 17.
49 Although the Multi-Fiber Agreement has expired as of January 1,2005, Article 6 of ATC still is 
applicable. The importance of this provision may have been diminished, but the underlying concepts of 
burden of proof and GRE are, nevertheless, relevant.
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industrialised Members. They lack the information necessary to fully comprehend the 
manner in which the domestic authorities appraised the evidence to justify the levying 
of a non-tariff barrier, such as quantitative restrictions; whereas the industrialised 
Members would not be in an opposite position as they are in general importers or avid 
protectionists of agricultural and textile products. Developing countries can attempt to 
alleviate this problem by requesting a more thorough examination by the panels of the 
respondent’s domestic authorities’ investigations justifying their imposition of 
quantitative restrictions.50 But, with the AB’s reluctance to review panellist conduct 
under Article 11 and the existing panellist selection process, this strategy may not be 
effective.51
To the benefit of developing countries, the AB kept the same line of reasoning in the 
Brazil-Export Financing2 case. There, Canada claimed that Article 21A  of the SCM, 
which allows developing nations to provide subsidies, derogates from SCM Article 3, 
and is therefore, a GRE.53 The panel with AB affirmation disagreed and held that 
Article 27.4 does not deserve a shifting of the burden of proof. However, this 
provision is different from ATC Article 6 and SPS Article 3.3 in that it has made a 
specific reference to developing nations. It is explicit; and the balancing of rights 
which the AB and panels have alluded to is built-in and self-evident. Most 
importantly, SCM Article 27.4 requires consulting the Committee on Subsidies and
50 Though the Agreement affords much deference to national authorities and does not allow adjudicators 
to make de novo review of their decision, nevertheless, the panels can instill limitations on the contours 
of this deference by scrutinizing the objectivity of those national authorities’ decision.
51 See Article 8 of the DSU on the panelist selection process and its ad hoc approach to selecting 
panelists from a large roster of diplomats, academics, economists and lawyers submitted by Member 
States.
52 Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Adopted 20 Aug. 1999).
53 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
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Countervailing Measures, mandating approval by the Committee; otherwise the 
measures must be withdrawn. This requirement sets the provision apart from the other 
provisions, as the determination of the validity of the exception is in the first instance 
made by a WTO Committee and not by the domestic authorities of a Member.
The AB refuses to allow any other GREs than the already established provisions. The 
ruling on Article 27.4 of SCM, which seems to have been beneficial to developing 
nations, was mandated by the Agreement itself in very explicit terms. However, in 
other areas, which an explicit preferential treatment has not been proffered by the text 
of the treaty, the AB has consistently ruled on the issue of GREs and burden of proof 
in a manner that harms the developing nations' exports.
The category of GREs should include, at a minimum, ATC Article 6 and SPS Article 
3.3. Instead, the AB has selected to grant these provisions “affirmative defence” 
status. The reasoning of the AB delineating the differences between the two concepts 
is not convincing. In this regard, the AB in the Gasoline case, when discussing Article 
XX and GREs, implicitly signals that a GRE is a type of affirmative defence that if 
held valid would basically be counter to the spirit and fundamentals of the WTO.54 
There seems to be no practical distinction between GREs and affirmative defences in 
the reasoning of the AB in Gasoline.
54 Supra at 36, Gasoline, section VI.
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2.3.1 Insecure Reasoning
In all the cases discussed, the AB has reiterated that once a party asserts a fact and 
provides the proof for that assertion, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the 
claimant’s assertions. This is the approach taken by common law jurisdictions, as 
these jurisdictions have two levels of burden of proof. 55 The first level is the 
substantive aspect of the burden of proof which holds that the plaintiff has the duty to 
persuade the adjudicator by the end of the case of the truth of its pleadings and 
assertions.56 The second level, which could be called “burden of evidence,” is a 
procedural matter which can shift from party to party during the trial and signals the 
timing and process by which assertions must be defended by evidence.57 The fact that 
a party has discharged its burden of evidence does not mean that it has also discharged 
its overall burden of proof though there are many overlaps between the two 
concepts.58
Therefore, the AB by not making this distinction has acted in an insecure manner in 
that it has not abided by international adjudicative norms. In international tribunals 
the most utilized approach is that used by civil law jurisdictions.59 There the parties 
make their arguments, present their evidence and must wait until the end of the trial 
when the judge or judges makes their final determination of whether the burden of
55 In civil law jurisdictions there is only one level of burden of proof, and that is the final burden of 
persuading the adjudicator of one’s truthfulness in claims. Refer to Sandifer, D. V., Evidence Before 
International Tribunals, (1975) pp. 125-127.
56 Heydon, J.D., Cases and Materials on Evidence (1975) p. 13.
57 Kazazi, M., Burden o f Proof and Related Issues: A Study o f Evidence Before International Tribunals, 
(1996) p. 25; Cross, T. & Wilkins, Outline o f the Law of Evidence, 5 th ed. (1980) p. 27.
58 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
59 Mani, V.S., International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects, (1980) pp. 202-206.
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proof has been discharged. However, the AB has taken the common law approach by 
ruling that the burden shifts during the proceedings. This is suitable as long as the 
GREs and affirmative defences are categorised accordingly.
2.3.2 Affirmative Defence, Burden o f Evidence and an Alternative Approach
If the AB continues to treat GREs and affirmative defences as distinct concepts, then 
an alternative approach exists which would make the application of the burden of 
proof more fair. Article 3.3 of SPS states that members must provide scientific 
justification for imposing higher standards. Furthermore, the justifications could be 
read in accordance with Article 5 of SPS, which provides guidelines for the 
assessment of risks and the appropriate level of SPS protection. The wording of 
Article 5 is directed at the party imposing those higher standards. Article 6 of the 
ATC uses stronger language in that it states that the members imposing safeguard 
measures must “demonstrate” that the product in question is being imported at 
excessive quantities.60 The AB has correctly placed the overall substantive burden of 
proof on the claimant, but it has incorrectly placed the burden of evidence on the party 
seeking to reverse protectionist measures. The AB should have allowed the safeguard 
provisions of the SPS and ATC to be deemed as GREs, and as such, accorded the 
overall burden of proof on the exception-imposing party.
Instead, it created a new distinction in international law, i.e., between affirmative 
defence and general rule exception. The result is that in the future if there are any
60 ATC Article 6.2.
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provisions providing exceptions to the general principles of the WTO, the claimant 
must pass two burdens: one of evidence and one of proof. The reasoning of the AB in 
this matter has not adhered to international norms of evidence and burden of proof, as 
tribunals either adhere to the civil law approach or, if not, they distinguish between the 
two levels of burden.61
The inclusion of the concept of affirmative defences could have functioned as a 
second-best approach, if the AB had held that affirmative defences are pleadings that 
shift the burden of evidence on the party invoking the protectionist measure according 
to the criteria set in the SPS or ATC; nevertheless, the overall burden of proof of the 
case remains with the claimant In order to claim exceptions, the SPS and ATC 
agreements have mandated an extensive evaluation of economic and scientific data. 
With regard to the ATC, the economic data necessary for the authorities of the 
protection-imposing Member are overwhelmingly domestic in nature. The same is 
true to a lesser extent in regard to the SPS exceptions criteria, as the scientific research 
required to impose the safeguards are mostly available in industrialised countries. The 
domestic agencies of Members are not required to present all the data that led them to 
their safeguard measure. Thus, the developing nations, in particular, are powerless in 
gathering evidence so as to prove that the imposition of protectionist measures does 
not meet WTO requirements. Furthermore, if these Articles were held to be GREs or 
that affirmative defences carry the burden of evidence, they could have promoted 
more cooperation amongst the parties to share their data at the consultations phase
61 Kazazi, Supra at note 57, pp. 86-90.
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promoting more settlement during that phase, and/or allowed better preparations by 
the parties during the litigation.
If the AB had ruled to include these provisions as GREs, or at least ruled that 
affirmative defences place the burden of evidence on the responding party, it would 
have acted more or less consistently, predictably and securely. Some experts argue 
that the AB has abided by the customary rules of interpretation as set out in Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. They claim that these 
rules do not afford grounds for preferring one portion of the text to another, by 
construing one provision more broadly than the other.62 However, the due process 
considerations as expounded in this section outweigh the argument that literal 
interpretation is the best path. In fact, the development approach’s principle of 
capacity building and access to industrialised markets would have persuaded the 
adjudicators to be less literal and textual in their interpretations. Article 3.2 demands 
that adjudication should not add or diminish Members’ rights and that the dispute 
settlement of the WTO should provide security and predictability. The 
implementation and application of these obligations in the provision would be 
sacrificed if one were to read Articles 3.3 of SPS and 6 of the ATC in a strictly literal 
manner. Moreover, Article XX and Article XI: 2 of GATT are not worded much more 
narrowly than the exception-creating clauses mentioned above (Article 6 ATC and 
Article 3.3 SPS) to justify the exclusion of those clauses from the list of GREs, or at 
least to shift the burden in instances of affirmative defence. In addition, ATC Article 
6, SPS Article 3.3 and other similar provisions are clear exceptions to the general
62 Palmeter, D., & Mavroidis, P., Supra at note 35, pp. 84-85.
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principles of the WTO; as such, the allocation of the burden of proof or even the 
burden of evidence should not be different from the established GREs of Articles XX 
and XL(2)(c)(i).
2.4 Judicial Economy
The concept of judicial economy in WTO law is outlined as a panel’s need to “address 
those claims, which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter at issue.”63 
According to the AB in US-Wool Shirts, the panel is not obliged to rule on all claims 
put forth by the disputants. However, in a legal order such as the WTO, this judicial 
discretion should be utilized with more caution when developing nations are parties to 
a dispute. It is not proposed that in every case the adjudicators should rule on all 
claims, but it should at a minimum understand the disadvantages faced by 
economically weaker parties in a dispute. Limiting the use of judicial economy in 
disputes involving developing countries is beneficial in that problems associated with 
the implementation of the rulings may be alleviated if the parties have more legal 
guidelines to refer to during negotiations on remedies. Less reliance on judicial 
economy by panels would increase predictability and accordingly the fairness of the 
system by providing clearer guidelines for states as to how to implement DSB 
decisions.
Due to economic developmental needs and a lack of well-functioning trade and legal 
infrastructure, implementation of DSB recommendations is quite problematic for
63 India-WoolShirts Supra at 40, p. 19.
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developing nations.64 The defeated developing country needs to be directed as to how 
to proceed and recognise the exact WTO inconsistencies it must address with regard to 
its trade measures. Overuse of judicial economy hinders the ability of developing 
states to correct trade restrictive behaviour. Likewise, when a developing nation has 
won a case, it would prefer a more legally accurate and comprehensive guide as to 
how the loser of the dispute must modify its measures into conformity. This is 
particularly important as the asymmetry in economic power between developing and 
industrialised nations is a huge obstacle to a truly equitable remedy regime.65 Of 
course, if the ruling of the adjudicators will clearly determine and settle the course of 
implementation, then the invocation of judicial economy might be prudent. It must be 
able to afford any reasonable person skilled in international law and economics the 
understanding of its ruling and its intentions with regard to implementation. This 
implies that it should be absolutely clear when the measure has to be fully withdrawn, 
and it should indicate when minor reforms of the measure would be insufficient.
The jurisprudence of the WTO illustrates that the panels and AB have overused 
judicial economy and have done so unpredictably. Thus, indirectly leading to less 
certainty in implementation. Initially, in Gasoline and Japan-Taxes,66 the panel and
64 For more insight into the problems of developing nations in the implementation of rulings in the 
WTO remedy regime, see, amongst others, Horn, H., & Mavroidis, P., Remedies in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and Developing Country Interests, paper for World Bank (11 April 1999) pp. 20-30 
found on www.worldbank.org; Hoekman, B., & Mavroidis, P., Enforcing Multilateral Commitments: 
Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries (Sept. 1999) paper prepared for the WTO/World Bank 
Conference on Developing Countries in a Millennium Round, found at www.worldbank.com; Lai Das,
B., The WTO Agreements: Deficiencies, Imbalances, and Required Changes (1998) Zed Books, pp. 9- 
23; Footer, M., Developing Country Practice in the Matter o f WTO Dispute Settlement (2001) 35 J. 
World Trade 55 pp. 69-75.
65 See Horn and Mavroidis, Ibid., pp. 4-17.
66 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS10&11/AB/R
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AB implicitly indicated that they would address all claims.67 Later, the AB clarified its 
stance in India-Shirts, stating that Article 11 of DSU does not force the adjudicators to 
respond to every claim. In Australia-Salmon, the AB held: “To provide only a partial 
resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial economy.” It reversed the 
decision of the panel because of not addressing the SPS violations that were claimed 
by Canada concerning formed salmon and non-ocean caught Pacific salmon.
The panel had held that Australia was in violation of Article 5.1(b), 5.5 and 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement with regard to ocean-caught pacific salmon and in violation of Article 
5.1(b) pertaining to other salmon products. It declined to rule on Canada’s claim of 
violation of 5.5 and 5.6 of SPS for the non ocean-caught pacific salmon based on 
judicial economy concerns. It further stated that the parties, in particular the claimant, 
had focused their evidence and arguments on the ocean-caught pacific salmoa
The error, rectified by the AB, was that the panel should have decided on all those 
claims because the terms of reference of the panel included all types of salmon. The 
panel could then have simply held that Canada did not make a prima focie case or that 
the evidence provided was not convincing. If this dispute involved a developing 
nation as claimant, at the implementation stage, it would be in far worse position to 
protect its interests than Canada.68 Products such as smoked, cured or formed salmon
67 Cameron, J., & Grey, K., Principles o f International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (2001) 
50 Int & Comp. Law Quarterly 248, p. 282.
67 In fact, India participated as a third party. It had an interest in the fish exporting industry, which is
important for India. India sided with Canada on the issue of judicial economy.
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would still be blocked from entering Australia because those measures would not have 
been in violation of SPS 5.5 and 5.6.
An example where the panel and AB arguably exercised better use of judicial 
economy is in the Canada-Car Industry69 case. The EC had made an “alternative 
claim” (under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement) aside from its core claims of 
violation of Articles ID: 4 of GATT and XVII of GATS. The panel again, simply 
ignored those claims and was appropriately reprimanded by the AB for the oversight. 
However, the panel did correctly set aside EC arguments that certain (CVA) 
requirements by Canadian authorities are subsidies based on export performance under 
SCM 3.1(a), though the panel found Canada to be in violation of 3.1(a) for other 
reasons. This is one case where the recommendation of the DSB would, in effect, 
withdraw the measure completely. The panel had already ruled in favour of the EC 
based on WTO provisions that any “good faith” remedial action would entail almost 
full withdrawal of the measure.
Another circumstance where the adjudicators tend to utilize judicial economy is when 
certain legal questions may be potentially controversial and politically sensitive. 
Unlike the concept of “political question doctrine” in US jurisdiction, which allows 
the court to reject hearing the case if the dispute is deemed to be a political matter,70 in
69 Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Car Industry, WT/DS139/R & 142/AB/R.
70 In fact, the Supreme Court of the US may refuse to grant a writ o f  certiorari in any case in which less 
than four of the nine justices decide that, irrespective of the matter being political in nature or not, the 
case should not be brought to die high court. However, lower courts may only refuse the hearing of a 
case for political issues. Most of the political issues that are not allowed a court hearing have to do with 
decisions and actions relating to foreign affairs and the executive branch.
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international law and many municipal jurisdictions the judge or tribunal is forbidden 
from failing to reach a decision on a dispute in its entirety (non liquet)?1 This is 
particularly true for the WTO, as Article 3.2 demands that the dispute be resolved in a 
positive manner.
Under these circumstances the panels and AB try to avoid these tinderboxes, which 
might have institutionally destabilizing effects. The Turkey-Textile72 case and Korea- 
Beef case are two examples. In the former, the panel stated that it is “arguable” 
whether they are competent to scrutinize a trade arrangement between the EU and 
Turkey under Article XXIV: 8(a) and 5(a).73 They decided that the case could be 
resolved without causing a political row, which would very likely ensue were they to 
rule that the arrangement was WTO-inconsistent. The fact that neither party raised 
this issue on appeal could be viewed as affirmation of this view. In Korea-Beef, the 
panel held that it did not need to rule on the claim of Article XX GATT violation, as 
this is an environmental issue with the potential of causing much consternation from 
environmental lobbies worldwide. In both these cases the panel and AB had plenty of 
other claims to adjudicate, with determinate resolutions within reach without causing 
institutional controversy. This may be deemed an appropriate use of judicial 
economy. However, if the cases were such that the core claims involved potentially
71 Thirlway, H. W.A., Evidence Before International Courts and Tribunals, in Bernhardt, R. (eds.). 
Encyclopedia o f Public International Law, Vol. 1 (1981) p. 59; Cheng, B., General Principles o f Law 
as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, reprinted (1987), pp. 334-340.
72 Turkey-Restrictions on Imports o f Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (Adopted 19 
Nov. 1999).
73 Ibid., para. 60.
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controversial decisions, the adjudicators must not avoid them by ruling on other 
narrow legal issues that might be tangential to the main legal matters.
These cases must be contrasted with Bananas and Shrimp/Turtle in order to highlight 
the line which must be drawn in potentially controversial political cases as they relate 
to judicial economy. In Bananas and Shrimp/Turtle, the central elements of the 
dispute were the EU’s banana regime for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the environmental effects of fishing nets used for catching shrimp, 
respectively. Though there were a variety of claims under different agreements in 
both cases, nevertheless, they were all fruits of the core trade restrictive tree, i.e., the 
banana regime of the EU and the banning of shrimp imports caught by turtle harming 
nets. In comparison, the Turkey-Textiles case had at its core measures restricting 
textiles from India, with the most relevant claims coming under the ATC Agreement 
and not GATT Article XXIV: 8(a) and 5(a). Also, the core issue in the Korea-Beef 
dispute related directly to the Agricultural Agreement and the importation of frozen 
beef products. The invocation of Article XX by Korea was not the central element of 
the case. Both cases resulted in the full withdrawal of the measures.
Some of the problems associated with the notion of using judicial economy in a more 
predictable manner stems from the absence of lucid and clear procedural rules in the 
DSU. First, when a panel disposes of a matter based on judicial economy, it is 
possible that the AB will reverse that decision and then it must rule on that matter de
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novo, as evidenced in Salmon and Poultry™ because it arguably does not have remand 
authority.75 This allows for imperfect rulings, as the AB does not have the authority to 
review the factual findings of the panel, and also it deprives the Members of their right 
to appeal. Remand authority is debatable, as some believe that there is nothing that 
prevents the AB from requesting the original panel to rehear the case based on AB 
instructions, whilst others believe that the AB has no such authority.76 Nevertheless, 
past practice indicates that the AB holds the latter view. Second, the panel and AB do 
not provide preliminary rulings dismissing the claim for lack of prima facie evidence 
or relevance. If they did, it would be possible for the adjudicators to rule on all claims 
which were deemed to be prima facie true, and thus avoid many of the problems 
associated with judicial economy. Dismissal of claims could function as a guide in 
that it illustrates that the circumstances of that particular case do not warrant 
examinations based on the allegations presented. The implementation phase will be 
more certain, since the dismissed claims will assist the negotiation of the parties by 
clarifying what actions may or may not be taken in bringing the losing party’s 
measures into conformity. It will immunize the losing party after it has taken steps to 
conform to the ruling from future identical claims by other Members. Whereas under 
the current situation, there is nothing that would prevent another Member, or even the 
Member which won the case, from lodging the same claims against a measure that was 
not addressed by the panel due to judicial economy concerns. Also, it has precedential
74 It may be argued that US-Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R Adopted 29 April 1996) and Canada-Periodicals 
(WT/DS31/AB/R) were similar in that the AB took up claims which were not ruled upon at the panel 
stage though the AB did not explicitly mention the concept of judicial economy.
75 See Bourgeois, J.H.J., Some Reflections on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Journal of Int 
Economic Law (2001), p. 152.
76 Ibid. Bourgeois believes that the AB has that authority, while Palmeter and Mavroidis disagree.
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value in that future claims could be more focused in scope, as Members will know 
what claims apply to which circumstances. The AB in Bananas recommended just 
such a procedure in the footnote of its report.
Claims based on inaccurate use of judicial economy are almost always grounded in the 
wording of Articles 11 and 7.2 of the DSU. These claimants believe that the panel has 
not made “an objective assessment of the matter before it ” and/or has not “addressed 
the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to 
the dispute.”77 If they have made a prima facie case, then that is surely before the 
panel, cited by the parties, and relevant to the case. In fact, using the reasoning in 
Australia Salmon by the AB, one can assert that since all products in the terms of 
reference of a panel must be addressed, the same should be true for the legal claims 
associated with those products. In order to clarify the nexus between judicial 
economy and the aforementioned DSU provisions, the panel should be able to make 
preliminary decisions during the initial phases of the process and dismiss superfluous 
claims. This will elucidate the relevant claims, satisfying the text of Article 7.2. Also, 
the dismissed claims may function as guidelines for Members involved in future 
similar disputes, avoiding redundancy of claims that the DSB has already indicated to 
be extraneous.
Opponents of this proposal counter that to have preliminary rulings will model the 
WTO system more like a common law regime. The dispute settlement system of the 
WTO is more inquisitorial and investigative similar to civil law systems. However,
77 Articles 11 and 7.2 of the DSU, respectively.
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firstly, the WTO has borrowed legal principles from different legal jurisdictions and, 
as such, there is no reason why this procedure should not be added.78 Secondly, if the 
party has made a prima facie case, then the inspection continues; however, if a party 
has not made a prima facie case or panellists are in doubt as to whether it has been 
made, then the possibility exists that further inspection into that claim could have the 
effect of making the case for the claimant. This would be counter to basic principles of 
international law, as the adjudicators’ neutrality prevents them from assisting 
claimants in their litigation efforts. The panel should have the right and obligation to 
inquire and investigate into the claims that have already been held to be prima facie 
true.
The concept of judicial economy has been mentioned and ruled upon both explicitly or 
indirectly in approximately 64% cases.79 The prevalence of contention on this 
procedural issue in WTO disputes illustrates that the Members do not have full 
understanding of the system’s use of this concept. The decisions made by the AB and 
the panels indicate a systematic lack of predictability and transparency with regard to 
judicial economy. The developing nations more than the wealthy Members need the 
predictability with respect to adjudicators’ use of judicial economy as it could have 
repercussions into the implementation phase of the dispute settlement regime. This 
failure to meet a necessary legitimacy element has led to unfairness from the
78 Cass, D.Z., The Constitutionalization o f International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the 
Engine o f Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 E.J.I.L. 3-38 (2001), specifically the 
discussion on Constitutional Doctrine Amalgamation.
79 The calculations were made until April 15,2004. Also, indirectly, the percentage indicates instances 
where the panel has simply ignored to rule on certain claims. However, no objections on record were 
made by the parties either on appeal or in the DSB meeting after the ending of the case.
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viewpoint of developing nations, as it has injurious effects on these Members’ interest 
in the implementation phase.
2.5 Amicus Curiae Submissions by Non-governmental Organizations
The creation and evolution of the WTO as the governing pillar of the multilateral 
trading system has provoked non-governmental organizations to demand more 
participation in the dispute settlement process. To this end, they have submitted 
amicus curiae (friends of the court) briefs to WTO panel and AB proceedings. The 
acceptance by the WTO adjudicators of amicus curiae briefs has aggravated many 
developing country Members who claim that their acceptance puts them in a 
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis industrialized Members.80 This section will 
explore three issues. First, that the legal arguments and interpretations put forth by the 
AB are not convincing, and therefore, do not assist in building a legitimate system. 
Second, as a practical matter, the acceptance of the amicus briefs have negative 
consequences for developing Members’ institutional interests, which signify the 
unfairness of the AB’s treatment of the matter. Third, the guidelines enumerated in 
the Asbestos*1 case do not assuage the concerns of developing nations even if they are 
assumed to be procedurally adequate.
80 See WT/DSB/M/50, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 Nov. 1998 (14 
December 1998); furthermore, 18 out of the 21 delegates interviewed for qualitative research held the 
view that the inclusion of third party briefs into the dispute settlement process is of great detriment to 
their litigation strategies. Of the other 3 delegates, 2 believed it to be of no importance, and one 
believed that it is a good idea to have third party submissions but the way the AB used its judicial 
authority instead of it being done at the General Council was erroneous.
81 EC-Measures Affecting the Prohibition o f Asbestos Products, WT7DS135/AB/R.
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The legal arguments against the use of amicus briefs include the following:
1. Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO states: “The 
General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related 
to those of the WTO.” The Appellate Body does not have the authority to decide 
the WTO’s relationship with NGOs.
2. The balance of rights and obligations as emphasized by Article 3.2 of the DSU is 
altered by amicus brief submissions.
Other subsidiary arguments may also be made which pertain solely to the AB’s lack of 
authority in accepting amicus briefs, in addition to points (1) and (2) above. They 
include:
1. Article 13 refers only to the panel and may not be held to be pertinent to the AB.
2. DSU Article 17.4, which only allows parties and third parties involved in a 
dispute to make submissions, is being violated.
3. The AB Working Procedures devised by the AB itself affirms that only parties 
and third parties to a dispute may participate in the proceedings.
The amicus issue first arose at the panel level in the Shrimp/Turtle2,2rase. There, the 
panellists interpreted Article 13 in a literal manner in accord with past WTO
82 US-Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R & WT7DS58/AB/R 
(Adopted 6 Nov. 1998).
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practice.83 The panel held that “accepting non-requested information from non­
governmental sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible with the provisions of 
the DSU as currently applied.”84 The word “seek” in the panellists' view meant 
information that is actively solicited by the panel. Thus, the panel refused 
consideration of two amicus briefs proffered by environmental NGOs. At the 
appellate stage, the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) submitted an 
amicus brief to the AB. The AB in a letter addressed to the parties stated that it would 
consider the “pertinent” legal arguments of this brief.85 Both parties objected to the 
AB’s ruling, asserting that the AB must abide by rule 16(1) of the Appellate Body
Working Procedures, which provides for gap-filling authority on a one-off basis in a
* 86particular case. However, no mention of this procedure was made m the AB report.
The AB rejected this argument and held that Article 13 affords much broader authority 
to the panellists. Most importantly, the AB found that the right to “seek information” 
includes the right to accept non-requested submissions. Here, the AB sought no 
guidance from any legal or literary dictionary, as it has on many previous occasions, 
for ascertaining the meaning of the word “seek.” Instead, it relied on its own literal 
definition of the word.
83 The WTO adjudicators in particular, the AB has been interpreting the WTO provisions in a textual 
manner. This is evidenced by the extensive use of different literary and legal dictionaries in a great 
amount of cases. Some examples are, inter alia, Reformulated Gasoline, Bed-linen, India- 
Pharmaceuticals, Thailand-H-Beams from Poland, Japan- Photographic Paper and many other similar 
cases. Also, see Jackson, J.H., The Jurisprudence o f GATT and the WTO (2000) Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 133-194, for indications of textual interpretations. Furthermore, see Petersmann, E.U., The 
GATT Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute 
Settlement (1997) Kluwer Law Publishing, pp. 107-117.
84 Shrimp/Turtle case, Supra at 82, para. 7.8 (panel report)
85 Shrimp/Turtle Supra at 82, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 83-84.
86 Appleton, A.E., Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case, 4 J.I.E.L. 691(2000) p. 693.
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The next case involving amicus submissions was the Australia-Salmon Recourse to 
Article 21.5 by Canada*1 cast. The panel cited Article 13 of DSU and the AB’s 
holding in Shrimp/Turtle to accept a non-requested brief from the Concerned 
Fisherman and Processors of South Australia.88 This case set the stage for amicus 
curiae to be accepted at every level of dispute settlement-panel, Appellate, and 
recourse to Article 21.5 disputes.
The AB’s authority to accept amicus briefs arose once again in the Carbon Steef9 
case. There, the AB decided to elaborate on its reasoning behind the acceptance of 
amicus briefs, as it had not done so in Shrimp/Turtle. The AB noted that the DSU and 
its Working Procedures are silent with regard to this issue. However, Article 17.9 of 
the DSU grants them the power to devise working procedures, and the procedures that 
have been promulgated indicate, under rule 16(1), that “where a procedural question 
arises that is not covered by these Rules, a division may adopt an appropriate 
procedure for the purposes of that appeal only, provided that it is not inconsistent with 
the DSU, the other covered agreements and these Rules.”
87 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation ofSalmon-Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, 
WT/DS18/RW (Adopted 18 Feb. 2000).
88 Ibid., at para. 7.8.
89 US-Imposition o f Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products
Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (Adopted 7 June 2000).
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2.5.1 Article V o f Marrakesh
Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement, though arguably not part of the “covered” 
agreements, does shed some light as to the dynamics of the relationship between 
NGOs and the WTO.90 It provides for the General Council, which resembles a 
legislative body, to devise rules to coordinate the interaction of the WTO with NGOs. 
This provision illustrates, at a minimum, the “spirit of the law” and at a maximum, a 
clear mandate that the WTO adjudicators be precluded from accepting amicus briefs.
The wording of the Article should be understood to indicate that the Members have 
made a decision to protect the institutional balance of rights that they possess in the 
WTO. The Article also illustrates that the Members acknowledged the political role of 
the WTO as an international institution and that only Members via the General 
Council have the prerogative to devise working relationships with other international 
non-governmental agencies. This is the overall policy of the WTO with regard to it 
external relations. The DSB and its agencies, i.e., the panel and AB, may have limited 
rights to make rules for improving the functioning of the dispute settlement regime, 
but the scope of that power is limited to internally oriented matters of the WTO. The 
responsibility for external relationships of the institution is solely under the purview of 
the General Council
90 Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement states the following: “1. The General council shall make 
appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations that have 
responsibilities related to those of the WTO. 2. The General Council may make appropriate 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-govemmental organizations concerned with 
matters related to those of the WTO.”
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2.5.2 Article 3.2 of the DSU and the Balance o f Rights Contained in Other Provisions
Another aspect of amicus briefs that will conflict with provisions of the DSU pertains 
to Members’ rights under Article 3.2. This Article prevents rulings which “add to or 
diminish” Members’ rights. The AB in Carbon Steel, struggled to avert such criticism 
by stating that the only rights that parties and third parties have under Article 3.2 is the 
right to make submissions and have them heard.91 This is a very narrow view of the 
Article’s scope.92 Articles 17.4 and Rules 21,22, and 28.1 of the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review only allow parties and third parties to a dispute—not external 
entities—to make submissions. Also, the fact that an accepted amicus brief must be 
responded to by the parties further convolutes the balance of rights. Articles 17.4 of 
DSU states that the parties have the right to only respond to the claims made by the 
Members which are party to a dispute. This can also be adduced from the DSU in 
general, because the language of the DSU in Article 1.1 indicates that the settlement 
regime is for Members.93 Thus, at a minimum, the parties have the right not to respond 
to amicus briefs without prejudice to their case and that no negative inference may be 
made by the adjudicators. However, this is not the optimal situation, as once the 
submission is reviewed, it is difficult to reverse the effects of that submission on the 
minds of the adjudicator.
Moreover, allowing NGO briefs tips the scale in favour of the NGOs over the 
Members in cases where a developing country does not have sufficient interest to
91 Appleton, Supra at 86, pp.697-698.
92 Ibid.
93 Article 1.1 of the DSU. See Annex 1.
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achieve standing but wishes to participate. An NGO has the opportunity to submit its 
brief even after proceedings have been initiated. This is an important point, as many 
developing countries test the DSB waters by participating as third parties before 
becoming actual parties to a dispute. Third-party participation, aside from serving 
certain trade interests, functions as a learning experience in the dispute settlement 
regime. Rather, the time restrictions set in the DSU are not necessarily applicable to 
the NGOs. If a Member has not abided by these time restrictions, its standing in a 
dispute becomes questionable; but the same is not true for NGOs.94
Article 4 of the DSU grants parties the right to consultations before the panel 
proceeding begins. The object is to settle the dispute more amicably by negotiations 
before initiating legal proceedings. It also allows the parties to have a better 
understanding of the claims and counterclaims involved in the dispute. It is, in a 
sense, similar to the “discovery” requirements in many common law jurisdictions, 
which mandate that both parties share the evidence at their disposal before trial 
commences so as to avoid “surprise attacks” from either side. The consultation phase 
clarifies some of the arguments of the parties beforehand and provides for parties to 
better prepare their cases. Accepting amicus briefs impugns the parties’ right to 
consultations. This is a crucial point for developing countries as third-party briefs 
potentially exposes them to surprise “arguments” and expends more resources, 
thereby, denying them one of the benefits of Article 4.
94 Though the Asbestos case provided guidelines for NGO submissions with time restrictions as one 
criterion, nevertheless, they are according to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review a one-off set of rules. There is no guarantee that the next time they use amicus briefs, the same 
restrictions will apply.
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2.5.3 Amicus Briefs and the International Legal Arena
Proponents of the use of amicus briefs rely on examples of other jurisdictions and 
tribunals which allow amicus briefs.95 However, there are many international 
tribunals that do not allow such briefs (i.e., International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
contentious cases, International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Protocol on Dispute Settlement). One reason 
given for their use is that it allows for non-party interests to participate in the 
resolution of the dispute because it could have future consequences for them 
However, the AB in the US-FSC^held that the adjudicators of the WTO could not 
make their rulings, constantly taking into account all future repercussions of their 
decisions. They are bound to resolving the dispute at hand.97 Additionally, the WTO 
dispute settlement regime is clearly for Members’ use. Consequences that affect 
Members may need to be addressed, not consequences of decisions for certain interest 
groups.
Also, it is argued that the AB has full authority to consider past panel and AB 
decisions, as well as academic writings and judgments of other international tribunals 
such as the ICJ, and that amicus briefs are similar to them98 However, these are
95 Marceau, G. & Stilwell, M., Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO 
Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J.I.E.L. 155-187 (2001), and see also Editors Note countering to some extent 
Dr. Appleton’s arguments in essay at supra at 86.
96 US-Tax Treatment for  “Foreign Sales Corporations ”, WT/DS108/AB/R (Adopted 20 March 2000).
97 Ibid.
98 Marceau, & Stilwell, Supra at 95, pp. 159-162; and Editors Note pp. 705-706 4 JEEL (2000).
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established secondary and tertiary sources of international law accepted by the 
international legal community. There is a certain understanding of objectivity and 
relevance associated with these legal sources. Amicus briefs are not comparable as 
their allegiance to a certain cause or interest group is unclear.
2.5.4 Gap-Filling Authority o f the Appellate Body
The AB struggled to alleviate concerns of procedural fairness associated with the 
acceptance of amicus briefs in the Asbestos case. At the panel phase the panellists 
considered two briefs by NGOs. The issue at stake was the manner in which the AB 
was to treat amicus brief submissions in light of its lack of detailed reasoning in 
Carbon Steel. It promulgated a set of criteria which must be met by NGOs in order 
for the AB to accept their submission." It understood that if it were to alter the AB’s 
general Working Procedures to include amicus brief procedures permanently, it must 
go through a burdensome process of consulting with the DSB Chairman and the 
Director-General. They are political appointees and as such, are aware of the lack of 
support from Members for amicus briefs. Therefore, they selected to craft the criteria 
by invoking Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures. This rule allows them to “fill 
gaps” in procedure for a particular case only. Nevertheless, amicus brief submission is 
very significant, and the procedures for accepting them should not be relegated to 
mere “gap filling” techniques of the AB. A noteworthy point is that their report 
explicitly mentioned their consultation with all seven members of the AB when
99 Asbestos case, Supra at 81, para. 52.
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adopting the additional procedures. This could be an indication that these rules will 
apply in other appellate cases.100
The criteria for submitting amicus briefs pursuant to Asbestos, aside from procedural 
matters (such as timing and format restrictions), include substantive requirements 
relating to the nature and character of the amici, its sources of funding, and their 
relations with parties to the dispute.101 However, there is still much room for non- 
Member entities to abuse the procedures so as to influence the trial Assuming that the 
AB has the fact-finding authority to ascertain the nature of the amici, it lacks the 
resources and time needed to verify them This problem may be compounded in cases 
where many organizations submit briefs. In the said case, the AB granted itself 8 
working days, to review the character of at least 17 different organizations,102 making 
for a very shallow review of the requirements. Furthermore, there is a real possibility 
that organizations will misrepresent themselves in order to meet the criteria necessary 
for the acceptance of their briefs.
2.5.5 Resource and Power Imbalances and the Prospects for Abuse
NGOs which tend to participate in the WTO system are based in developed nations, 
mostly as syndicates and associations protecting and promoting certain industries’
100 It is obvious that the AB division hearing a case may consult other judges and that the non-hearing 
AB judges may participate in the hearings as they have done many times in the past. It is well within 
their rights to do so and is thought to provide more coherence amongst the AB judges. However, 
participation by non-selected judges is not explicitly noted in the reports.
101 Asbestos, Supra at 81 para. 52.
102 Asbestos Supra at 81 para. 52,53 and 55.
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interests. A count of the NGOs which participate in the Ministerial Conferences 
illustrates that approximately 80% of them originate in OECD countries and that 70% 
of those are actual industry syndicates.103 Also, the NGOs in developing nations are 
usually not as organizationally sophisticated and well funded as the NGOs in the 
industrialised world. This presents an equality problem which the Asbestos guidelines 
do not resolve. Furthermore, if the guidelines are not scrutinised extensively, then 
there is the potential that in a particular case an organization with many vested 
interests is able to abuse the system and make submissions. On the other hand, if the 
guidelines are to be strictly scrutinized, then that has the potential of locking out many 
NGOs from the developing nations, as their sources of finance, legal status, and links 
to a party to a dispute might not be clearly distinguished due to a lack of institutional 
and legal capacity faced by their home country.
In the Thailand-H-Beams case, the Thai authorities were able to thwart an attempted 
abuse of amicus curiae privileges. There, before the AB had the opportunity to devise 
requirements for amicus briefs, it was demonstrated that an industry syndicate which 
was created simultaneous to the establishment of the panel (most likely for the sole 
purpose of submitting a brief) had violated confidentiality provisions of the DSU. 
This was done via the leaking of information by the private counsel appointed by 
Poland (the claimant), which also happened to represent the said “NGO.” The 
Asbestos criteria would not have prevented this. Had it not been for an inadvertent 
reference in the amicus brief to the arguments of Thailand (which was to be held
103 This stat is based on Ministerial Conferences, including the Doha Round, found on the NGO list of 
participants as stated on the WTO web site www.wto.org.
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confidential), there would have been no way of discovering the abuse. If the practice 
of accepting amicus briefs becomes prevalent and the AB devises Asbestos-type 
requirements, then the developing countries will have much to worry about; as not 
only the legal issues, but also the potential for improper functioning of the procedures 
will put them at a clear disadvantage.
The acceptance of amicus briefs is meant to alleviate some of the transparency and 
“democratic deficit” issues associated with the WTO system104 In an inter­
governmental organization the Members are thought to be accountable to their 
citizenry; however, this is not the case for NGOs. Their accountability is not 
transparent, and the Asbestos requirements cannot shed any real light on their 
character. Thus, the democratic deficit that the AB is trying to resolve is being 
replaced by procedures which offer privileges to undemocratic entities, analogous to 
the adage of “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.” Moreover, amicus briefs would 
forever change the institutional landscape of the WTO as an inter-governmental 
organization, which in and of itself could alter the balance of rights and obligations 
that was negotiated at the Uruguay Round.
The AB sought to open the dispute settlement process of the WTO to civil society. In 
the process, it overstepped its authority imprudently in order to achieve that goal. It is 
one thing to be judicially active in interpretation and application of laws in order to
104 Gaffney, J.P., Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the 
Dispute Settlement System, (1999) 14 Am. Univ. Int’L. Rev. 1173 at 1192-1193, and also, Chamovitz,
S., Participation o f Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization (1996) 17 UPa J 
Inti Econ L 331 at 340-341.
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resolve a dispute or fill legal gaps. Yet, it is another to alter the nature of an institution 
from a member-driven body to a judicial-driven organization. The action, if carried 
over to other matters, would result in the transformation of the nature of the WTO. 
Furthermore, judicial activism may arguably be necessary at times for the protection 
of institutional integrity or the benefit of weaker parties, but the amicus curiae 
adjudication has achieved neither. It has justified the use of amicus briefs based on 
unconvincing and insecure legal interpretations of Articles V of Marrakesh 
Agreement, Article 13 and 3.2 of the DSU. It has also foiled in the correct distribution 
of justice, as the developing nations have been put at a clear disadvantage as opposed 
to the stronger industrialised members. The acceptance of amicus briefs under these 
circumstances is unfair from the perspective of developing nations.
2.6 Conclusion
The foregoing discussion attempted to explore some of the more important procedural 
issues facing the developing nations when litigating cases in the WTO. Based on the 
premise that developing countries so often lack adequate resources to effectively 
maximize their use of the DSB, emphasis was given to the resolution of issues relating 
to “standard of clarity” of claims, burden of proof, appeals of Article 11 of DSU, 
judicial economy and amicus brief submissions. As consistency, predictability and 
security of the dispute resolution regime act as benchmarks of a legitimate legal 
system, the chapter discovered that the adjudicators have not met developing 
countries’ expectations in this regard. As a corresponding effect, the justness of the
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adjudication is called into question, since the interpretation of the said issues has 
harmed the developing nations more so than industrialised Members. It became 
apparent that the panels and AB must be more rigorous in their protection of the rights 
and interests of the developing nations, without harming the integrity of the institutioa
Article 6.2 of the DSU relating to the standard of clarity associated with the making of 
claims in the REP is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The case law in this regard 
illustrates that the reason for this holding stems from the fret that the adjudicators do 
not have a consistent and coherent understanding of this standard. In order to avoid 
frequent dismissal of claims, the AB vacillates between accepting a “mere listing” test 
{Bananas) and mandating a matching of claims with legal references when more than 
one obligation is encompassed in a provision (Korea-Dairy). Furthermore, the AB 
judges have raised the threshold of dismissal under Article 6.2 to instances where a 
party has been prejudiced. The evolution of this issue has been fraught with 
unpredictability and inconsistency. The case-by-case standard puts the weaker nations 
at a disadvantage in that no clear guidelines are evident before the case goes to the 
panel. In fact, the rulings have undermined the objective and purpose of Article 6.2 
because its characteristic demands that the standard of clarity and its other related 
issues be outlined before the commencement of pleadings and argumentation.
The practical impossibility attached to making appeals under DSU Article 11, as ruled 
by the AB, is of detriment to the WTO legal system and more so to developing 
nations. The “objective assessment of facts” standard of the panel is of utmost
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importance to the Members. The AB has explicitly ruled that it will not consider 
Article 11 appeals unless the panellists have engaged in wilful and egregious error, 
showing a lack of good faith. This is too high a hurdle to overcome, as proving such 
ineptness by diplomats and academics sitting on panels is highly unlikely. This harms 
developing nations in sectors crucial to their export interest in relation to trade 
contingent remedies, e.g., anti-dumping and SCM, in addition to safeguards under the 
SPS Agreement. The AB should be able to scrutinize the manner in which the panel 
applied the law to the facts and matters where the distinction between law and fact is 
not very clear. This would not be out of line with past AB practice in that it has on 
several occasions “completed the analysis” of the panels or ruled de novo on an issue.
The principle of burden of proof in WTO law has been matched, correctly so, with 
other international tribunals, i.e., actori incumbit probatio (the party making a claim 
carries the burden of proof). However, on the one hand, controversy arises when 
dealing with the distinctions between “General Rule Exception” and affirmative 
defence; and on the other hand, between substantive or overall burden of proof in a 
case and the burden of evidence during the settlement process. Under the current 
situation, the difference amongst GREs and affirmative defence is vital, as the overall 
burden of proof will shift to the defendant in GRE claims, whereas it remains with the 
claimant in provisions recognized as affirmative defences.
Provisions held to be affirmative defences by the AB most often involve action taken 
by domestic authorities of importers (e.g., ADA, SPS, Safeguards and SCM), which
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affords them a great deal of deference. The sectors most important to developing 
countries’ exports are more often the target of such action by domestic authorities in 
industrialised nations. Coupled with legal and organizational inadequacies faced by 
developing nations, this greatly hinders their export interests because they would not 
be able to successfully bring cases against industrialised Members. The just course of 
action would be to interpret some of these provisions as GREs in the same spirit as 
Articles XX and XI (2)(c) of GATT. There should be no distinction made between the 
concept of GREs and affirmative defence if they both derogate from the general rules 
of the WTO. The legal justifications are also valid in that the wording of Articles XX 
and XI (2)(c) is not narrower than the likes of Article 6 of ATC and Article 3.3 of the 
SPS. Furthermore, these regulations are, in fact, derogations from fundamental 
principles (General Rules) of the WTO, Le., MFN and national treatment.
Yet, if the AB continues to refuse the addition of other forms of general rule 
exceptions, another alternative exists which has been proposed in this chapter. The 
second-best choice relates to the distinction between substantive or overall burden of 
proof and the burden of evidence during the hearing. The AB could hold that 
provisions such as Article 6 of ATC and Article 3.3 of SPS are affirmative defences, 
and that the overall substantive burden of proof remains with the claimant; however, 
the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent. The respondent must put forth the 
evidence that justifies the actions of its domestic authority in prescribing the safeguard 
and selected trade contingent remedy measures. However, in order for the claimant to 
win the case, it must bear the burden of proving its case in totality. The evidence of
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the defendant presented is just one element in the overall resolution of the dispute. 
This allows for evidence that is usually at the sole disposal of the defendant that has 
taken the safeguard action to be presented in the dispute, so that the panel and the 
opposing party may see the validity of the trade-restricting measure. The first scenario 
where there is no true distinction between GREs and affirmative defence is optimal 
since the developing Members’ interests are better protected. However, if the AB 
decides to make such distinction, then it should levy the burden of evidence on the 
party invoking the affirmative defence plea, whilst maintaining the substantive burden 
of proof on the claimant.
The claims and counterclaims that adjudicators select to consider have a tangible 
effect on the parties to a dispute. This section endeavoured to illustrate that at times 
the utilization of judicial economy has been confusing and inappropriate, as evidenced 
in Australia-Salmon and EC-Poultry. The Australia-Salmon panel lacked true 
understanding of the concept and provoked reversal by the AB. In order to have a 
more effective implementation stage, the WTO panels and AB should attempt to 
respond to as many relevant claims as possible—in particular, cases involving 
developing nations. Limited use of judicial economy would make more transparent 
the possible remedies afforded to the winning party and, consequently, produce less 
controversy with regard to conformity to DSB recommendations. It would also assist 
in streamlining the negotiations between parties at the implementation stage. 
Developing nations have a large interest in improving the effectiveness of
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implementation as the retaliatory remedy system of the WTO inherently disadvantages 
them vis-a-vis the developed Members.
The acceptance of amicus briefs is a huge diversion from that path. The legal 
arguments in favour of amicus briefs are not very convincing as compared to the legal 
arguments opposing their submissioa The acceptance of amicus briefs violates 
Articles 3.2, 13, and 17.4 of the DSU, Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement, and 
Rules 21,22, and 28 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. Furthermore, 
as an organizational matter, it runs counter to the notion of the WTO as an inter­
governmental institution. It alters the political, legal and consequently, economic 
landscape of the WTO as envisaged at Uruguay. The AB disregarded some 
fundamental issues in its quest for the inclusion of civil society in the WTO. It did not 
adequately address legitimacy and justice—thereby, creating an unfair situation for 
developing countries.
With the judicialisation and consequent constitutionalisation of WTO law, fairness is 
vital in the protection of economically weaker developing nations. The DSU has 
introduced some very prudent instruments of due process to the dispute settlement 
regime. However, their application and interpretation by the arbiters and judges 
regarding due process matters have been unsatisfactory for developing country 
Members. To better protect the interests of developing nations, more legitimate, just 
and consequently fair holdings must begin to disseminate from the DSB since 
rectifying common practices of the dispute settlement regime becomes more arduous
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as the constitutional norms and instruments become evermore pervasive, and its 
contours evermore structured in the WTO.
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Chapter 3
The Development Approach to Fair Interpretation in Relation to the TRIPS
The UR brought to the fore the merger of international trade law and intellectual 
property rights. Previously, most disputes and concessions between nations were 
done on a bilateral basis; however, developing nations were very sceptical of the 
inclusion of an intellectual property agreement that went beyond anti-pirating 
obligations in the WTO. But due to US and EU political and economic pressure and 
the “single package” requirement of the UR negotiations, developing countries were 
thwarted in their efforts to excise an intellectual property agreement from the new 
trade body. Developing countries, similar to other Member States, seek large-scale 
economic growth, which is offered by neo-liberal and other economic theories.1 Yet 
historically, developing countries have been largely disappointed in achieving such 
growth. A lack of institutional capacity and pedigree in free trade economic 
structures as a result of past import substitution economic models is the main reason 
for the developing nations’ lack of growth stemming from intellectual property 
rights.
Developing countries embarked on the neo-liberal economic path in the 1980’s and
early 1990’s, and their increased pro-active participation in the UR is a testimony to
that fact. The process of industrialization, as perceived by developing nations in the
context of IP rights, entails the free flow of technology and lower prices for
consumers of technology, so as to create a domestic technological base. These
attributes are the building blocks for the founding of more solid and capacious
1 Gam, R.L., Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 1996,29 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 735, p. 736.
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economic and legal institutions necessary for sustaining growth and industrialization. 
Developing countries were concerned that entering into an international agreement 
such as the TRIPS would hinder the free flow of technology and increase prices for 
technology. Moreover, the costs associated with implementing the obligations of the 
TRIPS were deemed very high, due largely to the positive or affirmative nature of 
TRIPS obligations, which mandate state action vis-a-vis private behaviour.
In general, the developing countries want to be able to access technology from 
industrialised nations, whilst producing a domestic technology base. Furthermore, 
they seek to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) from abroad, which is an 
important element in overall economic development. Many of these countries believe 
that an excessively stringent global IP regime will hinder their economic growth, 
especially in the short to medium term. In contrast, many industrialised nations 
believe that the only way to transfer technology and attract FDI is by having strong 
IP protection regimes in order to persuade firms to operate in the developing world.2 
Strong IP regimes are supposed to protect these firms from the theft of knowledge 
and reproduction in third countries. The impact and benefit of strong IP regimes as a 
matter of theory is debatable but the fact that the “knowledge and technology gap”
2 Callan, B., Pirates on the High Seas: Why We Care About Global Intellectual Property Rights and 
What We Can Do About Them, 1996, Council on Foreign Relations, NY found on www.cfr.org; 
Chamarik, S., & Goonatilike, S. (eds.), Technological Independence: The Asian Experience, 1994 
(UN Univ., Tokyo), which highlights and counters some of the arguments put forward by policy 
makers and industrial organizations in the rich world; Hagerdoom, J., & Schakenraad, J., The 
Internationalization o f  the Economy, Global Strategies and Strategic Technology Alliances, 1994, in 
The European Community and die Globalization o f Technology and the Economy, (Brussels) found on 
www.eu.europa.int archives; Kumar, N., Intellectual Property Protection, Market Orientation and 
Location o f  Overseas R&D Activities by Multinational Enterprises, 1996,24 World Development 4; 
Maskus, K., The Role o f  Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer, 1997 conference paper in “Public-Private Initiatives After TRIPS: Designing a 
Global Agenda” found on www.colomdo.edu/econdep makes a statistical argument that stronger IP 
does induce a limited amount o f FDI and technology transfer.
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between the industrialised and developing countries has increased since the 
implementation of stronger IP regimes is less debatable and more obvious.
During the negotiations at the UR, the developing nations were able to secure some 
flexibility in the implementation of the Agreement. The TRIPS agreement sets 
minimum standards for IP protection. However, many issues remain unresolved, and 
the adjudicators of the WTO have a responsibility to alleviate some of the more 
problematic issues for developing countries within the framework of the Agreement 
and the concept of fair adjudication. The institution itself has through the Doha 
Declaration attempted to assuage developing Members’ concerns over 
pharmaceutical patents and compulsory licensing; however, its potential efficacy is 
unclear and inadequate. In contrast, the impact of panel and AB decisions is much 
more tangible in the short to medium term.
This chapter argues that the WTO adjudicators should interpret the positive 
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that allows developing countries 
the most flexibility in implementing the Agreement and addressing their socio­
economic development. In order to do so, the development approach to fairness is 
suggested as the legal tool that will balance the needs of the developing countries 
with the obligations of the TRIPS. The chapter will evaluate some of the more 
pressing issues for developing countries and complement the analysis by evaluating 
some of the decisions of the DSB under the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, it will 
address some of the potential problems facing developing countries since the expiry 
of the grace period for bringing non-violation and situation complaints. As outlined
3 Seeratan, N., The Negative Impact o f  Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: 
An Examination o f the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001, 3 Scholar 339, p. 360; also see Correa,
C.M., Intellectual Property Rights, The WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and 
Policy Options, 1998 Zed Books, p. 5.
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in the first chapter, the development approach to fairness entails having regard to the 
legitimacy and the justice of the rulings, as they are the two elements required for 
achieving fairness. Legitimacy can be achieved if the rulings are predictable, secure 
(adhere to normative rules of international law), and consistent or coherent. Justice 
involves the advantaging of the disadvantaged and having a principled view towards 
the law. The principle at stake here is the building and strengthening of institutional 
capacity in developing countries and gaining market access to the developed world.
A desirable outcome may be achieved if the DSB implements the concept of fairness 
espoused in this thesis under the “development approach.” By adjudicating disputes 
under this approach, it is proposed that developing countries could attain more 
flexibility in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, whilst being able to 
overcome some of the obstacles that exist in the accessing of technology (both price- 
based and strategic access), as the Agreement leaves some room for developing 
countries to promulgate domestic laws which may conform to specific national 
concerns, thereby utilizing the TRIPS Agreement to foster economic development. 
As a norm-producing body, the WTO can through its dispute settlement mechanism, 
in the context of the TRIPS Agreement, promote the institutional capacity building 
efforts of developing nations by interpreting the built-in flexibility that benefit the 
developing nations.4
This chapter will begin by presenting some of the fundamental issues relating to 
intellectual property rights, such as its definition, the concerns of developing 
countries as reflected in the drafting process of the TRIPS, the Agreement’s
4 Cass, D.Z., The “Constitutionalization ” o f  International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as 
the Engine o f  Constitutional Development in International Trade, 2001, European J. of Int’l. Law 39- 
75, pp. 48-71 on judicial norm generation by the AB.
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substantive provisions, and the nature of TRIPS obligations. The Doha Declaration, 
which was created in order to alleviate some of the concerns of the developing 
countries, will be analysed, and shown to be of little significance as it pertains to this 
thesis. The discussion will then focus on some of the core substantive issues in the 
context of dispute settlement that are critical for the economies of the developing 
nations such as, the contours and limits of patent and copyright law implementation 
and subsidiary issues such as exceptions to exclusive rights, compulsory licenses, 
and scope of patentability. Patents will be given most attention, as they tend to be of 
greater importance to the industrial and technological base of developing countries. 
However, copyrights and to a lesser extent trademarks will also be discussed in this 
chapter. As there has not been a significant body of case law with respect to the 
more important issues in the TRIPS Agreement, this section will at times use 
hypothetical cases in order to explain more clearly. Finally, the discussion will focus 
on the possibilities of developing countries being exposed to non-violation and 
situation complaints since the transitional period afforded under the Agreement has 
expired.
3.1 Definition of Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights may be defined as protection of private or in some 
instances public innovations of creativity.5 Intellectual property law should protect 
“original ideas, creative forms of expression, new discoveries, inventions, and trade 
secrets.”6 The basic forms of intellectual property rights include patents, copyrights,
5 Sherwood, R.M., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 1990, pp. 11-12.
6 Garcia, G., Economic Development and die Course o f Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico, 27 
Tex. Int’l L.J. 701, p. 707.
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and trademarks. Although there are other subsidiary forms of IP rights, nevertheless, 
these are the more general and widely used ones.
Patents are granted to inventors of novel inventions and give the inventor the right to 
exclude others from using and profiting from his or her invention for a certain period 
of time.7 Copyright is the temporary right of an author or artist to have sole and 
exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of his/her work and to publish and market 
them.8 Trademark is a distinctive mark or word through which the products of a 
particular enterprise can be recognizable from another.9 Each form of IP right has its 
own distinctive procedures and standards, which govern the subject matter protected 
and the process involved in attaining protection. Also, they have their own system of 
protection, remedy, and infringement.10 The underlying feature of the various forms 
of IP protection is to grant exclusive rights to IP owners for the use and exploitation 
of the products, processes, or signs.
3.2.1 The Emergence of the TRIPS Agreement
3.2.7.7 The Effects o f the Technological Revolution on International Trade 
Relations
During the last three decades, the leading industrialized industrialised countries, 
seeing their prosperity threatened by the technological advancements, sought 
avenues in which to maintain their dominance. The Quad Nations saw their national
7 Sherwood, supra at note 5, p. 12.
8 Garcia, supra at note 6, pp. 708-710.
9 Garcia, supra at note 6, ibid.
10 Su, E., The Winners and Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and 
Its Effects on Developing Countries, 2000,23 Hous. J. Int’l L. 169, p. 173.
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incomes eroded by proficient counterfeiters in some developing nations, using high- 
tech instruments to produce mass quantities of imitated goods bearing a valuable 
intellectual property component.11 The necessity to combat counterfeiting and piracy
became all the more important as the level of research and development (R&D)
• 12 needed to develop new products increased, particularly in the high-tech sector.
Yet, this was the sector most prone to counterfeiting at profitable rates.13 Therefore,
there was a perception that counterfeiting could dangerously threaten not only the
industrialised nations’ future investments and innovation, but also, their financial and
commercial domination of the international economic order.14
In support of increased intellectual property protection, the major producers of 
technology began to hold the view that counterfeiting and piracy distorted 
international trade by diminishing national revenue and discouraging expansion into 
foreign markets.15 In contrast, the call for more protection of IP rights by importers 
of technology in the developing world was no more than a ploy by the rich nations’
11 The decline in the national revenue of the US was the most pronounced relative to the other 
industrialised countries. During the 1980’s, it became a debtor nation for the first time since the end 
of post-WWII reconstruction. The negative impact o f counterfeiting on the balance o f trade is best 
reflected in the estimate o f the US International Trade Commission (ITC) in 1986, which projected 
that the worldwide losses to all of the US industries ranged from $43 billion to $61 billion, a figure 
representing approximately 15% of the country’s trade deficit. See, US ITC Foreign Protection o f  
Intellectual Property Rights and the Effects on US Industry and Trade (Feb. 1988) US ITC 
Publication 2065. In another estimate by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) in 
1994 pertaining to copyrighting industries alone estimated that the losses to the US would amount to 
$15-$18 billioa (IIPA Report 26 July, 1994, found on the UPA website.) These statistics must be 
read with a certain degree of skepticism as measuring these losses are less than scientific, because 
they take the form of lost revenue opportunities and not actual losses. However, these and other 
similar data collection feed the perception that US firms are being victims of intellectual property 
theft, thereby, greatly contributing to loss of revenue and huge trade deficits. The EC has not 
conducted such data collection, but the perception remains the same.
12 GATT Focus “The Uruguay Round File: Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Other Trade-Related 
Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights” Pts. 1&2 (No. 48 July/August 1987).
13 Correa, C.M., supra at note 3, p. 12-15.
14 Abbot, F.M., Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations 
in the GATT Multilateral Framework, (1989) 22 Vand. J. Trans. Law 689, pp. 691-740 & Chang, 
K.Y., Super 301 and Taiwan: A Case o f  Protecting United States Intellectual Property in Foreign 
Countries (1994).
15 Alford, W., How Theory Does-And Does Not-Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual 
Property Law in East Asia (1994) 13 U.C.L.A. Pacific Basin Law Journal 8, p. 9.
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multinational firms to extract higher royalties on the pretext of an international legal 
regime.16 The policies of most developing nations reflected a development strategy 
based on making technology available to the domestic industry at the lowest price in 
the short to medium term. To this end, many developing countries permitted 
relatively free use of IP-protected goods for their domestic industries.17
3.2.1.2 The Linkage o f Intellectual Property to GA TT/WTO
The leading developing countries challenged the inclusion of IP rights into the UR 
negotiations.18 Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the subject matter of intellectual
property had been seen as a discrete area of law associated with intangible property 
and not directly related to trade in goods. The World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), an agency of the UN, had sole responsibility for the 
administration of the Berne, Paris, and other IP-related Conventions.19 Politically, 
the balance of power within WIPO reflected the interests of the majority of 
developing post-colonial countries.20 As a result, the industrialised countries had 
found their efforts to reform the international IP regime commensurate with their 
interests futile.
16 Cornish, W.R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights (1989) 
Sweet & Maxwell Publishers, pp. 14-15.
17 Evans, G.E., Lawmaking under the Trade Constitution: A Study in Legislating by the World Trade 
Organization, 2000, (Kluwer Law Publishing) p. 110; Nogues, J., Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: 
Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries, 1990,24 J.W.T Law 81; Reichman, J.H., 
Implications o f  the Draft TRIPS Agreementfor Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated 
World Market, 1993, UNCTAD Discussion Paper, no. 73 UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73 Nov. 1993.
18 Stewart, TP (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. H, 1993, 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) pp. 2280-2295.
19 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property-(1967), Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971), the International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers o f Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961), Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect o f Integrated Circuits (1989), amongst others.
20 Evans, Supra at note 17, p. 112.
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On the other hand, for the industrialised countries determined to maintain their 
superiority as producers of technology, the GATT presented a negotiating advantage 
of cross-sectoral leverage coupled with consensus requirements.21 In defence of their 
interests a group of 10 developing nations spearheaded by India and Brazil 
challenged the legal competence of the GATT to deal with commercial 
counterfeiting. These arguments mainly centred on sovereignty rights and a 
supranational organization mandating systemic legal reforms in Member States, and 
conflict of laws with the WIPO.22 The Group of Ten rejected both the connection 
between trade and intellectual property rights, and more fundamentally, objected to 
GATT involvement in IP rights since WIPO was the institution with authority in the 
field. This view was opposed by the major exporters of technology who argued that 
the effects of counterfeiting on their trade balances was compelling evidence that IP 
is a commercial asset and as such has relevance as a trade matter. The divergence of 
positions in this regard was so entrenched that it delayed the completion of the UR 
by two years. However, the power of the major producers was to hold sway, and the 
matter remained on the negotiating agenda with the US and EC solidifying their 
positions, which extended much further than an anti-counterfeiting agreement.
3.2.1.3 The Construction o f the Agreement
From the outset, the parties disagreed over the content and form of any IP agreement. 
With respect to content, the rich nations demanded a comprehensive approach to IP 
protection with the objective of ratifying an agreement which would address all areas
21 Ragavan, C., Recolonization: GATT, The Uruguay Round and the Third World, (1990) Zed Books 
p. 60, arguing that the consensus approach put the developing nations in an even weaker position, as 
these nations have a much more difficult time creating collective positions for bargaining.
22 Simmonds, K.R., & Hill, B., Law and Practice Under the GATT, 1987 (Oceania Publications, NY), 
Ministerial Declaration in GATT 29th Supp BISD 9,19 1983.
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of intellectual property, including copyrights, patents, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, and trade secrets. They demanded that the GATT 
principles of MFN and national treatment must extend to IP rights as well. 
Furthermore, they were able to extract agreement on a system of minimum standards 
instead of harmonization and an incorporation of the treaties under WIPO authority 
into the new GATT. This meant that nations that were not parties to the WIPO 
Agreements were to adhere to those conventions. The new platform at the UR for 
the negotiations of an IP regime was a major victory for the powerful economies.
3.2.1.4 Developing Nations Resist Minimum Standards
The proposal to establish minimum standards met a fierce challenge by the “Group 
of Ten” developing nations spearheaded by India and Brazil. The developing nations 
perceived the call for tighter IP controls as a digression from the necessary measures 
needed to redress the balance of interests in international trade, as they sought 
measures that would benefit and assist their economic development and welfare. 
The “Group of Ten” was obliged to take a defensive strategy at the negotiations, 
trying to limit any IP agreement to counterfeiting and a narrow range of IP matters 
that affect trade.25 The developing Members were opposed to substantive standards 
and the subsuming of the WIPO Conventions into the GATT. Brazil and India were
23 Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects o f  
Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG/NG1 l/W/16 (20 Nov. 1987).
24 Otten, A. & Wager, H., Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 1996,29 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 391; Gutterman, A.S., The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection o f  Intellectual 
Property Rights, 1993,28 Wake Forest Law Review 89; Oddi, S., TRIPS-Natural Rights and a 
‘Polite Form o f Imperialism, ” 1996 29 Vanderbilt J. Trans. Law 415; Abbot F.M., & Gerber, D.J. 
(eds.), Public Policy and Global Technological Integration, 1997(Kluwer Law ); Stewart, G.R., & 
Tawfik, M.J., & Irish, M., (eds.) International Trade and Intellectual Property: The Search for a 
Balanced System, 1994 (Westview Press) Chs. 9 and 10; Dessler, D., China’s Intellectual Property 
Protection: Prospects for Achieving International Standards, 1995,19 Fordham Inl.’l Law J. 181.
25 Reinbothe, J., & Howard, A., the State o f  Play in the Negotiations on TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay 
Round), 1991,13 European Intellectual Property Review, p. 158.
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adamant that no international agreement should interfere with their ability to control 
the creation and enforcement of intellectual property rights, which would curtail their 
capabilities to regulate the use of foreign patents and trademarks. They believed that 
the provision and enforcement of minimum standards would be a surrender of their 
sovereignty to set developmental policies that would help their capacity-building by 
denying them free or cheap access to technology needed.
Nowhere was these nations’ concern more pronounced than in the area of patent 
protection. Developing countries compromised to allow the proposed IP agreement 
to extend to copyrights, trademarks, and certain areas of trade secrets. They 
vehemently opposed an agreement dealing with patents because it would focus 
mainly on the right holders’ monopoly rights while ignoring the enormous 
differences in the levels of industrialisation and technological development between 
North and South.26 Patent protection, it was argued, needed to be more equitable in 
scope, focusing on both the obligations and rights of patent holders and their 
consumers. They contended that patents were not simply granted to enable a right 
holder to enjoy monopoly rights for importing the patented product or to resort to 
restrictive or anti-competitive practices.27 For instance, India believed that 
developing countries should be allowed concessions under patent and trademark 
regulations that would give them the discretion to exclude key sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals, and an overall reduction of the scope of 
protection.28 Furthermore, compulsory licenses should be a means of preventing 
patent owners from abusing their rights.
26 Sabatelli, A.D., & Rasser, J.C., Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 1995,22 N. 
Kentucky Law Rev. 579-620.
27 Evans, Supra at note 17 p. 121.
28 Kosy, S., The Effect o f  TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1995,
1 Boston Univ. J. of Science and Tech. 4-18.
144
With respect to implementing the minimum standards, the EC proposed that they 
must be enacted within the national laws of Member States, with the effect that every 
Member would have to change its laws accordingly.29 The enactment of these 
standards went above and beyond rules and standards devised under other trade 
agreements, i.e., they included obligations to build legal and administrative 
institutions. They required change in the legal structures of many developing 
country Members and heavy costs associated with the training of judges, lawyers, 
civil servants, and policing authorities. To this end, the South Korean delegation 
proposed that the national treatment requirements be more formal in nature so as to 
account for the differences in national IP protection systems of Member States.30
3.2.1.5 The Extension o f Non-Violation and Situation Complaints to TRIPS Dispute 
Settlement31
During the UR negotiations, many parties hesitated in including the non-violation 
and situation causes of action pursuant to GATT Article XXIII: 1(b) and XXIII: 1(c) 
to TRIPS disputes.32 Non-violation and situation complaints are concepts unique to 
the GATT/WTO system. Non-violation complaints are those, which allow a Member 
to bring forth a complaint based on an assertion that the negotiated balance of 
concessions has been disturbed because of a measure implemented by another 
Member, notwithstanding whether it has actually violated the provisions of an
29 Evans, G.E. supra at note 17, pp. 112-118.
30 Song, S.H., & Kim, S.K., The Impact o f  Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property 
Laws in Korea, 1994,13 U.C.L.A. Pacific Basin Law Journal 118 pp.l 18-123.
31 Cottier, T. & Schefer, K.N., Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, 
Present and Future, and Roessler, F., The Concept o f  Nullification and Impairment in the Legal 
System o f  the World Trade Organization, in Petersmann, E.U., International Trade Law and the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1997, at 145, p.161 & at 123, pp. 138-141 respectively.
32 Abbot, F.M., TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and die Future o f  the TRIPS Agenda, 
2000,18 Beikeley J. Int.’l L. 165, pp. 169-170.
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agreement. Pursuant to Article XXIII: 1(c) of GATT, a Member has the right to 
bring a complaint, even when WTO rules have not been breached by another 
Member, provided that the complainant’s accumulated benefits under the WTO- 
covered Agreements have been nullified or impaired due to a lack of action or 
prevailing circumstances in the defending Member State, without any remedial 
action within its powers to correct the situation.
EC negotiators were concerned that the US would seek to challenge its film and 
sound industry’s market access restrictions under the GATT non-violation clause.33 
Many developing countries were concerned that the industrialised Members would 
attempt to use non-violation as a pretext to expand the scope of coverage and 
language of the TRIPS to accommodate the multinational firms’ objectives and 
expectations.34 Developing nations viewed the inclusion of non-violations 
complaints as a market access instrument with a multitude of avenues for punishing 
them in a variety of different areas of IP rights and issues, including parallel imports, 
compulsory licenses, and inexpediency in building the necessary court and policing 
structures domestically.35
3.2.1.6 General Results o f the Negotiations
The momentum of the UR negotiations carried the industrialised nations well beyond 
their initial objective of countering counterfeiting. Instead, the single package nature
33 For comprehensive negotiating history o f the Uruguay Round see, Stewart, TP (ed.), The GATT 
Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), 1993, (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers), 
section on TRIPS.
34 Evans, G.E., supra at note 17, pp. 122-125.
35 Drahos, P., Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, inDrahos, P., & 
Mayne, R., Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, 2002, Palgrave 
Macmillan pp. 161-181, p. 165-169.
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of the negotiations and political economic forces gave the rich nations fodder to 
impose a comprehensive set of standards that go further than minimum standards in 
the classic sense. Rather, they are an expression of the standards and laws governing 
IP rights, which the Quad Members could agree to amongst themselves.36 These 
high substantive standards are coupled with new procedural standards demanding 
minimum levels of enforcement in all Member States.
There were however, some small concessions made to the developing countries, such 
as, transition periods for the protection of patents in areas not previously patentable 
in Member States and for non-violation and situations complaints under GATT 
Article XXIQ (b) and XXm(c). Furthermore, the language of the provisions 
covering exceptions to exclusive rights and compulsory licensing were “loosened.” 
Neither of these concessions was of satisfactory proportions. Additionally, issues 
relating to the scope of protection of patents and the limits of exclusive rights granted 
to IP owners illustrated the extent of the imposition by industrialized Members on 
developing countries’ sovereignty. However, the most important element of this 
agreement for the developing nations was the flexibility in the language of the 
Agreement. The justification was that the flexibilities would enable developing 
countries to pursue their development policies more independently. This flexibility 
is the only legal avenue that exists for developing countries in limiting the harm of 
these obligations on their development strategies and capacity building, in particular.
36 Reichman, J.H., Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v. India, 1998,1 J.I.E.L. 
4, p. 585.
37 To illustrate the level o f interference into the working of developing country governments and the 
imposition of these procedures can only be a reflection of standards already in place for decades in the 
developed world, Reichman presents the following analogy. “Imagine, for example, how the 
Congress might have reacted in the past if other countries had tried to tell the United States when 
injunctions were to be made available in intellectual property cases, what scope of US discovery and 
appellate review procedures should be, what actions to criminalize, and how US Customs agents 
should treat cultural and manufactured goods at the point of entry to this country. Yet, that is 
precisely what the TRIPS Agreement does in considerable detail...” See ibid.
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The language of Article 7 and 8 of TRIPS reaffirm this flexibility, which highlights 
the objectives, and principles of the Agreement, respectively. These provisions 
allude to the necessity of transfers of technology and development of innovation, 
which are in themselves important developmental goals for the third world nations, 
and, also to the necessity of allowing Members to pursue the protection of public 
health and sectors of vital importance without the undue interference by the 
mandates of the Agreement.
3.3 An Overview of the TRIPS Agreement
Previous to the establishment of the WTO, international protection of intellectual 
property rights was under the auspices of the WIPO the organisation which 
administered the Paris and Berne Conventions and other IP-related treaties. The 
Paris Convention protects against trademark and patent infringement,38 whilst, the 
Berne Convention protects against copyright infringement.39 The object of the Paris 
Convention is to provide “protection of industrial property.... The protection of 
industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, 
trademarks, trade names, service marks, indications of source or appellations of 
origin, and the repression of unfair competition.”40 Furthermore, it mandates national 
treatment amongst the signatories.41 The problem for industrialised nations with the 
Paris convention is that it does not set minimum standards of protection and that 
disputes are to be settled by the ICJ. These created problems in that national
38 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883, last revised on 14 July 
1967.
39 Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886 last revised 
24 July, 1971.
40 Paris Convention Art 1.
41 Paris Convention Art 2.
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authorities could set the standards as low or as high as they decided as long as the 
national treatment principle was respected. Moreover, some countries do not 
recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction.42
The Berne Convention was the first multilateral copyright treaty. Like the Paris 
Convention, the principle of national treatment is also enshrined in the Berne 
Convention.43 However, unlike the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention sets 
minimum standards of protection. Yet, it fails to provide clearly defined remedies 
for copyright holders, and it does not provide any form of punishment for violating 
countries.44
The TRIPS Agreement as part of the covered agreements of the WTO subsumes the 
Paris and Berne Conventions but mandates higher requirements and obligations. It 
attempts to remedy the flaws of the Paris and Berne Conventions from the 
perspective of nations that demanded the inclusion of an international intellectual 
property regime, i.e., the US, EU, and Japan. The purpose of the TRIPS is to afford 
adequate protection for intellectual property rights in order to reduce impediments to 
international trade and competition.45 It covers copyright and related rights, patents, 
trademarks, industrial design, layout design of integrated circuits, and trade secrets.
The TRIPS Agreement is divided into three major parts, standards, enforcement and 
dispute settlement. Sections I and II outline the principles of the Agreement, which
42 Pechman, R. J., Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United States 
‘TRIPS” Over Special 3 0 1 ,1998,7 Mina J. Global Trade 179, pp. 181-182.
43 Beme Convention Art 5.
44 Romano, F., Global Trademark and Copyright 1998: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the 
International Marketplace, in International Conventions and Treaties, Practicing Law Institute, 545 p. 
557.
45 The TRIPS Agreement Preamble.
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are minimum standards, national treatment, and most-favoured-nation; while Section 
III sets forth general obligations with respect to enforcement procedures.
Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, which describe the “objectives” and “principles” of the 
Agreement, sets the framework for interpretation and implementation of the IP 
rights.46 According to article 7, the protection of IP rights is intended to promote 
“technological innovation” and most importantly for developing countries, the 
“transfer and disseminations of technology.” It is argued that this article is meant to 
explain that IP protection is not a means in itself, but rather that the TRIPS 
Agreement is a document which allows Member States to achieve a balance between 
the rights and interests of IP owners and users of technology.47 The achievement of 
this balance affords developing countries the opportunity to increase welfare and 
spur economic growth.48
Article 8 states that Members are allowed to take into account the protection of 
public health and nutrition and to promote sectors of vital importance to their social, 
economic, and technological development when promulgating laws and regulations 
domestically.49 This provision also holds that Members may take measures in order 
to eliminate impediments to transfer of technology or practices that adversely affect 
international trade.50
46 Correa, at note 3, p. 6.
47 Cornea ibid.
48 Correa, C. et al., Options for Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in Developing Countries, 1997, 
Report of the Expert Group panel convened by the Third World Network, July 1997 in Geneva, found 
on www.twnside.org.sg or a revised version in Correa, C., supra at note 3, Annex.
49 TRIPS Art. 8.1.
50 TRIPS Art. 8.2.
150
The significance of the provisions lies in their ability to afford developing countries 
more flexibility to solve public health, nutrition, and transfer of technology and to a 
certain extent FDI-related problems. The Articles also allow the adjudicators to take 
account of a Member’s difficulties and lack of resources in a TRIPS dispute 
involving a developing party.
The enforcement procedures of the TRIPS use both internal and external 
mechanisms. The internal mechanism guarantees that private actions may be taken 
in domestic courts. Private entities both foreign and domestic must have the 
opportunity to take action in national civil and/or criminal courts.51 Articles 42-49 of 
the Agreement prescribe the standard of evidence, damages and remedies, 
injunctions, and other enforcement procedures. The external mechanism is the WTO 
institutional regime, which allows for trade sanctions if Members do not comply with 
their obligations. The use of sanctions is legitimised only through institutional 
bodies of the WTO with the most important being the Dispute Settlement Body.52
Articles 65 and 66 of the Agreement provide transitional arrangements for 
developing countries to implement the TRIPS Agreement. Developing nations, 
transitional economies, and centrally planned economies had until January 1, 2000, 
to implement their TRIPS obligations, whilst products which were not previously 
covered by patents have until 2005 to be protected under national laws. However, 
the provisions of Articles 3-5 of the TRIPS, which cover national treatment and 
MFN obligations, had to be implemented from January 1, 1996.
51 TRIPS Art 41.
52 TRIPS Art 64.
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3.3.1 Main Substantive Provisions in the Area o f Patents, Copyrights, and 
Trademarks
3.3.1.1. Patents
Patents are to be granted and the rights are to be exercised without discrimination as 
to the place of invention, the field of technology, or local content requirements.53 
The main substantive provisions pertaining to patents, includes standards relating to 
patentability, exceptions, compulsory licensing, and 20-year duration for protection. 
Furthermore, the TRIPS contains minimum standards with respect to the following 
issues:
• Patents shall be granted for any invention whether product or process, provided 
that they are novel, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application.
• Patents must be granted in all fields of technology.
• Diagnostic, surgical, or therapeutic medical processes for humans or animals, as 
well as plant and biological process, may be excluded from patentability.
• Plant varieties shall be patented or protected under a sui generis regime.
• The scope of exclusive rights under the patent regime is defined.
• Exceptions to exclusive rights are enumerated, and requirements for granting 
compulsory licenses are outlined.
• Reversal of the burden of proof in civil proceedings relating to infringement is to 
be established in certain cases.
53 Correa, Supra at note 3, pp.16-17.
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3.3.1.2 Copyrights
In the field of copyrights and related rights, the TRIPS Agreement enhanced the 
market position of the software, database, and phonograph industries, in which US 
and European firms have dominance.54 In general, the copyrights section of the 
TRIPS protects works covered by the Berne Convention with the exception of moral 
rights, mathematical concepts, and methods of operation. It also recognises 
computer programs as literary works and requires that data compilations be protected 
under copyright laws. The TRIPS also limits the exception to exclusive rights to 
special cases, which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder. There is also 
a 50-year minimum term for works owned by persons or performers and phonogram 
producers. The TRIPS also recognizes the rights of broadcasting organizations and 
sets requirements, amongst others, on licensing and protection of recorded material.
3.3.1.3. Trademarks
The protection of trademarks under the TRIPS was enhanced by defining what 
constitutes a trademark and by treating trademarks and service marks as equals. 
Trademark owners also benefit from requirements of the TRIPS that allow for 
counterfeits to be confiscated at the border.
The TRIPS stipulates that the definition of a protectable trademark is a sign, which 
should be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings. A major achievement of the TRIPS was also the
54 Cornea, Supra at note 3, p. 12.
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granting of protection to “well-known” trademarks as it broadens the scope of 
protection. These are marks, which are known through publicity and not by usage of 
the trademark in a particular country. These trademarks are to be recognised and 
protected as long as a significant amount of promotion has taken place, and usage in 
the territory is no longer a requirement. Furthermore, the term of protection shall be 
seven years renewable indefinitely.
3.4 Affirmative or Positive Obligations of the TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement requires Member States to fulfil obligations known as 
positive or affirmative, i.e., demanding that governments take certain actions in order 
to protect IP rights. There are two forms of positive obligations under the TRIPS. 
One form obliges state institutions and administrative bodies to implement certain 
provisions, for instance, granting seizure orders, injunctions, judicial reviews, and 
enactment of regulations. The other form is obligations directly related to private 
non-state behaviour, such as the investigating and prosecuting of counterfeiters, 
making of generic drugs without a license, or playing music and movies in local 
establishments.
Unlike trade in goods, trade in intellectual property requires governments to regulate 
in order to protect IP rights. For example, the TRIPS Agreement commands states to 
regulate to protect the monopoly rights of innovators and authors. These affirmative 
or positive obligations require state action in contrast to GATT’s negative obligations 
or passive obligations to deregulate trade in goods, or to try to eliminate tariffs. 
Therefore, the TRIPS cuts deep into national sovereignty at a great cost to nations 
which have not had previously protected IP rights. Whereas, trade barriers to goods
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typically involve active prevention or delay entry into a market, and trade barriers for 
copyrighted or patented goods involve a lack of government action, that is, 
inadequate protection that permits free riding or lower profits for foreign IP rights 
holders. Thus, TRIPS unlike the GATT, requires more governmental action to 
prevent undesirable private action. As mentioned, these proactive positive actions by 
the state incur great costs, particularly to those nations which do not have the 
necessary institutional infrastructure and a history and culture of intellectual property 
protection.55
Developing nations have problems both in formulating a regulatory framework that 
promotes economic development and in effectively enforcing the TRIPS obligations. 
With respect to the regulatory framework, many developing nations as mentioned 
before, believe the obligation of creating the regulations as required by the TRIPS, 
hinders access to affordable knowledge. On the other hand, effective enforcement 
incurs great costs as it must control non-state conduct pursuant to the affirmative 
obligations under the TRIPS.56 The executive branch of most Members of the WTO 
sets tariffs on goods. Therefore, lowering them would be an easier task than creating 
judicial bodies and enacting new laws and regulations, which involve the more 
fractious legislatives branches of most governments. Furthermore, achieving 
effective IP protection requires policing non-state action, which is more difficult to 
monitor. Abiding by the GATT requires simply lowering tariff instruments directly
55 These costs could be monetary, opportunity or allocational ones.
56 Samahon,T., TRIPS Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition and Moratorium: Non­
violation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 2000, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l. Bus. 
1051, pp. 1053-1066.
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under the control of the executive, whereas TRIPS obligations require action against 
private and third-party pirates.57
Furthermore, there are entities and activities that developing nations may want to 
promote, such as research and development activities, which they may not be able to 
overlook under the TRIPS. These are actions the state in most developing countries 
either does not have the resources to control or considers them harmful to economic 
development and capacity-building. Unlike borders where states usually have a 
better presence internal enforcement may lack effective state presence.
The institutional and regulatory demands the TRIPS makes are also costly and 
difficult to satisfy.58 Not only as mentioned before, do these judicial and institutional 
reforms cost a great deal of money and training, they also cost a great amount of 
governmental politicking and manoeuvring.59 The political cost in some countries is 
sometimes difficult to overcome, taken that many developing countries suffer from 
political instability or at least political fractiousness. The adjudicators should be 
aware of these problems and to the extent that they are able to satisfy the spirit of the 
TRIPS, defer much authority to Member States in meeting responsibility. The 
following case analysis will illustrate how the AB did not achieve fairness with 
respect to India’s obligation to provide for a “mailbox” system of patent filing.
57 Otten, A., & Wager, H., Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 1996,29 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 391, pp. 404-406.
58 Vandana, S., Protect or Plunder?: Understanding Intellectual Property Rights, 2001, Zed Books, pp. 
15-18.
59 Ibid.
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3.4.1 The India-Pharmaceutical Patents Case (Mail Box Case)60
The first TRIPS case to reach the DSB involved India and the US. This case is an 
interesting enforcement case which may shed some light on the differing perceptions 
of the AB and developing countries. The holding of the adjudicators, in contrast to 
how the development approach would have functioned, illustrates that the needs and 
difficulties developing countries face in relation to “on the ground” enforcement of 
the TRIPS are not being addressed. Furthermore, it shows that the AB had a 
different understanding of the provisions at issue from that of India and other 
developing countries. Finally, it will show that the deference to national authorities 
required in TRIPS matters was not given to the Indian government.
3.4.1.1 Facts o f the Case
The issue in the India-Patents case was whether India had established a mechanism 
that adequately preserved novelty and priority with respect to patent applications for 
pharmaceutical and agrochemicals inventions; given that in India these products 
were not patentable.61 Article 70.8 imposes the obligation that Members must 
establish “a means” by which applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
products can be filed.62 This filing mechanism is called a “mailbox” system. It also 
provides that exclusive marketing rights must be granted where a product is the
60 India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R 
(Dec. 19,1997) (hereinafter, India-Patents ox India-Mail Box).
61 India Patents Act o f 1970, Section 5.
62 TRIPS Agreement Article 70.8 states: “Where a member does not make available as o f the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products commensurate with its obligation under Article 27, that Member shall... 
notwithstanding the provisions o f Part VI, provide as from the date o f entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement a means by which applications for such inventions can be filed.”
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subject of a patent application.63 These provisions should be read in light of Article 
65 of the TRIPS Agreement, granting developing countries a transitional period to 
protect patents in areas that were not patentable before the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement.
At the end of 1994, the president of India enacted via an executive ordinance, the 
Patents Ordinance of 1994. This was done because of parliamentary quorum 
requirements which could not be met at the time. The ordinance was valid for six 
weeks after the reassembly and quorum of the parliament. This ordinance created 
the mailbox system required by Article 70.8 of TRIPS. Parliament reassembled in 
1995 but the ordinance was never enacted and thus, expired after the six weeks.64
The US claimed India had derogated from its obligations because there is no mailbox 
system available. Consequently, the exclusive marketing rights granted by Article 
70.9 for a period of five years, is being violated. The government of India contended 
that the executive branch had given “administrative instructions” to the relevant 
agencies to provide for the filing of patents and the granting of exclusive marketing 
rights as per Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS.65 India maintained that the 
purpose of Article 70.8 is to ensure Members receive patent applications from 
January 1, 1995, and record them on the basis that patent protection may be granted 
in 2005, the year the patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement enter into force for 
India. Therefore, novelty and priority pertaining to patent applications for
63 TRIPS Article 70.9 states: “Where a product is the subject o f a patent application in a Member in 
accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted ... for a period of five 
years after obtaining market approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in 
that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that subsequent to the entry into force o f the WTO 
Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent granted for that product in another 
Member and marketing approval obtained in such other Member.”
64 The insight into Indian legislative process is taken from the AB report itself, India-Patents para. 62.
65 India-Patents para. 58-60.
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pharmaceutical and agrochemical products are preserved.66 India argued that the 
TRIPS does not mandate legal certainty as to whether patent applications will be 
rejected or accepted in the future67 Furthermore, the exclusive marketing rights 
provision of Article 70.9 is to enable developing countries to postpone legislative 
reforms.68
The US claimed Article 70.8 provides for assurances that the mailbox system will be 
properly in place and the marketing rights under Article 70.9 are effective as of 
January 1, 1995, and not in 2005. The WTO panel and AB sided with the US in 
finding India in violation of Articles 70.8 and 70.9. However, the AB modified the 
ruling of the panel but the outcome remained the same.
3.4.1.2 Reasoning o f the Panel and AB
The panel ruled in favour of the US based on the notion of “legitimate expectations” 
holding that: when interpreting the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimate 
expectations of the WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be taken 
into account, as well as standards of interpretation developed in past panel reports in 
the GATT framework in particular, those laying the principle of the protection of 
conditions of competition flowing from multilateral trade agreements.69 The panel’s 
rationale was based on past GATT practice, interpretation under the Vienna
66 Ibid. para. 5-6.
67 Ibid. para. 5-6.
68 Ibid. para. 12.
69India-Patents (panel report) para. 33.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31, and the object and purpose of the 
TRIPS Agreement.70
The AB reversed the panel with respect to the non-violation matter. First, it held the 
panel had confused two different concepts emanating from the GATT practice. It 
stated the protection of expectations of contracting parties as to the competitive 
relationship between their products and imported ones are developed within the 
context of violation complaints under GATT Article IE (national treatment) and 
Article XI. Whereas, the protection of reasonable expectations of contracting parties 
relating to market access is developed in the context of GATT Article XXIII (b) 
complaints, i.e., non-violation complaints and at times, situation complaints.71 Since 
Article 64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement has allowed for a five-year moratorium for the 
filing of non-violation and situation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement, the 
panel has erred in its reasoning.
Moreover, the AB criticized the panel with respect to its reliance on the VCLT 
Article 31 for its “legitimate expectation” interpretation. The AB reasoned that the 
“legitimate expectations” of the parties could be found in the text of the TRIPS 
itself.72 The AB cited DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2 to reaffirm that the adjudicators 
cannot “add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.”73 In the view of the AB, the panel had overstepped its authority by
70 However, the panel did not put the object and puipose of the Agreement in the context o f Articles 7
and 8 o f the TRIPS. Furthermore, the legitimate expectation concept is derived from Article XXIII(b) 
and (c) o f GATT pertaining to non-violation complaints. This point was addressed by the AB, 
ejecting the inclusion o f the legitimate expectations through the interpretation o f VCLT Article 31. 
India-Patents (AB report) para. 36-42.
72 Ibid. para. 43-45.
73 Ibid. para. 46.
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importing concepts and principles, which do not exist in the treaty itself and as such, 
is not appropriate course of action by the Panel.74
3.4.1.3 Analysis o f the Holding
The panel concluded that in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
international law, the TRIPS Agreement gave rise to the protection of “legitimate 
expectations” of rights holders. The AB rejected the panel’s reasoning holding that 
legitimate expectations cannot be read into the language of the TRIPS. It held that 
India was in violation of Article 70.8 and 70.9 due to circumstances and lack of 
proper enforcement as evidenced by inadequate legislation in this regard. This 
would have been a good chance for the AB to affirm the objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement as stated in Article 7, and interpreted the provisions in the same light. As 
Article 31 of the VCLT states, the treaty must be interpreted in light of a) the 
ordinary meaning of the text b) the context and, c) its object and purpose. Article 7 
would have been a clear indication of the objectives of the TRIPS and as such would 
have been a clear guide for the AB.
An alternative interpretation was open to the panel and AB based on Article 7 in 
particular, but also drawing on the language of the Preamble. The context of the 
TRIPS is mentioned in the Preamble, which states that development via the transfer 
of and access to technology and the protection of intellectual property rights as a tool 
to achieve this goal is the reason for the inclusion of TRIPS into the WTO 
Agreement. Furthermore, the last sentence of Article 7 states protection of IP rights 
should be “in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of
74 Ibid. para. 44^5.
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rights and obligations.” This is deemed a reference to the concept of the “intellectual 
property bargain.”75 The bargain is the balancing of rights between consumers and 
producers at both the international level and domestic level. That means that the 
actors in this “bargain” are the citizens and most firms of the developing countries on 
the one side, and the multinationals of the developed world on the other.
Assuming that the “bargain” is accepted then the vagueness and ambiguity of the text 
of Article 7 and 8 must be decided by the adjudicators, in particular, the AB. The 
development approach would require the AB to rule in a manner that when faced 
with such interpretational questions of the TRIPS the settlement of the true meaning 
of the words be done in a manner that advantages the disadvantaged in the context of 
the “bargain.” However, not only did the AB in this case ignore the guidelines of 
Article 7 or 8, it proceeded to interpret Article 70.8 in a manner that harms the 
interests of the developing countries.
According to the AB the question at issue was “what precisely is the ‘means’ for 
filing mailbox applications that is contemplated and required by Article 70.8(a)?”76 
In attempting to interpret the “means” described by the provision the AB set a 
standard that gives no deference to national authorities to decide those means, as 
prescribed by Article 1.1 of the TRIPS which allows Members “to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the TRIPS within their own 
legal system and practice.” The Indian government decided that at the end of 1994 
the most appropriate means was a Presidential Ordinance, whilst later it felt the 
“administrative instruction” was the best manner to do so. The AB explained that the
75 Abdulqawi, Y.A. & Correa, CM.., Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS 
Agreement, 1998, Kluwer Law International, p. 12.
16 India-Patents, (AB report) para. 54.
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Indian “administrative instructions” lacks the required legal security, hence, the 
Indian government is in breach of its obligations.77 This reasoning is counter to the 
development approach because it lacks the requisite security element of the 
legitimacy test. The AB should interpret in accordance with VCLT Article 31, by 
reading into the object and purpose of the TRIPS, yet it made no explicit or implicit 
reference to Article 7 and 8.
Furthermore, the principles underlying the development approach have been 
overlooked, as the lack of deference to national authorities in relation to an 
affirmative obligation imposing great costs is not in conformity with the principle of 
capacity building for third-world countries. Also, justice has not been adequately 
addressed because the ruling does not advantage the disadvantaged, instead it has 
advantaged the producers of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products that are 
overwhelmingly manufactured by rich multinationals in the US and the EU. The AB 
could have interpreted the provision in a manner that gives India the full period of 
transitional time allotted to developing countries for pharmaceuticals by allowing the 
Indians to proceed with regulations as they deem necessary.
In contrast, the development approach would not have precluded any decision with 
regard to Article 70.8 and 70.9. If the US was able to show a systematic lack of 
enforcement or a systematic lack of adherence to the “administrative instructions” 
within a time period of approximately 2 to 3 years, then they would be able to show 
that the “administrative instructions” are not being respected. Moreover, they should 
provide evidence that their firms have tried on many different occasions for many 
different products, to file a mailbox application but have failed and as such, the US
77 ibid. para. 63-64.
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firms have not been able to preserve novelty and priority of products in India. This 
would be the burden necessary for industrialized nations to meet with regard to 
issues relating to developing countries, enforcement and the moratorium granted on 
certain matters.
A development approach would suggest that deference should be given to national 
authorities in developing countries to exercise regulatory and judicial discretion. The 
principle of building institutional capacity for developing countries under the 
development approach entails allowing these nations to act in accordance with 
unique circumstances in relation to the TRIPS so as to allow the least amount of cost 
and harm to their economies.
3.5 Problems and Prospects for Patent Protection in Developing Countries
Prior to the signing of the TRIPS Agreement, the patent protection system under the 
Paris Convention was fraught with procedural mechanisms that allowed many 
developing countries to implement a “weak” protection regime.78 However, after the 
coming to force of the TRIPS, developing nations must implement and perform 
obligations which are unfavourable to their interests.79 The restrictions and 
conditions developing countries attached to patent protection have been curtailed 
extensively.
There are some important issues for developing countries with regard to international 
patent protection. They pertain to the subject matter of protection, compulsory
78 Gana, Supra at note 1, p. 745.
79 Guttennan, A.S., The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection o f  Intellectual Property Rights, 
1993,28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 89, p.93-97.
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licensing and exceptions to exclusive rights. New subjects such as traditional 
knowledge and biotechnology patents are at the forefront of the debate between 
developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, these matters are still not 
clarified to a satisfactory level from the perspective of developing nations by the 
adjudicative process or through negotiations at the WTO.80 Certain intellectual 
property subjects have been adjudicated by the DSB and as such the reasoning and 
holding of the cases will be analysed in this chapter whereas, hypothetical scenarios 
will be used for unchallenged matters.
3.5.1 Subject Matter and Scope o f Protection
Unlike the Paris Convention which allowed the subject matter of protection to be 
deferred to domestic authorities, the TRIPS mandates the subject matte that must be 
protected. It states patents must be granted in all fields of technology, to inventions 
which are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.81 
These requirements are identical to patent regulations of the US and the EU.82 US 
law uses the terms “non-obvious” and “utility” which the TRIPS Agreement has held 
as being equivalent in meaning within the language of Article 1 of TRIPS.
The ambiguous language of certain treaty provisions can pose some problems for 
developing countries, especially if judicial interpretations restrict the built-in 
flexibility of the Agreement. The TRIPS requires new standards in IP protection 
which must be implemented in a short period of time. Second and more
80 Fowler, B., Preventing Counterfeit Craft Design, in Finger, J.M., & Schuler, P., Poor People’s 
Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, 2004, World Bank Publication, 
ppl 13-132 p. 124-127.
§1 TRIPS Art 1.
82 Gana, Supra at 1, p. 748.
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troublesome, is the fact that these countries do not have the legal and administrative 
experience necessary to clearly define the contours of these terms. In the US for 
example, there are many state and federal cases that have dealt for instance, with 
questions such as the criteria for “non-obviousness” and “utility.”83 A very extensive 
jurisprudential body of law has been established in developed nations for over a 
hundred years.
The lack of jurisprudential guidance is due to the colonial history of many 
developing nations or because they have had tumultuous political-legal systems that 
have gone through many transformations. Secondly, under their pre-ffee trade 
models of development, such as import substitution industrialization regimes, patent 
protection either did not exist or was very elementary. The patent system had little 
or no influence on the jurisprudence of these nations, which give rise to a lack of 
knowledgeable judges and legal practitioners. Thirdly, the patent regulations of 
developing countries are mostly the result of ratification of international agreements 
and not a self-developed paradigm or model of intellectual property rights with its 
own individual characteristics and with its own mechanism for balancing consumer 
and business interests.84
Thus, the present regime of patent protection raises many questions, for instance, 
where do developing countries look to when faced with definitional problems? Do 
they seek the advice of developed nations and their jurisprudence on matters or do 
they attempt to create their own version and will that derogate from the TRIPS? For 
instance, may a national court in South Africa refuse an application for patenting
83 See 35 U.S.C. sec. 103 1994; for the criteria of non-obviousness the case of Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
84 Gana, Supra at note 1 p. 749.
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glaucoma-curing medicine by a multinational firm based on that fact that there are 
native botanical medicines and thereby the invention is not new? These are 
questions that necessitate long-term and extensive empirical research, proper 
economic management, and basic trial and error in order to devise effective 
regulations defining the contours of patent protection. Without such experiences 
developing countries are not able to select the intellectual property paradigm that 
best serves their interests. For example, a Chinese applicant may be refused patent 
for a traditional Chinese medicine in the US based on the principle of prior public 
use.85 On the other hand, it is possible that a US firm can manipulate Chinese 
traditional medicine in order to extract certain effective components of the plant so as 
to meet the patentability criteria of the US. This is a very important issue as one of 
the areas which developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have a 
comparative advantage is traditional knowledge. However, the current IP regime 
potentially allows this form of free riding by Western pharmaceuticals. This is an 
area that the WTO adjudicators could interpret and implement the TRIPS language in 
such a manner to prevent this form of abuse.
More questions abound, may a developing country patent an invention that satisfies 
the “inventive step” requirement but is it a “petty” invention? And how is the term 
“novel” supposed to be interpreted? “Petty” patents and low-level inventions are 
very important for developing nations as they tend to stimulate local economic
85 US Patent Act section 102; see the Hodoshv. Block Drug Co.. 786 F.2d 1136.1142-1143 (Fed. Cir. 
1986).
86 Dutfield, G., Legal and Economic Aspects o f  Traditional Knowledge in Maskus, K., & Reichman, J., 
International Public Goods and Transfer o f  Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, 
2005, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 495-520 p.505-506. and Cottier, T., & Panizonn, M., Legal 
Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection in Maskus, K., & 
Reichman, J., ibid, pp. 565-594, p. 569-572.
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development.87 The promotion of local inventions is crucial in the current situation 
because imitating technology from the developed countries is no longer feasible, as 
the Japanese were able to do in the past. A combination of international treaties, 
political and economic pressure from the Quad and the evermore-sophisticated 
nature of technology has made imitating inventions as a form of long-term 
development obsolete.88 Nonetheless, some utility remains in imitating certain 
inventions for third-world businesses but long term effects of that strategy are not 
productive.
Adjusting novelty standards is a prudent way to stimulate local economies and 
technological advancement.89 The language of the TRIPS is permissive of that 
approach and the interpretations of the AB and panel of TRIPS provisions in this 
regard, is crucial for the long-term use of this strategy by developing countries. 
Arguably a lower standard for novelty will allow Western multinationals to patent 
petty inventions in developing countries and therefore, hinder the promotion of 
technology in these countries.90 However, multinationals will be deterred by the 
transaction costs associated with patenting a product in a foreign country that cannot 
be patented in the rich markets. Developing countries must be allowed to set a lower 
standard of novelty under the TRIPS agreement in order to stimulate the local 
economy.
87 Petty patents are currently not available in the US and the EU as the inventive step threshold is 
much higher in these jurisdictions, however, under the TRIPS, at first glance it would seem that 
developing countries could allow for the patenting o f petty inventions. See Gana at 1 p. 751.
88 Saggi, K., International Technology Transfer and Economic Development, 2000, in Hoekman, B., 
&Mattoo, A., & English, P., Development, Trade, and the WTO: a Handbook,2002, (IBRD/World 
Bank), p. 351-359, p. 352-353.
89 McDonald, S. Exploring the Hidden Costs o f  Patents in Drahos, P ., & Mayne, R., supra at note 35, 
pp.l3-39,pp.l5-17.
Correa, C., supra at note 3 p. 122-125.
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The ambiguity of the “novelty” requirement is also a point of concern in developing 
nations in particular, in the field of biotechnology and traditional knowledge. 
Cultural or traditional knowledge is known to be a stimulator of domestic 
inventiveness and subsequently, economic development.91 Different plants and 
potions used by people in Latin America, China, and Africa have been known to cure 
or remedy many illnesses. Certain types of hot pepper and bitter gourd vegetables 
are examples of traditional biological medicine that exist in these regions. The 
TRIPS Agreement in its current state, does not provide protection for traditional 
knowledge per se, which is a great contribution to human inventiveness and a great 
source of economic development.92
In fact, the definition of novelty as prescribed in the US and the EU would most 
likely exclude such medicine from patent protection. However, if one were to extract 
the active chemical of these plants then protection could be granted. For instance, 
Andean Indians of Central and South America have been using a plant called 
cinchona as an anti-malaria potion. In the early 1800s a French doctor, Pierre 
Pelletier, extracted the chemical quinine from the cinchona, the active ingredient in 
combating malaria. Under the present IP regime Dr. Pelletier would be the sole 
owner of the patent rights to the drug. This system heavily favours the firms in 
industrialized countries, as they are able to obtain knowledge cheaply and then use 
sophisticated technology to reach the threshold of novelty required by their domestic 
regulations and be in conformity with the TRIPS. In essence, it is a form of reverse 
engineering in the medical field. The true owners of the knowledge for example, the 
indigenous people, do not gain any benefits from the system.
91 Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., & Gambadella, A., Markets for Technology, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
Development, in Maskus, K., & Reichman, J., supra at note 86, pp. 321-336.
92 Cottier, T. & Panizonn, M., supra at note 86.
169
The TRIPS Agreement significantly extends the scope of patent protection. It 
requires patents be granted in “all fields of technology” including process patents and 
biotechnology patents.93 Biotechnology was not patentable in many developing 
nations such as Brazil, India, and Argentina. Developing nations are very sceptical 
about granting patents in the biotechnology area. Their concerns are ethical, legal 
and economic in scope.94 There is a high level of uncertainty amongst WTO 
Members as to what constitutes “new” with regard to plant and animal processes. 
The balance between the rights of farmers in connection to seed variety and organic 
pesticides vis-a-vis the multinationals and their GM products that tend to lower 
consumer prices, is at the core of the issue.95
Access to cheap pharmaceutical and agrochemicals was a major concern for 
developing Members during the Uruguay Round. They are extremely reluctant to 
grant patents to firms which are usually foreign multinationals, for pharmaceutical 
and agrochemical products. Larger developing nations such as India, Brazil, and 
South Africa have a very efficient generic drug industry that afforded their citizens 
cheap drugs.96 These nations must now disband generic drug companies over a 
certain period in order to meet the requirements of the TRIPS. The problem of 
providing affordable drugs is at the core of some of the most controversial disputes 
between developing and developed nations regarding patents and IP protection at the 
political level, though there are still no official WTO disputes.
93 TRIPS Agreement Article 1-3
94 Khor, M., Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices, 2001, Zed Books pp. 130-136.
95 Vandana, S., supra at note 58, pp. 53-54
96 Lai Das, TheWTO Agreement, Deficiencies, Imbalances, and Required Changes, 1998, Zed Books. Sec. 
TRIPS Agreement
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The TRIPS Agreement requires that patent applications must disclose the invention 
appropriately. The Agreement, at first glance, seems to help technology consumers 
as the information is disseminated on how the patented product is created. However, 
this will only benefit developing countries if they adopt a narrow and restricted 
requirement for claims. When an inventor applies for a patent the claims in the 
patent application for a product or process define the limits of the patent. The more 
narrow the claims the more narrow the scope of the IP rights become. The patent 
holder has less power to control improvements or similar inventions by another 
party. In fact, broad claims could work as a way of excluding improvements on 
patents from IP protection. The process of local adaptations on inventions is a very 
important mechanism for developing nations to improve their technological basis.97
Under the “development approach” the adjudicators must allow developing countries 
to formulate strict claims regulations at the domestic level. The developing countries 
themselves should devise regulations that limit the scope of claims made by patent 
applicants. The courts of developing countries should also limit the concept of 
equivalence unlike in US and EU jurisdictions. The doctrine of equivalence holds 
that products that essentially perform the same function or equivalent function as a 
product previously patented should not be protected. The adjudicators’ role would 
be to confirm this strategy for developing Members. They should not prevent 
developing countries from allowing local applicants from patenting improvement or 
adapted products and processes. The restriction of claims coupled with the principle 
of national treatment will not allow foreign multinationals the opportunity to patent 
even more products. As mentioned before, the transaction costs of patenting 
products in other countries is usually too high for multinationals, therefore only the
97 Reichman, supra at 17, p. 6.
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more significant of inventions will deserve protection. The restriction of claims will 
only give local entities the opportunity to invent and patent products and processes.
3.5.2 Hypothetical Case On Scope o f Patent Protection (Inventiveness/  Non- 
Obviousness)
Zelda Labs has created a new pharmaceutical drug for the treatment of Spinitis. The 
drug uses compounds that bind to magnesium. It is patented in Zelda’s home 
country of Whelmia and in Devistan. Devistan is a developing country that is a 
WTO Member and has adopted patent laws conforming to its international 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. A Devistan firm sells the same drug with 
the same formula with only one exception: it uses manganese instead of magnesium. 
Zelda Labs exhausted local remedies by suing the Devistanian company to no avail. 
The court in Devistan found that before Zelda Labs put this drug into the market it 
was common knowledge that Spinitis sufferers were having problems with 
absorption of metals; therefore, this new compound is not really sufficiently 
inventive to obtain protection. Furthermore, In Zelda Labs’ patent application it 
stated that the binding compound is an “alkaline earth metal bond” and manganese 
does not fall into this category, thus the product does not violate Zelda’s patent.
Whelmia alleges that Devistan violated article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement by 
raising the threshold of “inventive step” to the point that it is not providing adequate 
protection of inventions. Furthermore, in Whelmia’s Request for the Establishment 
of a panel under Article 6 of the DSU, it alleges Devistan also violated Article 28.1 
of the TRIPS in that it allowed others to use Zelda Labs’ knowledge without its 
authorization. Devistan contends that its courts applied established principles of
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Devistan law in a non-discriminatory manner without consideration to nationality. It 
is simply that the definition of “inventive step” or “nonobviousness” and 
infringements carry a heavy burden in Devistan.
3.5.2.1. Possible Approaches to Adjudication
One possible approach the adjudicators of the WTO can pursue is a US modelled 
one. It is possible that a court in the US would take the following approach: it would 
first decide whether the identification of a metals problem in Spinitis sufferers was 
part of the art in existence prior to Zelda’s invention. It would then ascertain how 
many possible systems of metal absorption exist. If there are many such systems 
then Zelda’s invention is patentable since an ordinary person skilled in the art may 
not have found this system easily.98 Basically, the US courts would ask whether it 
would be obvious to the ordinary artisan to substitute manganese for magnesium. If 
not, the product is patentable, if so, then it is not.99
However, the US approach tends to insure its own interests not just domestically but 
also at the international level. This approach if implemented globally, will only 
place US and EU firms already technologically endowed in an even better position to 
make profits. This approach would make the cost of technology more expensive for 
consumers of technology as it allows patents for even more products. It broadens the
98 It is known that a patent is supposed to be awarded for an invention not simply for an improvement 
that would be obvious to a person skilled in the ait. Whether the obviousness o f trying renders an 
invention unpatentable depends on a combination o f factors, such as options available and whether 
there are writings in the art that state preference for one alternative over another. See Novo Industri v. 
Travenol Lab. Inc.. 677F.2d 1202.1208 (7th Cir. 1982). Furthermore see Dreyfiiss, R.C., & 
Lowenfeld, A.F., Two Achievements o f  the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement 
Together, 1997,37 Va. J. Int’l. L. 275.
99 Dneyfuss, R.C., & Lowenfeld, A.F., ibid., p. 299-302.
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scope of patentability, which naturally benefits states that have a more advanced 
technology and research base.
The development approach in this case would interpret Article 27.1 in a manner 
which allows for flexibility in defining the inventive step and obviousness. To 
express the implications of such an approach in practical terms and to illustrate that 
developing countries need more leeway in the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the following description is instructive.
Since Devistan is a developing country it is allowed a transition period before it is 
required to extend patent protection to such products. However, in this case Devistan 
has implemented the TRIPS requirement before the expiry of the transition period.100 
This could be an indication that Devistan is trying to promote local innovation and 
research. A research and development industry needs a highly skilled work force, 
hence, an effective way of training unskilled workers would be to employ people in 
laboratories and other R & D projects. In order to properly train the work force there 
needs to be real and meaningful work options for them to pursue. Producing 
alternatives to foreign medicine is an obvious and beneficial option. It not only 
creates a knowledge base but could also help in the promotion of social health.
Devistan could argue that in developed societies a less stringent interpretation may 
be necessary to spur a highly trained work force to look through different 
alternatives, amongst many so as to find the right choice, in this case different metals
100 It is true that the transition period for many products has expired for developing countries, 
however, in this example it is valid to state that the period has not expired in order to illustrate the 
difficult issues facing developing countries in enacting legislation in conformity with the TRIPS. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the period has not expired only as an indication that developing 
countries are trying to play the intellectual property game.
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and metal absorption systems could be tested to find the best alternative. However, 
in Devistan and other developing countries there is no need to incentivise the 
promotion of finding different alternatives to the production of a particular drug or 
product. The labour force struggles with unemployment and low wages. Devistan 
should give monopoly rights to innovators that confer truly unique inventions with 
major social benefits. Denying the sort of patents that Zelda Labs of Whelmia is 
seeking to obtain in Devistan can effectively and efficiently do this. Zelda Labs’ 
product can and should be perceived as an advance on prior art and not an entirely 
new and innovative product. Therefore, Devistan has not violated Article 27.1 of the 
TRIPS and consequently, is not in breach of Article 28.1. Allowing Devistan to 
produce variations on Zelda Labs’ product is an effective and tangible way for it to 
develop the skills it needs to take advantage of the supposed benefits that the TRIPS 
Agreement provides.101
A scenario whereby this example of adjudication may be rejected is if Devistan 
somehow violated the national treatment or most-favoured-nation principle vis-a-vis 
Whelmia. In that case, the decision should go against Devistan as it has violated a 
major principle of both the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO.102 A systematic failure 
to protect innovations is another example of a clear TIPS violation, in order to prove 
such a case a pattern of violation of Article 28 of the TRIPS must be claimed and 
evidenced. In this hypothetical case, however, the Devistan firm had not 
counterfeited the product or engaged in systematic failure to protect IP: in fact it 
created an alternative. Zelda Labs’ product could still go on the market and could
101 Adelman, M.J., & Baldia, S., Prospects and Limits o f  the Patent Provision in the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case o f  India, 29 Vand. J. Transnaf 1. L. 507,525-534.
Article 3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement mirror GATT Articles 3 and 1 pertaining to national 
treatment and most-favored-nation principles, respectively.
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not be feasibly priced out of it as the Devistan firm must have invested in research to 
create the alternative and that cost will be reflected in the price of the drug.
3.6 Copyrights and Developing Countries
Bringing IP protection under the auspices of the WTO was an attempt to give 
incentive or coerce trading nations to enforce intellectual property rights by wielding 
the threat of trade sanctions against violators. The general concern of developing 
countries with respect to copyrights is similar to patents that is the accessibility to 
knowledge, in particular with regard to education and literacy. Again, the interests 
of developed and developing nations at times, conflict in another form of IP rights. 
Publishers, broadcasters, software writers, artists and the like in developed countries 
seek to protect and thus, maximize profit from their artistic works. For developing 
countries, not only is the access to knowledge under the TRIPS cumbersome and 
costly, but in many of these countries a knowledge culture that is anathema to some 
of the western notions of IP also exists.103
The granting of exclusive rights to copyright holders puts forth the question of the 
limits and scope of that right. Therefore, developing countries are most concerned 
with the costs associated with obtaining knowledge and how they can strike a 
balance between the producers and consumers of knowledge within the framework of 
the TRIPS. Again, the issue of interpretation and language of the Agreement 
presents both problems and opportunities. The AB should to the extent its authority 
allows, decide in a fair manner. Using the “development approach” to achieve
103 Leaffer, M.A. Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism, 1991,76 Iowa L. Rev. 273 p. 283-4.
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fairness will diminish problems and increase opportunities for economic growth in 
developing countries in relation to intellectual property rights.
For example, the TRIPS Agreement copyrights provisions,104 allows for exceptions 
to exclusive rights in situations where the grant would not conflict with the “normal 
exploitation” of the work and does not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder”105 However, the terms “normal exploitation” and 
“legitimate interests” are vague and interpretation at both the domestic and WTO 
level has the potential to significantly influence access to copyrighted material in 
developing countries. As these terms are directly pulled from the Berne Convention 
(Art. 9.2) a look at its application may indicate these terms refer to actions such as 
massive photocopying or small scale viewing of movies in local film houses.106 
Moreover, the concept of “legitimate interests” is not a uniform one. In European 
countries a moral right is attached to the term, yet the TRIPS is silent on that issue.107 
Therefore, interpretation of these terms is crucial for the proper functioning of the 
TRIPS.
The concern of developing countries is that access to copyrightable works could be 
beyond reach as costs of obtaining licenses will be more expensive. Article 11 of the 
TRIPS pertaining to rental rights has given rights holders much more control over 
software and cinematographic works. The article stipulates that Members are to 
“provide authors and their successors in title the right to authorize and prohibit the 
commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of the copyrighted works.”
104 TRIPS Art. 9-14.
105 TRIPS Art 13.
106 Ricketson, S., The Berne Convention for the Protection o f Literary and Artistic Works 1886-1987, 
1987, p. 482-483.
107 ibid.
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This added control for rights holders does not bode well for developing countries.
10SThe right holder could limit rentals of its work in a particular country. In 
developing countries rental is usually the most accessible way of obtaining works as 
rental is cheaper than purchasing. Therefore, the right holder has full control on how 
and when it desires to disseminate its work to the extent that it could inflict too heavy 
a cost on developing economies. Also under this provision right holders are easily 
able to pass on all the transaction costs for rental enterprises to the consumer.
With regard to computer programs the access problem presented by Article 11 is 
exacerbated by the fact that these works are deemed as literary ones.109 Thus, 
copyright laws of the TRIPS protect them. During the Uruguay Round the US 
pushed to have computer programs protected by copyright laws because this was the 
cheapest form of IP protection, as it does not have the same disclosure requirements 
as patents.110 Furthermore, the length of protection and its universality of protection 
from the date of creation afford a stronger protection mechanism. However, 
categorizing computer programs as literary works is contradictory to the conceptual 
dichotomy that exists with regard to copyrightable products, that is, expression of 
idea versus the idea itself.111 The TRIPS Agreement Article 9.2 protects the 
expression of the idea.
To this end, the production of an identical work of a program is illegal if it is based 
on the pre-existing program. There is no infringement if an identical program is 
independently created. Likewise, there is no infringement if the program performs
108 Kennes, W., Small Developing Countries and Global Markets: Competing in the Big League, 2002, 
Palgrave MacMillan, pp.23-24.
109 Fong, M., Information Technology for Knowledge Management in China, in Dadashzadeh, M., 
Information Technology Management in Developing Countries, 2002, Irm Press pp. 294-304 pp. 297
110 Correa, Supra at note 3.
111 Supra at note 96, pp. 103.
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the same functions but its expression is different than the copyrighted work. This is 
important because many computer programs are developed incrementally by 
amending, adapting and improving previous forms of programs. The fact that 
computer programs are copyright protected and rental rights are expansive makes 
developing countries access to this technology very arduous and expensive. 
Furthermore, it hinders the creation and production of software programs of their 
own, as access to previous programs is hindered.112
There are other issues of concern for developing countries under the TRIPS 
agreement. They include Article 11 (bis) and 12 of the Berne Convention, which is 
incorporated into the TRIPS and translation rights under Article 2 of the TRIPS. In 
general, the overall problem that developing countries have with regard to copyrights 
is the accessibility and cost of the works needed for their own economic 
development. This is at the core of issues that the adjudicators must address in 
decision-making and the “development approach” is the route that will assist them in 
achieving that objective.
3.7 Trademarks and Developing Countries
Patent and copyrights laws have attracted the most attention globally in the context 
of IP protection, yet trademarks are inclined to become even more concern for 
developing countries. The dissatisfaction with patent and copyright protection in
112 Of course it could be said that India and to a certain extent, China, Malaysia, and Thailand are 
doing quite well under this regime as they have become evermore proficient at software 
manufacturing. However, the overwhelming majority of developing countries have not been able to 
gain access effectively. It can also be said that India and China had weak protection levels and 
therefore were able to benefit from imitated copies, though illegal ones. Arguably, it is possible that 
these countries would be in an even better position to manufacture computer programs had they been 
protected under another regime such as patents with strict disclosure requirements.
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developing countries is probably the main reason behind the pressure inflicted by 
industrialized Members of the WTO to include the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay 
Round.113 Nevertheless, in the era of globalised markets trademark law is beginning 
to exert its importance on national authorities of Member States. Developing 
countries are sceptical of this trend, however, less than what they perceive as threats 
from stronger international patent and copyright laws.
Developing countries for the most part have conflicting perceptions about trademarks 
and their enforcement.114 First, they believe trademarks to be of less importance in 
the overall economic development and consequently, strict enforcement an improper 
allocation of administrative resources.115 As with other aspects of IP protection they 
seem to enforce only when pressured by countries such as the US and the EU. 
Policy-makers in the developing world believe that the pressing issues facing the 
respective nations in the context of IP rights are for instance, cheap and easy access 
to patented products such as medicine and copyrighted computer programs. These 
countries realize that to a certain extent IP ownership is the domain of the developed 
countries with a huge amount of trademarked products. Developing country 
politicians are hard-pressed justifying spending resources on protecting the marks 
and signs of large multinational American and European firms in their own markets. 
This mentality is even more perceptible when it comes to trademarks.116
113 Correa, C., supra at note 3 p. 12-18.
114 Fink, C., & Smarzynska,, B., Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Developing Countries, in 
Mattoo, A., & English, P., at note 86. pp. 403-412, and Yang, D., & Sonmez, M., TRIPS Compliance in 
Developing Countries: The Impact o f  China’s Trademark System in Katrak, H., & Strange, R., The WTO 
and Developing Countries, 2002, Oxford Press.
115 Leaffer, M.A., The New World o f  International Trademark Law, 1998,2 Marq. Intel. Prop. L. Rev.
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Secondly, these Members have not whole-heartedly accepted that trademarks can be 
a valid and sound form of consumer protection against counterfeiting. In some of the 
larger developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil, which also have a less 
centralized governmental system, local protection of manufacturers is a key issue. 
Local protection refers to the local or regional authorities of a country which have 
the responsibility of protecting trademarks and to ignore enforcement of the owners' 
rights in order to protect its local industry. For example, a textiles manufacturer in a 
small town in one of the lesser-developed regions of China is producing 
counterfeited Nike sportswear. This manufacturer employs most of the work force in 
this town. Shutting down and confiscating the operation of this producer has major 
implications for the citizens of this locality. Therefore, the Chinese authorities of the 
province will be very reluctant to enforce the trademark rights of a rich multinational 
such as Nike.
Thirdly, many developing countries claim that local consumers are exploited by the 
pervasive use of brand names as a tool of advertisement. They contend that 
trademarks abuse the illiterate and largely uninformed populations of these countries
11 *7by enticing them to make choices that are irrational. Fourth, businesses in 
developing countries are overwhelmingly small to medium sized and thus perceive 
trademarks as threats to their interests. Large firms have the resources and legal staff 
to file trademark claims around the globe. These firms are able to take advantage of 
trademarks more effectively and expeditiously, leaving the smaller firms behind in 
the race.
117 Leafier, supra at note 103, p. 283-4.
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However, as developing countries firms and consumers become more acquainted 
with the principles of trademarks there can be some tangible benefits from better 
enforcement of trademarks. The protection of consumers against counterfeit and 
low quality products is a well-known benefit. As e-commerce becomes more and 
more available to consumers in the developing world trademarks can be a good way 
to protect the consumer against fraud. Furthermore, from the perspective of 
companies in developing countries, once a certain level of sophistication has been 
achieved they can tailor services and products to local preferences in their 
geographic regions. This may be an advantage that they can exploit over the large 
multinationals.
Since the UR three ministerial summits have been held in which the problems in the 
TRIPS Agreement for developing countries has been discussed. The latest being the 
Doha Ministerial, formulated a declaration reflecting the results of the Members’ 
negotiations in the upcoming new round of trade negotiations. Thus, a closer 
inspection of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS is prudent.
3.8 The Doha Ministerial Declaration
In November 2001 in Doha Qatar, the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference was 
held. After the failure of the Seattle Conference in 1999 the agenda of the WTO 
needed to respond to the demands of civil society and developing Members in a more 
tangible and proactive way. One of the key issues to be resolved was the status of IP 
rights and developing Members’ urgent public health problems. There was a very 
public controversy between South Africa and Brazil on one side and multinational 
pharmaceuticals on the other with regard to access to HIV/AIDS drugs. The
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pharmaceutical companies had bowed to public pressure after resisting calls for 
parallel importation or granting of compulsory license to provide for cheap generic 
retroviral drugs. Furthermore, developing nations were rightfully claiming that the 
objectives of transfer and access to technology and foreign direct investments which 
were expected under the TRIPS Agreement had not come to fruition.
At the conference, a proposal was submitted by a group of developing countries to 
the secretariat. 118The focus of the proposal was a rebalancing of rights and 
obligations in favour of public interest matters. It highlighted the fact that expected 
gains from the TRIPS have not been obtained. In order to achieve the objectives of 
the TRIPS Agreement greater leeway must be allowed for granting compulsory 
licenses without the prior attempts to obtain authorization from the rights holder in 
cases of national emergency.119 It also demanded that industrialized Members 
should not levy trade sanctions on developing and LDC Members when they 
implement national policy that promotes public health.120 Furthermore, the proposal 
asked for another five-year extension of article 65.4 pertaining to patenting products 
that had not been previously protected under national law.121
However, at first glance, one of the most important aspects of the proposal was 
contained in its preamble which reaffirmed the language of Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS, i.e., the objectives and principles clause. The failure of developed countries 
to engage actively in promoting the transfer and advancement of technology in the
118 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Proposal by the African 
Group, Bangladesh, Baibados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, 
IP/C/W/312,4/10/2001.
119 Ibid. para. 4.
120 ibid. para. 10.
121 ibid para. 13.
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developing world had been strongly rebuked. Thus, developing Members felt that a 
declaration, which makes Articles 7 and 8 relevant to all provisions of the TRIPS 
necessary. The proposal offered read that “the mere existence and exercise of IPRs, 
such as patents, do not necessarily result in the fulfilment of the objectives of the 
Agreement.”122
The Ministerial Declaration that has become the framework for negotiations at Doha 
is far short of the necessary reforms needed to achieve the proper allocation of rights 
and obligations under the TRIPS. The Declaration recognizes the gravity of the 
health problems facing developing countries but in no way does it provide additional 
options for developing nations to combat this problem other than the options already 
available under the TRIPS itself. It seems redundant and superfluous to give such 
high accolades for a Declaration that merely repeats what the TRIPS Agreement had 
always contained. The only explanation may be that the WTO needed a public 
relations boost by making an announcement that would alleviate some of the 
credibility problems it faced vis-a-vis the public at large and especially, some of the 
more reputable anti-globalisation organizations.
The legal status of the Declaration reinforces the effectiveness of the declaration is in 
limbo. It is not yet clear what legal consequences this Declaration will have as 
legislative interpretation and amending of any provision of the WTO has to meet the 
strict requirements set forth by the Marrakech Agreement, stipulating that 
interpretations by a V* majority and amending by unanimity of the General Council is 
necessary.123 Ministerial Declarations can and should only be deemed as political
122 Developing Country Group’s Paper, TRIPS Council IP/C/W/296, June 20 2001.
123 Marrakesh Agreement Article 10
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declarations not legal ones.124 Thus, even if the assumption was that the Declaration 
somehow goes beyond what the TRIPS Agreement allows the legal status of the 
Declaration is suspect.
Furthermore, the Declaration only pertains to matters of public health and to only a 
few diseases. It also supposedly relaxes the requirements for granting compulsory 
licenses or parallel importing with regard to public health matters. Yet, the 
developing countries concerns over TRIPS go beyond public health matters. As 
mentioned, the accessibility to technology and infrastructure for enforcement of IP 
rights is necessary. The Declaration does not address these issues. Furthermore, 
with respect to parallel importation it merely restates Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which reflects the ambivalence of the Agreement toward the issue. The 
only benefit to come from the declaration is that the US has signed on, because if the 
developing nations were to interpret the TRIPS provisions dealing with parallel 
importation and compulsory licenses in a way that the US opposed they could then 
be punished by the US unilaterally. US law allows for unilateral trade sanctions if 
the US Trade Representative believes that a country is distorting free trade.125
However, in the context of this thesis, the Doha Declaration does not have much 
effect. This is because the “Development Approach” to fair adjudication goes 
beyond what is in the Declaration. The “Development Approach” clearly promotes 
the full extent of flexibility built into the TRIPS. Public health, access to technology, 
and capacity building would become the issues that adjudicators must at all times, 
consider when deciding cases involving developing countries. It would read Article 
7 and 8 of the TRIPS relevant to the whole Agreement. In fact, these two provisions
124 Chamovitz, S, The Legal Status o f the Doha Declarations, 2002, JIEL 5(1) p. 207-209
125 US Section 301 of the UCT.
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almost mirror the overall general direction of the allocation of justice elements of the 
“development approach.” Therefore, in this chapter the effects of the Doha 
Declaration are very limited and will not be emphasized.
3.9 Exceptions to Exclusive Rights (Article 30 of TRIPS)
The TRIPS Agreement has laid out exceptions to exclusive patent rights in two 
separate provisions, i.e., Article 30 titled exceptions to exclusive rights and Article 
31 titled Compulsory Licenses. Pursuant to Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
there are exceptions to exclusive rights granted to the patentee. The provision 
provides that in order to grant exceptions three conditions must exist: they must be 
limited, they should not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
patent and exceptions should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner.126 Carlos Correa argues that due to the vagueness of the provision, 
national authorities may allow for exceptions in the following areas: private acts on 
a non-commercial scale, use of invention for research, experiments made or the 
purpose of seeking regulatory approval immediately after the term of patent expires 
(Bolar Exception), and importation of a patented product that has been marketed in 
another country without the consent of the patent owner (parallel importation).127
Article 31 of the TRIPS contains a detailed set of requirements for dealing with 
compulsory licenses. Compulsory licensing is the granting of rights to entities other 
than the patent holder, without its consent, to utilize a patented product or process. 
Under the Agreement there are five specific grounds for granting a compulsory 
license, namely the refusal to deal by the patent holder, emergency or extreme
126 TRIPS Art 30.
127 Correa, Supra at note 3, p. 75-78.
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urgency, anti-competitive behaviour, non-commercial use and dependent patents. It 
is arguable whether this provision sets the ceiling on compulsory licensing or if it is 
in fact, a minimum standard. For example, can environmental concerns be grounds 
for a compulsory license? Although the US is one of the major users of compulsory 
licenses, it nevertheless, confines itself mostly to federal agencies working on 
pharmaceutical experimentation or defence industry products without commercial 
use. The US and the EU do not desire a broader application of compulsory 
licensing, whereas the developing countries would like to see the requirements set 
forth as only minimum standards for compulsory licenses. For instance, a “public 
interest” grounds would benefit developing countries, as it would allow them more 
flexibility in granting compulsory licenses.129
Furthermore, Article 31 not only sets forth certain legitimate uses of the compulsory 
licenses but also describes the conditions under which a grant of compulsory license 
can be made. They include case-by-case evaluation by domestic authorities, prior 
negotiation with patent holder for a voluntary license, scope and duration of license, 
non-exclusivity, non-assignability, remuneration and administrative or judicial 
review of the grant. The cohesion or reasons for the separation of Articles 30 and 31 
is unclear, as article 30 provides for general exceptions to exclusive rights whilst 
Article 31 allows for “other uses” of a patent grant, however, with a list of uses 
which are proper. These provisions define the limits of patent rights that developing 
countries could look to when formulating national intellectual property regulations.
128 Scherer, F., The Patent System and Innovation in Pharmaceuticals, 1999, in Crop Science Society of 
America, American Society of Agronomy, Intellectual Property Rights Associated with Plants, ASA 
Publication No. 52.
129 Adede, A.O., The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement: Origins and History o f Negotiations, 
2001, pp. 26-29, paper presented at the International Centre for Trade and Development in collaboration 
with the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) found on ICTSD website, www.ictsd.org.
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As mentioned above, one of the main elements of interest within the TRIPS 
Agreement for developing countries could be the exception to exclusive rights under 
Article 30. The scope of this provision defines to a certain extent, the contours of the 
flexibility to implement the Agreement for these nations. This provision allows 
Members to exclude certain rights from the IP holder. This exclusion is most often 
used for research and experimentation in the field of pharmaceuticals. Exceptions 
relating to research can be an important tool to create favourable grounds for 
innovation. It can allow for researchers to find more information about the product 
and its possible alternative uses.
Another important exception deals with the use of an invention relating to 
pharmaceuticals to conduct tests and obtain approval from the health authorities of a 
Member before the expiry of the patent in order to market the generic form as soon 
as possible afterward. This can play a very important role for developing countries’ 
health policy as generic drugs reach the consumer at the earliest possibility without 
any delay due to regularity requirements. Developing countries should be given 
maximum leeway in allowing exceptions to exclusive rights in most fields of 
technology but especially with regard to pharmaceuticals. The development 
approach would encourage the use of these exceptions so as to secure a desirable 
level of health in these countries. The desired level will be deferred to national 
authorities and would stay within the bounds set by the language of Article 30 of 
TRIPS. The DSB has resolved one major case to date in relation to Article 30.
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3.9.1 Canada-Pharmaceuticals130and Exceptions to Exclusive Rights Pursuant to 
Article 30
The Canada-Pharmaceuticals case is the first and only case directly dealing with 
Article 30 of the TRIPS and as such will be analysed in order to better understand 
how the adjudicators of the WTO have decided this issue and how it may or may not 
adhere to the development approach to fair adjudication. Although the parties were 
not developing Members many participated as third parties because they deemed it of 
great interest as a matter of practice and precedent.
3.9.1.1 Facts o f the Case
In the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case the panel decided on two forms of exception: 1) 
known as the “regulatory review provision” of Canada, which permits generic 
manufacturers to complete the regulatory approval process before the patent term is 
expired, and 2) the “stockpiling” provision of Canadian law which allowed generic 
manufacturers to produce the patented product and put them in inventory until the 
exact day the patent expires thereby accessing the market immediately after the 
expiry. The panel decided to uphold the first Canadian provision whilst rejecting the 
second, based on Article 30 of TRIPS.
The Canadian regulatory review provision allows the generic manufacturer to 
produce samples of the patented product for use during the review process.131 If the 
generic manufacturer is able to get approval for its product it is able to begin selling 
it immediately upon expiration of the patent, instead of beginning the process at that
130 Canada-Patent Protection o f  Pharmaceutical Products (WT/DS114/R adopted April 7,2000).
131 Canada Patent Act Section 55.2(1).
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time which would take up to 30 months for approval. Furthermore, Canadian 
“stockpiling” law allowed generic manufacturers to make the drug and begin 
stockpiling six months prior to the expiration of the patent.132 This provision is 
available only if the regulatory review provision had been invoked.
The EC contended the Canadian Patent Act is in violation of Article 28.1 of the 
TRIPS which stipulates that: A patent shall confer on its owner the following 
exclusive rights: a) where the subject-matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of making, using, offering for 
sale, selling or importing for these purposes that product. The Canadians did not 
dispute the fact that these two provisions violate Article 28.1 but they claimed that 
they are justified to do so under the exception granted by Article 30 of the TRIPS.
3.9.1.2 Reasoning and Holding
3.9.1.2.1 The Stockpiling Provision
The panel ruled against Canada’s stockpiling provision, arguing that Canada violates 
Article 28.1 but is not able to justify this violation in accordance with Article 30.133 
It stated that Article 28.1 grants five legal rights to IP holder, i.e., making, using, 
offering for sale, selling an importing. The stockpiling provision clearly violates the 
making and using elements of that right. On the other hand, Article 30 which sets 
out the exceptions to the obligations of Article 28.1, creates three requirements that 
must be met before the exceptions can be invoked: a) the exception must be limited;
b) they must not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent; and
132 Canada Patent Act Section 55.2(2).
133 Canada-Patents para. 7.17.
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c) the exception must not prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner or of 
third parties.134
Canada correctly invokes Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS. Article 7 in part, stipulates 
technology must be used “to the mutual advantage of producers and users in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.” Article 8 states that the “Members may adopt or amend the laws in 
order to protect health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development... ”135
Canada believed these provisions allow adjudicators to interpret the conditions of 
Article 30 in a flexible manner so that governments have the necessary policy 
instruments to maintain a balance between the rights of users and producers of 
technology. The panel rejected this argument, holding that Articles 7 and 8 give 
“context” to the TRIPS provisions and not a renegotiation of rights granted under the 
Agreement.136
The panel then went on to apply the conditions of Article 30. It only did so for the 
first requirement that the exception be limited, and since it found Canada to be in 
violation of this condition, citing judicial economy, it found it unnecessary to 
continue the analysis. In particular, the panel found there is a “corollary right to a 
short period of extended market exclusivity after the patent expires.” Furthermore, 
there is no limit to how much the generic manufacturer can produce.137 Therefore, it
134 ibid. para. 7.19-7.20.
135 ibid. para. 7.23.
136 ibid. para. 7.24-7.25.
137 ibid. para. 7.34-7.37.
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found the stockpiling provision violates the “limited exception” requirement of 
Article 30.
3.9.1.2.2 The Regulatory Review Process
The panel found that Canada had not violated Article 30 because the regulatory 
review process meets all three criteria of the provision. With regard to the “limited 
exceptions” criteria it held that “as long as the exception is confined to conduct 
needed to comply with the requirements of the regulatory review process the extent 
of the acts unauthorized by the right holder that are permitted by it will be small and 
narrowly bounded.”138
With regard to the second criteria of Article 30 that prohibits exceptions, which 
“unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent,” the panel rejected 
Canada’s view that post-expiration market exclusivity can never be deemed normal 
exploitation, arguing that it is not “abnormal.” However, it did agree with Canada in 
that if the post-expiry market exclusivity is a result of governmental regulations then 
it does fall outside the lines of “normal exploitation.”139
Finally, it decided on the third criteria, i.e,. that the exception must not 
“unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner...” The panel 
focused on whether patent owners can claim a “legitimate interest” in the economic 
benefits that can be derived from an additional period of post-expiry exclusivity and 
whether the regulatory review process prejudices that interest.140 The panel, in ruling
138 ibid. para. 7.45.
139 ibid. para. 7.54-7.57.
140 ibid. para. 7.60-7.61.
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in favour of Canada, based its decision on the legal definition of the word 
“legitimate” and also on the negotiating history of the Berne Convention Article 9.2. 
Thus, Canada was justified in having a provision which allows generic drug 
manufacturers to use and make a patented drug in order to have regulatory 
requirements met as soon as the patent has expired on the original product.
3.9.1.3 Analysis o f the Holding
3.9.1.3.1 Regulatory Review Process
The ruling that the regulatory review provision is a justified exception to Article 28.1 
under Article 30 is a desired outcome under the development approach. As 
developing countries try to improve the research and development base the time 
saving mechanism to market the products is very important. The biggest beneficiary 
at the moment will be the larger developing countries such as India and Brazil, which 
have a very active and efficient generic drug-manufacturing base. They would be 
able to market the products soon after the expiry of the patent. This is true for both 
importing and exporting of the generic products.
If the patented product from a large multinational drug firm is being sold in India for 
instance (assuming India has a regulatory review process), the Indian generic firm 
can market its product more expeditiously as it will be able to obtain the regulatory 
verifications necessary to sell its products, thereby providing the Indian people with 
cheaper drugs faster. Moreover, it is an incentive to develop the generic drugs 
industry which will in turn, promote more R&D by obtaining the knowledge earlier, 
and increase its profits. On the other hand, if the Indian firm is trying to sell its 
products in the industrialized markets of the US or the EU, then it is able to access
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that market faster. In this sense, it abides by both of the elements contained within 
the principle of development through trade, i.e., market access to the industrialized 
countries, and the capacity-building of developing countries.
The ruling is also legitimate according to the development approach. It is predictable 
because it clearly holds that regulatory review processes fall under the guise of the 
exception to exclusive rights under Article 30. Future regulatory schemes could be 
based on the analysis proffered by this case. It also affords a little more insight into 
some of the ambiguities of Article 30, that is, the meaning of the term “limited” in 
the first sentence of Article 30, or what could be “normal exploitation” and 
“legitimate interests.” The reasoning is secure, as it has adhered to internationally 
accepted devices for interpretation of treaties. The panellists at the outset stipulate 
that VCLT Articles 31 and 32 apply and will be used and they will seek insight into 
the negotiating history of the TRIPS including the incorporation of the Berne 
Convention.141
However, one can argue that the consistency of the ruling is somewhat inadequate. 
The panellists held that the post-expiry right of a patent holder is part and parcel of 
that right, however, the differentiation that they have made between the post-expiry 
times associated with the regulatory review process does not jibe with the analysis of 
the post-expiry time pertaining to stockpiling. The manner in which they justified 
the post-expiry of the regulatory review should also be applied to the stockpiling 
provision in order to justify that also. The ruling is still deemed fair as the 
development approach allows the trumping of legitimacy when justice concerns are
141 ibid. para. 7.13-7.15.
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met and the elements that are illegitimate are not so blatant and extreme as to 
promote non-compliance.
3.9.13.2 Stockpiling
The ruling and reasoning with regard to the stockpiling issue, however, does not 
reach the threshold of fairness. The ruling lacks the requisite justice and consistency 
that the development approach demands. The panel’s ruling that stockpiling is a 
violation of Article 28.1 and not justified under Article 30 is harmful to developing 
countries because it allows the patent holder to profit after the expiry of the patent. 
The panel ruled the extra period of time is a legitimate interest and part of the normal 
exploitation of the patent.
However, nowhere can such an interest be expected or deemed legitimate. There is 
no international standard for such an expectation. The EU and the US do not have 
such expectations in their regulations or laws. The panel sought no guidance from 
other national jurisdictions or WIPO to inquire whether stockpiling is deemed illegal. 
Within the context of the TRIPS it would be quite useful to investigate US and EU IP 
laws as the protection and language of the agreement is very similar to their IP 
regulations. This provision truly harms the interests of developing countries with a 
generic drug-manufacturing base because they must wait even longer than the patent 
term to market their product. The extra time afforded to the pharmaceutical firms 
only slows the process of achieving a better R&D base in developing countries. This 
practice is not in line with the goal of capacity building and tends to delay market 
access. Thus, the justice of the ruling is inadequate.
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The panel made a distinction between the “limited use” in stockpiling and in the 
regulatory review process. It is not clear why doing clinical trials, expansive 
pharmaceutical and chemical experiments, producing small quantities, writing 
reports and researching the efficacy of a drug is any more limited in the scope of 
exploiting the patent than the mere mass production of the drug as occurs when 
stockpiling. If the nature of the product makes the mass production and then 
stockpiling less limited of an exception, the panel in its over 320-page report, failed 
to mention such inherent differentiation between the limitedness of stockpiling as 
opposed to undergoing the regulatory review process.
The legitimacy of the ruling is further diminished by the differentiation proposed by 
the panel in relation to the exclusive rights of a patent holder and its exceptions. The 
panel argument that the regulatory review provision is a valid form of exception has 
at its core, a time element. The generic manufacturers should not have to spend one 
or two years after the expiry of the patent to be able to market their product. Yet, the 
stockpiling provision is also based on timing concerns. The differentiation of the 
timing elements between the two provisions is an arbitrary one. It is basically the 
panellists themselves deciding that one post-expiry time is acceptable whereas 
another post-expiry time is not, due to its length. Stockpiling these drugs as defined 
under Article 28.1 is only violating the making and using elements of the right to 
exclusivity, but so is the regulatory review provision. The stockpiled products are 
not sold or marketed before the patent is expired. Therefore, the reasoning based on 
timing lacks consistency.
The predictability of the ruling is also suspect because many practical questions have 
not been addressed. What if the product was not a pharmaceutical and thus the 
regulatory review provision was not so long? For example, what if Brazil had a 3-
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month review process for making prosthetics while stockpiling a significant amount 
took more than 3 months? What if a Member such as the US enacts regulations that 
state that the regulatory review for generic drug manufacturers can only begin one 
year before the expiry of the patent and the review takes about 3 years thereby 
protecting its firms against cheap generic drugs. Would the two year extra period be 
a legitimate interest or normal exploitation of the patent in the US? It would 
probably take less than two years to stockpile a significant amount of the drug. In 
fact, such a rule would in most cases, make stockpiling unfeasible because unless the 
firm is willing to risk making the drug before the review is finished without 
assurance of its approval by the governmental agency. The manner in which the 
panel ruled in this case makes the provisions of Article 30 even more unpredictable 
and vague. This could become even more of a problem if non-pharmaceutical 
products must go through a review process.
Therefore, the ruling that stockpiling is not allowed is unfair according to the 
development approach. It lacks the justice concerns that demand better capacity 
building for developing countries and market access to developed markets. 
Moreover, the ruling lacks legitimacy, as it is both unpredictable and inconsistent.
3.9.2 Compulsory Licenses
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement on “other use without the authorization of the 
right holder” contains the requirements and conditions for granting compulsory 
licenses. The five conditions in which compulsory licenses may be granted are: 
refusal to deal by the rights holder, emergency and extreme urgency in the consumer 
country, anti-competitive behaviour, non-commercial use and dependent patents. All
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these conditions are important for developing nations as they relate directly to a 
proper functioning of an economic development regime. Furthermore, the process of 
granting compulsory licenses must adhere to the following:
• Case-by-case evaluation
• Prior request for a voluntary license
• A properly formulated grant which sets the limits and duration of the license
• Non-exclusivity and non-assignability of the grants
• Remuneration
• Administrative or judicial review opportunity
The role of the adjudicators under the “development approach” should be they 
evaluate developing country disputes with clear reference to Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Agreement, which will assist in the proper allocation of justice, and to a legitimate 
decision.
Rights holders refusing to deal with entities in developing countries are a common 
problem. The right holder either is reluctant to grant a license because it is 
concerned about IP theft or is simply not extracting the price it desires. As long as a 
developing country has implemented a viable IP protection regime the fear that the 
knowledge would be stolen is unwarranted. Every WTO Member has signed on to 
the TRIPS Agreement and therefore, the assumption must be that it is abiding by that 
Agreement until systematic failure to protect or bad faith is witnessed. A 
streamlined and predictable criteria set by developing Member policy-makers in this 
regard would create more certainty and allow domestic firms to obtain knowledge 
without having to succumb to the demands of intransigent multinationals.
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The issue of low prices for multinationals can be solved much the same way as 
evaluations on costs done in anti-dumping cases with the exception that adjudicators 
could calculate a fair price in lieu of national agencies, if domestic authorities’ 
decision on compensation is a claim in the dispute. If rights holders refuse to deal 
because the price they demanded was not satisfactory and a developing country 
grants a compulsory license and is brought to the DSB to defend its action, the AB or 
the panel can evaluate by retaining experts or even construct a fair price for that 
license. In fact, since the compulsory licensing government must pay remunerations 
for the grant it is natural that the fair price can be constructed by the adjudicators as 
the appropriate compensation to the right holder is also determined. However, the 
fair price should be one that covers costs plus a margin of profit that is less than what 
a developed country Member would be expected to pay. This is in line with the 
“development approach” and its adherence to advantaging the disadvantaged that is 
taken from Rawls.
With regard to emergency and extreme urgency situations the adjudicators should 
defer much authority to domestic developing country authorities. The Doha 
Declaration has made it clear that in such situations the right of Members to grant 
compulsory licenses will not be hindered. This Declaration is in line with rights that 
had already been granted to Members under the TRIPS. It is nothing new or 
profound. The threshold of what is an emergency or urgent situation should be 
lowered for developing countries. Obviously, matters of public health are one 
category, but there are other situations that can be envisaged which would demand 
the granting of compulsory licenses.
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The definition of emergency and extreme urgency could be deemed to be only public 
health issues, war or national security for industrialised nations but, should also 
include economic emergencies for developing countries. Again, this is in line with 
the concept of advantaging the disadvantaged and upholding the principle of WTO 
law with regard to fostering economic development as espoused by the “development 
approach.” The principle of promoting development through trade is affirmed if 
adjudicators allow economic emergencies to be grounds for compulsory licenses. 
Furthermore, the disadvantaged is benefiting by giving them more flexibility than 
may be afforded to industrialized countries in achieving economic stability. The 
crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 and the Argentine crisis in 2001-2002 are prime 
examples of situations whereby compulsory licenses could be granted.
Protection from anti-competitive behaviour is important for developing countries, as 
the spectre of abuse of exclusive rights casts a threat to their vital economic interests. 
The developing countries that possess competition laws have their right to prevent 
anti-competitive behaviour established under their own system. The developing 
countries that do not have a proper competition policy may use this provision of the 
TRIPS to defend against such market abuse behaviour by foreign multinationals. 
However, the adjudicators must reach a balance. This balance is between actually 
preventing anti-competitive behaviour by a right holder on the one hand, and 
preventing trade distortion by frivolous use of compulsory licenses by a Member on 
the other. Simply because a developing nation does not have competition policy on 
the books does not mean that it can search selectively to find an excuse for trade 
distortion. Summary decisions and expedited executive orders without justifications 
are some examples of possible trade distortion mechanisms that must be scrutinized a 
little more in detail.
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The adjudicators in this instance may use a competition regulations system of 
another country as a model in order to decide whether the granting of a compulsory 
license is justified. In this case the proper model should be the relevant regulations 
of a country that is most similar in economic development and legislative systems. 
Furthermore, if the adjudicators decide the case based on their own concept of anti­
competitive behaviour then they should make sure to address the myriad of problems 
faced by developing countries. The non-commercial use requirement for granting 
compulsory licenses is one that is extensively used by the US governmental agencies 
and by many European national authorities.142 Developing countries will be well 
served to take advantage of this requirement in order to expand their research and 
development base. The non-commercial use clause has allowed the US Food and 
Drug Administration to experiment with patented drugs that are new to the market. 
They are able to evaluate the efficacy of the drug and also obtain the necessary 
knowledge with regard to making the drug.143 As pharmaceutical knowledge 
although not to the extent of computer programs, is a cumulative venture, it provides 
states with a tool to improve and even develop drugs that are very useful.
The non-commercial use requirement should expand far beyond pharmaceutical 
products and into process patents and manufacturing goods. It is true that most of 
these R&D endeavours would be too costly for developing countries to pursue, 
nevertheless, developing members could engage in specific narrowly defined areas of 
R&D by obtaining compulsory licenses for non-commercial use. For instance, the
142 See amongst others, Coggio, B., & Cerrito, F., Immunity fo r  Drug Approval Process, 1997,52 Food 
and Drug Law Journal 4, pp. 345-355, p. 347-350; Love, J., A Free Trade Area fo r  The Americas: A  
Consumers Perspective as they Relate to Rules on Intellectual Property, 1997, paper presented at Third 
Trade Ministerial and Americas Business Forum, May 1997 found on cptech.org/pharma.
143 Coggio & Cerrito, ibid
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US Department of Defence has granted compulsory licenses for many experiments in 
the field of weaponry and other technology related but not specific to the weapons 
industry.144 In the same light developing countries should be able to grant 
compulsory licenses in other areas of technology which would help their overall 
development.
The dependent patent condition for granting compulsory licenses is also very 
important for developing countries. An effective way to broaden the base of research 
and development in poorer countries is to begin by improvements and adaptations of 
already patented or even copyrighted products (in the case of computer programs 
where copyright protection is required). Also, dependent patents may become a huge 
obstacle to inventiveness. The strict protection of dependent patents gives too much 
control to the right holder. If a right holder is allowed to protect its product from 
being used in another product that in essence, has a different function and outcome, it 
should not be able to hold other inventions hostage to its demands. For instance, if a 
right holder to textile processing system refuses to allow an inventor of a new 
mechanism for producing an agricultural seed dispersal machine from using its 
process in a totally unrelated industry or function, the granting of compulsory 
licenses should be allowed. This is especially true for developing nations, as their 
knowledge base is not as wide and not as well funded as industrialized countries. 
Even if in developed countries the crude example above would not qualify for a 
compulsory license, the AB should interpret the dependent patent provision such that 
developing countries would be allowed such generous use of compulsory licenses.
144 See statement by the European Commission “Under US Law (28 US Code Sec. 1498) a patent owner 
may not enjoin or recover damages on the basis o f his patent for infringement due to the manufacture or 
use of goods by or for the US Government Authorities. This practice is particularly frequent in the 
activities o f the Department of Defence but is also extremely widespread in practically all government 
departments.” European Commission Report 1997 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and 
Investment, para. 34-35. found on www.europa.eu
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The viability of a compulsory license in developing countries is contingent upon the 
possession of adequate infrastructure and resources. There are no benefits in 
granting a compulsory license to produce medicine or to develop agricultural 
processing machines if the necessary resources are not adequately available. This is 
the dilemma faced by many developing countries with regard to compulsory 
licensing. There is and has been much debate whether the WTO rules allow for the 
granting of a compulsory license to a foreign entity or a subsidiary thereof in order to 
import the product. This is a crucial issue because a compulsory license is worthless 
if it is not workable. The TRIPS agreement and the Doha Declaration are silent on 
the issue. However, the EU and the US have voiced great reservations about 
allowing the granting of compulsory licenses in order to import the product from 
abroad. This view is unjust, since it gives the developed countries a huge advantage 
in so far as they have the ability to produce the compulsory licensed goods. The 
developing countries in general, do not have the same capabilities and it would be 
just were they to benefit from the provision of the TRIPS as much as developed 
countries.
The AB should allow interpretations of the TRIPS in light of Articles 7 and 8, in 
conjunction with the overall development approach to jurisprudence in order to allow 
the granting of compulsory licenses for importation to the third world. Under the 
development approach the AB would be justified to do so because of the justice 
requirements of the guidelines to adjudication i.e. the advantaging of the 
disadvantaged. In practical terms they would actually be simply equalising the 
advantage that first world countries hold. In fact, it is arguable whether importing 
products is as cost effective as producing them locally. At a minimum the advantage
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of gaining knowledge is lessened when products are imported. Furthermore, the 
Dworkinian aspect of the development approach stipulates that the reading of the law 
or regulations of the WTO should be in line with the principle of promoting and 
encouraging development in poor countries. A decision to allow compulsory 
licenses on imported goods would satisfy that requirement also.
3.10 Non-Violation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries
As of January 2001, a five-year transition period for developing countries to enforce 
intellectual property rights expired. Most important as a matter of dispute settlement 
is the moratorium on non-violation and situation complaints.145 As a result, 
inadequate substantive intellectual property protection or inadequate enforcement 
will become actionable before the DSB even if no violation has occurred. This issue 
could pose many problems for developing countries, as they have enacted laws that 
comply with the requirements of the TRIPS but at times lack the necessary capacity 
and legal infrastructure to enforce them.
The main question to be asked when claims of TRIPS violations are brought forth is 
at what point can adjudicators decide whether national authorities have neglected or 
derogated from their obligation to control private conduct.146 The threshold for 
triggering TRIPS complaints is not spelled out in the Agreement itself. Most 
countries are unlikely to bring a claim based on a single or few instances, rather they 
would negotiate bilaterally to reach an agreement. This is so because the TRIPS
145 TRIPS A it 64.2.
146 Abbott, F.M., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f  Intellectual 
Property Rights, in Petersmann, E.U. International Trade Law and the GATTAVTO Dispute 
Settlement System, 1997, supra at note 31, p. 413-416.
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Agreement is to provide for overall IP protection at the national and international 
levels.147
3.10.1 Non-violation Complaints
In contrast to violation cases, non-violation cases do not require any literal breach of 
a TRIPS provision. Article XXffl (l)(b) of GATT, which is applicable to the TRIPS, 
stipulates that non-violation is that which nullifies or impairs TRIPS objectives 
resulting from the “application by another contracting party of any measure, whether 
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement” or not. It is argued that the broad 
scope and reach of this provision was the cause behind the Indian and European push 
to include Article 64.2 and 64.4 of the TRIPS, which grants the five-year transition 
period.148 Non-violation complaints require: 1) affirmative governmental action, such 
as an offending Member states’ measures to offset trade benefits it has conceded; 2) 
the complaining Member states’ valid expectation that the offending measure will 
not be applied or would not exist; and 3) Injury.149 Furthermore, when claiming that 
the offending state applied a nullifying or impairing measure the injured state must: 
1) clearly indicate the measure at issue; 2) the application of the measure must not 
have been “reasonably anticipated at the time the specific rights and obligations of 
market access were negotiated.”150
147 ibid.
148 Lee, K.D, & von Lewinski, S., The Settlement o f International Disputes in the Field o f  Intellectual 
Property in Beier, F.K., & Schricker, G., From GATT to TRIPS-The Agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights, 1996, p. 289.
149 Samahon, Supra at note 56, p. 1061; Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld supra at note 98, p. 283-285.
150 Cottier, T. & Schefer, K.N., Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, 
Present and Future, in Petersmann, E.U. supra at note 31, at 145, p. 161.
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The following hypothetical situation will illustrate better how adjudicators should 
decide non-violation cases under the “development approach”:
In Devistan, a developing country judges have never ordered pirated goods to be 
seized or destroyed under Article 46 of the TRIPS. The judges have never sentenced 
anyone to prison or at minimum, convicted him or her under criminal code of 
Devistan as prescribed by Article 61 of the TRIPS. Devistan domestic law allows for 
criminal prosecution and seizure of counterfeited goods in compliance with the 
TRIPS, yet as a matter of discretion they have not ordered any injunctions or 
criminal remedies of any kind. The EC Trade representative brings a case to the 
DSB claiming that Devistan has not enforced copyrights laws as validly expected by 
the EC and as such, injury has occurred. In this case it has actually failed to take 
appropriate action thereby nullifying or impairing EC’s benefits, although Devistan 
has enacted laws complying with the letter of the TRIPS. According to the EC REP 
this is a clear example of a non-violation complaint.
TRIPS Article 43.2 and 46 which deal with injunctions and judicial remedies uses 
discretionary language such as judges “may” grant the remedies requested by the EC. 
There is no mandatory requirement to do so. Devistan claims it cannot order its 
judges to rule in a manner which satisfies the EC’s demand. The executive branch is 
separate from it judiciary. Furthermore, Devistan rightfully claims that by doing so it 
would have changed the balance of rights and obligations negotiated at the Uruguay 
Round, as it would create a mandatory requirement for the granting of injunctions 
and criminal proceedings.151
151 This is somewhat different from the mandatoiy/discretionary principle o f WTO whereby, 
discretionary authority in the regulations or laws of a Member which allows that Member’s authorities 
to use the discretion in a manner that may not conform to WTO law as legal under WTO law.
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The non-violation complaint in this case would be very hard to prove under the 
development approach as clear bad faith and/or systematic lack of enforcement must 
be shown on the part of Devistan. The justice elements of this hypothetical ruling 
demands deference be given to national authorities which are strapped for resources, 
qualified judges, and administrators. Benefiting the disadvantaged and appreciating 
the lack of capacity in developing countries would suggest that Devistan can not 
burden the cost of creating the judicial and legal environment which would allow 
non-violation claims to be accepted for infrequent and isolated circumstances. The 
enactment of regulations demanded by the TRIPS is not simultaneous to proper 
effective enforcement immediately. In particular, for violations that are not 
expressly written in the treaty.
3.10.2 Situation Complaints
The rarest sort of claim in the WTO jurisprudence is a situation complaint. Similar 
to non-violation complaints, situation complaints require no literal derogation from 
the text of the TRIPS or any other WTO covered Agreement. A situation complaint 
under Article XXm (l)(c) of the GATT, may be brought when circumstances spelled 
out in Article XXIII: 1(b) and (c) do not exist, but the “existence of any other 
situation” nullifies or impairs any benefit accruing under the WTO Agreements or 
that hinders the achievement of any objective of any of the WTO covered 
Agreements. There has never been a case in the GATT/WTO history of a situation
However, a domestic law that mandates action or inaction that clearly is in violation of WTO must be 
stricken from that Members regulation and brought into WTO conformity. Here, the non-violation 
clause o f GATT Article XXIQ:l(b) is different in that there needs to be no formal regulation or law in 
order to come under the catchments of the non-violation provision as long as a Members expected 
benefits have been nullified or impaired.
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complaint but one could be contemplated under the TRIPS as this agreement seeks to 
enforce affirmative obligations on Members and also, strives to create an overall 
general regime of rights protection globally. It is more prone to having developed 
countries seemingly frustrated at the efforts of developing countries to protect their 
rights holders, to allege a situation complaint in order to force a developing country 
to protect “on the ground” the rights of its firms in a way that is desirable for the 
multinational.
A situation complaint is one where a defendant WTO Member has the capability to 
correct the situation and the claimant has offered specific and clear evidence for its 
case, although the letter of the law has not been violated.152 Therefore, a situation 
complaint only applies if the situation in question arises from a WTO Member not 
applying measures which it was not obliged to do under the WTO covered 
Agreements.153 A reasonable standard for situation complaints could be that the 
panel or AB must decide whether the Member could reasonably expect for that 
situation not to occur and also that the defendant had the means to intervene and 
prevent such a situation.154 This standard would limit the scope of situation 
complaints such that events outside of the contemplation the parties to a TRIPS 
dispute could be addressed whilst, preventing Members acting in bad faith from 
failing to correct situations within their power.155
For example, the Devistanian courts’ system is inefficient or unsatisfactory in its 
operation and timeliness. It has a very limited budget and a lack of qualified judges.
152 Roessler, F., The Concept o f  Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System o f  the World Trade 
Organization, in Petersmann, E.U. Supra at note 31, p. 138-141.
153 Samahon, Supra at note 56, p. 1066.
154 Roessler, F., Supra at note 152.
155 Samahon supra at note 56, p. 1067.
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It has literally interpreted Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement advising that the 
creation of new courts is not mandatory. Due to the inadequacy of Devistan’s 
judicial administration prosecution of IP rights is slow and inadequate. There are no 
specialized IP courts and like any other court action they are very protracted.
The US alleges a situation complaint exists as the inadequate functioning of 
Devistan’s courts is nullifying or impairing the interests of the US. The failure of 
Devistan to provide adequate judicial mechanisms to enforce IP laws presents a 
situation where Devistan could rectify. It is within the powers of Devistan to correct 
the inadequacies of its courts system with regard to IP protection. The US claims it 
reasonably expected Devistan to fix its courts system when it signed the WTO 
Agreement.
However, Devistan contends that Article 41.5 of the TRIPS does not guarantee IP 
protection to have priority over other rights and obligations in Devistan domestic 
law. Article 41.5 stipulates that TRIPS enforcement does not create any obligation to 
devise a judicial system solely for the proper enforcement of IP rights. Furthermore, 
it states, “nothing...creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of 
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement 
of law in general.” Devistan claims that it does not have to create IP courts and does 
not have to allocate its resources in a special manner for the protection of IP rights as 
it does for any other rights provided for in Devistan.
Under the Development Approach the adjudicators should heed the claims of 
Devistan as it is developing and lacks the necessary resources to properly implement 
the TRIPS Agreement enforcement requirement in a way that is satisfactory for
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industrialized nations. It is not appropriate for an international organization to expect 
that the obligations created under its treaties should be given priority over Devsitan’s 
domestic laws. The legitimacy of rulings pertaining to situation complaints is very 
difficult to grasp as legitimacy seeks to affirm the status quo and in international or 
even domestic law situation complaints similar to the GATT are very rare, if not 
nonexistent. Thus, legitimacy of the ruling would have to be done in a way that 
seeks to establish a precedent of sorts or to basically lay the first foundations for 
legitimacy. Predictability of their ruling could be established if they would decide in 
a way that is clear and concise in its reading, concentrating on ex-post predictability 
to clarify issues for future reference. The security and coherence of the rulings will 
have to be established through case law and over time.
The justice aspect of the ruling would be proper as cases involving situation 
complaints will have to decide whether the defendant has the capacity and power to 
intervene and correct the matter. As developing countries lack the level of resources 
that industrialized countries do, it can be deduced that developing countries will be 
given more consideration in this respect. They will naturally be less able to enforce 
obligations in the same way as an industrialized country would be able to do. 
Assuming that developing countries do not perceive such strict IP protection as 
desirable is in a way, advantaging the disadvantaged.
One way for the US in this case to prevail would be if Devistan had acted in bad 
faith. For instance, if it somehow meddled with its judiciary so as to prolong IP 
cases coming to trial, or if it in practice, allocated IP protection cases to certain 
courts which are less efficient, although its judicial code does not explicitly separate 
dockets by type of claim. It could also prevail were it to somehow show a systematic
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lack of protection by using the inefficient court system as an excuse. For instance, if 
the Devistanian government advised its companies to negotiate in bad faith with an 
IP holder, or that they should use delay tactics in negotiations so that every case is 
taken to trial in order to deprive the IP holder of the remedies it seeks.
3.11. Conclusion
The development approach to fair adjudication in relation to the TRIPS Agreement 
has been the focus of this chapter. The main problems areas are patents and 
exceptions to exclusive rights, non-violation and situation complaints, and to a lesser 
extent, certain issues with respect to copyrights and trademarks. The main 
arguments presented are the adjudicators need to decide cases under the development 
approach in order to help develop to fruition, the objectives of the agreement for 
developing countries. The development approach is in line with the objectives and 
principles of Agreement as stated in Articles 7 and 8. Although the development 
approach is more concerned with justice, these two Articles provides explicit legal 
instrument that should be used to achieve fairness. The overarching theme 
throughout this chapter has been that development approach to fairness suggests that 
the flexibility in the language of the Agreement should be used to the full extent. 
This includes amongst others, a great amount of deference to national authorities in 
implementing, interpreting and enforcing the provisions of the TRIPS due to the 
positive nature of its obligations. The chapter used hypothetical cases and situations 
in order to better explain how adjudicators must decide cases under the development 
approach and also used actual cases to illustrate how the adjudicators have been 
unable to achieve fairness in their holdings from the perspective of developing 
nations.
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Firstly, the discussion analysed and described the landscape of intellectual property 
protection globally under the TRIPS and from the perspective of developing 
countries. It explained the developing world after buying into the arguments of 
liberal free traders and the pressure of the industrialized countries, have as of yet to 
achieve the TRIPS’ promise of flourishing local technology and better access to 
knowledge or an increase in FDI, which are all key elements in the capacity-building 
process. Whether the future holds better fortunes is speculative and dubious at best. 
In contrast, the TRIPS Agreement imposes affirmative obligations on Members that 
are very costly and burdensome to meet such as training of judges, enforcement 
measures against private actions, creation of administrative bodies, etc. These 
obligations tend to harm local industry in favour of foreign multinationals in the 
short to medium term.
During the Doha Ministerial Conference, the Members promulgated a declaration 
aimed at assuaging some of the legitimate concerns of developing countries. 
However, the Doha Declaration simply reiterated the text and the spirit of the TRIPS 
Agreement by paraphrasing some of the stated objectives and principles of the 
TRIPS as embodied in Articles 7 and 8. Moreover, the Doha Declaration limited its 
scope to mainly pharmaceutical products for treatment of HTV/AIDS, TB, and 
Malaria. Also, it allowed for more deference to Member States in determining 
situations that constitute an emergency and/or urgent situation thereby, justifying the 
withholding of the exclusive rights of the IP holder. The Doha Declaration has little 
or no effect in comparison to the development approach. The development approach 
goes beyond what is suggested in the Declaration. Furthermore, the legal value of 
the Declaration itself is suspect as the declaration is not an interpretation of the
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agreement that must be accepted by % of the WTO Members. Also, the development 
approach would want to broaden the scope of the covered sectors to other industrial 
and non-pharmaceutical areas.
Another area of concern for developing countries is the scope of patent protection 
that must be implemented domestically. The developing nations want to limit the 
scope of protection as much as possible. The language of the TRIPS Agreement 
allows for domestic authorities to enact laws and regulations that compared to 
industrialized countries, restrict the scope of protection. For example, defining terms 
such as novelty, industrial application, and “inventive step” is left to domestic 
authorities. The adjudicators’ role in this regard is to be flexible in how developing 
countries’ courts and institutions define these terms. The developing countries 
should also retain the authority to restrict the patenting of products associated with 
indigenous and traditional knowledge so as to prevent multinational firms from 
patenting these products without proper royalties and compensation. A hypothetical 
case was presented that illustrated how adjudicators should allow the flexibility in 
the language of TRIPS to promote product improvements and adaptations without 
the threat or potential for violation of the original IP holders patent.
The dispute in the India-Pharmaceuticals case was mainly in the context of 
implementing the positive obligations of the TRIPS and deferring the manner of 
implementation to national authorities. The AB held that simple administrative 
instructions were not adequate in fulfilling the obligation to provide a “mailbox” 
system of patent registry. Although the TRIPS has deferred the manner in which that 
obligation must be met to Members, nevertheless, the AB reasoned that an 
unpublished administrative instruction does not pass WTO threshold of acceptability.
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This ruling is not in line with the tenets of the development approach to fairness as it 
has created a higher legislative burden on India. In essence, it seems that the AB 
does not trust the bureaucracy of India to fulfil its obligation. India, the largest 
democracy in the world with a fractious legislative branch, would be hard pressed to 
enact laws in such a short period of time. Fairness would demand that the Indian 
authorities be monitored to see whether the administrative instructions did in fact 
work properly or not. This is especially prudent since, as mentioned before, the 
manner an obligation is satisfied is up to the Member state itself, pursuant to Article 
1 TRIPS.
An important issue for developing nations is also the exceptions to exclusive rights 
that are granted under Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS. Developing countries have 
an opportunity to lessen the shock and harm to their economies of TRIPS 
implementation by taking advantage of these exceptions. Again, the adjudicators 
have a responsibility to use the flexibility in the language of the provisions to allow 
developing nations to take the maximum use of these exceptions. The Canada- 
Pharmaceuticals case was analysed as an example of how the panel erred in its 
interpretation of the Article 30. In that case the issues were whether regulatory 
review proceedings and stockpiling is a correct use of the exceptions granted by 
Article 30. The panel thought that the regulatory review proceedings can be used as 
an exception by generic drug firms to test and make the drug before the expiry of the 
patent so as to get the approval of governmental health agencies, thereby, allowing 
generic production soon after the patent expires. Yet, the stockpiling of products 
before the expiry of the patent was deemed a violation that is not justified under 
Article 30. Although the disputants were not developing countries the precedent of
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this case does not bode well for developing nations. The development approach 
would also allow stockpiling of products so that the product is marketed as soon as 
the patent expires. This would be of great benefit to the larger developing nations, 
which have a strong or burgeoning generic drug making sector, such as India, China, 
Brazil and even countries like Egypt and Mexico.
Article 31 sets out the conditions and criteria for Members to grant compulsory 
licenses. Again, in this regard the development approach to fairness suggests that 
adjudicators interpret the conditions under which compulsory licenses maybe given, 
flexibly. The Doha Declaration, if deemed to be legally valuable, has stated that 
Members have full authority to decide extreme emergency and urgent circumstances 
in health crises. However, the development approach would go further by giving the 
same authority to Member State government for economic crises. The Argentine 
crisis of 2000-2001 and the Southeast Asian crisis of 1997 are two examples 
whereby Members should be allowed to declare state of emergencies and grant 
compulsory licenses to not only pharmaceutical products but also any other product 
or process deemed necessary.
Other conditions such as refusal to deal, non-commercial use and dependent patents, 
are all very important for developing countries. Many developing nations’ firms are 
not granted licenses because IP holders prefer to import the product leaving firms 
and labour in these countries behind in the R&D race, as they will not be able to gain 
the necessary knowledge. This is also true for non-commercial use. The 
adjudicators should interpret the term broadly so that firms, governmental agencies, 
and scientists in developing countries make full use of this exception. Dependant 
patents sometimes prohibit the smaller and less advanced corporate entities from
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developing new or improved products and processes as the costs and lack of 
knowledge prevents them from doing so. Developing country firms are very prone 
to such obstacles since improving or adapting products is a good way to promote 
local innovation. The adjudicators of the WTO have the responsibility to diminish 
legal hurdles to the full extent allowed under the TRIPS.
The issue of exceptions to exclusive rights arises also in the area of copyrights. The 
language of Article 13 of TRIPS provides that exceptions to exclusive rights may be 
granted if it does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder. The terms 
normal exploitation and legitimate interests must be defined narrowly so as to afford 
developing countries the opportunity to obtain the knowledge desired. This is 
especially true since copyright laws cover computer programs. A narrow 
interpretation of Article 13 relating to rental rights would assist in the affordable 
access to computer programs and other knowledge material. Under the TRIPS the 
copyright holder has full control of rental rights; however, developing countries 
could use the exceptions to the exclusive rights clause to provide easier rental 
opportunities for their firms.
The area of trademarks has generally not been of great concern to most developing 
counties. Nevertheless, international pressure on countries such as China and India 
to better enforce trademark violators is slowly bringing the issue to the fore. 
Counterfeiting of trademarked goods is still the most outstanding area of concern, 
and this involves enforcement on the ground. As the importance of trademarks has 
not been widely recognized in the developing countries this issue has not been given 
much attention in this chapter, but the developing countries must be able to protect
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their interest on the one hand, against demands for excessive granting of well known 
trademarks that have not been used in their jurisdiction, and ensuring consumer 
protection against local counterfeits on the other.156
As of January 2001, the five-year moratorium on bringing non-violation and 
situation complaints against developing countries has elapsed and although these 
claims are very rare in the GATT/WTO history, it is nevertheless, potentially a 
matter of grave concern. The TRIPS Agreement’s affirmative obligations come at a 
great cost to the developing countries’ economy and administration, since 
industrialized nations could potentially bring forth many complaints under Article 
XXIII: 1 (b) and (c) of the GATT as it relates to the TRIPS. The adjudicators must 
be very cautious and tread carefully when a non-violation or situation complaint 
involves a developing country. The complainant Member must carry a greater 
burden of proof than it would if the non-violation or situation claim concerned 
another WTO covered agreement without affirmative obligations. The affirmative 
obligations of the TRIPS, the lack of adequate institutions-judiciary and executive-in 
developing countries, and the relatively short period of time to implement the TRIPS 
Agreement are some of the reasons why the panel and AB must rarely favour non­
violation and situation claims against developing countries. For non-violation and 
situation complaints, the complainant must prove beyond the requirements of Article 
XXIH, that the developing nation acted in bad faith; systematically infringing on IP 
rights and that it can feasibly correct the matter without economic harm to the 
defendant.
156 The WTO has only adjudicated one case- The Havana Club. However, the issue in that case was 
mainly expropriation and national treatment matters.
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Chapter 4
Developing Countries and the Nature of the WTO Antidumping Regime
The strengthening of the world trading system was one of the basic objectives of 
developing countries participating in the Uruguay Round. For developing countries 
one of the most important aspects of this system strengthening was the law and 
regulations of antidumping. They believed a more effective international legal regime 
would be to their advantage as being poorer and less advantaged made them easier 
prey in the international power-oriented political system. Furthermore, antidumping 
measures had become and are still a very prevalent mechanism for protectionism in 
the industrialized world. Since market access to the rich world is one of the main 
tenets behind liberal trade and development theories, the antidumping regime found 
even more focus and attention during negotiations.
The traditional economic rationale for antidumping measures has been the threat of 
international predation, a very legitimate and necessary objective. However, a more 
empirical and pragmatic look at the current situation leads to a different assessment. 
With the great increase in transnational commerce, domestic economic policies, laws, 
and business practices have obtained a new and more urgent extra-territorial impact. 
In light of a lack of international harmonized rules governing which domestic business 
practices and policies constitute trade distortion, antidumping laws have evolved as 
the strategic tool of choice to counteract the effects of domestic structural differences 
and other non-tariff barriers between Member States of the WTO. While antidumping
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actions may be deemed to protect Member States’ crucial economic interests, in reality 
antidumping laws block entry of many otherwise reasonably priced imports from 
exporters incapable of predation.
Developing countries have traditionally been the targets of this strategic protectionist 
tool, and although many more developing countries are implementing antidumping 
laws and initiating investigations, the overall structure of the system is still harmful to 
trade interests.1 The laws of asymmetric economic power also create a structural 
disadvantage to these Member States. Developing countries imposing antidumping 
duties on products from industrialized nations could be inflicting harm to themselves 
as their financially-challenged consumers must pay higher prices. Also, due to a less 
advanced industrial base than developed countries, most imported products will 
probably be used by their own industries as input goods thereby creating a domino 
effect of higher prices. Nevertheless, antidumping measures remain ever present and 
developing countries saw no other option but to negotiate a new Antidumping 
Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round which would lessen harm to trade 
and also promote more predictability and transparency for exporters.
Therefore, this chapter will discuss some fundamental elements of dumping and 
antidumping measures from the perspective of developing countries. It will serve as a 
prelude to the next chapter which evaluates the case law of the WTO pertaining to
1 Harvard Center for International Development, Debate Over the Use of Anti-Dumping Measures, 
2002, found on www.cid.harvard.edu; Hudec, R., The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An 
Overview o f  the First Three Years, 1999,8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1 explaining the overall increase in 
the initiation of dispute settlement cases in the WTO;
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antidumping and developing countries under the development approach to fairness. 
Hence, this section will explain the economics of dumping, including, among others, 
its relationship with competition law, then proceed to describe the current WTO 
regime under the new Antidumping Agreement Also, developing countries 
negotiation positions with regard to certain aspects of the antidumping rules will be 
presented in order to gain perspective of the demands and concerns of these countries. 
However, it will not be exhaustive as some matters such as injury determination and 
causality have always been problematic and no tangible change has occurred in the 
negotiation rounds to date. Finally, this chapter will analyse the relationship of the 
Antidumping Agreement with the “development approach to fairness.”
The outcome is that although the new Antidumping Agreement has been amended, the 
overall strategic nature of its use has not changed and in order to protect developing 
countries from protectionism in industrialized countries the adjudicators must use the 
development approach so as to lessen the harm done to third-world exporters.
4.1 Economics of Dumping
Economists have traditionally defined dumping as transnational price discrimination 
where prices vary between national markets, that is, domestic vis-a-vis foreign 
markets.2 Although some object in principle, they now accept that dumping may also 
be defined as a transnational sale below cost. In fact, the two definitions are both
2 Jackson, J. & Vermulst, E. (eds.) Antidumping Law and Practice 1990, New York: Harvester 
Wheatleaf.
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equally the centre of many antidumping disputes in recent years. Sales below cost 
“has gradually acquired the elevated status of an alternative definition.”3 However, 
there is no direct correlation between price discrimination and sales below cost as 
sales below cost may occur with or without price discrimination.4 The following will 
address both types of dumping definitions and reasons firms may engage in such 
activity.
4.1.1 Traditional Definition o f Dumping
Price discrimination occurs when different units of the same commodity are sold at 
different prices for reasons not associated with differences in costs or when different 
units of the same commodity are sold at the same price where costs are different. 
Dumping refers to a situation where prices in the importing market are lower than in 
the domestic market of the exporter. The assumption is two distinct markets exist and 
are separated by geographical, social or cultural elements, or that one market is less 
competitive than the other (i.e., the elasticity of demand and supply must differ 
between the two markets).5
There are many reasons why a firm may want to maintain a price discriminating 
scheme for a certain period. First, when a firm with market power in the exporting
3 Deardorf A., Economic Perspectives in Antidumping Law 1990, in Jackson & Vermulst, ibid.
4 Marceau, G., Antidumping and Anti-trust issues in Free Trade Areas, 1994, Clarendon Press, p. 11.
5 For Analysis of Antidumping regulations and economics see: Snyder, F., Antidumping in WTO Law, 
2003, in Lewis, D., China and the WTO: Trade Law and Policy (Hong Kong University Press) at 
p.51 JIandley, B., & Messerlin, P., Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized Protection in the WTO 
and What to Do About It, 1996 (AEI Publishing) pp. 6-24 & 52-69; Arnold, B .G., Antidumping Actions 
in the US and Around the World: An Analysis o f  International Data, 1998 (Congressional Budget 
Office) found on CBO website.
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country enters a new market separated by tariffs, technical standards or other factors, it 
may maintain lower prices in the new and more competitive market at a profitable 
level, without any predatory desire to eliminate competition.6 Second, in order to 
achieve economies of scale for promotional reasons or to test a new product, a 
producer may need to expand into a new geographical market.7 If government in the 
first market controls prices, the reduction of price caused by increased output may 
only take place in the importing market. Third, in a period of recession or of excess 
capacity, a producer active in two or more markets may be able to lower its prices in 
one market if cartels or government in one of the markets regulates prices.8 Fourth 
and most concerning, is international predation. A firm with market power may price 
discriminate and cross-subsidize a low price market with profits from a high price 
market to eliminate competition in the low price market and eventually reap 
monopolistic profits.
In the first three scenarios the producer may have the intention of raising its price 
rapidly when regular or normal production or market circumstances begin. The 
producer may not have the capacity to predate. However, it must be noted that much 
controversy and ambiguity in identifying true predators as opposed to normal business 
practice remains. Aside from predatory situations, the problem does not lie in the
6 Ruttely, P., Antidumping Regulations and Practices, 2004, pp. 107-124, p. 112 in Reuvid, J., A 
Handbook o f  World Trade: A Strategic Guide to Trading Internationally (Kogan Pages ICC);
7 Prusa, T.J., The Economic and Strategic Motives fo r  Antidumping Filings, 2001 (US National Bureau of 
Economic Research) found on www.nber.org;
8 Ruttely, P., supra at note 6, p. 113
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lower priced market or the one where price discrimination exists, rather the higher 
priced market is to blame for any market distortions or problems.9
4.1.2 Alternative Definition o f Dumping
Dumping can also be defined as the pricing of exports below some definition of costs. 
The argument in favour of this approach is that exports below costs must be 
subsidized with sales at a much higher price, usually in the home market, constituting 
evidence of price discrimination. Sales below cost may also signal future price hikes 
after predation is completed.
Three main types of costs are usually referred to when looking at sales below costs: 
average total cost, average variable costs, and marginal costs. Calculating true 
marginal costs is very difficult as it refers to the extra costs required to produce an 
extra unit of good. Variable costs are those which vary with the level of output while 
fixed are those which do not change.
Structure and allocation of costs also vary within different countries, management 
models, accounting methods, social institutions, regulatory requirements and culture. 
Furthermore, in a multinational, multi-product enterprise the identification of different 
types of costs becomes very difficult and at times arbitrary. In any international 
setting reference to a particular type of cost must include recognition of national 
structural and business environment differences. Also, the proper price level to cover
9 See Ruttley, P pp. 114-115 supra at note 6 and Prusa, T.J., pp. 10-13, supra at note 7.
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costs is at times arbitrary. Economically, the use of sales below marginal costs or 
allocated costs depends entirely on the actual circumstances of the market and its 
competitive structure.
4.1.3 Justifications for Businesses Selling Below Cost
In a market economy the primary objective of firms is to maximize profits in the long 
term. In accounting terms, producing an extra good should yield at least the extra 
costs of producing that extra good: marginal costs of production. As long as marginal 
costs are covered, producing at a price where at least some of the fixed costs are 
recovered can therefore be considered rational and reliable business. For a company 
to continue producing without recouping its full costs is reasonable when, for 
example:10
1. The testing and promotion of new products may warrant sales below total average 
costs and even below marginal costs for a certain period of time. At times, firms 
entering a market prefer to price the product as low as possible so as to ensure 
viability due to uncertainty of the market situation and a high price at the beginning of 
entry could hinder and block marketing and promotion of the good as consumers are 
turned away from the new higher priced product.
10 For more discussion on why firms may dump see, among others, Besanko, D., & Dranove, D., & 
Shanley, M., The Economics o f  Strategy, 2000 (2nd ed.) Part 2-3; Brander, J., & Krugman, P.,A 
Reciprocal Dumping Model o f  International Trade, 1983, J Int'l. Econ. 313; Low, P., Trading Free: 
The GATT and US Trade Policy, 1993; Anderson, K., Antidumping Laws in the United States: Use and 
Welfare Consequences, 1993, J. World Trade 99
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2. The market is slow or depressed or an excess capacity exists, therefore an 
enterprise with high fixed costs may decide to sell below cost in order to minimize 
losses.
3. A new entrant into a competitive market may forgo some profits by selling below 
total variable costs for a short while in order to make itself known and market itself 
better in the new environment. Of course, the assumption is that after its recognition 
prices will increase to cover any previous losses.
4. An enterprise may want to maximize sales over profit without any intention of 
eliminating competitors. This is objectionable to competitors because excess supply 
will depress prices though, consumers will gain. Many Japanese firms have 
implemented, and some still use in this form of business strategy. However, some 
critics claim overproduction is a form of predation.11 In fact, the Alcoa case in the US 
has held that overproduction is a form of predation.12
5. The uncertainty about new markets leads producers to make decisions on price in 
contracts before export costs are fully known. Prices may end up not covering 
marginal costs or even variable costs. However, this situation represents a wrongful 
evaluation of the costs rather than a decision not to cover marginal costs.
There seems to be rational business justifications for selling below costs or to price- 
discriminate. According to liberal economists, selling below cost or discriminating on 
prices serves only to benefit the importing country in the long run. The only exception 
is predation which often, is difficult to prove.
1 Williamson, O., Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis 1977, YaleL.J. 187 p. 194.
12 United States v. Aluminum Co. o f  America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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4.1.4 Overview of Welfare Impact and Categories of Dumping
Dumping was traditionally classified according to its duration because of its allegedly 
different welfare impacts. Dumping was considered to be sporadic, short-run and 
intermittent, or long run and continuous.13 In the early years of dumping analysis, 
economists such as Viner believed that short run dumping should be prohibited as “it 
could induce a maladjustment in the use of productive resources of the importing 
country”14 Whereas, sporadic dumping was of insufficient duration to affect 
investment and employment decisions.15 Long run dumping causes a shift in the 
allocation of resources, but was reasonable because of continued low price imports. 
Thus, for Viner, time was of material importance in evaluating the effects of dumping. 
However, this categorization of dumping seemed elementary since the true impact of 
dumping is more nuanced and complex.16
In more recent works on dumping’s impact, it is suggested that both predatory 
dumping and all forms of strategic dumping are detrimental for the global economy. 
Robert Willig identifies five types of dumping practices in reference to different 
circumstances where dumping has negative welfare effects:17
13 Viner, J., Dumping, 1923, University of Chicago Press, p. 139-141.
14 Viner ibid.
15 Marceau, supra at note 4, p. 12.
16 Marceau, supra at note 4, p. 15.
17 Willig, R., Framework o f US Antidumping Regulations, 1980, US Congressional Report found 
www.libraryof congress, gov.us.
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1. Market Expansion dumping: the exporting firm can profitably charge a lower 
mark up in the importing market since it faces a higher elasticity of demand with 
respect to price.
2. Cyclical Dumping: the motivation arises from the unusually low marginal costs 
or opportunity costs of production coupled with substantial excess capacity with little 
or no use apart from the manufacture of the particular good.
3. State-Trading Dumping: the main motivation here is the acquisition of hard 
currency. Developing countries are almost always the culprits in this form of dumping 
simply for acquiring hard currency.
4. Strategic Dumping: This term describes exports that injure rival firms in the 
importing country through an overall strategy of the exporting nation that 
encompasses both the pricing of the exports as well as restraints foreclosing the 
exporter’s home market. If each exporter’s share of its home market is of significance 
then a benefit from a significant cost advantage over any foreign rivals occurs.
5. Predatory Dumping: Dumping that fells under the authority of most Members’ 
competition or antitrust regulations. Here, the exporter is trying to eliminate 
competition by lowering prices in order to reap higher profits later.
Yet, this categorisation does not seem to resolve any of the ambiguities associated 
with the origin of dumping. Dumping at its core is due to the existence of different 
national laws and economic models between two different markets. National 
differences are normal and in many instances necessary for competition and 
exploitation of the comparative advantages states may have.
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In fact, many economists believe dumping is not so harmful to importing countries, 
except when predatory or strategic intentions are involved.18 Consumers in the 
importing country benefit from lower prices. The importing country as a whole 
benefits to the extent that it acquires access to imported goods at a lower price than if 
dumping were not taking place. This is true because the importing country is naturally 
a net demander of dumped products since its domestic firms competing with the 
dumped goods are being harmed.19 In economic terms, charging extra duties to 
counter the price discrimination caused by the dumping firm is serving only a narrow 
interest domestically and not the economy and the citizens as a whole.20 For the 
importing country, the effects of imposing antidumping duties or countervailing duties 
(CVD) has a ripple effect on prices charged by other businesses domestically. Not 
only must consumers pay a higher price for the dumped goods but also higher prices 
for domestically produced like goods, as the domestic producers are able to charge 
more and still remain competitive.21 Furthermore, if the product in question is an 
input product the prices of other complementary products will inevitably be higher.
However, antidumping measures have been on the rise in the past two or three decades 
mostly because national authorities are unwilling to recognize and work within the
18 Deardorf, A.V., Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, 1993, in Stem R.M., (ed.) The 
Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change 135 pp. 136-142.
19 Deardorf, ibid. p. 139.
20Bhala, R., Rethinking Antidumping Law, 1995,29 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l. L & Econ. 1 pl3. Also See, 
Fraedrich, L., the Japanese Minivan Antidumping Case: How American Manufacturers Lost the Legal 
Battles but Won the War, 1994,2 Geo Mason U.L. Rev. 107, p. 120-124.
21 Jackson, J.H. (ed), The Jurisprudence o f GATT and WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations, 2000, pp.87-98 For a more detailed discussion on the economic and legal merits of 
countervailing duties.
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existing national economic and regulatory differences, or to make long-term, purely 
economic decisions. Therefore, it must be assumed that antidumping measures will 
continue and that economic considerations, though superficially adhered to, are not the 
overarching reasons for the levying of antidumping measures. Rather, they are 
imposed in an overall majority of cases for political reasons and/or short-term fixes to 
assist certain domestic industries.
4.2 Antidumping Measures as a Tool for Protectionist Tendencies
International use of antidumping rules was formalized at Bretton Woods in 1947, 
where the contracting parties drafted Article VI of the GATT Agreement Later, in 
order to facilitate better administration of the antidumping measures that proliferated, 
an antidumping code at the Kennedy Round of multilateral negotiations in 1967 was 
devised. The Antidumping Code was significantly amended during the Tokyo Round 
of negotiations in 1979. The WTO Antidumping Agreement was promulgated to 
replace the Tokyo Round negotiations and is presently the Agreement that attempts to 
deal with international antidumping measures.
Antidumping complaints have emerged as the most effective weapon in the 
protectionist arsenal of national authorities. At times the mere filing of an 
antidumping complaint has “chilling effects” on competition at the price and volume 
levels. The complex set of rules and the costs that antidumping investigations pose is 
detrimental to exporters and importers. This “chilling effect” is highlighted within the
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export sector of developing nations as an investigation by US or EU authorities puts 
these firms in a disadvantageous situation with regard to issues of competition, 
domestic and foreign, and other corollary problems such as financing, obtaining bank 
loans, and adjustments in the allocation of resources.
4.2.1 The Tendency to Litigate Dumping Measures
As countries are required to lower tariffs and phase out other NTBs in order to comply 
with WTO rules, Members will naturally look to the ADA more often. Historically, 
the US, the EU, Canada, and Australia have been the primary users of antidumping 
law, accounting for over 60 percent of the antidumping cases initiated between 1990 
and 1995,22 (Including those at the WTO). These statistics do not show the real 
accounting of antidumping measures because it does not address the plethora of 
“administrative reviews” initiated by the US pursuant to a Draconian System of 
retroactive dumping assessments. The US uses many of these reviews in a given year 
and at times, more than it initiates new investigations.23
Developing countries have also commenced on the path of utilizing dumping measures 
so as to counter their proliferation by industrialized countries. Developing countries 
have been filing antidumping actions not only against the traditional users but also
22 Between the years 1990 and 1995 the US initiated 299 antidumping cases, Australia initiated 265, the 
EU 186, and Canada initiated 117. The Committee on Antidumping Practices, Reports o f  the Committee 
presented to the Contracting Parties GATT BISD1991-1996.
The periodic retroactive “administrative reviews” analyze whether imports in the previous year, 
entered under a pre-existing antidumping order, were dumped using the same rigorous data collection 
procedures as in the initial dumping investigation. For more info see the Import Trade Administration’s 
web site at www.ita.doc.gov/import.
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against other developing Members with increased frequency to the consternation of 
developed nations.24 A striking number of countries with no prior antidumping laws 
have adopted regulatory regimes for antidumping. In 1994 only 25 countries had 
joined the GATT Antidumping Code and implemented antidumping legislation.25 
However, by 2003 due to the “single package” nature of the WTO Agreement there 
are now 147 members which in some manner, must have antidumping regulatory 
schemes. Therefore, the institutional framework itself encourages the proliferation of 
antidumping measures.
A sharp rise in the number of antidumping actions initiated since the establishment of 
the WTO has occurred.26 The number of cases will fluctuate from year to year 
depending on the economic cycle and global economic health of certain sectors; 
nonetheless, the trend seems to be unmistakable. Antidumping measures are the most 
effective way to counter the lowering of tariffs offered by Members States in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, in particular, for the most established and traditional 
users of these actions.
The growing frequency of antidumping actions has resulted and will most likely 
continue to result in an increase in the number of antidumping decisions challenged 
before the WTO DSB. The WTO established new binding procedures, under which a
24 Report by US General Accounting Office stating that the spread of antidumping measures: ‘Tearing 
possible abuse of these laws, countries with established procedures have expressed concern over their 
adoption and use by newly industrialized countries such as Mexico, South Korea, and Brazil” See 
United States General Accounting Office, 1990, Report to Congressional Requestors.
25 Ruggiero, R., The State o f  World Trade, Trade Policy and the WTO, 1996 FOCUS, p. 8.
26 See amongst others Hudec, R., Supra at note 1; Harvard Center for International Development study 
supra at note 1; and WTO statistics up to April 2005, indicating on average a 15% increase in 
Antidumping cases year-on-year, found on www.wto.org.
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complainant may request a panel review of the decisions taken by the authorities of 
another Member in order to ensure its conformity with obligations under the ADA.27 
The WTO sets forth rules for resolving disputes involving antidumping measures. In 
theory, developing countries should be encouraged to use this system as it gives them 
more meaningful remedies than the old GATT regime. Yet, this chapter and the next 
will illustrate that so-called improvements in the system have led to other problems for 
developing countries with regard to antidumping measures, thereby, diminishing any 
real gains for these Members. Nevertheless, one can expect greater numbers of 
antidumping disputes involving developing countries as the ADA is the most effective 
of the three import protection agreements, the other two being the Safeguards 
Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement in the WTO.
43  Relationship Between Antidumping and Competition Policy
As antidumping regulations claim to prevent predatory behaviour by firms or to 
strategically prevent foreign competition, understanding the overlap between the 
concepts of antidumping measures and competition policy is prudent. The crux of the 
issue is the difference between the policy objectives of the two concepts. Competition 
laws, inter alia, strive to deter and prevent abuses of market power, exclusionary 
practices, cartels, and to provide guidance on mergers and acquisitions. The core 
objective of competition policies is to preserve and protect the process of competition
27 DSU, Art. 4 and 16.
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but not necessarily individual competitors, so as to maximize economic efficiency.28 
This is reflected in efficient prices, better quality goods and innovation. Competition 
policy focuses on the rules of the game over the behaviour and actions by market 
participants, as such it tends to be neutral in design as opposed to proactive. Through 
its deterrent effects, when legislation is effectively enforced, increases in competition, 
market discipline and a more competitive environment can be expected.
Trade policies on the other hand, have traditionally focused on facilitating access to 
markets, through reduction of tariffs and other non-tariff trade barriers, so as to 
increase output, efficiency and to realize the associated benefits of free trade, whilst, 
maintaining some level of protection for domestic industries. The arguments 
supporting the protective components have been varied, but most often they have been 
based on the need or desire to shelter nascent domestic industries from more advanced 
and efficient foreign competitors, or as the antidumping system illustrates, are based 
on political pressures from interest groups 29
In practice, trade policy tends to be more proactive, in that it can involve subsidies of 
one form or another that target or favour some domestic sectors or regions and erect 
barriers to foreign competition. As a result, trade policy can either significantly 
promote or substantially impede the economic goals of competition policy. Yet, there 
is also a natural affinity and opportunity for convergence between trade and
28 Victor, P., Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Two be Resolved? (1983), 15 Journal of International 
Law and Politics 1.
29 Guasch, J.L., & Rajapatirana, S., Total Strangers or Soul Mates? Antidumping and Competition 
Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, (1998) IBRD 433/1958 p. 3-8.
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competition policy. An example of this is seen in the protection of the market from 
predatory pricing or when import competition breaks the hold of domestic 
oligopolies.30 Moreover, trade policy instruments are designed to deter anticompetitive 
practices by foreign firms which are similar to competition policy although they have 
a more domestic focus.
In its current form, antidumping regulations have become tools of protectionism, 
which inherently strives to reduce competition. The only economic justifications 
under liberal free trade theory for antidumping measures are in predatory situations. 
However, with the opening up of markets as mandated by the WTO, the monopoly 
rents expected by predatory behaviour is rendered unfeasible. Predatory dumping loses 
its effectiveness because competition from other firms that have the same market entry 
rights as the predator will diminish any future monopolistic position.
Therefore, one can see that the objectives of competition policy and antidumping 
policy could converge and work to increase competition, whilst at times, depending on 
the true intent of the domestic authorities of the importer, antidumping policy could 
have the exact opposite effect and close the market to competitors. This is because 
the core objectives and policy goals of these two concepts are not really 
commensurate.
30 Hoeckman B.M., & Mavroidis, P .C Antitrust Based Remedies and Dumping in International Trade 
(1994) Center for Economic Policy Research, Paper 1010 August 1994.
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4.4 Other Agreements on Import Protection and Their Significance Vis-a-vis the 
ADA
The WTO Agreement encompasses several multilateral agreements on trade 
contingency remedies. Aside from the ADA which relates only to trade in goods, the 
other two agreements of importance are the Safeguards and the SCM Agreements. 
The Safeguards and SCM Agreements are of far less importance than the ADA 
because the prevailing economic realities of developing countries, the stricter 
requirements for injury determinations, and the lower level of countervailing duties 
that importing Members are allowed to levy make them a less appealing option for 
protecting domestic industry than antidumping measures. Thus, the ADA will be the 
focus of this chapter and the next.
4.4.1 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement
One of the import protection mechanisms permitted under the WTO is the antisubsidy 
scheme. Similar to the Safeguards Measures, anti-subsidy measures are noteworthy 
but of less significance than antidumping measures. Under the WTO SCM 
Agreement, importing nations may take antisubsidy measures against products 
benefiting from certain types of subsidies in the exporting country. The Agreement 
defines subsidies as financial contributions or other governmental measures such as
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price supports or tax breaks that “confer a benefit”31 and are “specific”32 to a particular 
industry or industries. The revisions of the old GATT agreement on subsidies, coupled 
with other international economic developments, have decreased the importance of 
antisubsidy measures.33
Antisubsidy measures imposed under the authority of the SCM and the GATT have 
had a relatively small impact on trade as compared to antidumping actions.34 This 
excludes agricultural subsidies that fall under the Agreement on Agriculture and has 
its own separate regime. The US has been the predominate user of antisubsidy 
measures most in the form of levying countervailing duties (CVD) rather than
35demanding the withdrawal of the subsidies.
The most frequent target of the US CVD measures has been the large Latin American 
nations of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, along with the EU.36 These countries have 
recently embarked on a wave of privatisation of state industries thereby eliminating 
most of the justifications for US CVDs. Furthermore, the new SCM makes it harder 
for importers to levy CVDs, as it requires an injury test that was not required during
31 SCM Agreement Art. 1.1: defining financial contributions and Art. 14 defining benefits
32 SCM Art. 2.
33 Coir, C., Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy o f  Antidumping Measures, 1997, 
18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 49 p. 68.
34 ibid.
35 Vermulst, E., Subsidy and Countervailing Measures, 2003, UNCTAD course on Dispute Settlement 
in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property, p.5-9 found on www.unctad .org.
36 Finger, J.M., & Nogues, J. J., Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: 
Fighting Fire with Fire, 2006, p. 6-9, Palgrave MacMillan Publishing.
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the GATT. Probably most significant is the lower level of protection proffered by 
SCM CVDs as opposed to antidumping measures.37
The SCM rules allowing for certain subsidies known as “Green Light Subsidies” will 
also contribute in diminishing the relevance of the SCM in comparison to the ADA 
due to the fact that these subsidies have been deemed legal. Previously, the legality of 
certain subsidy measures was unclear and could be determined by the importing 
nations’ authorities. Moreover, as most Members have privatised or are in the process 
of privatising more industries, the use of SCM CVDs will likely be curbed or at a 
minimum, have a small effect on the prices of these products, as the CVDs will be 
less. However, it must be noted that there are still certain industries which will come 
under scrutiny due to continued governmental support mostly due to “national 
champions” sectors in the industrialized countries such as airlines and automotives.
4.4.2 Safeguards Agreement
Article XBC of the GATT 1994 Agreement allows members of the WTO to impose 
temporary protection for domestic industries encountering increased import 
competition. Procedures for implementing this article are laid out in detail in the 
Safeguards Agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement. The objective of the
37 For example, in the US SCM CVDs are usually below 10% whilst, antidumping duties are usually 
above 10%. Compare the cases of Freshwater Tail Meat from China 62 Fed. Reg. 48218 (1997) with a 
91.5% margin; Vector supercomputers from Japan 62 Fed. Reg. 55392 (1997)with a margin of 173% to 
454% with, on the other hand, SCM CVDs on Oil Country Tubular Goods 60 Fed. Reg. 40822 (1995 ) 
from Italy with an ad-valerom rate of 1.43% and Pasta from Italy 61 Fed. Reg. 38544 (1996) ranging 
from 0% to 11.23%. Also see Coir, C., supra at note 33.
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negotiators in respect to this agreement is to afford a grace period for domestic firms 
to enhance market positions or shift resources into a different field.38
The SCM authorises Members to restrict imports when they are in “surging” 
quantities, and causing or threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.39 
The SCM specifies that measures may only be taken in respect to an increase in 
imports both in absolute terms and relative to domestic production.40 The definition of 
serious injury is stipulated as “a significant overall impairment to its position.”41 The 
intention of the drafters of the Agreement pertaining to the injury test is arguably, to 
set a higher threshold than the injury test in the Antidumping Agreement.42
The main remedies under the Safeguards Agreement are quantitative restrictions and 
higher import duties.43 However, when Members apply quantitative restrictions they 
must normally limit the measure to prohibit only injurious imports, that is, those that 
exceed the average quantity or value of imports over a three-year “representative
38 The WTO has other safeguard mechanisms, notably, Articles XII and XVIII:B of GATT 1994 which 
permit import restrictions in order to protect the Members’ external finances and balance of payments in 
extraordinary circumstances. Also, Article XX allows for protection of public morals, health, 
exhaustible natural resources, and Article XXI allows for protection of national security are other 
examples of safeguard provisions in the WTO. Aside from Article XX which has been elaborated and 
detailed through the procedures laid out in the SPS Agreement and has been invoked in many disputes, 
the other provisions have very rare usage and as of yet, have not played a significant role in the 
jurisprudence of the WTO.
39 Safeguards Agreement Art. 2.1.
40 ibid.
41 Safeguards Agreement Art. 4.1.
42 Corr, C. Supra at 33 p. 61.
43 Safeguards Agreement Art. 5.1 and Art. 6. According to Art. 6 if there is a finding of critical 
circumstances, in which delay would cause considerable damage, a Member may impose provisional 
safeguards after making a preliminary determination. Provisional measures may be granted for up to 
200 days while the investigation is conducted and should take the form of tariff hikes.
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period.”44 This is different than the ADA which allows national authorities more 
discretion in the products they may wish to target. Furthermore, the safeguard 
measures must be phased out in proportion to the recovery of the domestic industry.45 
Article XIX requires governments to suspend obligations on a non-discriminatory or 
MFN basis so that restrictions are applied to all imports. Quota shares normally must 
be allocated proportionately among different Members on the basis of relative import 
levels during the representative period.46 This requirement is stricter than the leeway 
granted national authorities in targeting dumped imports, as the ADA does not require 
such limitations.
The duration of safeguard measures is limited to a maximum of eight years (initial 
phase of 4 years with the possibility of extension for another 4 years) whereas 
antidumping measures could last much longer making them more attractive to 
protectionist impulses. Another significant difference is the Safeguards Agreement has 
included so-called grey area measures in its purview. Grey area measures are usually 
trade distortive non-tariff barriers devised through “voluntary” participation of 
exporters, such as voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, and 
export price or import price monitoring systems.47 The measures are explicitly 
prohibited under the Safeguards Agreement.48
44 Safeguards Agreement Art. 5.1.
45 Safeguards Agreement Art. 7.1.
46 Safeguards Agreement Art. 5.2(a).
47 Hizon, E.M., The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde o f Trade Protection, 1994, 
15 NW. J. Int’l. L & Bus. 105 p. 105-106.
48 Safeguards Agreement Art. 11.1.
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Although many of the WTO Members have implemented new domestic safeguards 
legislation, it is unlikely there will be a significant increase in safeguard actions due to 
the limitations of the safeguard remedies in contrast to the remedies available under 
the ADA. The Safeguards Agreements’ prohibition on grey area measures is most 
likely to lead to an increase in antidumping actions as the most attractive alternative 
for protection. Antidumping actions permit the targeting of specific countries, and the 
imposition of protective measures of indeterminate duration, without any 
compensation requirements.49 A more detailed look at the WTO Antidumping regime 
will reaffirm the greater significance of these measures vis-a-vis the Safeguards and 
Subsidies Agreements.
4.5 General Overview of WTO Antidumping Regime
The advantages and availability of antidumping relief relative to other import 
protective measures demonstrates why the antidumping regime is and will continue to 
be the most important and popular international import protection measure. 
Antidumping actions are effective because it is relatively easy to file a complaint and 
directly target specific competitors, impose duties that have a direct and sustained 
price effect on specific products, and will most likely act as market barrier.
49 Antidumping measures may incorporate grey area measures. VER in the form of quantitative 
restrictions and tariff rate quotas arguably are permissible, as long as they comply with the ADA. For 
example, Article 11.1 (C) of the Safeguards Agreement states that the prohibition on grey area measures 
does not apply to measures “sought taken or maintained” under the authority of other WTO covered 
Agreements.
240
4.5.1 The WTO Agreement
The fundamental principles of the antidumping regime were set out in Article VI of 
the GATT 1947, as detailed in an antidumping code that was periodically revised at 
various GATT negotiating sessions. After the entry into force of the WTO Agreement 
all previous antidumping agreements were superseded by the new Agreement on the 
implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(ADA).
The ADA requires Members to adhere to core substantive and procedural 
requirements, to achieve a certain level of uniformity in the international antidumping 
regime, yet much flexibility is built into the Agreement as national authorities are 
given a high level of discretion in implementing its obligations. The legal framework 
is particularly important for developing countries since a vast majority of them did not 
have antidumping schemes in the domestic regulations. The WTO has devised a model 
antidumping law for Members to implement should they so wish, however, the model 
may not be applicable to many developing countries as their legal and economic 
systems vary greatly.
4.5.2 Antidumping Proceedings under the ADA
The Antidumping proceedings mandated by the ADA consist of three major stages; 
petition by domestic industry, dumping investigation, and material injury and
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causation examination. An antidumping proceeding begins after the national authority 
accepts a petition from a complaining domestic industry (or an appropriate 
representative) alleging that a designated type of merchandise imported from one or 
more countries is a) being sold at dumped rates and b) those sales are materially 
injuring or are threatening to materially injure the specific domestic industry.50 The 
national authority may only initiate antidumping investigation if the petitioner has 
shown a prima facie case supporting its allegations and has notified the government of 
the targeted Member.51
After the initiation of the investigation the national authority must evaluate whether 
the domestic industry has been materially injured or threatened with injury by reason 
of the targeted merchandise, that is, whether the cause of the injury is actually the 
dumped product or other economic and business factors.52 In a separate investigation it 
must also decide whether dumping has actually occurred.53 The ADA sets out a time 
frame for provisional measures and final determinations of dumping and injury, as 
well as rules for public disclosure of these determinations.
The national authority has broad discretion in conducting the investigation. It will 
select the exporters which are to be targeted.54 It will request targeted companies fill 
out questionnaires pertaining to sales and cost systems for the “investigation period”
50 The Antidumping Agreement applies only to trade in goods and not services, which is covered under 
the GATS Agreement Also see ADA Art 5 for requirements of antidumping proceedings.
51 ADA Art. 5.
52 ADA Art. 3.
53 ADA Art. 2.
54 ADA Art. 6.10.
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preceding initiation (usually one year for dumping).55 After the questionnaires have 
been collected the national authorities may send auditors to conduct on the spot 
verification of the exporter’s submitted information.56 If the national authorities are 
unsatisfied with the responses of the exporter they may decide to proceed with the 
investigation based on “facts available” i.e., that it will ignore some or all of the 
submitted data and instead, use alternative information which is most likely to be 
detrimental to the exporter.57
If both the dumping and injury investigations result in an affirmative determination the 
national authority may impose a definitive antidumping duty. Virtually all Members 
except the EC and the US, use a prospective system under which the authority imposes 
final or “definitive” duties on imports. The US, however, uses a retroactive system 
under which importers are responsible to pay a deposit in advance and then collect the 
differences at the end of the year if warranted. The ADA permits national authorities 
to settle antidumping complaints through “price undertakings” in which the exporter 
normally agrees to comply with minimum export prices in exchange for the 
suspension or termination of the antidumping action.58
55 ADA Ait. 6.1.
56 ADA Art. 6.7. Also Annex I “Procedures for On The Spot Investigations Pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
Article 6.
57 ADA Art. 6.8. Also Annex II “Best Information Available in Terms of paragraph 8 of Article 6).
58 ADA Art. 8.
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4.5.3 Antidumping Methodology
4.5.3.1 Comparison
The national authority determines whether dumping is occurring by comparing the 
export price of the product with the “normal value” of the merchandise (the exporters’ 
home market, third country price, or a constructed price).59 In order to achieve an 
equitable comparison, the ADA mandates a comparison of ex-factory starting price for 
sales of the same or like product to the first unrelated customers in the export market 
and the comparison market during the investigation period.60 This requires the national 
authority to adjust prices by deducting transportation and selling costs and if 
necessary, differences in physical characteristics between products and trade levels.61 
Selling costs are normally distinguished between direct ones such as commissions and 
credit expenses, and indirect ones such as fixed expenses, salaries and warranties. 
Direct expenses are applied precisely on a sale-by-sale basis for all sales in the 
investigation period, whereas indirect expenses normally are allocated over revenue 
and then applied as an average. These complex sets of rules and transactions are 
usually not a part of normal business accounting practice, and as such the numbers 
could be open to a variety of interpretations. This numbers game tend to result in 
domestic authorities selecting interpretations that inflate dumping margins. This is 
especially true for developing country exporters as their business records and practices 
are less sophisticated and elaborate than those required by the national authorities, or 
in comparison with the more sophisticated level of record keeping by most firms in the
59 ADA Art. 2.2.
60 ADA Ait. 2.3 &2.4.
61 ibid.
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industrialized countries.62 Therefore, the scope for discretion is increased because of 
systematic differences between the ADA evaluation of pricing and normal business 
accounting practice.
4.5.3.2 Export Price
The export price is the targeted exporting firm’s price to an unaffiliated customer for 
consumption in the domestic market of the importing country. The export price may 
be the sales price to a purchasing agent or trading company in the exporting country 
for transport to the importing country, but usually a price to a buyer in the importing 
country. Since the customer has to be unaffiliated, the export price may be based on 
the resale price of the exporter’s sales subsidiary in the importing country, rather than 
the exporter’s price to one of its subsidiaries. Sales through subsidiaries are deemed 
“constructed export price” transactions because all of the expenses of the subsidiary 
including any further manufacturing and profit must be deducted from its resale price 
in order to “construct” an ex-factory starting price.63
4.5.3.3 Normal Value
The benchmark to which the export price is compared is called “normal value” and 
may be derived in a variety of ways. The primary option under the ADA is to select 
comparable sales in the exporting firm’s domestic market. This market can only be
62 Wright, R., Validity o f Antidumping Remedies: Some Thoughts 1989, in Jackson, J.H., & Vermulst,
E., Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study, at 425. p. 451.
63 ADA Art. 2.3 & 2.4.
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used if there are sufficient sales to constitute at least five percent of the amount sold to 
the importing country of the “like” product.64 The domestic authorities may 
investigate whether home market sales are made below the cost of producing the 
goods. Sales below cost in substantial quantities may be rejected as a basis for 
comparison.65 If the home market cannot be used as the benchmark price, the national 
authorities may use export sales to third countries or, calculate a constructed value for 
the exported good. In the case of “non-market economies” countries in which 
domestic market prices and costs are deemed unreliable, authorities may use special 
“surrogate values.”66
4.5.3.4 Cost o f Production or Constructed Value
If domestic market prices cannot be used, the normal value may be constructed from 
the cost of production sold to the importing country plus the profit earned in selling
67 68the good. Cost of production is the total of the manufacturing cost plus selling, 
general and administrative expenses.69 Net prices in the exporter’s home market are 
measured against this constructed cost benchmark.
64 ADA Art. 2.2. “Like Product” is defined by the ADA as, “Product which is identical i.e., alike in all 
respect to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, 
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration.” ADA Ait. 2.6.
65 ADA Art. 2.2.1.
66 Snyder, F., The Origins o f  “Non-Market Economies Ideas, Pluralism and Power in EC 
Antidumping Law About China, 2001, European Law Journal 7,4, pp. 369-424, pp.389-391.
67 ADA Ait. 2.2.2.
68 These include the actual cost of material, labor and overhead incurred in producing the merchandise 
sold in the comparison market.
69 ADA Art. 2.2.1.
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National authorities usually require actual product-specific costs and profit, and 
generally will not accept standards or budgeted amounts. As many manufacturers use 
a process cost accounting system and do not derive actual per product costs, this 
requirement often means that a company must make a burdensome recalculation of 
product costs for antidumping purposes. Moreover, the Agreement’s requirement of 
full production costs, rather than variable margin costs, may create higher dumping 
margins as normal business practice usually calculates costs based on variable margin 
costs. Domestic administrators have much discretion in adjusting an exporter’s full 
costs, especially, where the exporter is forced to depart from its normal accounting 
system to derive a per product cost analysis. These adjustments can have a significant 
effect on the antidumping margins calculated, particularly for firms in countries with 
less means for accounting expenses.70 For example, when calculating sales, general 
and administrative costs plus a profit margin, the investigators have a certain degree of 
discretion in how to calculate such a value. Also, due to the fact that normal value can 
be based on home market price or constructed price the exporter could still be found 
guilty even if its export price is not only above domestic market price but also if its 
export price is above production costs.
4.5.3.5 Calculating Dumping Margins
The calculation of dumping margins is the next step in Member States’ investigation 
of dumping allegations. Export sales are compared to normal value, on a weighted
70 Wright, Supra at note 62 p. 449, “ It may be unrealistic to expect an economically rational cost of 
production/constructed value analysis for what has become, in essence, a subtle web of import 
protection decisions.”
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average or transaction specific basis.71 The foreign denominated normal value is then 
converted to the currency of the export price using the exchange rate in effect on the 
date of the export sale.72
Average unit export prices generally are subtracted from average unit normal value, on 
a product-by-product basis, to measure the dumping margin. When the net export 
price for a product is less than the normal value, a quantity-weighted dumping margin 
is usually calculated. The margin for sales of all product types is tallied to derive a 
total dumping margin. This margin serves as the basis for the antidumping duty, 
although the methodology for imposing the duty varies amongst Members. The ADA 
mandates that separate margin rates be derived for each exporting company where 
possible, but the investigating authority has discretion to sample selected exporters 
when it cannot examine them all.73 For those exporters in the targeted country that 
were not specifically investigated, an “all others” duty is applied.74
The national authority has discretion not to impose an antidumping duty, or to reduce 
the amount calculated, if it deems such measures appropriate.75 The ADA encourages 
national authorities to impose lesser duties than the full dumping rate when a lesser
71 ADA Art. 2.4.2.
72 ADA Art. 2.4.1.
73 ADA Arts. 6.10 & 9.2.
74 ADA Art. 9.4.
75 ADA Art. 9.1. While the authority has discretion to reduce the duty, it cannot impose a duty higher 
than the dumping margin calculated. This provision could at times, create discriminatory effects as 
there is no regulation, which requires that “discounts” be given to all products and exporters. The 
selective nature of the deference given to national authorities is arguably counter to the WTO MFN 
principle. In fact, authorities could select exporters’ “discounts” strategically, so as to soften the burden 
on some exporters which compete, with exporters most competitive with the importing nations domestic 
firms.
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amount is sufficient to offset the injurious effects. For instance, Article 15 of the 
ADA stipulates that “special regard” be given to developing countries before applying 
antidumping duties, when duties would effect their “essential interests,” however, 
there is no precedence in which this article has been given appropriate effect.76
The ADA also allows national authorities to consider the interests of the consumer and 
the public in setting its antidumping amount. This consideration can potentially be an 
important part of the antidumping proceedings in Member States such as the EU.77 
The calculation of dumping margins is very much a practice in hypothetical scenarios, 
without much basis in the reality of whether there is truly dumping by exporters. The 
comparison of constructed prices and costs can create dumping margins where none 
otherwise exist. Since developing country exporters are most often targets of value 
construction by the US, Canada, and the EU, it is easy to understand the difficulties 
they face in exporting goods to these lucrative markets 78
76 In European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports o f Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 
WT/DS141/AB/R (March 1,2001) (hereinafter, Bed Linen}, the disputants accepted the obligation in 
Article 15 to seek constructive remedies. However, in die appellate stage, the AB held that Article 15 is 
a non-obligatory provision.
77 The EU antidumping regulations require the consideration of the “community interest.” Council 
Regulation 384/96 of 22 Dec. 1995 on Protection Against Dumped Imports from Countries not Member 
of the EU, Article 21,1996 O. J. (L356) 1,18. Also see, Wellhausen, M., The Community Interest Test 
in Antidumping Proceedings o f  the European Union, 2001,16 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 1027.
78 Lima-Campos, A., & Vito, A.., Abuse and Discretion: The Impact o f  Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Proceedings on Brazilian Exports to the United States, 2004,38 J.W.T. 37 p. 39- 
40.
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4.5.3.6 Injury Analysis
Under the ADA, the national authority must assess the impact of dumping on the 
domestic industry by examining both the volume of targeted dumped imports and, the 
effect of these imports on domestic prices and producers.79 The national authority 
must examine the absolute and relative volume of subject imports as compared to 
domestic production or consumption. Where the import volume is negligible the 
investigation must be terminated as to that country, unless there are a significant 
number of negligible countries.80 In analysing the price effect the authorities must 
address a number of issues such as, price undercutting and underselling by dumped 
imports. The factors for considering the effect of dumped imports on domestic 
producers include trends in sales, market share, capacity use, and profits, as well as 
employment and investment levels.81
After assessing these factors, the national authority must determine whether the 
domestic industry is materially injured, threatened with injury, or is materially 
retarded in its establishment.82 Threat in the ADA is defined as a situation where 
injury is “clearly foreseen and imminent” and not merely “conjecture or remote 
possibility.”83 The concept of “material retardation” is very suspect as it is not even 
defined in the ADA. It is more ambiguous than the “threat” standard because it does
79 ADA Ait. 3.
80 ADA Art. 5.8.
81 ADA Alt. 3.4.
82 ADA Art. 3.
83 ADA Art. 3.6.
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not require that a domestic industry exist as a condition to analyse affirmative injury 
finding.
In addition to analysing the injury to the domestic industry, the investigation must 
assess whether dumped imports are the actual cause of that injury. In order to make a 
definitive injury determination, the national authorities must show the causal 
relationship “between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.”84 
For a proper assessment of the causality of the dumped imports, the domestic 
authorities must also examine “any known factors other than the dumped imports” 
which may also be the cause of the injury, such as non-dumped import volumes and 
lower demand in the import market. Furthermore, according to article 6.2 of the 
ADA, authorities must allow individuals or representatives of industry and consumer 
organizations to provide information regarding injury and causality.
The new ADA has a high degree of built-in formalism but leaves much room for 
protectionist abuses by domestic investigating authorities. The aim of the UR 
negotiators to build a more predictable and economically justifiable system of 
antidumping regulation by promulgating rules has only created a different set of 
loopholes and opportunity for protecting domestic industry from the tariff bindings 
negotiated in Uruguay. Developing countries were not able to convince the 
industrialized nations to agree to a system grounded more on sound free trade 
economics, so as to secure better access to rich markets for their exports.
84 ADA Ait. 3.5.
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4.6 The ADA Negotiations and Developing Countries
Antidumping laws and investigations can have a negative impact on the competitive 
positions of firms and businesses.85 For instance, antidumping laws increase 
uncertainty in world trading conditions for exporting firms by reducing competition. 
In addition, they can cause foreign producers to relocate their production sites and also 
cause trade diversion.86 In general, a determination that a firm is dumping in an export 
market results in application of antidumping duties (ADD) to all producers in the 
targeted country, yet the culpability of individual firms is not considered. 
Consequently, rival firms from third countries are able to take advantage of the ADDs 
levied against products of competitors.87 These are merely a few examples of the 
effects antidumping rules may have on business practice. The effects on business 
behaviour coupled with the developing countries reliance on the markets of the 
industrialized members made them keen on addressing this issue in the Uruguay 
Round, more so than in any other GATT rounds of trade negotiation.88
4.6.1 Background to Uruguay Round Negotiation
At the 1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, an Antidumping Code 
was devised, however, the main negotiators were the industrialized countries whilst
85 Hoekman, B.M., & Leidy, M.P., Dumping, Antidumping, and Emergency Protection 1989,23 JWT 5
p. 27-35. 
ibid.
87 Lima-Campos, A., & Vito, A., supra at note 78.
88 Stewart, T.P., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History: Antidumping, 1993 (Kluwer Law 
Pub.) pp. 102-118; Kufour, K.O., Developing Countries and the Shaping o f  the GATT/WTO 
Antidumping Law, 1998,32 JWT 6 p. 167-196, p. 168.
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the developing nations played a marginal role.89 Nonetheless, in recognition of the 
fact that evaluating normal or home market price was not always feasible or proper 
and also because of economic structural differences, a Joint GATT Decision was 
declared pertaining to the relationship between developed and developing countries in 
antidumping matters.90 The substance of the decision was that it recognized the role of 
government in the functioning of the economies of the developing countries and as 
such, export prices could differ from domestic prices as a result of governmental 
intervention, but it was not to be construed as an intention to dump goods 91 More 
importantly, the GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices92 (CAP) was permitted 
to waive certain obligations on a case-by-case basis with regard to developing 
countries if they were able to show necessity. This was a recognition that developing 
countries lack the institutional capacity to properly implement the Antidumping rules 
and these members need assistance in gaining market access to the rich world 93
This was an important occurrence as previously in other GATT trade negotiations 
developed countries refused to accept the idea that home market prices were difficult 
or impossible to calculate under the economic structures prevailing in developing 
countries. The reason for this change by developed countries is an accumulation of 
different factors. As developing countries were becoming more involved in the 
multilateral trading system in line with new adherence to liberal economics, developed
89 Masserlin, P. Antidumping Laws and Developing Countries, 1988, Policy Research Paper, The World 
Bank, Paper #16, p.5.
90 Decision May 5,1980 ADP/2 27 BISD p.5.
91 ibid. p.16-17.
92 The Committee on Antidumping Practices was established under the Tokyo Round Code.
93 Another issue which was underlying the negotiations, was the restructuring of the developing 
countries’ economic systems from an import substitution regime to a liberal economic system.
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countries were struggling with new competition from manufacturers and commodity 
exporters from developing countries and were tightening the mles on dumping.94 
Therefore, developing countries understood the necessity for full participation in the 
upcoming Uruguay Round on antidumping matters.
4.6.2 Uruguay Round Negotiations and Some Aspects o f Developing Countries’ 
Proposals
The main argument put forth by developing countries during the Uruguay Round was 
antidumping duties are an obstacle for access to industrialized markets and, therefore, 
suggested limiting use and scope, in addition to requiring predictable and streamlined 
investigations by domestic authorities.95 For instance, the representative for Hong 
Kong claimed antidumping actions were supposed to be used with a high degree of 
restraint and only in situations where need was clearly evident and based on real 
tangible economic and social evidence.96 The submission goes on to argue that 
antidumping should be perceived as a narrow exception to the MFN and National 
Treatment principles of the GATT and benefits from trade may only be realized when 
rules are transparent and predictable.97 This submission was supported by a majority 
of participants in the Working Group set up for antidumping negotiations.
94 Kufour, K.O., Supra at note 88, p. 177.
95 Kufour, K.O., Supra at note 88, p. 178.
96 Principles and Purposes o f Antidumping Provisions, 3 July 1989, Communication from Hong Kong, 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46, p.3.
97 ibid.
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In accordance with the notion of a narrowly defined and predictable set of rules for 
antidumping measures, developing countries made proposals pertaining to different 
aspects of antidumping regulations. They included amongst many other submissions, 
proposals for a public interest clause, cost calculations, especially sales below costs, 
and standard of review. Developing countries also expressed concerns with regard to 
the requirements for the initiation of investigations, dumping determination, injury and 
causality.98 However, the nature of those issues has and will always be problematic 
and the negotiation history does not indicate any common ground amongst developing 
nations.
4.6.2.1 Public Interest Clause
The developing countries wanted the new AD Agreement to include a public interest 
clause which would mandate dumping investigations in the interests of consumers to 
be addressed. Developing countries believed inclusion of a public interest clause 
would achieve three objectives. First, consumers could be protected against the lobby 
of import-competing industries, and next, the adverse effects on the economy of the 
importing country, especially for the industries which demand cheap imports for input 
products would be able to neutralize the protectionist lobbying of industrialized 
governments.99 Last, it would decrease frivolous petitions by the domestic industry, 
which creates extra costs and diminishes exporters’ competitiveness.
98 Darling & Nicely, Understanding the WTO Antidumping Agreement: Negotiating History and 
Subsequent Interpretations, 2002 (Cameron May) pp. 122-139.
99 Singapore Delegation to the Uruguay Round, Proposed Elements for a Frameworkfor Negotiations 
Principles and Objectives for Antidumping Rules, (Oct. 13 1989) Found on www.worldtradelaw.net
255
In all likelihood the developing countries believed such a requirement would decrease 
the amount of dumping and antidumping duty margins that the industrialized countries 
would impose, as it would more than likely focus public attention on many of the 
antidumping investigations conducted by the national authorities of these countries. 
The effect would be an alliance could be built between the exporters that are targets of 
investigation and the firms in importing countries which demand cheaper products. It 
would enhance the ability of developing country exporters targeted for antidumping 
measures in defending their competitiveness vis-a-vis the protectionist commercial 
interests of the industrialised Members.100
However, a required public interest clause did not become part of the new ADA 
mainly because of US vehemence against it.101 It held that public interest clauses 
should be the domain of national authorities and such a requirement would be both 
costly and too vague to be truly effective.102 In essence, arguing that aside from the 
vagueness of the term, public choice and the interplay of different lobby groups should 
be acted out at the national level without the creation of lobbying forums at the 
institutional level, in contrast to the lobbying that occurs at the European Commission 
in Brussels. The EC, nonetheless, has unilaterally implemented a public interest 
requirement in its antidumping investigations. Yet, even though the Member States 
did not agree on including this notion in the agreement, it does not prevent the 
adjudicators of the WTO from including some of the elements that such a requirement
100 Kufour,K.O., supra at note 88.
101 Stewart, T.P. supra at note 88.
102 Kufour, K.O., supra at note 88 p. 179.
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may impose in the decision-making process. Nothing in the ADA would prevent the 
adjudicators from assessing the economic effects of antidumping measures against a 
developing country. For instance, a public interest examination may be deemed as a 
necessary element in determining the “conditions of competition” as required in injury 
determination analysis of ADA Article 3. Hence, the judges may examine issues such 
as production, degree of concentration and competitiveness of firms in developing 
countries as well as interests of consumers in those nations.103
4.6.2.2 Initiation o f an Investigation
Related to the issue above are the criteria for initiating an investigation. This issue is 
very important for developing countries as a mere threat of an antidumping 
investigation by developed Members such as the US and the EU, creates a chilling 
effect for exporter products.
The chilling effect comes from the importer’s perception that, in the majority of cases, 
the outcome of the investigation will be contrary to its interest, and the duties levied 
will increase the final costs of the imported product, causing loss of competitiveness 
and market share.104 In these circumstances the importer is unable to plan its business 
strategy with confidence. Two options available to the importer are cancelling the 
orders or substituting the original supplier country. The effect is that high usage of
103 These were some of the elements for consideration in the Public Interest Clause negotiations during 
the Uruguay Round. See, Delegation of the Republic of Korea in Submission by the Republic o f  Korea 
on the Antidumping Code, (Dec. 20 1989) found on www.worldtradelaw.net.
104 Lima-Campos, A., & Vito, A., supra at note 78, p. 41.
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anti-dumping proceedings tends to benefit third countries that have been excluded in 
the investigation.105
On the other hand, the developing country exporter has to bear the costs of the 
investigation, which in many cases is unfeasible and would thereby force it to leave 
the market or take a large loss. The process of replying to questionnaires, possibly 
attending hearings in the country sur place, and related tasks involve large costs and 
manpower.106 In any case, the exporter cannot avoid the losses that will follow since 
the importation of its products will decrease. Many times even if an investigation is 
not initiated, the mere suggestion or rumour of one will cause a drop in exports for the 
firm.107
From the perspective of the importing country’s producer of like products, filing 
antidumping petitions is a good way of gaining a competitive advantage. The loss of 
market share can sometimes be the only motivation for a company in the US or the EU 
to file a petition as the market share loss may cause opportunities for expansion in the 
local market. The existence of antidumping measures and trade restrictive effects are 
sometimes the basis for frivolous petitions.108 There are also strategic effects as the 
antidumping investigations especially in the US, are tailored in a way that promotes
105 Prusa, T., The Trade Effects o f US Antidumping Actions, 1996, Working Paper no. 5440, National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
106 Vermulst, E., Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy concerns for Developing Countries in the Millennium 
Round: Key Areas of Reform, 1999, in UNCTAD, Positive Agenda and Future Trade Negotiations,
2000, (UN Publication) p. 287-308 p. 293.
107 Lima-Campos, and Vito supra at 78, p. 39.
108 Staiger, R. W., & Wolak, F.A., The Trade Effects o f Antidumping Law: Theory and Evidence in 
Deardorf, A., & Stan, R. (eds.) Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System, 1994, 
(University of Michigan Press) p. 232-233.
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collusion amongst local producers not only to restrict foreign competition but also, to 
increase prices and profits during the investigation.109
Furthermore, within an industrial sector, exporters who are not mentioned in an 
antidumping investigation by a developed Member try to avoid sales in that market 
when competitors have been targeted. The rationale is that it is only a matter of time 
before its products are also targeted.110
The chilling effect on businesses in developing countries when faced with the prospect 
of an investigation by the US or the EU for example, lends credence to the need for a 
streamlined, transparent and narrow set of criteria for the initiation and termination of 
an investigation. The new ADA does not deal with this issue effectively as the 
requirements and standing criteria for companies to file petitions is simple and easy to 
fulfil. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the interpretations and 
decisions of the adjudicators have not been able to achieve this objective even in 
situations where they had the jurisprudential opportunity to do so.
4.6.2.3 Cost Calculation
Another important issue for developing countries during the Uruguay Round was that 
of cost calculations. Within this category, constructed values and sales below cost are 
arguably the most troublesome and problematic. These aspects of the antidumping
109 Ibid. Staiger, p. 246.
110 Lee, S.Y., & Jun, S.H., On the Investigation Effects o f  the US Antidumping Petitions: a 
Psychological Approach, 2002, (Dept of International Trade, Chung-Ang University) p. 4-12.
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code at the time (the Tokyo Code) were up for negotiation and developing countries 
held that the regime must be reformed so as to prevent protectionist forces in the 
developed Member States from abusing the cost calculation system to their 
advantage.111 The Tokyo Code allowed for normal value to be calculated based on 
elements besides the market price in the exporting country, when no sales of the like 
products are in the ordinary course of trade or when such sales do not permit proper 
comparison. The developing countries wanted a more uniform approach in this 
regard, by regulating and defining terms such as “ordinary course of trade” and sales 
which do not allow proper comparison.112 On the other hand, the US, the EU, Canada, 
and Australia, believed that sales below costs should be excluded when determining 
the foreign market value of a product, since they should be deemed as outside the 
ordinary course of trade.113 As described in the last section on the ADA principles, it 
is clear that most of the demands of the Quad countries and Australia were met over 
the demands of the developing countries.
Singapore submitted a proposal pertaining to cost calculations and normal value which 
was rejected by US and EU negotiators. The proposal asked if normal value is to be 
constructed then the investigation should consider the full extent of the economic and 
business conditions of the exporting Member State.114 They wanted the importing 
national authorities to consider the prevailing practice in the exporting country with 
regard to actual production costs, and generally accepted profit margins in the
111 Kufour, K.O., World Trade Governance and Developing Countries: The GATT/WTO Code 
Committee System (Chatham House Papers), 2004, pp. 29-30, Blackwell Publishing.
112 Ibid.
113 Kufour, K.O., supra at note 88.
114 Supra note 99, Singapore delegation.
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exporting country. This last consideration was very important for developing 
countries in Southeast Asia as their business philosophy in many sectors was based on 
high production and low profit margins.115 Singapore’s proposal would allow the 
adjudicators to demand national authorities of importing countries to scrutinize 
whether they have taken into account the prevailing local business standards. This 
allows developing countries to tailor development according to local needs and the 
business environment, instead of being forced to accept practices of other developed 
nations. It also forces the hand of the protectionists in the industrialized nations which 
try to eliminate competition from developing countries. As market access to the 
developed nations is one of the main principles under the development approach, had 
Singapore’s recommendation been accepted, adjudicators would have a better tool for 
reaching the threshold of fairness required by the “development approach” in their 
decisions.
Yet, even without this explicit provision being included in the ADA, the adjudicators 
could still make decisions by using some of the ideas set forth by Singapore, as first 
the ADA does not prohibit them from doing so, and second, it could be justified by the 
existence of an underlying WTO principle of development through trade.
The determination of a hierarchy between the alternative forms of calculating normal 
value bases was considered during both the Tokyo Round and UR, that is, normal 
value based on third country exports or based on constructed value.116 Developing
115 Ibid.
116 Darling & Nicely, supra at 98, p. 26.
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countries argued for a hierarchy whereby, third country export prices would be used 
before an investigating authority could calculate a constructed value.117 The new 
ADA does not suggest an explicit hierarchy nor does it prevent a hierarchical 
approach.118 The US and the EU do not normally use export prices to third countries 
as an alternative base because the use of this base would lead to lower dumping 
margins than the one obtained with constructed values. Constructed values are usually 
derived downstream in the domestic distribution network and are thus, higher. In 
contrast, third country prices are normally export prices to an appropriate third 
country. Since they are usually ex-factory prices of goods intended for export, 
normally minus the domestic distribution costs, and are therefore lower.119
The constructed cost methodology has been subjected to a bit more discipline without 
tangible effects under the new ADA. Yet, there are still many more problems 
associated with the current methodology that hinder the market access of developing 
countries to the rich world. The next chapter will look into the case law of dumping 
determination and cost calculations, in particular, price comparison and “zeroing,” and 
overhead costs (sales, general and administrative plus profits), evaluating their 
treatment by the adjudicators of the WTO and consequences for developing countries.
117 During the Tokyo Round members considered the export price to a third country used as alternative 
basis is more than likely the highest price whilst being representative. However, if it is the highest price 
then it is also very likely that it is not representative. See Kufour, K.O., supra at note 111.
118 In US-Imposition o f Anti-dumping Duties on Imports o f  Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from  
Norway, GATT Panel Report Adopted on 27/4/1994 (ADP/87), the panel rejected Norway’s claim that 
the US was obliged to used third country prices before construction of prices.
119 Vermulst, E., supra at note 106.
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4.6.2.5 Standard o f Review
Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement is believed to be a compromise between 
the industrialized countries that wanted national authorities to have greater discretion 
in interpreting the Agreement in developing countries and other smaller Members who 
wanted that discretion to reside with the judges and adjudicators of the WTO.120 
Under this provision the panel and AB are obliged to defer to the factual decisions 
reached by the national authorities as long as the establishment of the facts were done 
is a proper and acceptable manner. This provision stipulates that panels should 
interpret the relevant provision according to customary rules of international law, and 
if more than one interpretation is possible then the one that the domestic authorities of 
the importing nation devised, if “permissible,” must be allowed to stand. This is 
termed the standard of review.
This can have potentially adverse effects for developing countries as the industrialized 
members were unwilling to cede any more discretion to the new DSB. In general, any 
provision that affords Members who are the frequent users of antidumping measures 
more authority, and in light of the protectionist lobbies that influence these national 
authorities, developing countries tend to be the ones most harmed. Although many 
commentators believe that until now this provision has not had much effect.121 The 
following chapter will illustrate how the jurisprudence of this issue to date, does create
120 Crowley, S.P., & Jackson, J.H., WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard o f Review, and Deference to 
National governments, (1996) 90 Am. J. of kit.’1 Law 193, p. 199-202.
121 See, amongst others, Palmeter, D.,A commentary on the WTO Antidumping Code, (1996) 30 J.W.T.
4 p. 62-64. and Tarullo, D.K., The Hidden Costs o f International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review o f  
Domestic Anti-dumping Decisions, 2002,34 Law& Pol’y Int.’l Bus. 109.
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legal hurdles, and actual and potential harm to developing countries due to the 
prevailing legal interpretations whereby a wide margin of discretion is granted to the 
investigating authorities.
4.6.2.6 In jury Determination
Article 3 of the UR basically reproduces the corresponding provisions of the Tokyo 
Code with some additional details on the injury effects of dumped products, causality 
and injury. It also has a new provision on cumulation of injury (Article 3.3). During 
the UR, many Members proposed strengthening the injury provisions of the ADA. 
However, most of the demands of the developing countries were not addressed in the 
negotiations.122
Injury determinations are usually the main points of contention in antidumping 
disputes. The language of the ADA leaves much room for investigating authorities to 
find injury. One matter of contention for the developing countries in the UR was the 
issue of cumulation, whereby a group of exporters could be lumped together in order 
to find injury to the domestic industry. There are de minimus requirements and an
122 In a submission by Hong Kong supported by some developing countries, the issue of injury 
determination was a main cause of concern. The communication stated the following problems must 
be resolved in order to bring balance and reason to situation where procedures and methodologies are 
tilted against the exporting countries with antidumping working as a form of selective safeguard: the 
injury determination lacks a causal relationship between dumped imports and injury, obscure 
determination of the issue of “cumulation,” absence of distinction between price undercutting as an 
indication of injury due to dumping, and price adjustment to meet the prevailing market prices. 
Causality was added to the new ADA, whilst cumulation with only a small requirement of addressing 
the “conditions of competition” was included. Price undercutting still involves a methodology that 
creates bias in favor of finding higher dumping margins. See, Submission of Hong Kong, doc. 
MTN.GNG/N8/W/46 found on www.worldtradelaw.net and, p. 15-16, and Stewart, Supra at note 88.
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evaluation of the “conditions of competition” of the product added to the text but, the 
de minimus threshold is very low and “conditions of competition” evaluation are still 
very vague.
At Uruguay, the Nordic delegation with the support of 10 developing countries, 
opposed automatic cumulation even if the imports are more than de minimus, 
therefore, they proposed an obligation to examine the injurious effect of dumped 
imports from each source in relation to dumped imports from other sources be 
included in the Agreement.123 Canada also proposed a similar obligation whereby, if 
there is no injury caused those exporters should be excluded in the evaluation.124 
There was a compromise on this issue whereby, cumulation was accepted yet, in light 
of the conditions of competition. Nonetheless, the language of Article 3.3 does not 
prevent the Member States’ investigating authorities or even the adjudicators from 
taking the approach proposed by the Nordics and Canadians. The language leaves 
much room for interpretation. Unfortunately to date, there has been no cases in the 
WTO which has rejected the cumulation of a Member State’s investigating agency.
Other contentious points remain with regard to injury determination. Developing 
countries have problems with the manner in which investigating authorities delineate 
“factors other than dumped imports causing injury,” “other factors” which may 
negatively influence the status of the complaining industry, non-attribution of 
injurious blame to dumped imports and, the methodology for calculating injury
123 Darling & Nicely, supra at note 96, p. 40-44.
124 Kufour, supra at note 88.
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margins (in particular, price undercutting calculation). These issues, similar to the 
cumulation problem, are methodological in nature. The crux of the problem faced by 
developing countries is how investigating authorities evaluate the economic data and 
market structures, given the vague and broad text of the ADA.
4.7 Fairness and the Antidumping Agreement
Since it is recognized that antidumping measures are a huge obstacle to access 
developed markets and have historically been used as a protectionist measure, it is 
essential that the adjudicators of the WTO to scrutinise the national authorities of 
developed Member States thoroughly. This includes making sure that market access 
to developed countries is guaranteed to the extent the WTO ADA allows. As with all 
international treaties the ADA has left many issues unanswered and vague. However, 
it does not equate to having national authorities fill gaps and ambiguities of the 
Agreement with little or no judicial scrutiny at the WTO level.
The deference to national authorities granted under Article 17.6 of the ADA is not 
absolute.125 The acceptance of possible interpretations is still the domain of the 
adjudicators. These possible interpretations must be examined in light of the 
principles, context, and object and purpose of the ADA, as well as the WTO 
institutionally. In fact, as with issues relating to the TRIPS Agreement and due 
process discussed in this thesis, the AB has often filled the gaps and ambiguities of the
125 Article 17.6 can be restrained by narrowing the scope of possible interpretations devised by national 
authorities pertaining to the ADA.
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WTO covered agreements. Furthermore, as Jackson and Cass have argued, the DSB 
in general, and the AB in particular, have become a quasi-legislative or even a norm 
generating, constitution-promulgating body of the WTO.126 The responsibility of an 
organ such as the DSB is to ensure that the principles and objectives of the WTO are 
safeguarded, including the principle that developing countries are to advance their 
economies via trade and in particular, with developed countries. Hence, protecting 
market access to developed countries is a principle that the adjudicators must uphold 
and not allow the protectionist lobbies of developed nations to prosper at the expense 
of developing countries. The adjudicators must consistently and predictably fill the 
gaps of the Agreement with a view toward protecting the vulnerable Members. It 
must also, as a general rule, be consistent and predictable in its interpretative 
fundamentals. It should not decide to narrowly define in a very textual manner, one 
provision of an agreement and then play an activist role with regard to another matter. 
If it is to engage in such behaviour then it must be aware of the interests of the weaker 
parties.
Similar to Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement discussed in the previous chapter, 
Article 15 of the ADA gives context and guidance on the principles and goals of the 
Agreement in relation to developing countries. Article 15 is in line with the 
development approach to adjudication as it acknowledges the need to give developing 
countries better treatment when faced with the prospect of ADDs levied by the rich
126 Cass, D.Z., The “Constitutionalization ” o f International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as 
the Engine o f Constitutional Development in International Trade, 2001, European J. of Int’l. Law 3 9- 
75, p. 48-71; Jackson, J.H., supra at note 17.
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Members. It must be noted that Article 15 does not encompass all elements of the 
development approach. The development approach includes judgments that must also 
be legitimate, whereas article 15 only deals with certain aspects of justice, i.e., 
advantaging the disadvantaged by easing the harm done to their vital economic 
interests. Furthermore, it only involves the notion of finding “constructive remedies” 
and “exploring possibilities” other than CVDs. Whereas, the development approach is 
all encompassing in that it strives for fairness in all aspects of WTO law and its 
adjudication. Therefore, it can be argued that Article 15 also is a legal compass, inter 
alia, for the justification of the development approach to fairness as espoused in this 
thesis.
However, some legal analysts, and the AB in EC-Bed Linen, contend that Article 15 
provides for no real obligation for developed countries, as the language is vague and 
non-obligatory. As will be addressed in the next chapter the AB has consistently 
interpreted this provision as non-obligatory. Yet, interestingly, in the EC-Bed Linen 
case, the defendant, the EC, accepted India’s assertion that certain parts of the Article 
do in fact, create obligations for developed countries. The development approach 
would interpret this proviso as one that entails an obligation on the part of developed 
countries. Accepting Article 15 as a norm that obligates developed countries to 
“explore possibilities” other than CVD’s and other “constructive remedies,” would 
enhance the strength and effectiveness of the development approach and spell out its 
contours more clearly in relation to the Antidumping Agreement. The limits and
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definition of these terms would be clarified through future case law and 
interpretations.
4.8 Conclusion
In the post-world war international trading regime, antidumping has been and will be a 
contentious issue, particularly for developing countries. The new WTO entails the 
most comprehensive set of regulations with regard to antidumping measures. Liberal 
trade theory has at its core, the promotion of exports as the main avenue for economic 
development. However, developing countries in the process of tailoring their 
economies toward an export driven one are faced with protectionism in the form of 
antidumping measures by industrialized WTO Members. This chapter has explained 
the certain economic aspects of dumping, the new WTO antidumping regime, the 
needs of developing countries pertaining to international antidumping, and has sought 
to outline the development approach to fair adjudication in antidumping matters. 
These issues are covered in order to provide better understanding of the evaluation of 
antidumping case law of the WTO, which will be addressed in detail in chapter 5.
The economics of dumping starts with the different definitions assigned to dumping 
i.e., export prices below domestic prices, and sales below costs. Then, different types 
of dumping and their economic impact have been explained. According, to liberal free 
trade theorists, levying antidumping duties are most justifiable when predation or 
strategic dumping is the intent of the exporter. Other economists have also included
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intermittent dumping as worthy of ADDs as they create confusion and thereby, 
misallocation of resources for the exporter. However, in respect to developing 
countries one economic axiom inherent in the global power structure is obvious, i.e., 
that economic asymmetry makes levying duties on dumped industrialized country 
products less attractive and in some cases, harmful to the economy of the importing 
developing country. Whereas, the economic might of the industrialized nations makes 
levying antidumping duties on developing country goods very effective in the altering 
of exporter behaviour.
The history of antidumping measures reveals that the most likely reason for the use of 
and increase in antidumping measures stems from protectionist lobbies and industrial 
groups in the domestic markets of importers. The Quad countries have been the main 
users of antidumping duties and it is arguably due to stronger and more influential 
lobbying schemes that exist in their political arena. In fact, antidumping duties are 
used as another form of escaping the tariff bindings set during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations.
This leads to the next section, and the question of why it is possible to use 
antidumping measures today as a form of protectionism if the new WTO ADA is so 
comprehensive and detailed as no other international antidumping rules has ever been? 
The simple answer is that although the ADA has at first glance formalistic and 
rigorous criteria, which must be met in order to allow importing nations to levy duties, 
nevertheless, the Agreement is still fraught with legal loopholes and ambiguity. In
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addition, the domestic authorities of the Member States still have a large level of 
discretion in interpreting and implementing the ADA obligations. For instance, the 
construction of prices when sales below costs and domestic price calculations are 
deemed unreliable is one of many problematic issues for developing countries. 
Whether these prices are reliable or not is the discretion of domestic authorities prone 
to industrial lobbying and protectionism. In fact, under the current ADA it is possible 
that an exporter is neither selling below cost or below domestic prices and yet be 
guilty of dumping.
Since the issue of dumping is vital for developing country trade interests this chapter 
also delved into some of the negotiating history of these Members in this regard. This 
provides for better appreciation of the needs and demands of these Members in the 
international trade realm. Issues such as the requirements for the filing of petitions for 
the initiation of investigations, dumping determination and cost construction and 
evaluation, injury determination and causality, and the standard of review in settling 
antidumping disputes are some of the more outstanding concerns of developing 
countries during multilateral trade negotiations. Of course, there are other areas of 
concern which the new antidumping agreement raises also, such as injury 
determination and causality. It is important to know their demands, as the adjudicators 
should be aware and address developing country concerns in resolving disputes.
Article 15 sheds light on the fact that members states acknowledge the difficulties of 
developing countries in dumping matters, and requests that industrialized nations seek
271
“constructive remedies” and “explore” other possibilities in lieu of levying full CVDs. 
Although the language of the provision may not create the obligation to force the 
hands of the industrialized nations, nevertheless, the provision informs on the spirit 
and principles behind the WTO antidumping system specifically, and the WTO legal 
structure in general. Article 15 in conjunction with other broadly worded provision of 
the WTO which indicate the acceptance of developing countries as Members in need 
of special treatment and consideration, can be used to justify and implement the 
guidelines set forth by the development approach to fair adjudication by the judges of 
the WTO.
The new Antidumping Agreement of the WTO has sought to clarify and streamline the 
international antidumping regime. However, in trying to do so, new and more 
troubling problems have emerged for developing countries. The tariff-b in dings 
negotiated under the Uruguay Round have been supplanted by antidumping measures 
in the form of countervailing duties. The more legalistic nature of the process has put 
developing countries in a bind since their legal and trade infrastructure in not as 
advanced as the industrialized nations. This new form of protectionism is seriously 
harming the developing countries’ trade interests. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the 
adjudicators to protect the interests of the weaker Members by keeping to the spirit 
and principles of the WTO, by applying the development approach to fair 
interpretation.
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Chapter 5
Antidumping Disputes and Developing Countries
The previous chapter explained some of the theoretical issues involved in dumping 
and antidumping measures. Furthermore, it expressed some of the problems and 
concerns the developing countries have with the international antidumping regime. It 
sought to explain these problems by looking at some of their negotiation positions 
during the UR and the Antidumping Agreement itself. One of the main objectives of 
developing countries within the world trade system is market access to the 
industrialised countries. Their shift toward export-oriented economies and liberal 
economic systems demands they reap some of the promised benefits of the world trade 
regime. Market access to the developed world is part and parcel of the constant 
struggle for economic and institutional development.
The WTO has established a set of rules that must be adhered to by Members 
investigating authorities of the WTO. Most of these rules are premised on building a 
more transparent, cohesive and fair system, whereby national authorities of Members 
that conduct investigations into whether dumping has occurred have less opportunity 
to capitulate to interest group pressure or to simply dissuade them from making 
protectionist choices and decisions. As mentioned in Chapter 4, antidumping is a 
protectionist tool and its ever-increasing prominence is an indication of how the 
formalistic rules of the ADA are still the easiest way for Members to counter foreign
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competition and to circumvent the binding tariff reductions negotiated under the 
GATT Agreement at the UR.
Similar to chapter 3 that discussed the TRIPS Agreement, the focus of this chapter is 
how adjudicators are developing norms via their rulings, are treating developing 
countries in antidumping matters. The norms that are being generated with regard to 
the ADA standard of review pursuant to Article 17.6(ii), the evidentiary threshold for 
the initiation of investigations, injury determinations, dumping investigations and ccst 
calculations will be assessed in relation to the development approach to fairness. Tie 
aim is to elucidate the teleology of adjudicators and show how unfairness exists flat 
harms the trade and development interest of the developing countries. This unfairness 
or imbalance is a jurisprudential one that goes beyond the axiomatic power-orientjd 
treaty-writing nature of the WTO Agreement. This systematic unfairness is a step-ty- 
step, norm-by-norm incremental process. Each case discussed may not on its owi, 
indicate unfairness, but all cases together show a common thread: the process aid 
substance of the antidumping dispute settlement system and its jurisprudence is unfeir 
and has not achieved its stated and implicit goals.
This chapter first discusses the application and views of the AB on the ADAs 
standard of review under Article n.bfii).1 It is argued the AB has diminished tie 
effectiveness of this unique standard of review and its objective of allowing natioml
1 Article 17.6(ii) states: the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordant 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevan 
provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find th( 
authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible 
interpretations.
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authorities to engage in “permissible” interpretation of the provisions of the ADA. 
Developing countries should be content with this approach, as it would theoretically 
curb the protectionist impulses of national authorities in industrialised nations. 
However, the next sections on substantive issues demonstrate the expected benefits 
have not come to fruition. In the second section, a procedural issue of importance, i.e., 
the evidentiary threshold for the initiation of an investigation will be explored. The 
initiation of an investigation has a great chilling effect on the developing country 
exporters because fighting an investigation is very costly and time consuming, plus it 
opens them up to provisional duties. As such, the amount and quality of evidence the 
domestic industry must provide their investigating authority to justify an inquiry is 
crucial to the interests of these exporters. The substantive issues that will be addressed 
in the third and final sections pertain to cost calculations and injury determinations. 
Finally, a brief overview of the possible justifications that may exist for the manner in 
which the adjudicators have ruled will be addressed. The possible justifications are 
adherence to textual interpretations, promotion of methodical investigations, free 
trade, and political considerations. In brief, the chapter draws the conclusion that 
although there are some disjointed jurisprudential battles being won by the developing 
countries the long-term systematic war, nevertheless, is being won by the rich nations.
5.1 Standard of Review Pursuant to Article 17.6(ii) of the ADA
Article 17 of the ADA, which provides for settlement of antidumping disputes by 
application of the WTO's DSU, contains one of the Agreements most controversial
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provisions, the standard of review contained in Article 17.6(h). Any evaluation o>f the 
interpretations presented by the adjudicators of the WTO must analyse the 
Agreements’ own prescriptions for interpretation. At the heart of the debate i§ the 
deference to national authorities that this standard of review affords. The UR was 
fraught with controversy over the issue of how much authority and deference should 
be allotted to Members with regard to antidumping investigations and measures. This 
pits the US view for more deference against developing countries that wanted less 
deference given to Members’ national authorities to prevent them from restricting 
access for developing country goods to the rich markets. In the end, the US prevailed 
but the interpretation of the standard by the DSB has for the most part, rendered 
Article 17.6(ii) less consequential than initially thought.
Article 17.6(i), requires panels to defer to the factual conclusions reached by the 
domestic authorities “if the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation 
was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different 
conclusion.” This standard is rightfully designed to prevent de novo reviews by the 
panels of the domestic authorities’ findings. Panels have limited fact-finding 
resources, and apart from demonstrated bias or lack of objectivity, could reasonably be 
expected to defer factual findings to domestic authorities even if this provision was not 
included. Most disagreements brought to panels do not concern disagreements over 
facts; rather they concern disagreements over the legal relevance and consequences of 
stipulated and acknowledged facts.
2 Palmeter, D., A Commentary of the WTO Antidumping Code, 3J.I.E.L.172 p. 177.
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Article 17.6(ii) provides panels shall interpret the ADA provisions in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the Panel finds 
that a provision allows for more than one permissible interpretation, the Panel shall 
find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the ADA if it rests upon one of 
those permissible interpretations. Critics note the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) 
is inconsistent with the first. This is because the first sentence refers to Article 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and these two articles do 
not seem to foresee the possibility of co-existing permissible interpretations, but rather 
envisage a single preferred interpretation, to be arrived at on the basis of the 
interpretational rules. On the other hand, some legal commentators such as Ian 
Sinclair hold the view that although the VCLT made significant advances in treaty 
interpretation by establishing a clear set of “guidelines,” they are nevertheless, merely 
guidelines.4 He stated further that, “Review of recent international case law on treaty 
interpretation reveals only too clearly that widely differing results can still be achieved 
even if a conscious effort is being made to apply the Convention rules.”5 He 
concluded the inherent general ambiguity in international treaty law will inevitably 
result in “serious divisions of opinion” relating to treaty interpretation.6 In furtherance 
of that view, Ian Brownlie has noted the textual approach of the VCLT “in practice 
often leaves the decision-maker with a choice of possible meanings and in exercising
3 See, amongst others, Vermulst, E., & Graafsma, F., WTO Dispute Settlement with Respect to Trade 
Contingency Measures, 2001, 35 J.W.T. 209-228 p. 211, and Horlick, G., & Clarke, Standards for 
Panels Reviewing Anti-Dumping Determinations under the GATT and the WTO, in Petersmann (ed.) 
International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1997, p. 6.
4 Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed. 1984) p. 153.
5 ibid. p. 153.
6 ibid. p. 154.
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nthat choice it is impossible to keep considerations of policy out of account.” Since 
the DSU has referred to the VCLT and has included the supplemental tools of 
interpretation of Article 17.6(ii), and in light of the negotiating history of the ADA, it 
is appropriate to assume that the drafters felt VCLT Article 31 and 32 allows for the 
possibility of multiple interpretational choices. Therefore, it is natural that the 
adjudicators of the WTO in the final analysis make a policy decision and rule with 
policy in mind.
5.1.1 Application o f Article 17.6(ii)
To date, there have been 11 cases decided by the DSB, which involved the application
o
of Article 17.6(ii), and another two more are pending. The exporting country 
challenging the imposition of antidumping duties by other countries have prevailed in 
every case in at least one of their claims effectively leading to withdrawal of the 
antidumping measure. However, this fact is not very informative as to the prevalence 
of violation of the ADA. It may be that only the most egregious violations are 
challenged in the DSB and/or those national authorities under political or lobbyist 
pressure violate the ADA frequently and therefore, are broadly vulnerable to 
challenges from exporters.9 Thus, in order to evaluate the performance of the DSB it is 
necessary to assess reports looking into their legal interpretation in light of the 
development approach to fairness.
7 Brownlie, I., Principles o f Public International Law, 1990, p. 632.
8 See www.worldtradelaw.net statistics and tables on specific claims under Article 17.6(ii) and also 
WTO Dispute Settlement Index found on www.wto.org date 3/1/2005.
9 Tarullo, D.K., The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti­
dumping Decisions, 2002, 34 Law & Pol’y Int.’l Bus. 109, p. 114-115.
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Examinations of the WTO cases indicate Article 17.6(ii) has not had the effect 
expected by some of the delegates in the UR. Developing countries reluctantly 
accepted the text of Article 17.6(ii) in exchange for a transparent, streamlined and 
economically rational process. Nonetheless, future references and precedence on the 
issue could play a large role in how antidumping measures are evaluated and decided. 
For example, China’s recent accession to the WTO will test the robustness of the ADA 
and the limits of the DSB’s ability to resolve antidumping disputes amongst major 
trading nations. Thus, the interpretative methodology regarding Article 17.6(ii) 
employed by the adjudicators an important component in the overall functioning of 
the dispute settlement regime.
As the following section will illustrate, the standard of review itself is not mentioned 
often in the reports and reasoning of the adjudicators in antidumping cases. Instead, 
the panel or the AB has usually found one single unambiguous meaning for provisions 
of the Agreement that seem quite susceptible to multiple interpretations. It seems the 
adjudicators have been making decisions based on the belief that only one true 
meaning exists, though according to Brownlie’s conception of treaty interpretation, it 
seems they are ultimately making policy decisions, yet couching reports as if multiple 
“permissible” interpretations do not exist.
The DSB seemingly favours fewer restrictions on market access and mistrusts the 
domestic authorities levying antidumping duties. In the Japan-Steel case10 which
10 United States-Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 
WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001).
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provides one of the more detailed explications of Article 17.6(h), the report discusses 
the relationship between Article 17.6 of the ADA and the general standard of review 
pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU. There, the AB sought to answer whether Article 17 
of ADA and Article 11 of the DSU are complementary or in conflict with each other. 
The conclusion reached was that these standards are complementary yet somewhat 
different in application. The AB evaluated the language that distinguishes the two 
provisions, noting the second sentence of Article 17.6 “presupposes that application of 
the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 3land 32 of the Vienna Convention could 
give rise to at least two interpretations of some provisions of the Anti-dumping 
Agreement, which under that Convention, would both be ‘permissible 
interpretations’.”11
Having acknowledged the WTO ADA is unique in its standard of review, it went on to 
reduce its significance by referring to the language of Article 11 of the DSU, noting 
“nothing in Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement suggests panels 
examining claims under the Agreement should not conduct an ‘objective assessment’ 
of the legal provisions of the Agreement, their applicability to the dispute, and the 
conformity of the measures at issue with the Agreement.”12 In its final analysis the 
AB stated, “Article 17.6(ii) simply adds” to the normal Article 11 approach the 
proviso that a panel shall uphold a national anti-dumping measure “if it rests upon one 
permissible interpretation” of the Agreement.13 This reasoning is mirrored in the 
language of Article 17.6(i), which is the standard of review for factual questions, and
11 ibid. para. 59.
12 ibid. para. 62.
13 ibid.
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holds panels are forbidden from overturning determinations if the establishment of the 
objective was unbiased “even though the panel might have reached a different 
conclusion.”
The AB’s reasoning seems to have diminished the effectiveness of Article 17.6(ii), 
which would be a victory for developing countries. During the UR many developing 
countries objected to the inclusion of Article 17.6(ii) but were rebuffed by US pressure 
to include it. A closer look at how cases are decided is warranted as the inconsistent 
“one interpretation” approach taken by the AB throughout the existence o f the WTO, 
has had little effect on how the Agreement is being applied by adjudicators with 
regard to antidumping measures in light of the development approach to fairness.
5.1.1.1 Inference o f  the Application o f  Article 17.6 in DSB Reports
In the Japan-Steel case, one issue was the manner in which national authorities can 
invoke the “facts available” proviso when faced with the absence of information. 
There, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) held a Japanese steel exporter had not 
cooperated with the investigation because the company had not made “every effort” to 
obtain certain cost and price information from its joint venture partner. Under US law 
the DOC is allowed to use “adverse” facts available concerning prices and costs in 
determining the dumping margin.14 Japan contested the finding that its exporter had 
not cooperated, but not the use of “facts available.”15
14 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677e(V) f2000).
15 Japan-Steel supra at note 10, para. 19.
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Thus, the issue was whether non-cooperation justified using “adverse” facts available. 
The AB upheld the panel’s ruling that the DOC was not justified in finding a lack of 
cooperation, despite US insistence that this is a question of fact, not law. Interestingly, 
the AB did not cite Article 17.6 (ii) in its reasoning, in its stead it focused on the 
VCLT Article 31, whilst examining the relevant text of the Agreement in Annex 2 
paragraph 7 which deals with the issue at hand. It then proceeded to define the term 
“cooperate” trying to find its “ordinary meaning” by referring to the Oxford 
Dictionary.
Afterward, the AB commenced on interpreting paragraph 7 in the context of VCLT 
Article 31. The AB found other provisions of the Agreement indicate a certain level 
of reprieve from investigations. Paragraph 5 of Annex 2 prohibits authorities from 
disregarding information that “may not be ideal in all respects” if an interested party 
“has acted to the best o f its ability.” Paragraph 2 of annex 2 allows authorities to 
require submission of information in a particular medium such as computer programs 
but not if “the interested party does not maintain its accounts on computer and if 
presenting the response as requested, would result in an unreasonable extra burden on 
the interested party, e.g., it would entail unreasonable additional costs and trouble.” 
Finally, Article 6.13 of the ADA requires the authorities to take “due account of any 
difficulties experienced by interested parties, in particular, small companies, in 
supplying information requested, and shall provide any assistance practicable.”
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From the first two provisions, the AB concluded the Agreement reflects “a careful 
balance between the interests of investigating authorities and exporters.”16 The AB 
read Paragraph 2, “As another detailed expression of the principle of good faith...that 
informs the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement.”17 Investigating authorities 
“are not entitled to insist upon absolute standards or impose unreasonable burdens” 
upon exporters.18 The AB in effect, seconded the panel’s ruling that the Japanese 
exporter (KSC) had cooperated to a reasonable extent. Specifically, the adjudicators 
found the insistence of the US DOC that KSC must invoke its rights under a 
shareholders’ agreement to force its joint venture partner to produce the relevant 
information, to be an unreasonable burden on the exporter.
However, the Panel in its report barely mentions Article 17.6(ii) and the AB struggles 
to address the standard o f review by merely stating, “In effect, the Panel held that the 
US DOC’s conclusion that KSC had failed to ‘cooperate’ in the investigation did not 
rest on a permissible interpretation of that word.”19 The use of the term “in effect” 
could be construed as an implicit admission by the AB that the Panel did not really 
follow the standard o f review required. Yet, the AB’s own interpretation of 
“cooperate” is hardly compelling. Insofar as Paragraph 2 of Annex II imposes 
constraint upon requests for information in one particular circumstance, where 
computerized data is involved, the absence of such a qualification in other provisions 
of Annex II and the Agreement itself might fairly be read as indicating the absence of
16 Japan-Steel supra at note 10, para. 102.
17 Japan-Steel supra at note 10, para. 101.
18 Japan-Steel supra at note 10, para. 102.
19 Japan-Steel supra at note 10, para. 109.
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constraint. More to the point, the AB nowhere answers the question why “cooperate” 
in paragraph 7 might not permissibly be read to mean in the case under discussion, 
“cooperate through the use of all legal means available to the exporter.” The 
discussion of the AB similar to the Panel’s seems like a determination of the best 
interpretation of the provision and not whether the term is unambiguous in its context 
or susceptible to more than one “permissible” interpretation.
Under the legitimacy requirements of the development approach this selective use of 
dictionary definitions of a particular word is insecure or according to Thomas Franck, 
lacks adherence to international norms of interpretation. If one definition of the word 
benefits one party while another definition of the same word benefits the other 
disputant then the selection of one definition over the other must be explained and 
reasoned.
20A similar approach and outcome can be seen in the Bed Linen case. Here, the issue 
involved a challenge to the imposition of dumping duties on bed linen from India, due 
to the EC’s methodology for calculating dumping margins. The EC used a method 
known as “zeroing” of “negative” margins for some product types. In short, national 
authorities in the EC categorised different types of bed linen and instead of finding 
different dumping margins for each adjusted for quantity, they averaged the dumping 
margins of all the different types of bed linen into one uniform margin for all types of 
bed linen. This method by itself is not illegal per se. However, the problem arises
20European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports o f Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 
WT/DS141/AB/R (March 1, 2001) {hereinafter, Bed Linen),
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when the EC found certain types of bed linen being sold at higher prices in Europe 
than in India for the same type of linen, thereby creating a negative margin of 
dumping. The EC would use zero as the dumping margin instead of the negative 
dumping margin. Thus, it created a higher average dumping margin for all bed linen 
types.
The crux of the matter revolved around Article 2.1 and 2.4.2 of the ADA, which 
required that all comparable export transactions be considered. Specifically, the 
meaning of the word “comparable” determined whether zeroing would satisfy 
requirements of Article 2.4.2. In specifying the ordinary meaning of the word 
“comparable,” the AB then cited the Oxford Dictionary definition “able to be 
compared.”21 From this definition and a strained reference to the context of other 
parts of Article 2.4, the AB concluded the EC’s methodology impermissibly excluded 
some export transactions by zeroing negative margins for discrete types, “All types or
99models falling within the scope of a ‘like’ product must necessarily be ‘comparable’.
The significance of this norm is highlighted when assessing the negotiation history of 
the WTO. The word “comparable” was the only change made to this provision 
between publication of the Draft Final Act and the text as adopted. In fact, the panel 
in Korea-Steel found the inclusion of the word comparable “was not merely incidental 
but reflected careful consideration by the drafters.”23 Moreover, the reference to the
21 Bed Linen para. 57.
22 Bed Linen AB report, para. 58.
23 US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from 
Korea (Dec. 22, 2000) WT/DS179/R, para. 6.111.
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dictionary meaning of “comparable” is very selective. The AB chose one of the four 
meanings for “comparable” that may be deduced by the dictionary definition of 
comparable and its verb form “compare.”24 The meaning of the term may well be 
susceptible to many interpretations but the AB in a very casual and cursory manner, 
selected this definition without admitting the possibility that other meanings of the 
word could be permissible.
The outcome of the case adequately addresses justice concerns from a developing 
country perspective, i.e., India. Yet the reasoning is flawed and as such, is likely to 
create confusion in the future. The justice of the outcome is based on the fact that 
zeroing is obviously a protective instrument. It has nothing to do with the averaging 
of different types of linen, nor is the nomination of zero for a negative number a real 
indication of whether dumping has occurred and at what real margin. It simply invites 
more and more categorization of types of products then zeroed until desired margins 
are produced.
The AB did mention 17.6(ii) at the end of its analysis, a response to the European 
claim that the panel had ignored the ADA standard of review. However, the AB ruled
24 The definition of comparable in the Oxford dictionary is “able or fit to be compared.” The next step 
for the AB should be to seek the definition of compare in the dictionary. The Oxford Dictionary lists 
the following definitions for compare: 1. (usually followed by “to”) express similarities in; liken. 2. 
(often followed by “to” or “with”) estimate the similarity of. 3. (often followed by “with”) bear 
comparison. 4. form comparative and superlative degrees of comparison. Furthermore, the Dictionary 
under the heading “usage” states: In current use, “to” and “with” are generally interchangeable, but 
“with” often implies a greater element o f formal analysis. The AB did not explain why it did not seek 
the definition for compare. In fact, under the AB's method the term “able to be compared” leaves them 
full discretion on deciding what “compare” means. There would be no reason to seek the assistance of 
the Oxford Dictionary as the suffix “able” clearly indicates an adjective of the verb “compare” and thus, 
the meaning is self-evident.
286
the emphatic nature of the panel’s findings in essence, rendered the interpretation of 
the EC impermissible.25 It is somewhat incongruous that the AB would reject the EC’s 
standard of review claim by reference to the panel report when the AB itself had 
significantly modified the panel’s reasoning. With this line o f reasoning the AB has 
minimized the effects of Article 17.6(ii) of the ADA in the jurisprudence of the WTO.
India’s victory at first glance may seem like a victory for developing nations. 
However, the methodology of the EU seems almost intuitively erroneous and counter 
to simple mathematical rules for averaging. Furthermore, the manner in which the AB 
treated Article 17.6(ii) is the same as Japan-Steel, i.e., selectively choosing one 
definition from a variety of possible definitions yet claiming that definition to be the 
sole permissible meaning of the provision. The AB did not properly engage in a 
contextual or economic debate about the merits of the methodology and its 
permissibility.
5.1.1.2 Consideration o f  Alternative Interpretations
Another issue in the Japan-Steel case that was treated more in accordance with Article 
17.6(ii) was a challenge to the US DOC practice of excluding from its calculation of 
“normal value” in the home market, any sales by the exporter to an affiliated entity 
unless the prices of those sales are on average, at least 99.5 percent of the prices 
charged to unaffiliated customers. The US justified this practice by invoking Article
2.1 of the ADA, which states dumping exists where the export price is “less than the
25 Bed Linen AB report, para. 65.
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comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined 
for consumption in the exporting country.” The panel rejected the US argument on the 
grounds that the “arm’s length” test applied by the US “does not in fact test for 
differences in prices of sales to affiliated customers... but only test whether prices to 
affiliated customers are lower, on average, than prices to unaffiliated customers.”
The AB affirmed the ruling on slightly different grounds. The AB stipulated
ontransactions between affiliated parties “might not be in the ordinary course of trade,” 
and the ADA did not provide a methodology for determining when such a 
circumstance occurred.28 The AB further concluded the US has every right to 
implement a rule that delineates sales in the “ordinary course of trade”; however, this 
discretion is not limitless and must conform to certain notions of fairness and even- 
handedness. Its main argument was that if  the US wanted to have a bright line for 
lower than average sales it must also have one for higher price sales also.
Although neither the panel nor the AB explicitly cited the ADA’s standard of review, 
it did state that US practice does not rest on “permissible” interpretations of “sales in 
the ordinary course of trade.”29 Both sets of adjudicators addressed and rejected the 
US interpretation that nothing in the ADA compelled the use o f the same test for 
determining whether artificially high and low prices to affiliated parties were outside
26 Japan-Steel Panel Report, supra at note 10 Para. 7.110.
27 Japan-Steel, AB Report, supra at note 10, Para. 141.
28 Japan-Steel, AB Report, para. 147.
29 Japan-Steel Panel Report. Para. 7.112.
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the ordinary course of trade. Instead, the AB based a large part of its arguments on 
notions of fairness and even-handedness.
Other anti-dumping cases contain similar reasonings on questions of legal 
interpretation. The issue at stake in the unappealed Korea-Steel panel report was 
decided against the importing country, after consideration and rejection as 
“impermissible,” of alternative interpretations offered by the respondent US. The 
issue involved the use of two separate “averaging periods” by the DOC in its 
calculation of margins. The two periods were divided due to the financial crisis that 
struck Korea and other Asian nations in November 1997. The value of the Korean 
currency (Won) declined by over forty percent in two months. The US justified this 
methodology premised on Article 2.4 which states that price comparisons should be 
“in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time,” and that the 
depreciation of the Won during the investigation period created a situation where
1 A
prices could not be compared under the language of Article 2.4.2.
The panel did not use the usual dictionary definition approach to interpret the words
“comparable.” The panel acknowledged that Article 2.4 made the timing of sales a
1 1
relevant issue in deciding the comparability of export and home market transactions. 
However, the panel held the fact that Article 2.4.2 mentions averaging means there are 
circumstances that sales made at different times are still comparable. Furthermore, it 
held, “The requirement that a comparison be made between sales made at as nearly as
30 Korea-Steel report para. 6.107-6.108.
31 ibid. para. 6.120.
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possible the same times requires as a general matter, the periods on the basis of which 
the weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price are 
calculated, must be the same.”32 The panel admitted to the ambiguity of Article 2.4 
and yet it rejected the US argument.33 The US argument was valid and their 
interpretation of the provision could feasibly be in conformity with Article 17.6(ii).
In US-Steel Plates from India, 34 the panel rejected a US interpretation in a case 
involving an Indian claim against the legality of US anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on steel plates. The issue in the case revolved around the use of data, which 
relied on the “facts available.” DOC had disregarded all information submitted by the 
Indian exporter and based its determination exclusively on facts available. The US 
believed it had permission to do so under Article 6.8 as long as any “essential” 
element of the requested information was not provided in a timely manner. The panel 
held this is a stringent requirement and the US interpretation is not in conformity with 
paragraph 3 of Annex II to the Agreement (which elaborates on the obligations of 
Article 6.8), that “all information” that are submitted appropriately and according to 
prescribed time constraints, shall be taken into account by the investigating 
authorities.35 After citing Article 17.6(ii) standard at the beginning of its report it did 
not actually apply the standard. Instead, it simply reasoned the US interpretation was 
not a valid or “permissible” one.36
32 ibid. para. 6.121.
33 Japan-Steel panel report, para. 7.27-7.29.
34 US-Anti-Dumping and countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India, WT/DS206/R (June 28, 
2002).
35 ibid. para. 7.57.
36 ibid para. 7.7 and also, para. 7.59-7.62.
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Finally, in a case between two developing countries, Egypt and Turkey, a panel 
rejected Egypt’s contention that an importing country is never required by Article 2.4 
of the Agreement to make a price adjustment for credit costs where constructed value 
is the basis for comparison with export prices.37 Egypt claimed that, because a 
constructed value is a “notional price,” its level “cannot be influenced by any 
conditions and terms of the relevant sales.” 38 Egypt’s submission to the panel
39explicitly argued that its reading was a “permissible interpretation” of Article 2.4. 
The panel prudently addressed Egypt’s claims but still found that such a reading was 
not “possible.”40 The panel mentions that Article 2.4 mandates a “fact-based, case-by- 
case analysis of differences that affect price comparability.”41 For emphasis, the panel 
repeated the wording of the provision which states that “due allowance shall be made 
in each case, on its merits” for differences, as well as other clauses of Article 2.4, 
indicating that case-by-case consideration of possible adjustments is necessary.42
Under the development approach to fairness, the legitimacy of the rulings are in doubt, 
however, the outcome of most of the cases analysed do benefit developing countries. 
When the AB made inferences to Article 17.6(ii) (first claim in Japan-Steel and the 
Bed-Linen case), the reasoning lacks any security or adherence to international norms 
because it selectively used dictionary definitions that best suite the judges’ disposition
37 Egypt-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WT/DS211/R (August 8, 
2002).
38 ibid. para. 46 and annex 2.
39 ibid.
40 ibid. para. 7.351.
41 ibid. para. 7.352.
42 Although Egypt lost on this legal point, it was able to win on the issue because the Turkish authorities 
had failed to raise this matter before Egyptian national authorities.
291
of the case. They did not make a thorough economic or contextual analysis of the text 
at issue.
In instances where the adjudicators actually addressed the issue by explicitly applying 
Article 17.6(h), the reasoning is more legitimate under the development approach. In 
Japan-Steel the claim regarding sales to affiliates and the US 99.5% rule for sales 
below costs, the panel had a sounder argument than the AB. The panel ruled that price 
effects of all sales made in the ordinary course of trade must be evaluated and the US 
law does not do that. The Panel’s verdict was based on both economics and the 
context of the ADA. Whereas, the AB based its decision on concepts of faimess-that 
the US should have also looked at the sales to affiliates that were above export prices 
and made rules for them, too. These concepts are ambiguous as neither the AB nor the 
General Council has made any declarations about what is meant by fairness, e.g., are 
they based on equity, justice or principles of non-discrimination? So for instance, if 
the US had eliminated from calculation sales above cost that were 100.5% of normal 
value then the AB should rule in favour of the US. But the ruling did not address 
whether its understanding of fairness mandates a numerically symmetric formula. 
What if instead of 100.5% the US had chosen 102%? Or would the US be abiding by 
notions of non-discrimination if it had chosen a narrow range such as 99.8% to 
100.1% of sales below or above costs? The AB did not predictably answer these 
questions.
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In Bed-Linen, the references to the dictionary were continued, with the word 
“comparable” being the focus of definitional gymnastics. The selection of the 
definition suitable to the taste of the adjudicators was one, which diminished the 
efficacy of the targeted word, a word that was the sole addition to the language of the 
old Tokyo Code of Anti-dumping during the UR. It lacks predictability, as one does 
not know whether other forms of “comparison” will be acceptable to the judges and 
panellists. Again, the selective nature of defining words of the Agreement induces 
insecurity by not really abiding by rules of interpretation that would satisfy most 
observers. In fact, the almost random way in which terms are defined with the help of 
a dictionary only indicates the AB must be making a policy choice. In this case they 
could have looked into the negotiation history of the UR or at least addressed the fact 
that the only difference between Article 2.4 and its equivalent in the old Anti-dumping 
code is the word comparable.
Ostensibly, there is an inclination by the adjudicators to decrease the deference to 
investigating authorities but it is done by reasoning that is not cohesive, predictable or 
substantive. The arguments of the Panel and AB do touch upon some economic 
concepts but the ultimate decision is made by a cursory mention of Article 17.6(ii) and 
some mathematical logic interspersed with mentioning of certain antidumping 
regulations of the WTO. Nowhere in the reasoning can one find the substantive legal 
and economic reasons for the decision. It merely says the investigating authorities 
were wrong to calculate negative margins as zero, however, it is rationally possible
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that zeroing could be allowed based on the wording of Article 2.4 if one were to read 
the provision without insight into its context and purpose.
Likewise, nowhere in the case law does the AB make a solid or foundational statement 
about the nature of Article 17.6 and its application. If the adjudicators simply want to 
prevent arbitrary or creative methodology by investigating authorities they need to be 
clearer on the limits of the discretion. It is possible the AB is trying to strike a balance 
between what the language of the Agreement states and what may be the limits of 
Members’ acceptance of the reasoning. As mentioned in the first chapter there is such 
a tendency, and the asymmetrical nature of the WTO obligations tilted against 
developing nations may incline them to see this theoretically, as welcome judicial 
activism.
However, this activism has to help the weaker Members, not on a case-by-case basis 
but rather a systematic approach is preferred. The problem with a case-by-case 
approach, although inevitable in some situations, does not streamline the process nor 
promote a predictable regime. This is because protectionism can be achieved by 
national governments by using investigating techniques that fall into the loopholes of 
the ADA. The chilling effects on the industry of the developing countries when the 
EU or the US is the importers are great and costly. Very few, if any developing 
country firms have the resources to counteract antidumping duties by the US over the 
two to three years it takes for a case to be settled under the WTO system.
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Two issues arise for developing countries on the matter. First, there are indications 
that the AB has more trust and deference for investigating authorities of the EU and 
the US over other developing country members. The decreasing of the investigating 
authorities’ powers equates to decreased possibility of reciprocal investigations by 
developing countries on exporters from the developed nations. Second, the 
adjudicators may not agree with the version of free trade espoused by the AB. The 
developing countries' version of free trade indicates some observance to the trade and 
development paradigms stated in various sections of the WTO covered Agreements 
(further discussed in the next section).
Also, as the scope of permissible interpretations are being diminished and single 
interpretation inclination being advanced, the policy choices adjudicators make in the 
final step of the interpretation process is central to developing Members’ interests. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in the next part of this chapter, the lack of requisite 
fairness to developing countries on substantive issues by the judges adds another layer 
of ambivalence for these members and the ADA standard of review.
Thus, although at first glance the diminishing of the credence given to the AD 
standard of review seems to be beneficial to the developing Members, in actuality it 
does nothing systematic to benefit these nations. The only hope is that in certain cases 
on a patchy basis, the adjudicators find the protectionist impulses of the investigating 
authorities of industrialized nations has crossed the threshold of what is acceptable.
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The discussion will now focus on the procedural provision of Article 5 and the 
evidentiary threshold for the initiation of the investigation. After some of the key 
substantive provisions of the ADA Articles 2 and 3 will be covered.
5.2 The Threshold for the Initiation of Investigations
The threshold for initiating an antidumping investigation has a considerable effect on 
the number of investigations a nation conducts as well as the number of complaints 
filed by members of the WTO. The threshold question is very important for 
developing countries, as any threat of an investigation by a developed Member tends 
to have chilling effects on the industry of the exporting third-world country. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, many developing country firms decide to withdraw from the 
developed market as the lesser of two evils, instead of challenging an investigation 
from a developed Member. The developing countries that challenge the investigation 
must do so at a great cost, as these investigations are fact and evidence-intensive, as 
well as requiring alterations in their standard business practices, accounting 
procedures and pricing mechanisms.
Clearly, if  there were no minimum requirements the protectionist impulses of national 
authorities would create a stifling amount of investigations resulting in the erosion of 
any benefits gained from the tariff reduction negotiations of the UR.43 On the other 
hand, a very high threshold that would effectively require conclusive proof of 
dumping makes little sense. The balancing act that must be performed should take
43 Bhala, R., Rethinking Antidumping Law, (1995) Geo Wash. J. Int’l. L. & Econ. 1, p. 56.
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into account both standing and evidentiary threshold for the initiation of the 
investigation. To date, there has not been a truly benchmark case that would shed 
light on the standing issue. Standing was a big point of contention during the Uruguay 
and Tokyo Rounds of Multilateral negotiations.44 Standing may be defined as “the 
standards that the government uses in determining who is entitled to initiate and 
prosecute an antidumping investigation.”45 Since the adjudicators have not addressed 
standing in-depth, the section will focus on the issue of initiation of investigations.
The breakdown of positions with respect to the issue of initiation of investigations 
tends to depend on whether the Member is mainly an importing or exporting Member 
or alternatively, whether antidumping measures are an established and practiced form 
of trade protection.46 Although developing countries have begun to enact more 
antidumping measures they as a group, prefer a higher threshold as a buffer against 
measures levied against them by developed countries.47
With regard to the evidentiary burden to initiate an investigation, a request for an 
investigation must include sufficient evidence of dumping, a clear injury to domestic 
industry pursuant to Article VI of GATT, and a causal link between the dumping and
44 Stewart, T.P. (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History(1986-1992), (1993) p. 1577.
45 Cass, R.A. & Narkin, S.J., Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Law: The US and the GATT, 
in Boltuck, R., & Litan, R.E. eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration o f the Unfair Trade Laws, (1991) 
at 200, p. 229.
46 Stewart at note 44.
47 An interesting point is that during the Guatemala-Cement case, the US acting as a third party, 
submitted that the Mexican position which would elevate the threshold as spelled out in Article 5.2 and 
5.3 of the ADA, is the proper threshold. The US tries to strike a balance between being subjected to 
investigations by developing countries with less than adequate evidence on the one hand, and a 
threshold that would compel its firms from producing more evidence than they currently do, on the 
other.
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injury.48 The Agreement also mandates specific standing requirements including: 1) 
prior to an investigation, the authorities must determine the petition has been put forth 
by or on behalf of the domestic industry;49 2) it must be supported by domestic 
producers who account for at least 25% of the domestic production;50 3) authorities 
may use sampling in the case of fragmented industries;51 4) producers who are related 
to foreign producers subject to investigation, and producers who are themselves 
importers, may be excluded from the standing determination; 5) workers are 
considered as interested parties;53 6) silence on the part of particular industry members 
does not expressly count for or against an initiation.54 The criteria set forth are very 
broad and as such, are fairly easy to meet the standing threshold.
5.2.1 Case Law in Relation to the Evidentiary Threshold
Two cases best demonstrate the WTO adjudicators’ attitude toward the evidentiary 
burden in initiation of investigation. They are the Portland Cement II55 (hereinafter 
Cement II) and the Soft Wood Lumber56 cases. The Portland Cement 157 case was the 
first antidumping dispute to be considered by the DSB. Despite the ruling of the AB 
that the matter was not properly before it, the outcome of the panel decision provides
48 ADA Articles 5.2 and 5.4.
49 ADA Article 5.4.
50 ADA Article 5.1.
51 ADA Article 5.4 footnote 13.
52 ADA Article 4.1(i).
53 ADA Article 5.4 footnote 14.
54 ADA Article 5.4.
55 Guatemala - Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico 
WT/DS156/AB& R, (adopted 24/10/2000).
56 United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R  
(adopted 13/4/2004)
57 Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico WT/DS60/AB 
(adopted 02/11/1998).
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considerable insight, as later in the retrial of Cement I  (Cement II) and in the Softwood 
Lumber case the main elements of that decision were generally affirmed.
5.2.1.1 AD Agreement Article 5.3 and the Issue o f  Sufficient Evidence
An important finding by the panel in Cement II is the requirement that investigating 
authorities take into account relevant substantive dumping and injury factors contained 
in other provisions of the ADA when determining whether “sufficient evidence” exists 
to initiate an antidumping investigation.58 Specifically, ADA Article 5.3 requires an 
investigating authority determine the sufficiency of the evidence regarding dumping, 
injury and causality before initiation. The Panel held that in reaching that 
determination, investigating authorities are required to consider the factors contained 
in Article 2 and Article 3.59 At minimum, this requirement means making obvious 
price comparison adjustments, examining volumes and price effects, and considering 
factors that indicate injurious impact or threat of injury.
In effect, the panel stated Article 5.2, which describes the content requirements of the 
petition, and Article 5.3, which requires investigating authorities to check the 
adequacy, accuracy and its sufficiency, are distinct yet mutually necessary obligations 
that must be met to initiate an investigation.
58 Cement IIpara. 8.59-8.62.
59 Cement IIpara. 8.60-8.61.
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The standard set in the Softwood Lumber case states that in order to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence the panel must ask whether an “unbiased and objective 
investigating authority have concluded the application contained accurate and 
adequate evidence sufficient to justify the initiation of the antidumping 
investigation.”60 Then the panel addressed the nature of the obligation contained in 
Article 5.3. In this regard, the Panel stated that while the information contained in the 
application under Article 5.2 forms the foundation for the determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of the initiation of the investigation under 
Article 5.3, the authorities are not precluded from gathering information on their own 
though they are not obligated to do so.61 Hypothetically, the domestic industries can 
now provide a minimal amount of evidence, relying on the investigating authorities to 
complete the evidentiary requirements in accordance with this ruling.
According to the development approach, the requirement that some of the factors 
outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the ADA must be addressed in an application for the 
initiation of an investigation under Article 5.2 and 5.3 of the ADA could be considered 
fair. However, the adjudicators took one step back in the Soft Wood Lumber case and 
injected unpredictability and a less than optimal distribution of justice. The fact that 
under this precedent investigating authorities are allowed to gather their own evidence 
is problematic. This is due to the fact there are no time restrictions and deadlines in 
the initiation stage of the investigation, which leads to uncertainty on the part of 
exporters and domestic users of the imported product, in addition to allowing
60 Cement IIpara. 8.60.
61 Cement IIpara. 8.61-8.62.
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investigations in perpetuity. When the application for the initiation of an investigation 
is filed the investigation in essence, commences. The investigators look at the 
evidence in the application and decide whether the investigating authorities could find 
more evidence in support of the domestic industries’ application. The initial 
application by representatives of the complainant industry is not close-ended. As the 
next section will illustrate the termination of an investigation, according to the rules 
that have been disseminated by case law, is not clearly established by the text and as 
such they are at the discretion of the investigating authorities.
The investigating authorities of the importing country with protectionist tendencies are 
supporting the industries, with their responsibility to be “unbiased and objective” 
tainted by the fact that they are now essentially working to find sufficient evidence to 
justify the investigation. This creates unpredictability as the responsibilities and 
interests of the domestic industries and the civil servants becomes intertwined, 
allowing greater discretion to find dumping determinations. The legitimacy of the 
ruling is diminished due to this unpredictability whilst the greater discretion afforded 
to the investigators tends to harm the developing countries, thereby compromising 
justice. As such, the decision to allow the investigating authorities a high degree of 
discretion in relation to Articles 5.2 and 5.3, whereby they can wittingly or not, and 
assist in the collection of evidence, is unfair.
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5.2.2 Article 5.8 and the Rejection of Applications by Investigating Authorities
Article 5.8 of the ADA requires an investigating authority reject an application and/or 
terminate an investigation “promptly,” as soon as the authorities concerned are 
satisfied there is insufficient evidence of dumping or injury. The correct use of this 
provision is important for developing countries, as merely the initiation of an 
investigation targeting their products is enough to harm the interests of the developing 
country exporter. The requirement to terminate an investigation if there is not enough 
evidence, could expedite the recovery of the harmed developing country exporter.
The issue here is when and how must the rejection of the application occur. In Cement 
II the decision was straightforward, as the panel effectively suggested the Guatemalan 
investigation was shoddy at best, and found violation of Article 5.3, due to the fact the 
application by the Guatemalan cement company lacked any substantive evidence. 
Article 5.8 was violated since Guatemala should have rejected the application as soon 
as it was found to be lacking evidence. Guatemala claimed Article 5.8 pertains to the 
post-initiation period but the panel disagreed and held it relates to both the pre and 
post-initiation periods.
A contradiction occurs in light of the decisions made related to article 5.2 and 5.3 as 
mentioned in the previous section. If Article 5.8 pertains to both pre and post­
initiation periods and investigating authorities can gather evidence it would signal the 
domestic industries application lacked “sufficient” evidence and therefore, the
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investigation should be terminated. This contradiction or inconsistency signifies a 
lack of legitimacy with regard to Article 5 of the ADA and the initiation of 
investigations.
Previously in the Mexico-HFCS62 case, the panel had held Article 5.8 does not create 
obligations beyond Article 5.3. The panel in Cement II, citing Mexico-HFCS, held 
there is an additional obligation if, as in this case, a Member has been found to be in 
violation of 5.3.63 This is a strange argument as there is nothing in the ADA that 
implies such a position. If Article 5.3 and 5.8 are related by the necessity to provide 
sufficient evidence, then one cannot be exclusive of the other. If a Member is in 
conformity with 5.3 then it would be in compliance with 5.8 also and vice-versa. The 
panel in Cement II actually rejected the Mexico-HFCS ruling by stating there is an 
added obligation. 64 However, as these panels are in contradiction ex-ante 
predictability on this issue is suspect.
Later, in the Soft Wood Lumber case the panel sought to clarify its position on the 
issue in particular, with regard to post-initiation. There, Canada claimed that midway 
through the US investigation process, information was given to the US authorities, 
which would have exonerated Canadian firms from dumping. The Canadians 
expected the US to terminate the investigation.
62 Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigation o f High-Fructose Com Syrup (HFCS) form the US, WT/DS132/R 
(Adopted 8/05/1998) {hereinafter, Mexico-HFCS}.
63 Cement IIpara. 8.72-8.75.
64 Cement IIpara. 8.73.
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The panel rejected the argument stating, “When examining the plain meaning of the 
relevant text of Article 5.8 we note that it states that ‘an investigation shall be 
terminated as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied there is not sufficient 
evidence of dumping.’” Moreover, it held there is no continuing obligation to 
terminate once the investigation has commenced and that only after a situation where 
the investigators have been “satisfied” o f the insufficiency can termination take place. 
In effect, the panel ruling raises the bar o f sufficiency of Article 5 in post-initiation 
circumstances to a point where only a factual finding can terminate the initiation. 
Thus, if  exculpatory evidence is given to the investigators they do not have to 
acknowledge it as such until after the investigation period has lapsed, or at minimum, 
it leaves the decision of whether to review new evidence found post-initiation and its 
evaluation at the discretion o f investigating authorities.
The developing countries would want the obligation to terminate an investigation in 
light of insufficient evidence to be continual, because their exporters have much more 
difficulty in obtaining evidence in a timely manner. Thus, they will be suffering from 
the provisional duties levied against them for the duration of the investigation even if 
some or all the exporters may not be even prima facie guilty of dumping.
As demonstrated, the reasoning and holding that have emerged are not consistent and 
predictable. The panel in Cement II acknowledged its digression from the HFCS case 
but used a spurious argument to justify it. Then, the ruling in that case acknowledged
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both a pre and post-initiation obligation with regard to Article 5.8.65 However, later in 
Soft Wood Lumber the panel in effect, diminished the authority of Article 5.8 by 
allowing investigators to dodge assessing important information until after the 
investigation finished and factual findings were made. Thus, the legitimacy of the 
ruling under the development approach is lacking.
Furthermore, justice concerns have not been met as developing nations are put at a 
greater risk of harm due to the ongoing investigations by national authorities. The 
Cement II case involved a shoddy investigation by Guatemala, which is indefensible 
under the development approach. Were the exporters in the Soft Wood Lumber case 
from developing countries it would be easy to recognize the harmful effects of the 
limits promulgated by the panel pertaining to Article 5.8. As mentioned, the harmful 
effects of continuing investigations is more pronounced for developing countries as 
the provisional duties attached to investigations reduces the competitiveness in 
industrialised markets.
5.3 “Zeroing” Revisited as a Substantive Issue
The practice of “zeroing” was discussed in the previous section in the context of the 
application of the standard of review of Article 17.6(ii). There, the issue centred on 
how the AB applied Article 17.6(ii) to the methodology prescribed pursuant to Article
2.4 of the ADA. In this section the discussion will focus on “zeroing” as a substantive 
matter and also, how the practice of “zeroing” can take place in other areas of 
antidumping investigations aside from Article 2.4.
65 Cement II para. 8.73-8.74.
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In the Bed Linen case, the investigating authorities of the EC had divided Bed linens 
into various “models” and calculated dumping margins for each one. By using this 
methodology, the EC was able to inflate the overall dumping margin by treating any 
negative dumping margin-situations where the export price was actually higher than 
the normal value-as zero, rather than their full negative value, when combining the 
margins for each “model.”66 The AB recognised the inherent “unfairness” in this 
approach and held it is a violation of Article 2.4.2, which requires “all” transactions 
must be compared.67 Furthermore, it stated zeroing does not provide for a “fair 
comparison” between export price and normal value, as required by Article 2.4.
Zeroing can occur in other ways as well within the context of Article 2 of the ADA 
and price comparisons. During the UR, zeroing was discussed in the context of price 
comparison based on transaction or weighted average methods.69 It has been the 
practice of some Members to calculate dumping margins on the basis of comparing 
weighted-average normal value to individual export prices. Under this approach, the 
difference between normal value and export price would be calculated for each export 
transaction. Positive margins were taken as is, whilst negative margins (where export 
price was higher than normal value) were nominated as zero. Thus, countries applying
66 Bed Linen (AB) para. 49-53.
67 ibid.
68 ibid. para. 55.
69 Drafting Proposals o f  the Nordic Countries Regarding Amendments o f the Anti-dumping Code, 
MYN.GNG/NG8/W/76, 11 April 1990; Amendments to the Anti-dumping Code-Communication from  
the Delegation o f Hong Kong-Addendum, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/51/Add.2; Submission o f Japan on the 
Amendments to the Anti-dumping Code, MTN.GNG/NG8AV/48 3 Aug. 1989.
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antidumping duties were sometimes able to find dumping existed even when prices 
were the same in both the home and export markets.
To address this issue, the UR negotiators placed certain limits on the use of average- 
to-transaction comparisons. Specifically, the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 
provides that:
A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of 
individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which 
differ significantly, among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an 
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account 
appropriately by the use of weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to- 
transaction comparison.
This provision was included to ensure that except in special situations where targeted 
dumping may exist, margin calculations would be made on a consistent basis.70 While 
this type of zeroing has now been superficially constrained by the ADA, other 
examples of zeroing exist, for instance in the Korea-Steel case. Due to exchange rate 
fluctuations over the period of investigation, the Department of Commerce (DOC) 
divided the period of investigation into two sub-periods.71 When one of the periods 
turned out to have a negative margin, the DOC treated this margin as zero. Korea 
unfortunately, did not challenge the practice of zeroing, only that the US was not
70 Kim, J.B. Fair Price Comparison in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement: Recent WTO Panel 
Decisions Against the "Zeroing"Method, 2002 36 J.W.T. 39-56 p.40-43.
71 Korea-Steel para. 6.44-6.45.
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allowed to use two different averages. Yet, the AB in the later Bed-Linen case has 
made it clear that it deems the practice of zeroing as inherently unfair, stating, “we are 
also of the view that a comparison between export price and normal value that does 
not take fully into account the prices of all comparable export transactions-such as the 
practice of 'zeroing' at issue in this dispute- is not a fair comparison....as required by 
Article 2.4 and Article 2.4.2.”(FN) It would seem that any form of zeroing after this 
case would be a violation of the AD Agreement. However, that is not the case.
77The latest dispute was between the US and Canada in the US-Softwood Lumber case. 
This case exemplified the two different concepts of dumping at the heart of the 
discussion. On the one hand are the opponents o f “zeroing” who believe the practice 
is one of the most blatant examples of biased protectionist thinking by domestic 
authorities that only want to inflate dumping margins.73 On the other side are those 
who see the “zeroing” ruling as judicial activism whereby an established domestic 
methodology has been declared in violation of the WTO rules.74 In fact, the split 
between the two schools of thinking is evident by the fact that in this case one of the 
panellists dissented, something that has rarely occurred in WTO dispute settlement.
The main focus of the debate in both the Bed Linen and Softwood Lumber cases is the 
meaning of the term “all comparable export transactions.” The zeroing opponents 
point to the requirement that margins must be based on “all” comparable export 
transactions. The use of the word “all” they say, means one cannot ignore some
72 United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R 
(adopted April 13, 2004).
73 Supra at note 70.
74 See analysis on www.worldtradelaw.net on Softwood Lumber case.
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transactions by nominating them as zero. If an investigating authority restates margins 
for certain transactions as zero, the margins have not been “established on the basis 
o f ’ these transactions, and “all” transactions have not been taken into account. The 
argument that the use of the term “all” means you cannot restate some margins, as 
zero is very strong. If some of the actual calculated figures are ignored, it is difficult 
to see how “all” transactions have provided the basis for establishing dumping 
margins. The panel majority relied for the most part, on this rationale in its conclusion 
that “zeroing” violates Article 2.4.2.75
The opponents of “zeroing” also claim the problem with allowing this practice is that 
it appears to make dumping margin calculations subject to almost unlimited discretion. 
If an investigating authority can restate negative margins for some product types as 
zero as part of the aggregation process, there is nothing to prevent it from for instance, 
trebling the positive margins because the weighting of averages demands such action 
due to the nature of the product and its distribution. This would seem fundamentally 
unfair. Allowing this amount of discretion to investigating authorities could lead to 
interpretation of other provisions such that the ADA becomes “toothless.”
The dissenting opinion in this case tried to argue the ADA does not include explicit
7 f\language that prohibits “zeroing.” Furthermore, the dissenter claimed the second 
dumping margin calculation methodology provided for in Article 2.4.2, “transaction- 
to-transaction” comparisons, does not use the word “all.” Thus, if  the word “all” is
75 Softwood Lumber para. 7.203-7.204 and 7.215-7.216.
76 Softwood Lumber para. 9.2-9.7.
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interpreted in the way “zeroing” opponents suggest, “zeroing” would be allowed for 
“transaction-to-transaction” comparisons, but not for “weighted average-to-weighted 
average” comparisons. Such a result, said the dissenter, would be “odd.”77 Moreover, 
the dissenter argues that notions of fairness in the abstract are a subjective exercise 
that could result in unpredictable interpretations.78
In response, arguably, the word “all” could be read to include the “transaction-to- 
transaction” section o f Article 2.4.2 and would be grammatically correct. Also, the 
“oddity” the dissenter indicates does not go away by allowing “zeroing.” The result of 
such a view is Members would not be allowed to use negative margins if  they so wish, 
because the word “all” is irrelevant. This would seem “odd.” Finally, notions of 
fairness although in the abstract, is difficult to pinpoint, it nevertheless, cannot be 
brushed aside as merely a philosophical understanding. The dissenter is more than 
likely trying to respond to his/her understanding of judicial activism by judges, 
however, gap-filling and norm generation is a practice that cannot be detached from 
adjudication in particular, with regard to international law, as treaties are most often 
less concrete than domestic laws. In addition, as mentioned before in this thesis, the 
AB and panels have been judicially activist in almost all cases. The AB’s practice of 
“completing the analysis” (see chapter 2) is one that is highly activist. An interesting
77 Softwood Lumber para. 9.10.
78 Soft Wood Lumber para. 9.16.
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point is the dissenter when discussing “multiple averaging,” claims it is one of the
79most “fair” ways of comparing prices when many different product types exist.
5.3.1 “Zeroing ” and the Development Approach
In general, any action or norm generated by the adjudicators, which limits the 
arbitrariness of finding dumping margins, is beneficial to developing countries. This is 
supported by the developing countries’ stance during the UR which tried to eliminate 
the practice and thought they may have done so by adding that comparisons must be 
fair and done on a weighted average-to- weighted average or transaction-to-transaction 
basis.
There are however, predictability and consistency problems with this decision. 
Although the Bed- Linen case seemed the final word on the zeroing issue with regard 
to Article 2.4, in the Softwood Lumber case a dissenting opinion was expressed which 
was explicitly counter to the AB’s previous decisions. Although one can argue the 
panellists’ decision is a unique occurrence, it does, however, give an opening to future 
panels. This case has been appealed by the US claiming zeroing is a legal practice. 
Furthermore, the AB has not ruled whether all forms of zeroing under article 2.4.2 is 
prohibited. In Bed Linen the EU had divided Bed-Linen and then averaged all the 
dumping margins, whilst in the Soft Wood Lumber case the US had divided the lumber 
into different categories and then after finding the averages for each, aggregated them
79 An interesting point is the dissenter when discussing “multiple averaging” claims it is one of the most 
“fair” ways of comparing prices when many different product types exist. See, Soft Wood Lumber para. 
9.3.
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with zero values for negative dumping. This slight difference in categorisation was 
one reason the dissenter in Softwood Lumber provided to distinguish it from Bed- 
Linen. The question still remains whether the AB and future panels will accept 
nuanced differentiation in methodology. Also, as will be discussed in the next section, 
zeroing can happen in relation to other provisions of the ADA.
5.3.2 Zeroing in the Dumping Margin Calculation and Price Undercutting Contexts
In EC-Pipe Fittings case, at the panel level the issue o f zeroing was addressed 
pursuant to two different provisions of the ADA, i.e., Article 2.4.2 and Article 3.2. 
Since these holdings of the panel were not appealed the ruling of this case has 
precedential value. The panel ruled in favour of Brazil basing its decision on the Bed 
Linen precedent, which banned the use of zeroing under Article 2.4.2. Brazil had also 
argued the EC violated ADA Articles 3.1 and 3.2 when it calculated the “price 
undertaking” margin based on an “unwarranted selection” of transactions where it 
found undercutting, while at the same time zeroing, and therefore, disregarding any 
negative undercutting margins.80
In the context of price undercutting the panel found zeroing is permitted, given the
O 1
specific language of Article 3.2. Whereas ADA Article 2.4.2 refers to a comparison 
of “all comparable export transactions,” Article 3.2 does not make similar mention of
80 European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from 
Brazil (WT/DS219/AB/R) (Adopted: August 18, 2003) {hereinafter EC-Pipe Fittings ox Pipe 
Fittings)panel report para. 7.268.
81 EC-Pipe Fittings , panel report, para. 7.277-7.278.
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“all” transactions. Thus, according to the panel, there is no requirement “to take each 
and every transaction involving the dumped imports into account, nor that the dumped 
imports examined under Article 3.2 are limited to those precise transactions subject to 
the dumping determination.”82 The panel continued stating, “The fact that certain sales 
may not have occurred at non-underselling prices does not eradicate the effects in the 
importing market of sales that were made at underselling prices,”83 and by requiring 
the investigating authorities to compensate in their methodology for over-selling 
prices would in effect, hide underselling prices which may harm the domestic 
industry.84
The panel in this case decided it would make its finding based on the narrow and 
literal interpretation of Article 3.2 and disregard the fact that the AB had ruled zeroing 
to be inherently unfair. Brazil argued in line with previous AB rulings on the issue by 
claiming that zeroing is inconsistent with “basic principles of good faith and fairness” 
in violation of Article 3.1 of the ADA.
Furthermore, it could be argued that price discrimination within a single market is not 
an unwarranted business practice.85 Undercutting and over cutting o f prices must be 
evaluated over a sensible period of time. There are many reasons why price 
undercutting occurs and at minimum, the reasons for such behaviour must be 
addressed in investigations under Article 3 and the causation provisions of the ADA.
82 ibid., para. 7.276.
83 ibid., para. 7.277.
84 ibid., para. 7.278.
85 Vermulst, E Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures, (2000) in UNCTAD, Positive Agenda 
and Future Trade Negotiations (UN No. 3661) p. 290.
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For developing countries the justice of decisions in the WTO are directly related to 
these kinds of issues. Short-term price undercutting if done for reasons of market 
access, excess inventory, and other such business, market-adjustments should be 
allowed in developing nations as their market access and other managerial issues are 
very volatile in these nations.86 The overall pricing scheme has to be evaluated at least 
during the whole of the targeted period of investigation. However, such undercutting 
over a long period of time can be said to fall under unfair business practices.
Furthermore, in the EC-Pipe Fittings case Brazil rightly argued that zeroing is counter 
to “basic principles of good faith and fairness” in violation o f article 3.1 of the ADA.87 
Unfortunately, Brazil failed to show mathematically or statistically why it is so. 
Brazil’s argument at its core is in line with the development approach as it does seek 
to recognize fundaments underlying the international antidumping regime while also 
being both legitimate and just. Antidumping calculations seek to approximate as 
closely as possible the “real” price of the product either based on the home market 
price or a constructed price. The average-to-average comparison can be given a 
statistical interpretation. It can be a calculation method by which the unknown 
dumping margin (or the difference between the normal price and export price) is
oo
estimated. The true dumping margin could be regarded as an unknown statistical 
parameter and the calculated dumping margin as the estimate.89 The antidumping duty
86 UNCTAD, Impact o f Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Actions, 2000, background note by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat.
87 EC-Pipe Fittings, panel report, para. 7.275-7.276.
88 Kim, J.B., Fair Price Comparison in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement: Recent WTO Panel 
Decisions against the “Zeroing” Method, 2002 36 J.W.T. 39-56 p.54.
89 See amongst others, Mann, P.S., Statistics fo r Business and Economics (1994 Wiley) p. 88-100;
Judd, K.L., Numerical Methods in Economics^ 1998 MIT Press).
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would be based on this estimate. By zeroing a certain amount of data points are being 
eliminated i.e., the ones that show a negative dumping margin. The exclusion of 
certain data points as entailed by zeroing creates a statistical bias in the calculation of 
the dumping margin.90
Another problem with the calculation is the quantitative effects of the EC 
methodology are not dismissed when the price has been zeroed. As the panel stated, 
the price undercutting analysis includes a quantitative evaluation of the sales at 
undercut prices.91 Then a margin of undercutting is calculated. The calculation is 
problematic because firstly, the quantitative or volume of under cut prices is not taken 
out of the calculation when zeroing the prices. This results in an overestimation of the 
effects of undercutting. Similarly, zeroing inflates the undercutting margin thereby 
causing the investigators to overestimate the effects of undercutting.92
In addition, when estimating an unknown dumping parameter the more data points 
used the more likely it is the estimate is closer to the unknown dumping parameter. 
Therefore, the estimate that uses all the transaction data in the period of investigation 
is more likely to be accurate than other estimates that exclude certain data points from 
the estimation. For these reasons it can be argued that zeroing does not achieve the 
objective of finding the most approximate price at any time. The statistical arguments
90 Judd, K.L. ibid.
91 EC-Pipe Fittings panel report, para. 7.277-7.278.
92 According to the holding by the panel, the undercutting margin unlike zeroing for calculating overall 
dumping margins, is only one element in the evaluation if  the injury done to the domestic industry. 
Nonetheless, zeroing undercutting margins still create an overestimation of its effects.
93 Harnett, D.L., Introduction to Statistical Methods, (1975) second ed. (Addison-Wesley) p. 247-248.
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proved by the panel in the Bed-Linen case are quite comprehensive, but these 
statistical justifications were not extended to other provisions of the ADA by the panel 
in Pipe-Fittings. The implicit holding in this case that the process of understanding the 
harm done to the domestic industry does not necessarily require finding the most 
approximate price because price-approximation is not an explicit objective of the 
ADA, is spurious. Understanding the harm suffered because of foreign price 
undercutting can only happen when we can grasp the true price, or in the case of 
undercutting, the true margin of undercutting of the foreign product.
As a result, the panel in Pipe-Fitting has granted investigating authorities expansive 
leeway to examine only selected transactions in determining whether “price 
undercutting” exists.94 Therefore, the interests of developing countries are harmed as 
they are most often targeted for constructed calculations more than the developed 
country firms, and the investigating authorities are granted ever more discretion to find 
higher dumping margins. As such, a just outcome has not been reached for 
developing countries in relation to the norm that has been established which permits 
zeroing outside of Article 2.4.
5.4 Constructed Normal Value: The Calculation of SG&A Plus Profits
Article 2.2 states in part, “When there are no sales of like products in the ordinary 
course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of 
the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of
94 In the aftermath of this ruling an interesting decision at the panel level was reported in the US-Lamb 
case, where a split panel decided against another form of zeroing in the context of Article 2.4.2 but the 
dissenting panellist in essence, ruled counter to previous AB decisions on this matter.
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the exporting country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison.” The provision 
holds that dumping margin is to be determined either through a third country 
comparison or by constructing a normal value based on cost of production, SG&A 
(general sales and administrative) costs and profits “shall be based on actual data 
pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product, 
by the exporter or producer under investigation.” Moreover, Article 2.2.2 seeks to 
guide investigating authorities on how the determinations of the SG&A/profits are to 
be made. It provides that the amounts for SG&A/profits “shall be based on actual 
data” for sales in the ordinary course of trade from the producer in question. If such 
data is not appropriate then it lists three other possibilities for making a determination: 
(i) “The actual amounts incurred and realised” by the targeted firm in relation to 
products sold at home in the same category of products; (ii) “the weighted average of 
the actual amounts incurred and realised by other exporters and producers subject to 
investigation” in relation to sales of like products in the home market; and (iii) any 
other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established shall not 
exceed the profit normally realised by other exporters or producers on sales of 
products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of 
origin.”
In the Bed-Linen panel one of the issues was whether there is a hierarchy amongst 
Article 2.2.2's three sub-paragraphs. India claimed there was a preference implicit in 
the provision that demanded using these three provisions in order. India believed the 
EC should have resorted to Article 2.2.2(i) for calculating profit instead of resorting to
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Article 2.2.2 (ii), because the sequence in which these two options are listed reflects a 
hierarchical preference.95 The panel rejected this argument and held that there is no 
implicit preference in the language of this provision, rather that the Members are free 
to decide which one of the three methods for calculating SG&A/profits suits the 
domestic industry best. This issue was not appealed therefore, the precedent is 
considered applicable.96
However, later in the Thai-Poland H-beams case, the same issue arose at the panel 
stage. The holding there was somewhat different in that the panel report implied there 
is a hierarchy of preference. There, the issue related to Article 2.2.2(i) and the 
analysis of the term “category of products.” The panel noted the text of Article 2.2.2(i) 
does not provide any elaboration as to the meaning of “the same general category of 
products.”97 Yet, the panel found guidance in other aspects of Article 2.2, particularly 
its chapeau and “overall structure.” The panel ruled these provisions set a preference 
for use of the actual profit data and provided instructions as to how to achieve an 
appropriate proxy when actual data cannot be used.98 In this way, the intention of the 
provisions is “to obtain results that approximate as closely as possible, the price of the 
like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting 
country.” In the panel’s view, this objective points toward use of a narrower category 
than a broader one.99
95 Bed Linen panel report, para. 6.54.
96 ibid., para. 6.58-6.62.
97 Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angels, Shapes, and Sections o f Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H- 
Beams from Poland (WT/DS122/AB/R) (Adopted: April 5, 2001) {hereinafter Thai-Poland or Thai- 
Steel} panel report para. 7.111-112.
98 ibid., para. 7.111-7.113.
99 ibid., para. 7.114.
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The fact that the Thai-Poland panel decided to look at the provision in context and 
stated the purpose of the provision is to find the most approximate price possible 
shows the provision implicitly suggests a hierarchy of preferences. To affirm this 
point Article 2.2.2(iii) states other reasonable methods can be used, further expressing 
a desire for reasonability and close approximation. The panels in both Bed Linen and 
Thai-Poland rejected a general reasonability test requirement for Article 2.2.2, stating 
the first two paragraphs i.e., 2.2.2(i) and 2.2.2(ii) naturally provide reasonable results. 
The panellists, by making this holding in essence, relegated Article 2.2.2(iii) to an 
inferior option. The first two provisions are in themselves, reasonable whereas the 
third provisions reasonability is open to question. If the purpose is to approximate as 
closely as possible then the first two options are more preferable as reasonability is 
presumed.100 If that is true, then it is difficult to think that Article 2.2.2's first two 
provisions are not preferentially ordered but the third proviso is so. It can only be 
deduced from the ruling in Thai-Poland that a preferential order exists.
Developing countries are often the targets of constructed normal values due to their 
lack of accounting and data sophistication both at the firm level and at the national 
economic level.101 There is simply less definitive statistics, data and transparency 
when it comes to cost and production data, or that developed countries deem the data
100 Logically, reasonable is preferable by the fact that reasonability is considered a requirement and it is 
not subject to review. Essentially, the first two options are automatically reasonable and if a Member is 
seen to be in compliance with them then they are in conformity with WTO law. However, a 
reasonability test can be required if a Member selects the third option and an exporting Member could 
challenge the reasonability of the methods employed by the investigating member.
101 Wint, A.G., Corporate Management in Developing Countries, 1995, (Quorum Books) p. 157.
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102unreliable because it does not conform to their own methods of data collection. 
Therefore, the developing countries want a more streamlined and methodical system 
of SG&A/profits calculation. They would prefer a system that mandates investigating 
authorities to try to find the most approximate values for SG&A/profits. To this end, 
they would want a preferential order for Article 2.2.2 especially since the third proviso 
grants investigating authorities a very high level of discretion in the price calculations.
The decisions of the Bed Linen and Thai-Poland cases are not predictable and 
consistent. The former ruled against a preferential order whilst the latter implicitly 
ruled in favour of one. The members are left uncertain as to how SG&A/profits in 
constructing normal values are to be treated. This has an effect on their gathering and 
presentation of evidence in future dispute settlement proceedings. Although the ruling 
in Thai-Poland would be the desirable outcome, nonetheless, they are not sure 
whether the next panel or the AB will accept the preferential order. Therefore, the 
lack of predictability and the inconsistency between the rulings of the two cases 
creates a norm that does not pass the legitimacy requirements of the development 
approach.
If the ruling in Bed Linen is upheld in future disputes then justice had not been 
properly served as the weaker developing country members are more prone to inflated 
dumping margins in relation to constructed normal values. If the preferential order is 
reaffirmed then at least the investigating authorities have to justify their use of less
102 Jones, K., Export Restraints and the New Protectionism: The Political Economy o f  Discriminatory 
Trade Restrictions, (Michigan Press 1994) p. 101-110.
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optimal options in the context of Article 2.2.2 and as such, they would be more open 
to review by the adjudicators and less deference is given to them on an issue which is 
open to protectionist abuse.
5.4.1 Low Volume Sales
Another aspect o f Article 2.2.2, which has risen lately in WTO jurisprudence, is the 
inclusion of low volume sales in the calculation of SG&A/profits. The AB in the EC- 
Pipe Fittings case provided the most guidance on the issue, yet its interpretation does 
not fulfil the requirements of the development approach to fairness. The EC in its 
calculation of normal value had excluded low volume sales according to Article 2.2. 
Yet, invoking Article 2.2.2, the EC included the low volume sales in its determination 
of SG&A/profits. Brazil claimed since the low volume sales were not included in the 
calculation of normal value then the SG&A/profit calculation based on data about low 
volume sales should also be eliminated.103 The panel and AB ruled against the 
Brazilian claim holding that in Article 2.2, the language explicitly requires the 
elimination of low volume sales and sales not made in the ordinary course of trade, 
whilst the language in 2.2.2 only excludes sales outside the ordinary course of trade 
for the calculation of SG&A/profits, thus the EC practice is consistent with its ADA 
obligations.104
103 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report para. 91-93.
104 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report para. 95-99.
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The adjudicators’ decision based on such a narrow and technical reading of the 
provisions is not convincing. Firstly, Article 2.2 clearly states that “proper 
comparison” is needed and therefore, low volume sales should not be included in the 
calculation of overall price. One can infer that low volume sales are somehow 
different than other forms of sales. Article 2.2 sets out the three different approaches 
that can be taken in order to determine whether dumping has occurred. The third 
option is to evaluate the “cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
amount for administrative, selling, general costs, and for profits.” Moreover, Article
2.2 clearly states that when there are no sales in the ordinary course of trade in the 
domestic market, or when there are low volumes of sales in the domestic market, these 
situations do not allow a proper comparison. The comparison at issue is price-based, 
which should extend to the calculation of SG&A/profits. Therefore, when 
determining SG&A/profits, based on Article 2.2, a proper price comparison cannot be 
made when there are low volumes of sales.105 The inability to make a proper 
comparison extends to both the cost of production and the SG&A/profits. Article 2.2 
does not make such an explicit dichotomy. Simply because Article 2.2.2, which 
details with more specificity, the manner in which SG&A/profits are to be calculated, 
does not detach itself from the supra-paragraph of Article 2.2.
The very technical and literal interpretation, which entails the adjudicators struggling 
to find the intention of the provision based on the elimination of certain terms, does 
not justify dismissing other relevant parts of the Article. If a contextual evaluation or
105 See amongst others, Saffran, B., Price Theory and its Application, (Cheltenham 1998) section on 
Low Volume Sales.
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one based on a reading of the object and purpose of the Article and the ADA in 
general had been made, then achieving “proper comparison” would have been the 
focus of the adjudicators. Consequently, they would have ruled in favour of Brazil 
and deemed it appropriate to eliminate low volume sales. In many instances, the 
calculation of SG&A/profits includes certain fixed costs which would lower the per 
unit cost of the product when sold in higher volumes and increase the per unit cost 
sold at lower volumes thereby affecting the dumping margins. The panel and AB 
refused to delve into the nature of the market or at least qualify its ruling based on 
market circumstances. For example, if  a producer in the EC was selling thick ski 
jackets the calculation of the SG&A/profits would most likely have to be conducted 
based on its sales to mostly northern European countries and other potentially cold 
regions, and not on its SG&A/profits in Malta. In sum, the SG&A/profits are directly 
linked to the cost of production and overall price and as such, if  low volumes sales are 
eliminated from the cost of production calculations then it should also be eliminated in 
the SG&A/profits calculation.
Furthermore, the AB did not in any way, require that if certain low volume sales 
indicated a lower margin for SG&A/profits then investigating authorities are required 
to include them in the calculations. The authorities are granted the discretion to 
selectively choose the instances where low volume SG&A/profit calculations could be 
included. For example, a producer may not want to sell low volumes of a product at 
high profit margins, as this may be work against them in antidumping investigations. 
Another interesting point is Brazil during the proceedings, presented a hypothetical
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scenario whereby, the interpretation of the panel (upheld by the AB) implies that the 
chapeau of Article 2.2.2 would allow a constructed value to be identical to a normal 
value that is based upon low volume sales under Article 2.2.106 The possibility of such 
a situation should be additional guidance to adjudicators that low volume sales can be 
read into Article 2.2.2. The AB rejected Brazil’s argument holding that “we are of the 
view that the possibility of the outcome suggested by Brazil, based on a certain set of
1 A n
circumstances, cannot overcome the specific text of the chapeau of Article 2.2.2.” 
However, there is no specific text that says anything about low volume sales in Article 
2.2.2, rather the adjudicators read low volume sales implicitly.
The reasoning of the AB on this issue does not do justice to developing nations. These 
nations are most often being targeted and the calculations by the investigating 
authorities of the developed world are being done by constructed value. Investigators 
have much discretion to inflate margins. The lack of institutional and corporate 
sophistication puts developing countries at a disadvantage in relation to the data and 
evidence they must present to the investigating authorities of developed nations, which 
require data and evidence to be as sophisticated as their own industries. The 
SG&A/profits amounts is a very fluid and instable amount as market situations, 
corporate marketing strategies, and geographical requirements are just some of the 
possible reasons why the SG&A/profit for low volume sales distort overall general
1 Oftamounts that are pervasive in the domestic market. In EC-Pipe Fittings, if one of 
the targeted Brazilian firms due to managerial or other bureaucratic reasons, started
106 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report para. 90-92.
107 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report para. 99-101.
108 Wint, A.G., supra at note 99, pp. 161-163.
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selling to a buyer which would require less administrative and profits due to ease of 
sale for a short period of time, should that low level of SG&A/profits for a low volume 
of sales be used to inflate dumping margins? The answer is that those prices would 
not be indicative prices or even the closest approximate price, because as mentioned, 
low volume, low SG&A/profit data is not required to be addressed.
Developing country firms seek to reduce the discretion of investigating authorities 
where margin inflation is possible and they usually want to be accountable for the 
price that is most approximate to the general pervasive price of a product. The 
economic and corporate structures of developing countries creates many instances 
where prices of products become more unstable and volatile, and allowing low volume 
sales in calculation of SG&A/profits which is already an amorphous and vague 
exercise, only harms them by allowing more margin inflation. Thus, the justice of this 
ruling is lacking as the disadvantaged members are put in a position of greater harm 
than developed Members.
5.5 Injury Determination and Causation
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the main problems facing the developing 
countries is the manner in which AD law is being interpreted and implemented by 
national authorities of importing countries. Article 3.1 sets a general criterion under 
GATT Article VI of GATT for any injury determination in an anti-dumping case, i.e., 
that the determination be based on “positive evidence and involve an objective
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examination” of three factors. They are: 1) the volume of dumped imports; 2) the 
effect of dumped imports on prices in the importing country of like product; 3) the 
impact of dumped imports on producers of like products in the importing country. 
The subsequent provisions elaborate on these general criteria. Article 3.2 deals with 
the first two factors, which are volume and prices. Article 3.4 and 3.5 deals with the 
impact of dumped imports (third factor) and causation, respectively.109 This section 
will evaluate three of the more important cases, which involved the issue of injury and 
causation. They are the Thai-Poland, 110 Japan-Steel, 111 and EC-Pipe Fittings112 cases.
109 These provisions state:
Article 3.1- A determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on 
positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports 
and the effect o f the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
Article 3.2- With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or 
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the 
dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a 
significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the 
importing Member, or whether the effect o f such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant 
degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one 
or several factors can necessarily give decisive guidance...
Article 3.4-The examination of the impact o f the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned 
shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of 
the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, 
return on investments or utilization of capacity, factors affecting domestic prices, the magnitude of the 
margin of dumping, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, 
growth, and ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of 
these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
Article 3.5- It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are through the effects of dumping, as set 
forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration 
of a casual relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be 
based on an examination of all relevant evidence before authorities. The authorities shall also examine 
any known factors other than the dumped imports, which at the same time are injuring the domestic 
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. 
Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not 
sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade 
restrictive practices o f and competition between foreign and domestic producers, developments in 
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.
110 Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angels, Shapes, and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H- 
Beams from Poland (WT/DS122/AB/R) (Adopted: April 5, 2001) {hereinafter Thai-Poland or Thai- 
Steel}
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5.5.1. Article 3.1 and the “Objective Examination ” of “Positive Evidence ”
In the Thai-Poland case the panel was required to interpret Article 3.1. Poland 
claimed Thailand violated Article 3.1 of the ADA, in that Thailand failed to make its 
material injury determination based on an “objective examination” of “positive 
evidence.” In other words, the investigating authorities were not unbiased and 
objective in their assessment. This was because Thailand had stated that its 
assessment was based on certain confidential evidence that could not be shared with 
the Poles, as it would undermine Thailand’s industry secrets. The Panel, however, did 
not accept the Thai argument and agreed with the Poles. The Panel in general terms 
held that Article 3.1 requires the investigating authorities of Members must support 
their reasoning based on evidence and documents on record, and interested parties 
have been given access to those evidence. Also, the factual basis underlying the 
authorities’ decision must be “discemable” from those documents.113 Therefore, the 
Panel refused to examine confidential documents that had not been shared with the 
interested parties upon which the Thai authority claimed to have relied in reaching its 
injury determination.
Thailand appealed the Panel’s interpretation of the ADA Article 3.1. The AB began 
by first examining the wording of Article 3.1 and noting that Article 3 as a whole,
111 Japan-Steel case at note 10.
112 European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from 
Brazil (WT/DS219/AB/R) (Adopted: August 18, 2003) {hereinafter EC-Pipe Fittings or Pipe Fittings).
113 Thai Steel AB report, para. 112.
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contained obligations Members must follow with respect to injury determinations and 
that Article 3.1 contains fundamental obligations that inform the more detailed 
obligations contained in the succeeding paragraphs.114
The AB overturned the Panel’s interpretation as to the scope o f the evidence, which 
can be examined in the context of Article 3.1. First, the AB pointed out anti-dumping 
investigations delve into the commercial behaviour of firms and in this way, involve 
the collection and analysis of both confidential and non-confidential information. As 
contextual support, the AB referred to the mandate in ADA Article 3.7 that injury 
findings be “based on facts and not merely allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility” observing, based on this provision, that the key issue with respect to the 
evidence that serves as the basis of an investigating authority’s injury determination is 
the “nature” of the evidence underlying the determination, and not whether that 
evidence is confidential or disclosed.115
The AB found additional support for its position in other areas of the ADA. It noted 
procedural and due process obligations are contained in Article 6 of the ADA which 
ensure certain evidence is disclosed to parties, that parties have full opportunity for 
defence, and that parties are informed of all essential facts that form the basis of the 
investigating authority’s decision. The AB could find no justification for reading 
these types of procedural and due process obligations into the substantive injury
114 ibid. para. 106.
115 ibid. para. 108.
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provisions of Article 3.116 Similar to the obligations in Article 6 of the ADA, the AB 
noted that Article 12 establishes “a framework of procedural and due process 
obligations concerning notably, the contents of a final determination.” Yet again, the 
AB found no reason to read these obligations into the injury standards in Article 3.117
Even though the investigating authority in this case was Thailand, a developing 
country, nonetheless, the ruling on confidential information is not conducive to 
gaining access to industrialised markets in the end. The panel’s decision is more in 
line with fundamentals of due process. The AB’s decision, in contrast, denies the 
exporters the opportunity to cross-examine and counter the investigators’ evidence. 
What is not clear is whether the panellists’ examination of the confidential material 
and their subsequent ruling is sufficient, as they are not equipped with the detailed 
knowledge and data that is needed to assess the evidence.
The AB believed that understanding the nature of the evidence is vital to make a 
judgement on the validity of the claimant’s arguments. In this case, the exporter has 
no input as to what it believes is the nature of the investigators’ evidence and therefore, 
is precluded from the opportunity of a proper rebuttal. This ruling encourages 
Members to devise sophisticated and complex confidentiality regulations so as to 
protect its firms from divulging undesirable data. The Quad Members already have
1 1 o
complex and highly protective rules on confidentiality. Developing countries on the
16 ibid. para. 109.
117 ibid. para. 110.
118 Regulations could be devised that make data and information protection more comprehensive and 
itrict, solely in antidumping investigations. Members would be hard pressed to challenge these
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other hand, have less strict and protective confidentiality laws. It is quite possible that 
crucial evidence is being asymmetrically disseminated and the rules spelled out in 
Article 6 and 12 do nothing to alleviate the problem.
The AB's reliance on Article 6 and 12, which demand information be factual and set 
forth standards for the dissemination of evidence to opposing parties, is simply based 
on good faith application of those provisions. But there may be no effective way of 
validating the good faith of investigating authorities. The nature of antidumping 
measures as a protectionist tool makes reliance on the proper interpretation and 
application of antidumping rules by national authorities doubtful.
Another scenario resulting from the ruling is in obvious or easy cases where the nature 
of evidence is clear, the adjudicators could rule whether the information is admissible 
or addressable. However, in hard cases, the assumption will be the investigating 
authorities have the power to decide how they want to use the supposed confidential 
material. The AB has tilted the balance in favour of the importing country on this 
matter. This does not bode well for the developing countries, as they will be hard 
pressed to fight cases where confidential materials are used. The systematic benefits
regulations under the current WTO laws pursuant to the ADA, TRIPS and its trade secrets provisions, 
and Article III of the GATT national treatment principle. Neither the ADA nor the TRIPS prevent 
Members from such regulations. The national treatment provisions of the WTO relate to any 
differential treatment given to products of foreign firms within the importing countries territories. This 
cannot apply to confidential material of the domestic firms. The same regulations would apply to the 
foreign firm or product but they do not have standing in relation to the antidumping investigations. The 
only remote possibility would be a challenge under Article XXIII and the non-violation clause of the 
GATT. The possibilities of success is slim as the burden of proof is much higher for these claims and 
also, there are not any rulings on this provisions in the WTO or even GATT jurisprudence.
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of this ruling are unjust to developing nations, as a lack of legal and institutional 
resources puts them at a even bigger disadvantage vis-a-vis developed countries.
With respect to Article 3.4 and 3.5 of the ADA, the ruling is sound. However, it does 
not go far enough and as later cases indicate, the AB refuses to continue a line that 
separates other factors of injury from the injury caused by dumped goods. The AB 
ruling that the 15 factors must be examined and separately analysed is a good starting 
point. This could make the process more transparent and asks that the investigating 
authorities conduct a more comprehensive investigation. But how and to what extent 
should those 15 factors be given weight is a question that was not answered by the AB. 
Thus, this victory is not so important because it does not go far enough. It does make 
the investigating authorities work harder and allows the panels to get a better picture 
of the state of the domestic industry of the importing Member, but it does nothing 
more substantial. In fact, in the next case we will see that the AB will not allow any 
more scrutiny of investigating authorities in this regard.
5.5.2 Cumulative Assessment o f  the Effects o f  Dumping
In the EC-Pipe Fittings case, Brazil claimed the EC acted inconsistently with ADA 
Articles 3.2119 and 3.3120 by “cumulatively assessing the effects of dumped imports
119 Article 3.2: With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or 
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the 
dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a 
significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the 
importing Member, or whether the effect o f such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant
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from several countries, including Brazil, without analysing the volume and prices of
dumped imports from Brazil individually, pursuant to Article 3.2.” The panel rejected
this claim concluding the conditions identified in Article 3.3 are the “sole” conditions
that apply in order to partake of a cumulative assessment of the effect of dumped 
121imports.
As stated by the AB, “The issue before us is whether an investigating authority must 
first analyse the volumes and prices of dumped imports on a country-by-country basis 
under Article 3.2 as a pre-condition to cumulatively assessing the effects of the 
dumped imports under Article 3.3.” In addressing the issue, the AB first considered 
the text of Article 3.3, which expressly identifies three specific conditions to be met 
before a cumulative assessment can be carried out. By contrast, the AB saw no basis 
in Article 3.3 for an additional requirement that a “country-specific analysis” be 
treated as a “pre-condition” for a cumulative assessment. Nor, it said, was such a 
requirement contained in Article 3.2.122 The AB noted its agreement with the Panel in 
that “it is possible for the analyses of volume and prices envisaged under Article 3.2 to 
be done on a cumulative basis, as opposed to an individual country basis, when
1 9 ^dumped imports originate from more than one country.”
degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No 
one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
120 Article 3.3: Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to 
anti-dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such 
imports only if  they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports 
from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of 
imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the 
imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the 
conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.
121 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report, para. 103-104.
122 ibid. para. 110-111.
123 ibid. para. 113.
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Finally, the AB stated, “the apparent rationale behind the practice of cumulation 
confirms our interpretation that both volume and prices qualify as ‘effects’ that may be 
cumulatively assessed under Article 3.3.” It further held, “A cumulative analysis 
logically is premised on a recognition that the domestic industry faces the impact of 
the ‘dumped imports’ as a whole and that it may be injured by the total impact of the 
dumped imports, even though those imports originate from various countries.” 
Moreover, “by expressly providing for cumulation in Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, the negotiators appear to recognize that a domestic industry confronted 
with dumped imports originating from several countries, may be injured by the 
cumulated effects of those imports, and that those effects may be adequately taken into 
account in a country-specific analysis of the injurious effects of dumped imports.”124 
The AB also reaffirmed the Panel’s belief that Brazil’s interpretation would render 
cumulation ineffective.125
The argument that the Article 3.3 stands on its own and does not mandate a country- 
by-country evaluation before making a cumulative one is spurious and counterintuitive. 
Firstly, the text of Article 3.3(a) requires that each country’s dumping margins be 
assessed individually. True, it does not ask for the same with regard to injury 
determination, but it is odd that one of the main criteria for justifying antidumping 
measures could be eliminated simply because more than one country is involved in the 
investigation. If one were to understand Article 3.3 as allowing Members to be 
grouped together (collective burden) then it is possible, as Brazil argued, Members
124 ibid. para. 116.
125 ibid. para. 117.
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could be punished although they do not meet the requisite criteria for dumping 
determination, i.e., that a member whose goods had not caused injury to the domestic 
industry be levied antidumping duties. In order for this reasoning to be justified, the 
overarching assumption in every case that involves more than one Member is that 
there is some form of coordination between exporting firms in different Members.
Secondly, Brazil linked Article 3.3 to the requirements of Article 3.2, which asks that 
during the investigation into injury determinations, each country is supposed to be 
assessed on volume and price. The volume and price examination is part and parcel of 
the overall injury determination that is to take place. It is inconsistent that on one 
level, volume and price which are crucial to injury determinations take place on a 
country by country basis but when more than one Member is involved and injury is to 
be cumulated there is a differentiation in the examination. This differentiation creates 
a situation where it is possible that a Member has satisfied Article 3.2 but could still be 
found guilty. Therefore, not only can a Member who is not injurious to domestic 
industry be charged with dumping by association but also even if they are not 
undercutting prices or have not had surges in imports from that particular Member 
they can still be punished. This is counter to Article VI of the GATT and incongruous 
with the last sentence of Article 3.2, which says, “No one or several of these factors 
can necessarily give decisive guidance.” This leaves the door ajar for gap filling by
126 It is also possible the market conditions are such that dumping is more likely but that could be due to 
regulatory and competitive nature of the importing nation. It does not justify grouping non-injurious 
exporters with injurious firms. The importing nation could also seek other forms o f legal trade 
protection covered by other agreements of the WTO depending on the type of product.
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the AB in order to rectify the apparent conflict between principles of antidumping 
regulations and a specific discrepancy caused by the language of Articles 3.2 and 3.3.
The AB and panel should have linked the two articles or at least acknowledged that 
under these provisions, the possibility exists that a non-injurious firm or firms from a 
particular Member are being punished and as such, should be exempted from 
antidumping duties (ADD). The language of the Articles would certainly allow the 
adjudicators to make such a ruling. It is understood that the purpose of interpreting 
Article 3.3 in this way may have been that the firm is dumping and the importer is 
being harmed due to the fact that many firms in different countries are causing this 
harm. However, if  there are some firms that are injurious while others are not though 
dumping has been determined, then the only proper way would be for those that meet 
all the criteria for antidumping measures to be found guilty. The non-injurious firms 
should not have to reimburse for the harm caused by other exporters.
5.5.3 Article 3.4 and Implicit Analysis o f  Factors
In the panel phase of EC-Pipe-Fittings, Brazil claimed Europeans had not “explicitly” 
addressed “growth,” one of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4. In reply, the EC 
argued, “While no separate record was made of its evaluation of ‘growth’ its 
consideration of this factor is implicit in its analysis of the other factors.” The panel 
rejected the Brazilian claim, noting that Article 3.4 requires “substantive, rather than 
purely formal, compliance,” such that an “implicit” analysis of this factor is sufficient.
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Here, the panel stated the record illustrated the implicit consideration of the “growth” 
factor by the EC. Brazil appealed claiming both Article 3.1 and 3.4 require explicit
1 97analysis of each injury factor.
On appeal, the AB held that Article 3.4 calls for an “evaluation” of the relevant factors 
but does not address the “manner” in which the results of the investigating authority’s 
analysis are to be set out in the published reports. Similarly, the requirements of 
“positive evidence” and “objective examination” in Article 3.1 do not regulate this 
“manner” either.128 During the AB hearing Brazil claimed that if it is sufficient to 
deduce implicit satisfaction of factors by merely addressing some of them, then the 
requirement that all 15 factors must be met is rendered ineffective. However, the AB 
disagreed and stated, “The obligation to evaluate all fifteen factors is distinct from the 
manner in which the evaluation is to be set out in the published documents.” It 
continued, “That when the analysis of a factor is implicit in the analyses of other 
factors does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a factor was not 
evaluated.” Therefore, “Because Articles 3.1 and 3.4 do not regulate the manner in 
which the results of the analysis of each injury factor are to be set out in the published 
documents, we share the panel’s conclusion that it is not required that in every anti­
dumping investigation a separate record be made of the evaluation of each of the
1 90injury factors listed in Article 3.4.” Then after an assessment of the facts of the case 
it upheld the Panel’s decision that the evaluations conducted by the EC met all the 15 
factors mandated by Article 3.4.
127 EC-Pipe Fittings AB report, para. 152-154.
128 ibid. para. 157-159.
129 ibid. para. 160-161.
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The AB’s upholding of the Panel’s decision in the context of Article 3.4 and the EC’s 
contention of an “implicit” evaluation “growth” is an unpredictable and arbitrary 
holding. After having ruled that the 15 factors associated with injury determination 
must be done completely, the AB diminished the effectiveness of that ruling by 
holding that investigating authorities have the discretion to select the manner in which 
the factor is set out in the published documents.
This is in contrast to its decisions pertaining to the Safeguards Agreement. In the US- 
Wheat Gluten Safeguards130 and US-Line Pipe Safeguards131 cases, the AB held that 
in order to comply with the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement’s 
“parallelism” clause explicit mention of the evaluation by the national authorities is 
required. Again, in the US-Line Pipe Safeguards case it held the non-attribution 
clause of Article 4.2 (b) must be established explicitly with its relevant reasoning and 
explanations.132
The ADA and the Safeguards Agreement relate to a different set of obligations but do 
share similarities in that they are trade contingent remedy agreements and as such, 
instruments to increase barriers to trade. Furthermore, the AB has accepted that there 
are “considerable similarities” in the non-attribution clause of the two agreements. 
Both demand the injury caused to a domestic industry by factors other than imports
130 US-Definitive Safeguards measures on Imports o f Wheat Gluten from European Communities, 
WT/DS166/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2001)para. 98.
131 US-Definitive Safeguards Measures on Imports o f  Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded Quality Line 
Pipes WT/DS202/AB/R (adopted Mar. 8, 2002) para. 181-198.
132 ibid. para 216-220.
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not to be confused with injury caused by imports. The AB has not helped in the 
transparency of the investigation process with this result and therefore, only tends to 
harm developing nations, since they have less opportunity to challenge injury 
determinations due to their disadvantage vis-a-vis industrialised Members in data and 
evidence collection.
The distinction between the factors for investigation and the manner in which they are 
addressed and conveyed is a specious one as transparency was one of the main 
objectives of promulgating an anti-dumping agreement. Brazil’s argument that the 
ruling negates the AB’s previous ruling of mandating all 15 factors to be addressed is 
sound because the ruling also diminishes transparency of process.
Procedurally, for the AB to be able to establish whether an implicit consideration of 
factors has taken place either it has to defer completely to the Panel or it must actually 
make a factual finding on this matter. The latter is prohibited by the DSU, although 
frequently overlooked by the AB in its reasoning. In the former scenario, the Panel 
would have to be the arbiter of whether there was an objective assessment under both 
Articles 11 of the DSU and 3.1 of the ADA. As discussed in Chapter 2 on due process 
rights, the AB has set the bar for violations of Article 11 DSU so high as to 
accommodate only situations of grave error, ill will and those bordering on criminality 
by panellists. Thus, invoking this provision is impractical in the cordial diplomatic 
setting of Geneva. Yet if one were to invoke the objective assessment provision of
133 Japan-Steel AB report para. 228-231. Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement states: when 
factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such 
injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.
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Article 3.1 in a situation where non-written, verbal or implicit analysis is tendered, the 
effectiveness of Article 3.1 is diminished. The claimant is denied knowledge on the 
true nature o f the implicit arguments of another Member by preventing them from 
knowing the evidence before the hearings commence. If the implicit conclusions 
made by the defendant or investigating authority are not the same conclusion as the 
claimant or third parties to a dispute perceive, the challenger or the exporting nation is 
at a disadvantage. Furthermore, if a claimant were to appeal the Panel’s mling 
pursuant to 3.1 on an implicit finding by national authorities then the adjudicators are 
presented with another problem. Either the AB must make factual findings, or it must 
accept the Panel’s findings, which were adjudicated based on verbal non-recorded 
statements and arguments of the national authority. The due process of the challenger 
is violated even more.
Arguably, the AB and the Panel simply did not want the Brazilians to evade sanctions 
because of a technicality in this case. However, that argument does not pass muster 
since the AB could have made such a mling and could have stated that this case is a 
special circumstance or as in other cases, it states litigation techniques cannot be 
advanced over substantive and legitimate issues of disputes. However, the AB did not 
do this, instead it made a general and broad statement with precedential consequences, 
distinguishing between addressing ones obligations and the manner in which they 
convey them, even though there are principles of due process and transparency at 
stake. Paradoxically, the AB encourages detailed investigations on the one hand, yet
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shows a willingness to accept implicit reasoning in relation to the substance of the 
factors under investigation.
5.5.4 Article 3.5-Causation and Non-Attribution
The panel in this case found the “relatively higher cost of production of the EC’s 
domestic industry did not constitute a ‘known factor other than dumped imports’ 
under Article 3.5.” 134 Furthermore, it found the “European Commission’s 
methodology in this investigation of analysing causal factors other than dumped 
imports on an individual basis, without consideration of the collective effects these 
factors, did not result in the attribution to dumped imports of injuries caused by other 
causal factors.”135 Brazil appealed both these findings.
With regard to the first claim, the AB in contrast to the Panel held relative higher costs 
of production could be deemed as other known factors. However, it believed the EC 
had conducted such an assessment and found no real difference between the costs of 
production that would break the causal link between the injury suffered by EC firms 
and the dumped imports.
On the non-attribution requirement, under which injury from known factors other than 
dumped imports must not be attributed to dumped imports, the Panel had concluded 
the EC properly “analysed individually the causal factors concerned and identified the
134 EC-Pipe Fittings, AB report, para. 164-166.
135 ibid. para. 167.
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individual effects of each of these causal factors.” The Panel rejected Brazil’s 
argument that these factors should have also been evaluated collectively. The Panel 
believed and later affirmed by the AB, that nowhere in Article 3.5 does it require 
Members to collectively assess the causal factors.
The AB after repeating the wording of Article 3.5, stated, “ ...we do not read Article
3.5 as requiring, in each case, an examination of the collective effects of other causal 
factors in addition to examining those factors’ individual effects.” Referring to its 
decision in US-Hot Rolled Steel, the AB said that while the non-attribution language 
of the ADA “necessarily requires that an investigating authority separate and 
distinguish the effects of other causal factors from the effects of dumped imports,” an 
examination of collective effects is not necessarily required. The AB continued by 
ruling that addressing collective effects is not compulsory in every case, rather there 
might be instances where such collective assessment is necessary. The domestic 
authorities are not bound to do so in every case; however, if such an evaluation is 
necessary due to specific factual circumstances in a particular case, then it must be 
performed.136 The AB stated, “An investigating authority is not required to examine 
collectively all other causal factors, provided that under specific factual circumstances 
of the case, it fulfils its obligation not to attribute to dumped imports the injuries
1 ^7caused by other causal factors.”
136 ibid. para. 190-193.
137 ibid. para. 192.
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The case-by-case holding pertaining to Article 3.5 and the non-attribution clause, is 
perplexing and harmful to countries with weaker economic development. The reason 
stems from the fact that the AB has only convoluted the ambiguities of the provision 
even more. It said that at times an investigating authority must examine the individual 
effects of causal factors, whilst there are situations where a collective approach to 
effects of causal factors must be done. The point according to the AB, is the 
authorities must abide by the provision in that they must make sure they simply do not 
attribute other factors causing harm from the effects of the dumped goods. However, 
this again becomes an exercise in numerical gymnastics. If it is to the benefit o f the 
importing country then they could examine them individually, if not then collectively. 
How and what amount of blame must be attributed to other factors? What if  the 20 
different factors each had 2% percent of the blame when dumped goods carry a total 
of 20% blame to injured domestic firms? Should the authorities collectively examine 
the effects of other factors or will individual assessments suffice? What is the 
threshold of injury from each factor before a decision of collective or individual 
attribution is justified? Nothing in this ruling ameliorates the legal gaps of the 
provision. The only thing that the AB has done is to ask for a cursory review of non­
attribution without any tangible effects on the investigation.
It would be prudent and logical to interpret the sentence, “.. .and the injuries caused by 
these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports,” as making a 
collective statement. It would be grammatically sound to say that since “these” and 
“other” indicate a plural statement, that collection of these factors would be
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appropriate. Numbers and factors are grouped in many different areas of math 
including statistics especially in parametrics.138 It is also logical to think that all other 
factors could be evaluated vis-a-vis dumped goods so that the dumped goods have a 
higher responsibility. The problem here is that there is no concept or notion of what 
the threshold level of attribution must be. The AB diminishes the relevance or 
effectiveness of Article 3.5 and defers to the devices of the investigators. As a result, 
it has indicated to the investigators that Article 3.5 applies in situations where dumped 
goods are very clearly and with overwhelming evidence, not the cause of the injury. 
But if  bad management, domestic market circumstances, natural disasters, structural 
financial problems, etc., are collectively the major causes for domestic industry 
troubles, then it is unacceptable the importing country makes foreign competitors who 
may combine for a smaller proportion of the overall cause to create “rent-seeking” 
circumstances for the domestic industry. The “rent-seeking” happens indirectly in 
form of current provisional or future permanent countervailing duties, which will be 
easier to apply with the adjudicators’ ruling on non-attribution. The justice, both in 
legal and economic terms of this conception espoused by the adjudicators, is spurious.
5.5.5 Captive Production and Article 3.5 (Japan-Hot Rolled Steel Case Revisited)
The application o f the causation and non-attribution clause pursuant to Article 3.5 in 
relation to captive production was another matter of dispute in the Japan-Steel case. 
Japan had taken issue with the International Trade Commission of the US with regard 
to its determination of injury and “captive production” evaluation. “Captive
138 Mann, P.S, supra at note 89.
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production” refers to internal transfers of a like product, transfers within different parts 
of a business enterprise of a product that is like the merchandise subject to the AD 
investigation.139 Captive production does not enter the open market. These transfers 
are distinct from “merchant market” into which a like product is sold to independent 
purchasers. The most common example of captive production is where a producer and 
consumer of the product are vertically integrated. The manufacturer produces 
downstream products such as finished products, a derivative or a more improved one. 
The problem with captive production arises during injury determinations because the 
domestic producers do not compete directly with importers. Usually, captive 
consumers do not need to buy from importers since their affiliate is producing the 
goods themselves.
US AD law pertaining to captive production states the ITC should “focus primarily” 
on the merchant market segment of the domestic industry, rather than both merchant 
market and captive production, when “determining market share and the factors 
affecting financial performance” of the industry.140 However, this statute sets out 
certain conditions.141 Since the ITC claimed imports constituted a small amount of 
total production of hot-rolled steel made in the US, the law is designed to avoid this
139 Bhala, R., New WTO Antidumping Precedents Part Two: Causation, Injury Determinations, and 
Penalties, (2002) 6 SINGJICL 980 p.985.
140 Tariff Act of 1930 section 771(7)(C)(iv).
141 The conditions are: If domestic producers internally transfer significant production of the domestic 
like product for the production of a downstream article and sell significant production of the domestic 
like product in the merchant market, and the Commission finds that: 1. The domestic like product 
produced that is internally transferred for processing into that downstream article does not enter the 
merchant market for the domestic like product; 2. The domestic like product is the predominant 
material input in the production of that downstream article, and 3. the production of the domestic like 
product sold in the merchant market is not generally used in the production of that downstream article. 
Then the Commission must in determining market share and the factors affecting financial performance 
set forth in clause (iii) o f 19 U.S.C. Section 1677(C)(iii), evaluate “all relevant economic factors” 
impacting the state of the domestic industry and lists a man examples of what they could be.
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kind of evaluation by ordering the segmentation of the industry in certain cases. Here, 
the ITC based its affirmative determination on only 30 percent of the domestic sales of 
American steel producers, and ignored the larger and more profitable segment of the 
market whereby producers consume hot-rolled steel internally to manufacture other 
products.142 The indication is they must not only protect the industry as a whole, but 
smaller segments, at least those segments competing on the market.
Japan’s claim in brief, was that the statutory instruction to the ITC to focus primarily 
on the merchant market “prevents a balanced assessment of the situation of the 
domestic industry as a whole and ignores the fact that a significant part of the 
domestic industry, captive production, is shielded or protected from the effects of the 
allegedly dumped imports.”143 Japan was asking how could an injury determination 
focus only on a segment of an industry whilst the larger segment o f that industry, 
which is protected from foreign competition, be left out? As a result Japan claimed 
the US violated the ADA Article 3.1 and 3.4 by not making an “objective 
examination” and to evaluate “all relevant economic factors... having a bearing on the 
domestic industry,” respectively. The Panel rejected Japan’s claim and found in 
favour of the US.
The AB reversed the panel’s decision in that it held the manner in which the US ITC 
applied US antidumping laws in this case was not consistent with the ADA. However, 
it did not hold the US AD laws were per se inconsistent with the WTO ADA. The AB
142 Pruzin, D., "Japan Hot-Rolled Steel Dispute ” (Jan. 25, 2001) 18 Int’l. Trade Rep. 145.
143 Japan Steel AB Report, para. 182.
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in essence, read into Article 3.1 and its phrase “objective examination,” a good faith 
requirement. Its ruling affirmed the US law is in conformity with the ADA but its 
application to Hot-Rolled Steel was not performed objectively. The ITC failed in its 
responsibility by not using its discretion afforded to it by the statute on captive 
production in an objective way, because it focused exclusively on the captive 
production market instead of focusing primarily on it.
5.5.5.1 Japan’s Causation Claim Under Article 3.5
Japan was basing its claim on the non-attribution clause of Article 3.5, which calls 
upon investigating authorities to avoid attributing cause for injury from dumped 
imports when in fact, other factors are to blame. Japan believed the ITC did not 
evaluate other factors that were harming US industry aside from dumped imports, and 
it failed to ensure injury caused by other factors were not attributed to Japanese 
imports. Japan claimed the US failed to look into other factors such as the general 
strike by General Motors’ employees, a decline in demand, and an increase in smaller 
steel mills across the US. The Panel rejected this argument holding that the key issue 
with the non-attribution clause is not that the investigating authorities must 
demonstrate that dumped imports alone, caused injury, rather that these other factors 
do not break the causal link between dumped imports and the injury to domestic firms.
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It relied on precedents established in other cases.144 The Panel concluded the non­
attribution clause of Article 3.5 does not call for isolating each of the other potential 
independent variables or for a finding that dumped imports alone was capable of 
causing the injury. Rather, the clause required clarity and avoidance of confusion of 
every other factor with the dumped imports.
The AB on appeal overruled the Panel in a nuanced way. It held the Panel was in 
error by not mandating the investigating authorities to separate and to distinguish the 
injurious effects of other known causal factors from the damage done by dumped 
goods. After a thorough response to Japan’s claim the AB promulgated a five-step 
process pertaining to causation. The investigating authorities of Members must: 1) 
identify factors that could be injurious; 2) make sure these factors exist 
simultaneously; 3) examine all these factors ensuring they are in actuality, causing 
injurious effects; 4) distinguish between two categories of known factors and the 
injurious effects of all other known factors, and 5) ensure damage done by other 
factors is not attributed to the dumped imports.
With regard to the first claim by Japan and the lack of consideration by the US of the 
captive production, Japan’s arguments prevailed. However, the precedent set here is 
anything but assuring. After the Panel sided completely with the US, the AB merely 
used a nuanced approach by citing that the US in essence, did not apply its laws 
properly. Although the law itself is consistent with WTO regulations, the manner in
144 These cases include, US- Atlantic Salmon Anti-Dumping Duties GATT (B.I.S.D.) 41st Supp., vol. 1 
1994 (adopted by Committee on Antidumping Practices Apr. 27, 1994), and US-Wheat Gluten 
(WT/DS166/AB/R) (adopted Jan. 19,2001) cases.
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which the law was applied was counter to the “objective assessment” criteria under 
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA.
Before this case, it had been well-established in panel reports that some kind of market 
sector analysis is permitted under AD Agreement Article 3. In fact, one might argue 
that in certain cases a sectoral analysis might be required as a "relevant factor" under 
Article 3.4. The Mexico - HFCS145 case made clear, however, that investigating 
authorities should not base an injury determination on data pertaining to only one 
sector of a domestic industry. Rather, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4, injury 
determinations must always be made on the basis of the domestic industry "as a 
whole." There, Mexico completely ignored the situation of the sector of the domestic 
industry that sold sugar to the household sector in its injury analysis, and therefore, the 
panel found a violation.
This case added a different twist to the issue. Here, in the context of the underlying 
investigation, the ITC under the U.S. captive production provision, examined data 
concerning the merchant market sector for Hot-Rolled Steel and data regarding the 
domestic industry "as a whole" but it did not examine separately the captive 
production sector. The Appellate Body found this application of the captive 
production provision violated Article 3. Specifically, because the ITC examined data 
for the merchant market sector in isolation, it also should have examined data for the 
captive production sector.
145 Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation on High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States, 
WT/DS132/R, (adopted Feb. 24, 2000).
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The panel and Appellate Body in US-Cotton Yarn146 also considered the issue of 
captive production. There, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's conclusion that the 
United States violated Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing by 
excluding “captively” produced combed cotton yam from the scope of the domestic 
industry in a safeguard investigation.
The issue of captive production and merchant market is cause for concern for 
developing countries. They face much more sophisticated and elaborate corporate 
structures with vertical integration at many levels in the developed countries that 
produce goods, which can compete with their firms. Therefore, captive production if 
eliminated from injury determinations, will allow for domestic authorities to be ever 
more selective in the manner in which they categorize and analyse domestic markets. 
This is because there is nothing that would prevent investigating authorities from 
including a captive market when they see benefits in doing so. The only condition is 
that one cannot look at one segment in isolation and not look at the other. In addition, 
there must be some semblance that the proviso in Article 3, which states the “domestic 
industry as a whole,” must be evaluated. Under the current mle, it can segment based 
on different competitive relationships. This, coupled with the inherent ambiguity of 
“like” product analysis can only enhance the discretion of investigating authorities to 
the detriment of exporter, especially the Members with less resources and 
sophistication in their own industries to fight such allegations.
146 US-Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R 
(adopted Nov. 5, 2001).
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Furthermore, Article 3 issues can cause problems with the approach taken by the AB, 
i.e., that concentration on captive production could be acceptable, as long as some 
form of consideration for “domestic market as a whole” is made. First, Antidumping 
law as mentioned before does not focus solely on competition, even though the 
competitive relationship of products is crucial in antidumping investigations. Issues 
such as employment, national champions, products’ physical characteristics in “like” 
product analysis, and general political and interest group consideration play a large 
role. So, a purely competition approach is not always justified. Second, captive 
production is an ambiguous term. Steel or input commodities may be easier to isolate 
as one captive product but what about more complex goods? For example, can a motor 
that has its component parts produced by other firms, sold to a down stream firm for 
use in refrigerators, be considered a captive production? Most likely not, but under the 
AB’s approach that would be entirely up to the investigators. These loose ends to the 
AB’s analysis premised on objectivity of investigation authorities is essentially 
dodging the issue at stake, which is the manner and extent to which the investigators 
segment their market.
Another example could be secondary competitors (in the example above, motor parts 
makers) that may change their corporate structure or cyclical issues such as demand, 
may be considered as other factors in injury determination but will be precluded from 
the evaluation, as more often they tend to exonerate exporters from causation. Third, 
the AB’s report only encourages nuanced approaches to defining domestic market. It
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serves to create categories of products and sectors that may function as changing the 
contours of the domestic market. Of course, this kind of categorization has existed in 
the realm of competition law and antidumping regulation since their founding, but the 
AB’s ruling does nothing to clarify and streamline Article 3 of the ADA.
Moreover, the elimination of captive production from the analysis is difficult to justify. 
Firstly, there is nothing in the ADA or other trade contingency Agreements of the 
WTO to indicate domestic markets may be segmented in this manner. Article 4 of the 
ADA speaks about the definition of domestic market. The definition presented there 
is related to how a Member may define domestic markets but it does not indicate how 
that domestic market may be segmented. The only requirement is that a significant 
proportion of production of a good may be constitutive of domestic market.
5.6 Possible Justifications for the Adjudicators Disposition and Their Rebuttal
Many commentators have claimed that many of the doctrinal problems in their 
decisions are due to their objective of trying to streamline the antidumping process or 
because of political considerations. The four most common justifications provided by 
these commentators are that the adjudicators are trying to: a) adhere strictly to a 
textual interpretation; b) promotion of free trade objectives; c) promote methodical 
investigations; and d) take into account the institutional politics of the WTO.147 The
147 Vermulst, E., Mavroidis, P.C., & Waer, P. The Functioning o f the Appellate Body after Four Years- 
Towards Rule Integrity, 1999, 33 J. W. T. 2, p. 1-50 for adherence to textual interpretations. Tarullo, 
D.K. supra at note 10 p. 119-127 (explaining all four elements); Steinberg, R.H., Judicial Lawmaking at
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first two points have been discussed throughout the chapter by demonstrating the 
problems associated with overly textual interpretations and also the impediments to 
developing country exports by granting excessive discretion to investigating 
authorities. This section will briefly discuss the latter two justifications that may exist 
for the manner and methods of interpretation conducted by the adjudicators. The 
underlying point is that in practice, the adjudicators have also failed to achieve their 
objectives of promoting methodical investigations and taking institutional politics into 
account. To this end, they may have ignited more controversy, and have only 
weakened the positions of the developing countries by generating norms that 
systematically erode any expected gains negotiated in the UR.
5.6.1. Promotion o f  Methodical Investigations
One of the goals of the AB is described as curbing shoddy investigations in the hope 
of encouraging Members to be more methodical. In order to do so, the ability of 
investigators to play with numbers so as to obtain the dumping margins they would 
like should be curtailed. The adjudicators have not been able to do so, both with 
regard to finding dumping margins by constructing values or by their rulings on injury 
determination. The rulings that allowed SG&A/profits and zeroing under Article 3.2 
for price undercutting only grant more discretion. The text of the agreement would 
have allowed them to limit the national investigators discretion without compromising
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, (2004) 98 Am. J. Int’l. Law 247 
(explaining that judicial politics is a crucial element in the WTO dispute settlement process).
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the legitimacy or justice of their ruling. With regard to Article 3 and injury 
determinations they also failed to promote methodical investigations.
The AB in Japan-Steel held that delineating among the injurious effects of known 
factors is required by the investigating authorities of importing Members pursuant to 
the wording of Article 3.5 and its non-attribution clause. The five-step process 
mentioned earlier, however, does not solidify a particular process. Rather, the AB left 
open other approaches and methodologies. The specification and separation of known 
factors and a distinct analysis of each requirement in connection to the dumped 
imports seeks to clarify some of the elements o f Article 3.5. Yet, this is not sufficient 
or productive in curbing protectionist interests and the authorities’ discretion in injury 
determination. The reason is that many questions remain unanswered and a torturing 
of numbers is still very possible.
Later, in EC-Pipe Fittings, the AB created more confusion by allowing investigating 
authorities to avoid calculating the collective injury caused by reasons other than 
dumped imports. It went even further, it said some cases might require a collective 
approach while other situations may not need such an approach. The result of the 
rulings on Article 3.5 is that one must look at individual causes other than dumped 
imports, but what the investigating authorities do with the data after that it is at their 
discretion. The crucial step in determining injury is again left to the devices of these 
national agencies.
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The AB did not say anything about the extent of causation of each of the known 
factors. Is it permissible to aggregate all “other known factors” and weigh them 
against dumped imports? What if dumped imports are not the most important cause of 
injury? What if they are equally important causes other than the ones listed? Most 
intriguing, what is the threshold level of causation of dumped imports, more than 
50%? These unresolved and persistent questions nullify any clarification the AB may 
have sought for investigations. These questions allow enough discretion in the hands 
of investigating authorities to make the numbers and data provided admit to their 
protectionist impulses. The argument that the AB would be considered an activist one 
were it to go so far is not sound as the judicial activism of the AB has been 
documented by a plethora of academics and lawyers.148 What is stopping them from 
doing so may only be a self-described adherence to judicial restraint or political 
considerations.
The issue here pursuant to the development approach is that the reasoning lacks the 
requisite predictability that leave many questions unanswered. They insist on basing 
decisions on the adherence of investigating authorities on vague concepts of 
“objective” assessments, domestic industry “as a whole,” positive evidence” (Thai- 
Poland dispute). Granted, justification for this approach is based on rules of deference 
to sovereigns but as mentioned before, this is done patchily as they are at times, quite
148 See amongst others, Davey, W.J., Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority? 
(2001) 4 J. Int’l. Econ. L. 79; Barfield, C., Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future o f the 
World Trade Organization^2001); Raustiala, K., Sovereignty and Multilateralism, (2000) 1 Chi. J. Int’l. 
L. 401 (discussing the norm generating nature of the WTO regime and its self-contained and inward- 
looking approach to international trade regulations); Ragosta,J., Joneja, N., & Zeldovich, M., WTO 
Dispute Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must Be Fixed (2003) 37 Int’l. Law 687, pp.691-93; 
Steinberg, R.H., supra at note 145.
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activist in their approach. Furthermore, they have exempted themselves from such 
justifications because in their reasoning they do not often refer to or address Article 
17.6. As mentioned, they have diminished the deference to Members that was 
conveyed in the standard of review. The case-by-case approach lends itself to 
inconsistency with few substantive guidelines. This has the potential of creating 
different outcomes in similar cases. The “collective” and “cumulation” interpretations 
under Articles 3.3 and 3.5 indicate such incoherence.
The justice of the rulings is inadequate for developing countries, as they desire a more 
predictable, coherent and methodical international system of dumping investigations. 
The fact that the adjudicators have done nothing to achieve this goal puts them at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the industrialized Members who seek to erect trade barriers to 
imports from developing countries.
5.6.2. Political Considerations
The decisions of the Adjudicators in injury determination matters seem to have some 
political considerations in mind. The desire and effort to curb disharmonious 
antidumping investigations has merely brought forth another set of loopholes and 
ambiguities. The AB judges in particular, are aware of the institutional dynamics of 
the WTO and how their decisions permeate into the political and diplomatic interplay 
amongst the Membership. The balance the AB is seemingly trying to achieve is one 
where they try to clarify and “harmonise” certain evidentiary and analytical issues that
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national investigators should address although admittedly normative in nature, while 
they do not want to criticised as activist judges over stepping their authority as was the 
case with regard to amicus briefs (See chapter 2). But this balancing act is a tenuous 
one that cannot be sustained without harm being done to the institutional legitimacy of 
the WTO. The first issue is that the reasoning is inconsistent and unpredictable. This 
was evident in the decisions on Article 17.6(ii), 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 of the ADA in the six 
cases discussed above. These at times, inconsistent and unpredictable rulings, 
nevertheless, play a major role in the norms that are being generated by the AB.
Precedent and stare decisis although not de jure  sources of WTO law, have been 
accepted as de facto  sources.149 This is exemplified in the extensive use of case law in 
every panel and AB decision in the past. Therefore, a vicious circle of institutional 
illegitimacy is created. In order to achieve the balance between law and diplomacy the 
AB sometimes undergoes tortuous reasoning that is not very convincing for the WTO 
community at large, then when expedient, relies on those precedents to give 
legitimacy to its rulings or to obtain the outcome intuitively made. This system is also 
indicative of a particular teleology by the AB, institutional fidelity, not fidelity to 
WTO law. Their motto seems to be we will settle disputes with limited controversy, 
making sure the dispute settlement regime remains intact. That inevitably plays into 
the power game that was the hallmark of the GATT system. It may be understandable 
for panellists who are mostly diplomats, civil servant in Members to bring forth a
149 Bhala, R. The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One o f  a Trilogy) (1999) 
14 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 845; Bhala, R., The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO 
Adjudication (Part Two o f a Trilogy){\999) 9 Fla. St. J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 1; Chua, A., The 
Precedential Effect o f  WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports, 1998, 11 L. J. I. L. 45 p.46-47.
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political orientation to the decision-making process but the AB is supposed to be the 
protector and arbiter of WTO law.
5.7 Conclusion
Four important aspects of the ADA and application in the dispute settlement process 
of the WTO have been the focal point of this chapter. The conclusion reached is that 
the adjudicators have not met the requisite level of fairness espoused by the 
development approach. Therefore, developing countries’ interests in the WTO have 
been harmed. One main reason for this sort of reasoning relates to the disposition of 
the adjudicators pertaining to the nature and also the text of the ADA.
Furthermore, some of the reasons why the DSB decisions were made in this manner 
were discussed, and shown that aside from the frame of mind o f the adjudicators, 
political considerations were probably another element in the decision-making 
process. In order to prove these points the chapter evaluated and analysed some of the 
major cases that have ruled on issues that increase the discretion o f the investigating 
authorities in finding dumping, injury and inflating of dumping margins.
The norms that have been generated through case law, which provide greater 
discretion to national investigating authorities, impede the market access of 
developing countries to the developed world. This is so because their exporting firms 
are most often targeted for constructed values that are prone to finding inflated
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dumping margins. Furthermore, the interpretations on injury determinations and 
causation, which are fact and evidence intensive, again grant investigating authorities 
greater leeway. Developing country firms are generally less able and sophisticated to 
provide or obtain the technical data, evidence and accounting practices that would 
allow them to fight the investigating authorities of industrialised states on a level 
playing field.
The ADA has its own special standard of review, which is arguably a restatement of 
the VCLT Article 31 and 32. Experts have debated whether using the customary rules 
of interpretation of international law as codified by the VCLT allows for only one 
possible interpretation or whether more than one possible interpretation is possible. It 
seems that during the UR the United States’ insistence on the inclusion o f the unique 
standard of review of Article 17.6(ii) that allows for the possibility of more than one 
permissible interpretation, was a direct challenge to the sole interpretation concept. 
Pragmatically, the US wanted to give its national authorities more deference in 
antidumping matters. The AB’s holdings on this matter are inconsistent and 
unpredictable. The manner in which it has applied Article 17.6(ii) is a Janus-faced 
one. On the one hand it has simply dismissed interpretations by domestic authorities 
that could very well be considered permissible and valid, opting for the interpretation 
that it believes to be the optimal one. It has done so by deciding that the national 
authorities’ interpretation was simply not permissible. On the other hand, throughout 
its reasonings in different cases, it claims a multiple interpretation approach is the law 
and norm in the context of the ADA.
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The AB’s decisions are not legitimate as they are inconsistent and unpredictable. 
They do not provide for clear guidance in future cases. The permissibility o f 
interpretations is not done on a consistent basis. The adjudicators seem to want to 
limit what they perceive as excessive deference to national authorities but believe that 
they are not allowed to by the wording of the ADA and its subsequent political effects. 
They have restricted the spectrum of permissible interpretations but members do not 
understand how that restricted spectrum of permissible interpretations plays out in 
relation to different provisions of the ADA.
On the surface, developing countries should benefit from the restrictions imposed by 
the AB on the national authorities, thereby, making their rulings more just. However, 
that is only true if they rule with a de facto one-interpretation disposition in a manner 
that is in accordance with the development approach. Additionally, when the tables 
are reversed and the developing country is the investigating exporters from the 
developed countries, the one interpretation approach could function to the detriment of 
developing countries if their interests are not considered.
The initiation of an investigation against developing country firms creates a chilling 
effect that is of great harm to the growth and profitability of these exporters. The 
threat of an investigation alone by the US or the EU authorities causes in many 
instances, for the firm to negotiate a price undertaking though no dumping has 
occurred, or to stop exporting to these markets altogether, as the costs of fighting the 
allegations is too great. Therefore, stopping an investigation before it starts or
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terminating one soon afterward is very important for developing countries’ exporters. 
Article 5, which lays the requirements for the initiation of an investigation demands 
representatives of a large proportion of the domestic industry producers must provide 
sufficient evidence to the domestic authorities before an investigation can commence. 
The ruling pertaining to Article 5.3 and the sufficient evidence clause are counter to 
the interests of developing countries, as it does not really provide for an effective 
means of preventing the chilling effects of an investigation when there is little 
evidence to support it.
Article 5.8 provides the investigators must terminate investigation as soon as 
authorities are satisfied there is not enough evidence to support an investigation. The 
Soft Wood Lumber and Mexico-HFCS holdings stated there is not a continuing 
obligation to terminate an investigation in Article 5.8, therefore, if exculpatory 
evidence is presented that would demonstrate dumping has not occurred or there is no 
injury, the investigators are not obliged to terminate the investigation. Aside from the 
chilling effects, the provisional antidumping duties which can be levied, are also 
detrimental to exporters especially one from the developing Members. The ruling on 
this issue lacked the requisite level of legitimacy under the development approach as 
they create unpredictability in the manner, format and timing of the investigation. 
Furthermore, these holdings provide for greater discretion to the investigators, which 
tends to harm the exporters of the developing nations vis-a-vis rich nation exporters.
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With regard to Article 2 and its provisions on dumping determinations two major 
issues were discussed, i.e., “zeroing" dumping margins under Article 2.4.2 and 
SG&A/profits calculations under Article 2.2.2. The adjudicators in Bed Linen and in 
subsequent cases declared, “zeroing” of dumping margins in multiple average 
calculations to be prohibited by the text of Article 2.4.2. At first glance this is a 
beneficial and good ruling for developing countries, as it tends to deflate dumping 
margins. However, the reasoning of the adjudicators does not guarantee the 
continuation of this ban on zeroing. The reasoning of the AB in Bed Linen was based 
on fundamental issues of fairness as it relates to the term “fair comparison” prescribed 
by Article 2.4.2. They did not clearly reason that there are statistical and mathematical 
justifications also that assist in the understanding of the concept of fairness.
Furthermore, they did not mention whether categorization of products in other ways 
that are slightly different than what the EC did in Bed Linen would be deemed 
prohibited. In fact, later in the Soft Wood Lumber case, which ruled against US 
zeroing methodology, there was a dissenting opinion amongst the panellists. That 
dissenter used the slightly different manner in which the US authorities had 
categorised Soft Wood Lumber as the justification to deviate from the Bed Linen 
decision. The US has appealed the decision of the panel only on the grounds that 
zeroing is legal. Therefore, the zeroing issue has not been resolved. Zeroing also 
happens in other aspects of antidumping investigations.
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In EC-Pipe Fittings, the panel ruled zeroing is legal in the evaluation of the effects of 
price undercutting under Articles 3.1 and 3.2. The prevailing norm is zeroing is only 
prohibited under Article 2.4.2 and price comparisons, and not under any other 
methodology or calculation. This is counter to the interests of developing nations, as 
margin inflation is much easier to calculate and injury determinations, much easier to 
obtain. Furthermore, the underlying objective of antidumping investigations and 
regulations is to determine the most approximate price for products before making 
comparisons or understanding the effects of the dumped goods. This involves and is 
based on statistical rules and mathematical principles. Thus, under the development 
approach the reasoning would go above and beyond literal interpretation by looking 
into the context and object and purpose of the agreement in order to create norms that 
are fair and assist in the development o f poorer Members.
Determining whether the dumped products are the source of injury for the domestic 
industry is another problematic area covered in this chapter. The issues relate to the 
availability of evidence, the examination of factors that may cause injury to the 
domestic industry other than the dumped goods, cumulative assessment of injury when 
several firms from different Members states are concerned, and causation and non­
attribution of injury to the imported dumped products.
In the Thai-Poland case, the AB decided investigating authorities may without the 
opportunity of cross-examination given to the exporter, use confidential material. The 
AB reversed panel on this issue and by doing so gave free reign to investigating
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authorities to prevent evidence from being disseminated. The good faith of the 
investigating authorities is all that protects exporters from dubious evidence being 
used to levy dumping duties. The procedural rights of the exporter are diminished, as 
it has no idea on the nature of evidence. It cannot adequately counter the claims made 
by the investigators. This leaves room for the formulation of tailor-made rules of 
confidentiality at the domestic level with regard to antidumping investigations.
Also, in Thai-Poland the AB ruled on how the 15 factors spelled out in Articles 3.4 
and 3.5 of the ADA must be addressed in order to assess whether factors other than 
dumping were causing harm to the domestic firms. There, the AB took a step forward 
by holding the investigators must separately address all 15 factors. However, it did 
not go far enough in its ruling because the manner and weight given to each of these 
factors is unclear and as such, creates unpredictability and gives more power to the 
investigators to charge antidumping duties. The inadequacy of this ruling was 
reaffirmed in the EC Pipe-Fittings case, which ruled that mere implicit analysis of 
these 15 factors is enough and the ruling in Thai-Poland does not inform on the 
“manner” they must be addressed. The effectiveness of these provisions has been 
greatly diminished by allowing less transparent means of assessing evidence.
The EC-Pipe Fittings case also ruled on how cumulative assessments can be 
conducted. Unfortunately, the AB ruled that even though Article 3.3(a) demands each 
country’s dumping margin be assessed individually, the injury determination can be 
done cumulatively. The wording of the text does not explicitly address this issue,
363
however, the principles of the ADA require antidumping duties may be levied if there 
is dumping, injury and causation. Therefore, exporters of a Member State cannot be 
held accountable if it does not meet one of those three requirements. Simply because 
more than one Member is involved it seems intuitively inappropriate that all exporters 
from different Members should be grouped together and levied duties. In essence, if 
some Members’ products are not causing injury they must be penalised for the 
wrongdoing of other exporters outside of their country.150 As mentioned, there is a 
high level of discretion afforded to the investigators in relation to dumping 
determinations. This could lead to investigators targeting certain exporters that are 
competitive because of factors other than dumping to be responsible for antidumping 
duties due to the fact that a third country satisfies the requirements for levying 
antidumping duties.
The issue of how captive production must be addressed by investigators under the 
injury determination provisions of the ADA is another cause for concern for 
developing countries. Manufacturers that have a captive production base are 
concentrated in the developed world, as it demands a large vertically integrated and 
sophisticated organisation. The AB ruled the captive production sector must be 
evaluated, but it did not mention what effects that should have or how much weight 
should be given to each market. It still allows investigators to make cursory reviews 
of the captive production market. The issue is part of the larger issue of market 
segmentation and the manner in which it may be done. The precedent in Japan-Steel,
150 They must be over the de minimus level as set forth by Article 3.3.
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as has been the case in other matters, superficially restricts investigators' discretion but 
it does nothing of substance to limit the protectionist tendencies.
In general, the jurisprudence of the WTO on antidumping has not been fair to the 
developing countries. The reasoning is either illegitimate, unjust or both under the 
development approach. On the surface, it would seem the adjudicators are struggling 
to limit the protectionism of domestic authorities but the true consequences of that has 
been to give them greater discretion. The way in which they write the holdings 
generate norms that, over time, will only harm the weaker Members’ objective to gain 
market access to the developed countries. The insistence of the adjudicators to 
interpret WTO law by reading the ordinary meaning of the word has created 
reasonings that are inconsistent, unpredictable, not adhering to international norms of 
interpretation, and unjust. Their reluctance to use a contextual and/or objective- 
oriented approach to interpretation is based on the apprehension to be labelled as 
activist judges, yet they have failed in inoculating themselves from such criticism.151 
Furthermore, it is near impossible to find the ordinary meaning of the words in the 
antidumping provisions without any context or insight into the purpose of the 
provisions. Therefore, the judicial disposition of the adjudicators becomes a problem 
for the developing countries.
As mentioned, the political considerations of the adjudicators which may incline them 
to make decisions which would cause the least controversy institutionally, is both
151 See supra at note 146, all commentators mentioned have criticised the activism of the WTO 
adjudication process in some form.
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fruitless and unfair to the developing countries. Controversy is rampant in response to 
the rulings by both the developed and developing Members. Moreover, they are 
guising political considerations as legal ones and as such, solidifying norms at the 
institutional level, which systematically puts the developing nations at a disadvantage.
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Conclusion
This thesis has demonstrated that the adjudicators of the WTO have abdicated from 
their role in addressing the link between interpretation and the facilitation of 
development. As a result, the evolving jurisprudence and constitution of the WTO has 
not fostered fairness towards developing countries. This unfairness goes beyond the 
standard criticism that WTO law, as negotiated at the Uruguay Round, is biased in 
favour of the wealthy nations’ trade interest. In the first chapter, the thesis constructs 
a framework for taking a development approach to fair adjudication. Subsequently, it 
evaluated the adjudication of due process rights under the DSU, the TRIPS and the 
Antidumping Agreements. The fairness framework for analysing the jurisprudence of 
the WTO under the development approach, borrows from the works of Thomas 
Franck, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin. Thus, the development approach is 
founded on established legal doctrines of legitimacy, justice, and ultimately fairness.
In 1995, the WTO replaced the old GATT as the pillar of regulating international trade 
and economic relations. One of the main characteristics of this new organization is the 
existence of detailed mles and procedures for the resolution o f trade disputes between 
Members. The GATT system had become obsolete, as the settlement of disputes was 
fraught with political and diplomatic manoeuvring by an ever-growing membership. 
The system was based on consensus and conciliation, as unanimity was required 
before the adoption of a ruling by the adjudicating panels. Over time this system 
proved ineffective as disputes were dragged out for several years before a settlement
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was reached. Consequently, GATT panellists were in constant search for the lowest 
common denominator in their decision-making as both the establishment of panels and 
the adoption of the rulings had to placate the “losing” party or risk having the 
panellists’ decisions rendered unenforcable. The GATT consensus approach was also 
deemed unmanageable as the UR negotiators under pressure from the major economic 
powers such as the US, EC and Canada were to extend the coverage of the 
international trade regime from goods to other areas of trade.
A major achievement of the UR was deemed to be the new dispute setdement regime 
spelled out in the DSU. The DSU created mandatory jurisdiction for Members to 
bring claims as well as affording the rulings of adjudicators’ binding force based on 
“negative consensus.”1 Negotiators believed that this system would promote the mle 
of law and diminish the power politics prevalent under the GATT regime. Members 
with less economic and political might can bring cases against Members such as, the 
US and EC with the expectation of obtaining tangible remedies. However, the 
optimism of the developing countries soon gave way to trepidation regarding the 
manner in which the panels and the newly established AB reasoned and resolved 
disputes. This concern was evident in both academic writings and in the responses by 
developing country delegates to the WTO given in interviews conducted by the author 
of this thesis. Assuming that the UR negotiations have created asymmetric obligations 
in favour of industrialised Members, the developing nations believe that the evolving 
jurisprudence and constitutionalisation process is further deepening the harm to their
1 Negative consensus demands that all parties including the “winning” party must reject the ruling of the 
DSB for the adoption to fail.
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trade interests and economic development. Their concern has been compounded by 
the fact that the DSB generates norms and constitutional instruments that function to 
solidify the existing benefits to industrialised Members without consideration for the 
relationship between interpretation and development.
Hence, according to this thesis fairness can only be achieved if judicial rulings entail a 
major economic development component grounded on legal concepts of legitimacy 
and justice. To this end, chapter one formulated a framework for fairness termed the 
“development approach,” for evaluating the case law of the WTO. Franck’s theory of 
fairness is the skeletal basis for the development approach, which claims that fairness 
is achieved through legitimacy and justice. Three factors are necessary for achieving 
legitimate results, i.e., predictability, consistency and adherence to normative 
standards of public international law (security).2 Justice under the development 
approach is borrowed from the Rawlsian concept of distributive justice, which 
mandates advantaging the disadvantaged. Furthermore, the adjudication should 
address certain socio-political principles that are prevalent in the community. In the 
context of the WTO’s adherence to achieving economic development through trade, 
institutional capacity building and market access to wealthy nations are core 
principles. Under the development approach the adjudicators are obliged to rule in a 
manner that satisfies all criteria of legitimacy, justice and the principle of capacity 
building and access to developed markets.
2 Under Franck’s legitimacy test a fourth requirement of symbolic validation also exists however the 
development approach in the context of the WTO deems this requirement to be of little relevance.
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After establishing the criteria for fairness, the analysis turns to three agreements of 
major importance for economic development in the context of the WTO and dispute 
resolution, i.e., the DSU, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Antidumping Agreement.
1. Due Process Rights and the DSU
The formulation of a new dispute settlement regime, resulted in the deepening of due 
process rights. Due process rights, as a leveller of power in WTO litigation, are very 
important to the weaker developing nations. However, the AB of the WTO has 
generated a body of jurisprudence that harms developing countries’ litigious interests 
with potential harm extended to their overall trade interests. This is due to the fact that 
the rulings have lacked the requisite threshold of legitimacy and, as a consequence but 
to a lesser extent, justice under the development approach. For instance, with regards 
to the terms of reference pursuant to DSU Article 6.2, which clarifies and 
distinguishes claims made by plaintiffs, the rulings have lacked the consistency 
amongst cases and predictability as to how claims should be made in the “Requests for 
the Establishment of a Panel.”3 This unpredictability and inconsistency creates extra 
costs and potential losses for developing countries, exacerbating their inadequate legal 
resources and capacity.
With regards to the allocation of the burden of proof, the AB has inappropriately 
created norms that harm developing countries, ruling in a manner that is counter to
3 The Request for the Establishment of a Panel is the formal WTO document, which outlines the terms 
of reference o f the panel based on the complainants’ claims and allegations.
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norms of international tribunals in allocating the burden of proof. Furthermore, the 
AB has deviated from rules governing the burden of proof in relation to general rule 
exceptions in the WTO. General rule exceptions are provisions that allow derogation 
from fundamental WTO principles such as, MFN and national treatment, which shift 
the burden of proof onto the party invoking the exception. Also, the AB has used 
judicial economy excessively, which creates unpredictability at the implementation 
stage of dispute resolution to the detriment of developing nations freed with the 
inherent bias against their ability to obtain favourable remedies from wealthy nations.4 
Finally, the AB’s ruling accepting third party submissions in the settlement process is 
a brazen example of its lack of concern for developing countries’ due process rights. 
Acceptance of third party briefs expends more costs and resources for developing 
countries and is counter to WTO provisions that implicitly touch on the issue. As 
such, the AB has contradicted the element of advantaging the disadvantaged, clearly 
ruling in favour of industrialised nations' litigious interests, since most NGOs 
participating in the WTO process are industry and trade groups in the US and the EC.
2. The TRIPS Agreement
The incorporation of intellectual property rights into the WTO system was one of the 
most contentious issues at Uruguay, with developing nations’ refusal pitted against 
industrialised countries’ insistence on its inclusion. However, due to international 
political realities developing nations had to submit to accepting the TRIPS Agreement.
4 Judicial economy is a concept that adjudicators use, which leaves certain questions and claims, not 
addressed. Adjudicator invoke this concept when they believe that responding to a certain claim may 
be irrelevant, controversial, or is not influential in the overall outcome of a case.
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The TRIPS Agreement magnifies the developing nations’ lack of institutional capacity 
to equitably participate in the international trade game. The positive nature of TRIPS’ 
obligations makes implementation excessively costly. The Agreement obliges 
Members to devise domestic enforcement regulations that encroach on national courts 
and governmental agencies’ powers to make policy and regulate their IPR regimes.5 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement is costly for developing Members due to 
requirements that make access to knowledge and R & D based goods, especially 
medicine, more expensive. The negotiations on intellectual property rights at Uruguay 
were very divisive along North-South lines. As a compromise, but with heavy US 
political pressure, the language and text of the Agreement was written with much 
built-in flexibility so as to obtain the acceptance of the TRIPS objectors. This 
flexibility was perceived by developing nations as a way to reduce the cost of 
implementation and application of the provisions. The development approach 
encourages maximum benefit for developing nations in light of this built-in flexibility, 
allowing each Member the ability to implement the provisions of the TRIPS according 
to their own conditions and circumstances.
There is a dearth of TRIPS related case law, yet, the existing body of jurisprudence 
indicates that the adjudicators have not allowed the developing nations to utilise the 
flexibility in the Agreement.6 In India-Pharmaceuticals, the panel and AB both ruled 
that India did not adequately provide a means for patent holders to file their claims (a
5 These encroachments include for instance, requirements to have injunction orders available for IP 
violations at the domestic level, seizure orders and other mechanisms such as “mail box” for filing of 
applications.
6 One o f the major cases discussed, Canada-Pharmaceuticals, did not involve a developing nation, 
however the precedent set forth in the case is not beneficial to developing nations.
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mail box system) so as to have priority when the five year grace period granted to 
Members for extending the scope of patent protection expires.7 Previous to the UR, 
India did not grant patents for pharmaceutical and agrochemical goods. Article 1.1 of 
the TRIPS allows Member States to select the means of implementing the 
Agreements’ obligations. Due to political circumstances, India had selected to give an 
administrative instruction to its agencies for mailbox applications. However, the 
adjudicators found this to be in derogation of the TRIPS, as the administrative 
instructions were considered an inadequate means of implementation. The 
development approach would require the adjudicators to accept India’s manner of 
implementation unless there is evidence that there is a systematic derogation from 
TRIPS obligations. For instance, the US should have demonstrated that many of its 
firms have had their “mail box” applications rejected. Furthermore, the US, with 
panel and AB approval, claimed that the exclusive marketing rights of the patent 
holder must remain intact, whereas Indian authorities had not ruled on the validity of 
the merits of the patent applications. This ruling clearly favoured the multinational 
pharmaceutical firms in the industrialised countries over Indian generic drug 
manufacturers as well as generic drug importers to India.
In the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case, the panel was faced with deciding whether 
Canada’s regulatory review procedures and stockpiling provisions constituted an 
appropriate exception to exclusive rights pursuant to TRIPS Article 30. The purpose 
of these provisions was to allow generic drug makers the opportunity to test, and make
7 The five-year grace period pursuant to Article 65 is for extending patent protection to products 
previously not patentable in a Member.
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patented drugs before the expiry of the patent in order to get the clinical trials and 
regulatory review procedures completed. This would afford generic drug makers the 
opportunity to market the drug soon after the patent expiry. Moreover, the stockpiling 
provisions allowed for production storing of the drug without putting it on the market 
before the expiry of the patent. The panel ruled in favour of Canada with regards to 
the regulatory review procedures but rejected its stockpiling provision. The panel 
relied on spurious arguments concerning the patent holders legitimate expectation to 
reap exclusivity for a short period after the expiry of the patent. The precedent set in 
this case is extremely harmful for developing countries as they are prevented from 
allowing generic drug makers to stockpile cheaper drug and market them as soon as 
the patent has expired, resulting in delayed access to cheaper drugs.
Chapter 3 also introduced hypothetical cases illustrating how the development 
approach would grapple with the scope of protection in Members, and the use of non­
violation and situation complaints. The adjudicators should allow Members to devise 
regulations that limit the scope of protection especially in the context of the 
inventiveness required for granting patents.8 They should affirm regulations that raise 
the inventiveness requirement to a level where truly beneficial innovations are deemed 
worthy of patents and prevent firms that slightly manipulate a compound or product 
from gaining a patent for the good.
8 Patents must be granted for products and processes, which are new, involve an inventive step (non­
obviousness in US jurisdiction) and are capable of industrial application.
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In light of the expiry of the five-year grace period for bringing non-violation and 
situation complaints, the adjudicators should relegate such claims to systematic and 
purposeful derogations of IP protection. Hence, the potential use of non-violation and 
situation complaints against developing countries as a tool for extracting higher profits 
for multinational firms is significantly curtailed. Only the wilful and systematic lack 
of enforcement, rather than a lack of adequate protection should be the benchmark for 
accepting non-violation and situation complaints. Although, certain developing 
countries may have the means to protect IPR’s more strictly, nevertheless, these 
complaints should be examined in light of nations’ more pressing priorities pertaining 
to resource allocation.
The development approach would ask the adjudicators to interpret the TRIPS 
Agreement in the context of their lack of institutional capacity to implement its 
obligations. This can best be done by recognising that the text of the TRIPS 
Agreement is flexible so as to allow each Member to implement its obligations 
according to its own domestic socio-political realities. Inadequate institutional 
capacity is one of the main elements under the development approach, which is 
directly related to the obligations of the TRIPS. The second element involved in fair 
adjudication is sustaining access to industrialised Members’ markets which is greatly 
affected by the interpretation of the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement.
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3. The Antidumping Agreement
Chapters 4 and 5 explained the economic and strategic nature of antidumping and then 
proceeded to analyse the antidumping case law of the WTO pursuant to the 
development approach, respectively. Antidumping measures are justified under free 
trade theory in predatory circumstances, with exceptions for vital infant industries and 
to counter intermittent strategic dumping. However, the antidumping measures as 
levied by industrialised countries have vastly strayed away from this principle and 
instead have functioned as a strategic tool for selected interest groups in their attempts 
to protect their market shares from more competitive foreign firms. Although, certain 
developing nations have recently become effective users of antidumping measures, it 
is only in response to industrialised nations’ antidumping actions. The negative 
welfare effects of levying antidumping measures are more pronounced for developing 
nations, as this tends to raise consumer prices.
Gaining market access through tariff reductions was a major objective for developing 
countries at the UR. Industrialised countries reduced their overall tariffs by 40% 
according to some estimates, however, a slew of protectionist mechanisms have been 
used since then to protect certain industries. Antidumping measures are by far the 
most effective and least cumbersome of all the trade contingent remedies that exist 
under the WTO system. Hence, industrialised nations have used antidumping 
measures as a strategic weapon in their protectionist arsenal so as to counteract against 
the reduced tariff-bindings negotiated in Uruguay. Developing nations fought to
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narrow the use and scope of such antidumping measures during the negotiations for 
the promulgation of the ADA. They argued that a regulatory regime, which espouses 
sound economic justifications for levying antidumping duties and creates a 
predictable, transparent and streamlined process is necessary to protect their market 
access gains. The development approach to fairness would oblige the adjudicators to 
reduce the discretion of domestic authorities in antidumping investigations by 
espousing a more economically sound and procedurally streamlined mechanism, based 
on the language of the ADA and in the context of basic WTO principles.
Chapter 5 illustrated that a vast amount of cases brought to the DSB have not reached 
the threshold level of fairness under the development approach. The adjudicators have 
generated norms with regards to the ADA’s standard of review, the evidentiary 
threshold for the initiation of investigations, cost calculations and injury 
determinations that have or potentially might harm developing nations’ market access 
to wealthy countries. Their interpretive methodology has been inconsistent, insecure 
and unjust, leading to unfairness from a developing Member perspective. With 
regards to the standard of review the adjudicators have, to a limited extent, curbed 
domestic investigators’ discretion by reducing the scope of permissible 
interpretations.9 They have implicitly adopted a single possible interpretation 
approach, which may be deemed as diminishing the discretion of investigators. This 
can only be seen as an illusive victory for developing nations, as such a single possible
9 Article 17.6 (ii) provides that panels shall interpret the ADA provisions in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation o f public international law. Where the panel finds that a provision allows for 
more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in 
conformity with the ADA if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations. See Chapter 5 
section 5.1.
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interpretation should consider the facilitation of development; however an 
examination into other substantive issues as presented in chapter 5 established the 
adjudicators’ unresponsiveness to development.
The threshold level of evidence for the initiation of an antidumping investigation is 
important for the facilitation of development because even rumours of a potential 
investigation by the authorities in the US or the EC have chilling effects on the 
targeted industry, and not just the targeted firm, in developing nations. The high costs 
of defending allegations of antidumping and the high rate of investigations leading to 
provisional and permanent antidumping duties are some of the causes that create the 
chilling effect. Therefore, developing country firms want investigations not only to be 
initiated based on clear evidentiary requirements, but also to adhere to strict time 
limits and requirements for the initiation and termination of investigations. However, 
the adjudicators in Portland Cement I  &II, and Softwood Lumber, have granted the 
investigators more discretion in this regard by loosening the restrictions on the 
presentation of evidence by the domestic firms against foreign entities, and by not 
interpreting Article 5.8 so as to require the termination of investigations immediately 
after finding a lack of sufficient evidence.
In relation to constructed values for normal value and SG&A/profits the adjudicators 
have again increased the discretion of the domestic authorities by not requiring better 
methods for finding the most approximate price of the targeted goods. In Bed-linen 
and Thai-Poland, the panels and AB had the opportunity to require more transparent
378
methodology for constructed values based on statistical models and mathematical 
concepts. Instead, they derogated from promoting transparent investigation by making 
it easier for investigators to manipulate numbers and findings of inflated dumping 
margins.
Another example of the adjudicators’ lack of adherence to statistical and mathematical 
concepts can be found in their ruling on zeroing in EC-Pipe Fittings. Previously, in 
the Bed-Linen case, in relation to the “fair comparison” requirement of Article 2.4 
ADA for the construction of values, the investigating authorities of the EC had divided 
bed linens into various “models” and calculated dumping margins for each one. By 
doing so, the EC was able to inflate the overall dumping margin by treating any 
negative dumping margin-situations as zero, where the export price was actually 
higher than the normal value, rather than their actual negative value, when combining 
the margins for each “model.” The adjudicators in Bed-linen decided, rightfully so, 
that this does not provide for a fair comparison of prices. However, in EC-Pipe 
Fittings, the prohibition of zeroing was not extended to the examination of price 
undercuttings. The adjudicators did not go far enough in their banning of zeroing 
completely, as a statistically sound approach would have required. This method has 
the potential of inflating dumping margins and making the finding of injury easier.
Another area where the adjudicators tried but failed to promote methodical 
investigation, concerns the manner in which investigators examine and collect data at 
the injury and causation stage of investigations. Injury determinations entail
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investigators’ examination of a variety of economic data, searching for a nexus 
between the harm to the industry and the dumped goods. However, the adjudicators 
either inadequately addressed the issue (Japan-Steel and captive production, EC-Pipe 
Fittings and the factors that need to be examined, and the Thai-Poland case pertaining 
to the sufficient evidence requirement of ADA Article 3.1 or made it easier for 
domestic investigators to target and levy duties on exporters.10 With regards to the 
former the adjudicators, in particular the AB, has asked that more detailed 
examinations are required for factors associated with injury determinations, however, 
these “extra” suggestion does nothing to curb the real and potential inflation of 
dumping margins. With regards to cumulation, the AB should have set a precedent 
that would make it more difficult to bring non-injurious exporters into the calculation 
to find injury and inflated margins.
These assessed cases may not individually indicate bias against developing countries, 
but the overall jurisprudence admits of a certain creeping unfairness towards their 
trade interests. Case-by-case, norm-by-norm, the market access gains extracted in 
Uruguay by developing countries are being eroded. As a consequence, some 
developing countries devise and levy more antidumping measures as a form of 
retaliation.
To conclude, this thesis has demonstrated that there is a nexus between the 
interpretation of WTO provisions and development objectives of third world nations. 
The preamble of the WTO admits of the underlying conviction that development
10 See ruling on cumulation in EC-Pipe Fittings. Chapter 5 section 5.6.2.
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should be promoted through trade. This conviction has to go beyond mere hortatory 
and superficial declarations, rather it must be woven into the fabric of WTO law and 
practice. In fact, industrialised economies will also benefit from consumers with 
purchasing power in the developing world in the long-run and a strengthened 
international trade regime.
Facilitating development has to go beyond the treaty negotiating realm, as 
international agreements are dynamic and take on a life of their own after coming into 
force. The WTO’s unique and vibrant dispute settlement system makes it incumbent 
upon the adjudicators to respond to the needs of developing countries. Rather than 
making the policy choice to wait on the sidelines for the formulation of development 
friendly provisions by an ever-expanding membership, the adjudicators, as engines of 
constitutional development, must extend their lawmaking function to generating 
norms that are commensurate with the economic ambitions of developing Members. 
Otherwise, trade rows may become unmanageable if developing Members lose faith in 
the regime and the DSB is perceived as the facilitator of a crumbling WTO edifice in 
the future.
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